

"Securitization/De-Securitization" and Attitudes in Azerbaijan in Reaction to the Karabagh Conflict

Alieva, Leila

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version

Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Alieva, L. (2021). "Securitization/De-Securitization" and Attitudes in Azerbaijan in Reaction to the Karabagh Conflict. *Caucasus Analytical Digest*, 121, 3-8. <https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000489488>

Nutzungsbedingungen:

Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz (Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:

<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de>

Terms of use:

This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence (Attribution-Non Commercial-NoDerivatives). For more information see:

<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0>

“Securitization/De-Securitization” and Attitudes in Azerbaijan in Reaction to the Karabagh Conflict

By Leila Alieva (University of Oxford)

DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000489488

Abstract

The article explores the securitization/de-securitization processes and attitudes towards the conflict in Azerbaijan in the periods before, during, and after the 2020 conflict in Karabagh. An earlier study (Alieva and Aslanov, 2018) revealed that even under conditions of strict autocratic rule, there has been a diversification of societal attitudes depending on sets of views and ideologies – from conservative and (pre)modern to liberal and post-modern – during the “status quo” period, demonstrating de-securitization potential from civil society actors (NGOs, political opposition, independent intellectuals). The recent flare-up in Karabagh shows, however, that neither favorable attitudes towards peace among the Azerbaijani elite, nor democratic changes in Armenia automatically immunize society against military/political mobilization and securitization if they are not indicators of deeper human and political emancipation and if the grievances, such as human rights violations, ethnic cleansing, violation of international borders, and/or war crimes, are not legally redressed internationally and/or domestically. In turn, the unsustainable nature of the attempts at “top-down” de-securitization, or that from formal authority, is affected by the fact that it does not “unmake securitization’s non-democratic, exceptional and exclusionary logic” (Aradau, 2004), but rather replicates it. The official “speech acts” reflect the utilization of the external threat against domestic opponents for purposes of blame avoidance¹ and, while calling for peaceful reconstruction, hint at the possibility of future war. Yet, even under conditions of strict autocracy, the internet and social networks provide for the silenced voices and for the multiplicity of agents challenging the monopoly on (de-)securitization of the formal authority, reinforced by the infelicities (amounting to flaws) of the post-war governance.

Introduction

The most recent flare-up of military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, starting on 27 September 2020 and referred to as the “Forty-four Day War” or the “Second Karabagh war”, has been unprecedented in its scale, the weapons used and the loss of at least 6,000 lives on both sides. Many factors contributed to the outbreak of hostilities, including the failure of the peace talks within the OSCE Minsk Group, which has made no substantial progress in 26 years and has rather preserved the status quo, the non-implementation of the UN resolutions on withdrawal of Armenian troops from the occupied territories², legitimization of the military gains in the negotiations process as a bargaining tool (Alieva, 2020), intense acquisition of weapons and boosting of military budgets on both sides, a diminished role of the US and passive role of the EU, increased activities of Turkey as an independent actor in the Middle East, and Russia’s ambitions as a critical factor in the region. One of the most profound changes in the region was the “velvet” revolution in Armenia, which brought to power the younger and more popular Nicol Pashinian

(Alieva, 2018; De Waal, 2018), whose policy after the initial “thaw” in rhetoric has increasingly contributed to escalation of hostilities. Seeking to sustain popular support, but at the same time having to compete with hardliners (such as Karabagh clans), in the escalating cycle of securitizing moves he eventually resorted to even more nationalist rhetoric and policy, reinforced by a statement from then Defence Minister David Tonoyan calling for “more wars for more territories” (Aravot, 30 March, 2019). In addition, the domestic factors of the flare-up in Azerbaijan – accumulated problems caused by the combined effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and the sharp fall in world oil prices (Alieva, 2020, Guliyev, 2021) – were “re-directed” to the liberation of lands, the occupation of which in the 1990s caused nearly 700,000 people to be internally displaced.

Autocracy/Democracy and De-Securitization Potential from Below

The lack of substantial progress in negotiations led to a number of publications pointing to the absence of democracy as one of the impediments to resolving the

1 For instance, in his recent speech, President Aliyev accused the National Council (the main opposition bloc) of being “foreign funded” and “serving Armenians.” https://www.turan.az/ext/srch/2021/3/free/politics_news/en/2000.htm/1616152601_nySLRnkj-1.htm/20/opposition

2 1993 UN Security Council resolutions: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/13508.htm>

Karabagh conflict. Developed in the area of security studies and from a constructivist point of view, the securitization theory stated that “in naming a certain development a security problem the “state” can claim a special right, one that will in the final instance always be defined by the state and its elites”, and extended the concept of securitization to the other sectors, first of all to society. It argued that “power holders can always try to use the instrument of a securitization of the issue to gain control over it” (Waever, 2007:73). Aradau (2002, 2004) points to the inherently undemocratic nature of securitization as a “speech act”, which elevates the issue from everyday politics to the level of the exclusionary and suggests understanding of de-securitization as “emancipation”, or radical “democratization” of security. In such context, the emancipation “tackles the concept of democratic politics and the issue of institutional authority in claiming the voice of the silent” (Aradau, 2004:397). Our study from 2018 (Alieva and Aslanov, 2018) is based on in-depth interviews aimed at exploring how autocracy/democracy affects attitudes towards conflict in the process of securitization/de-securitization. We argued³ that – to borrow an expression from Aradau – a “democratic politics of emancipation” unleashes the societal processes leading to de-securitization, and we examined this de-securitization through social transformation and changes in ideology. The latter transforms the perception of threat from its pre-modern and modern forms into a post-modern one, which is one of the ways to transfer a problem from one level of discourse and threat perception to another, partly resonating with a shift of Inglehart and Welzel’s (2007) classification of values to materialist and post-materialist. Here, the role of human emancipation is also stressed as primary, which can be understood as socio-cultural changes, leading to changes in public values, which in turn press for democracy. In other words, we argue that it allows the reduction of tension caused by confrontational and exclusive logics, themselves the result of rigidity of narratives, through transforming those logics and narratives, moving from enmity and win-lose thinking to viewing conflict through more universal, forward-thinking and global perspectives.

The in-depth interviews we conducted among members of civil society, politicians and average citizens allowed us to distinguish between groups of respondents based on their attitudes towards physical borders, geographical symbols, and exclusivity/multiplicity of identity, as well as towards basic liberal values such as women’s and minority rights, etc. The results showed that more liberal and post-modern groups preferred the alternative and creative solutions, moving away from

“win-lose” solutions and instead preferring those which transcend borders and overcome the power of geographic and material symbols, for instance EU integration. No less important are economic liberalization and market reforms in leading to the formation of free economic groups and globalized relations, which promote the ability to look beyond the typical ‘win-lose’ concept and traditional understanding of threats. Yet, the majority of respondents remained sceptical of the possibility of a peaceful resolution to the Karabagh conflict, apparently resulting from the lack of progress after two decades of peace talks. The broader attitudes and transformation of the mindsets of the society creates a favorable basis for development of alternative approaches to conflict and the resolution thereof. While this transformation may help to prevent war in cases of contested territories or historical disputes, the absence of redressing of current grievances creates another level of tension. The motivation to war results from the interaction between ideology (or rationality) and emotions. Although limited by the civil conflicts, it has been shown that the combination of indignation with radical ideologies is a crucial factor in sparking violent collective action (Costalli and Ruggieri, 2015). Emotions in such cases work as triggering mechanisms. Consequently, it was easy to mobilize collective action through the act of securitization from the formal authority due to the widespread indignation with the unaddressed displacement of hundreds of thousands and occupation of seven regions bordering Nagorno-Karabagh in 1991-1994. The surveys showed unresolved conflicts to be a priority both among the public (CRRC, 2013) and for political leaders (Aslanov and Samedzade, 2017). In the absence of reliable surveys during the war and post-war periods, social networks and e-media were the study’s main sources of supporting data.

Accumulated Grievances and Limited Formal Authority: July 2020 Hostilities and the Second Karabagh War

The resumption of fighting in July 2020 caused spontaneous thousands-strong public rallies in support of the army, but these did not mention or address the president. The personalized symbol of protest mobilization, General Polad Hashimov, was previously unknown to the general public, but his killing during the July hostilities (combined with his reputation as a person of integrity and decency) led to his rapid popular heroification. The mobilization did not involve any organized force and was illustrative of the degree of the accumulated grievances caused by the unresolved conflict. The absence of slogans addressing the president at the rallies also showed that the authority of the incumbent was limited. More-

3 The research conducted in 2015-2017 included structured interviews with 40 public civil and political leaders, journalists, and average citizens.

over, the rally was used by the leadership to silence its critics and launch a new wave of repressions by arresting dozens of opposition activists, many of whom did not even attend the rally.

The unaddressed issue of the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people from the occupied seven regions in violation of the internationally recognized borders (and four UN resolutions) lent popular legitimacy to the military nationalist mobilization in September 2020 and broadened support for the war across the political spectrum. This allowed – along with the limitations on internet during the Forty-four Day War – temporary monopolization of “securitization” processes by the president. The power of the factor of unaddressed grievances was also reflected in the large number and ethnic diversity of volunteers for the front and their readiness to fight (Azernews, 12.10.2020). The predominant attitudes reflecting grievances were perhaps best expressed in this Azerbaijani Facebook comment, posted in the middle of the Second Karabagh war: “Because of 140,000 Armenians, one million were deprived of their homes, not to mention the occupation and tragedies. Because 140,000 did not reconcile with cultural autonomy, 400,000 were deprived of their right to live in the villages they were born in and expelled from their homes in Armenia, while 600,000 became refugees in their own land. And there are still those who blame us. I do not need such an international justice” (10 October 2020). Other similar comments came to similar conclusions, for instance “I despise such a Western ‘justice!’” (17 October 2020). The advances in regaining control of the occupied regions were cheered by many Facebook users, including Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), some of whom are prominent leaders of civil society and who left comments like “...now I am not a refugee anymore” (CNIS Digest, 26.10.2020), “I am from Khojali, but [have never seen] my homeland” (CNIS Digest, 15.10.2020), etc. The opposition parties issued statements supporting the war as being in full compliance with international law and UNSC resolutions (CNIS Digest, 29.10.2020).

The perceived asymmetry in attitudes towards the parties in the conflict on the parts of Western media and politicians was often interpreted in Azerbaijani society as being biased in favor of Armenia, not least because of its being Christian (Shafiyev, 2020). The well-known journalist and activist-in-exile Emin Milli, commenting on UNESCO’s repeated refusals to send a fact-finding mission to the occupied territories, wrote on his Facebook timeline: “This is a disgusting level of hypocrisy, discrimination based on religion, nationality and eth-

nic origin” (FB, 28.12.2020). Indeed, some public figures and politicians in Europe called their followers to protect the “oldest Christian nation in the world” (see, for instance, the Facebook comment by Czech politician and Chamber of Deputies member Karel Schwarzenberg). The prominent human rights defender and investigative journalist Khadija Ismayil addressed her Western colleagues on her Facebook page: “Why, when the foreigners fight for Armenia, it is normal? ... Your biased approach also prevents peace, guys!” (FB, 08.10.2020). The popular commentator-in-exile Ramis Yunus called the reaction to the war “a litmus test of the attitudes of many observers” (FB Digest, 29.10.2020).

Top-Down (De-)Securitization: Sources of “Speech Act” failure

Certain classic examples of applied securitization theory point to the conditions under which securitization fails (Buzan and Waever, 2003), such as for instance the depoliticization of the public in the last years of the Soviet Union (Prozorov, 2009). The recent developments in the Karabagh conflict allow us to analyze how this de-securitization from above, or “speech act”, is challenged by a variety of factors. The partial redress of grievances through the war, including the return of seven regions, has boosted the ratings of President Aliyev (Synovitz, 17.12.2021), who soon after declared that “the conflict will remain in the past” (Press Conference, 11.01.2021). As the statement was based on an actual change of the status quo and a certain degree of redress of grievances, it had at least temporary power of de-securitization. Yet, the word “victory” has been used in all official rhetoric, spreading to and replicated in the public domain (notably social networks), promoting the paradigm of competition, or “win/lose” logic. This dualism was further enhanced by the military uniform of the president; as well-known opposition leader Tofig Yagublu pointed out, “If the ‘war went to the hell’, why did the president still not take off his military uniform?” (CNIS Digest, 25.03.2021).

In addition to the already-mentioned factors, the exclusive nature of (de-)securitization imposes limits on the effect it may have on reduction of the public’s perception of threat. From the very first days of the war, the mobilization against the external enemy was characterized by duality, as not just foreign but also “domestic enemies” were targeted – i.e., the opposition, which did not join the dialogue with government officials. While this exclusion might appear a shrewd strategy of blame avoidance, it deepened societal divisions in the post-war period,⁴ along with other challenges to de-securitiza-

⁴ One of the popular public opinion makers, lawyer Aslan Ismayilov, in a video appeal to his followers stressed the alarming levels of polarization, aggressiveness, and hostility within Azerbaijani society (27 March 2021 FB post, Aslan Ismayilov); <https://www.facebook.com/watch/>

tion. The de-securitization understood as emancipation deconstructs the non-democratic nature of securitization by giving voice to “security have-nots” (Dunn and Wheeler, 2004) and by applying principles of universality and recognition. Thus, the conditions for “emancipation” provided by a relatively free internet in the post-war period ensured alternative voices and a steady flow of information reflecting the situation on the ground, first of all the activities of Russian peacekeepers. After their arrival, the idea of peacekeepers violating Azerbaijan’s sovereignty dominated the social networks – at least the debates of the most active part of Azerbaijani society. The comments included messages like “One cannot trust Russia” (FB, 30.11.2021), “Russian flags in Azerbaijan is a tragedy for the country” (26.11.2020), and “Russia behaves like an aggressor and Baku keeps silent” (23.11.2020). But probably the most serious challenge came from the faults of the government and bureaucratic machine in addressing the social problems of the war, those who were killed or handicapped and their families. Social networks circulated the personal stories of the war’s participants, videos of protests of the families of those who died in the war – victims, in the minds of Azerbaijanis, of bureaucratic indifference.⁵ All of this affected the authority of the “messenger” by making part of the Azerbaijani public more open to ideas of opposition, which in turn were supported by the developing uncertainty on the ground in Karabagh.

Last but not least, the process of de-securitization is affected by the government’s popular opinion polling levels, which were boosted by securitization on the one hand, and challenged by its exclusionary and extraordinary nature on the other. It is perhaps not surprising that, after a certain period of promoting the idea of peaceful reconstruction, the president warned about the probability (although in a distant future) of another war. (05 March 2021). Yet, the limited power of the formal messages is influenced by today’s relatively free internet, which represents one of the acts leading to “emancipation” – release of alternative points of view which ranged

from calls to regain control over the rest of Karabagh by force or to demand Russian peacekeepers out, to advocating for peaceful relations and building bridges between societies of rival nations. An increasing number of public opinion makers, civil and political leaders, bloggers, and individual e-TV channel anchors, some of which attract viewers in numbers similar to the president, challenged the monopoly on (de-)securitization by the formal authority.⁶ It was in the post-war period when the social networks gave rise to peace initiatives and platforms, which turned the previously-marginalized dialogues from small groups of peacemakers and the lonely voices of writers⁷ into a virtual interaction of the public and political leaders.⁸ The local activists, journalists, and individual citizens, although relatively small in number, came up with initiatives from calling for the necessity of direct dialogue to critical assessment of the adversarial relations and support for cooperation between the two sides. The number of views of videos and live streams varied from 25,000 to 180,000 each, indicating high interest in direct communication with the adversary and alternatives to hostility discourses.

Conclusions

The securitization theory was developed in post-war Europe to accommodate the new, non-military threats it faced, those to society and identity, such as migration, EU integration and others. The Karabagh conflict, like other secessionist conflicts, is a military-political conflict, but the theory has become increasingly relevant at this stage, after the military “status quo” has changed and the ceasefire agreement has been signed. Further developments – whether this will be turned into a long-term peace agreement, or will give start to another war – depends, beside geopolitics, on liberalization, modernization and emancipation of domestic politics and capacity of local (and international) actors to de-securitize relations in society and with neighbours. Democratic change unleashes the peace potential of a society, but leaves it vulnerable to securitization if left without

[live/?v=4080714951968368&ref=watch_permalink](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4080714951968368&ref=watch_permalink)

5 The e-media and social networks reported both group protests of families of the war dead and individual stories told by the handicapped and their parents or relatives of such indifference. See for instance CNIS Digest 01.02.2021.

6 The number of views of the video speeches in the post-war period of opposition leaders, such as Ali Karimli, leader of the Popular Front Party (272,000 subscribers), Gultakin Hajibeyli (216,000 views, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BhmPVQ2rHpo>), or Jamil Hasanli (135,000 views, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tGj4eHNawic&t=3209s>), critical e-media like Sancaq TV (348,000 subscribers), Osmangizi TV (166,000 subscribers), Azerbaijan Saati (253,000 subscribers) or sites like Azad Soz (289,000 subscribers) are comparable to, if not greater than, the figures of the official sites.

7 Azerbaijani writer Akram Aylisli has been ostracized by the government due to his book *Stone Dreams*, in which the author depicts brutal episodes in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, displaying self-criticism. See e.g. his recent interview: <https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/burning-books-akram-aylisli-on-literature-and-cultural-memory/>

8 See for instance the Journalists’ Joint Stream Project by Yurii Manvelian, Emin Guseynov’s Peaceful Media Initiative (stream reaching 130 thousand views on FB, https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLY7VQsumkiYN569k7c0lfHq__vwkNbGsD), Ishkan Verdian’s Individual Peace Platform (<https://www.facebook.com/Ishkhanverdyan/videos/213568596827569>), and Ismayil Jalil “Duzdanishaq” interviewing leading Armenian and Azerbaijani public opinion makers (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y55TEWussZo>). All of them stress the importance of direct communication – without mediators – between the two societies.

powerful pressure for liberalization and modernization, or in other words emancipation, especially in the absence of redress of grievances. Thus, conflict mobilization has succeeded in both Armenia and Azerbaijan in times of political and economic challenges to their leaderships, who resorted to “securitization” of relations as a tool of enabling extraordinary means to facilitate the elite’s political survival.

As the analysis shows, in the post-war period the top-down (de-)securitization has been challenged by several factors, first of all by its exclusionary nature, which replicates the “friends vs. enemies” logic of securitization as well as excluding domestic opposition along with external “enemies”. This process is further challenged by alternative narratives from below as a result of partial “emancipation” enhanced by the relatively free internet and opportunities for free expression provided by social networks. The official “speech act failure” is also caused by the temporary nature of the ratings boosts provided by military rhetoric and action. The continuation of framing of the return of seven regions in terms of “victory” may for some time sustain the president’s popularity, but cannot prevent its decline due to policy failures in times of peace. Thus, while the president succeeded in gaining public support for the military action in the process of securitization of Azerbaijan’s unaddressed grievances, the diversity of the post-war views, reflecting controversy over the situation on the ground and the shortcomings of governance, challenged the official narratives, or “speech acts”. Similar to the pre-war period, public attitudes show a diversity of views – from appeals to build long-term peace to calls for the completion of the estab-

lishment of state control by force over the whole territory within Azerbaijan’s recognized borders.

The fact of the return of the seven regions adjacent to Karabagh, combined with the de-securitization from formal authority, which presented the war as redress of grievances, gave (at least temporary) rise, along with the trend of competition, to processes of reconciliation. One should be cautious, though, to not overestimate the role of a speech act of “de-securitization” as compared with the effect of the liberation of the occupied regions and the opportunity for IDPs to return to their homelands – at least partial redress of grievances as a result of war. Overall, there is no direct or linear dependence of securitization/de-securitization on the one hand and democracy/autocracy on the other. Neither does democratization lead automatically to de-securitization, conducive to peace, nor does autocracy necessarily promote only securitization or have a monopoly on this process. Public attitudes thus remain open to the influence (although to different degrees, depending on their authority and resources) of the multiple actors promoting securitization/de-securitization, which is facilitated by the relatively free internet giving voice to “security have-nots”. One of the important conclusions for the “bottom-up” de-securitization in the pre-war and post-war periods is that it opens opportunities for transfer of discourse and threat perception to the non-confrontational level in accordance with the contemporary nature of international relations, its virtualization and globalization reinforced by the specifics of the pandemic situation, further removing the obstacles of physical borders and geography.

About the Author

Dr. Leila Alieva is an affiliate of the Russian and East European Studies unit of the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies, University of Oxford and a part-time tutor at the Oxford Department for Continuing Education.

References

- Alieva, Leila (2018) Test case for the South Caucasus: Is consolidation of the achievements of the velvet revolution in Armenia possible without revision of the Karabakh issue? Working Paper 14, CNIS, July, <http://cnis-baku.org/eng/working-paper-n-14-2/>
- Alieva, Leila (2020) “How the Pandemic has Helped Officials to Control, Manipulate and Enrich in Azerbaijan” *Baltic Worlds*, 17 June, <http://balticworlds.com/how-pandemic-has-helped-officials-to-control-manipulate-and-enrich-in-azerbaijan/>
- Alieva, Leila and Aslanov, Bakhtiyar (2018) How autocracy impedes de-securitization, or why democracy matters: the case of Nagorno-Karabakh in the eyes of Azerbaijanis *The Caucasus Survey*, 6 (3), April.
- Aslanov, Bakhtiyar, and Samedzade, Sevinj (2017) The positions of the political parties and movements in Azerbaijan on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabagh Conflict, Imagine Center for Conflict Transformation and Center for Independent Social Research, Berlin.
- Aradau, Claudia (2004) Security and Democratic Scene: De-securitization and emancipation. *Journal of International Relations and Development* 7:388-413
- Buzan, Barry and Waever, Ole (2003). *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge, UK. Cambridge University Press.
- Caucasus Barometer Azerbaijan (2013) CRRC, <https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2013az/IMPIS1/>

- Costalli, Stefano, Ruggieri, Andrea (2015) Indignation, Ideologies and Armed Mobilization. (Civil war in Italy 1943-1945) *International Security*, 40, 2.
- Guliyev, Farid (2021) Azerbaijan's social policy response to COVID-19: swift response, modest benefits, *CRC 1342 COVID-19 Social Policy Response Series*, No.8. January.
- De Waal, Tomas (2018) Armenia's revolution and the Karabakh conflict Carnegie Europe Commentary, May 22. <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/76414>
- Dunn, Tim and Nicholas J. Wheeler (2004) "We the Peoples: Contending Discourses of Security in Human Rights Theory and Practice", *International Relations* 18(1):9-23
- Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel (2005) *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Prozorov, Sergei (2009) *The ethics of post-communism: history and social praxis in Russia*. Springer.
- Shafiyev, G (2020) Armenia-Azerbaijan Propaganda War and American Media Bias, *Modern Diplomacy*, December <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/12/26/armenia-azerbaijan-propaganda-war-and-american-media-bias/>

Social Media and News Agencies

- Synovitz, Ron (2020) Analysis: Nagorno-Karabakh War Transforms The Legacy of Azerbaijani President Aliyev, RFE/RL, 17 December, <https://www.rferl.org/a/nagorno-karabakh-legacy-azerbaijani-president-aliyev/31006302.html>
- Press statements following talks with the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinian, January 11, 2021, Kremlin, Moscow. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64880>
- The speech at the 7th congress of the YAP, <https://president.az/articles/50798>
- FbDigest@VoxPopuli Azerbaijan, CNIS, 15.10.2020 <http://cnis-baku.org/eng/5233/>
- FbDigest@VoxPopuli Azerbaijan CNIS 29.10.2020 https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=3662140900497081&id=300772036634001
- FbDigest@Vox populi Azerbaijan, CNIS, 26.10.2020 <http://cnis-baku.org/eng/5313/>
- Fb Khadija Ismayil 06.10.2020, <https://www.facebook.com/khadija.ismayil/posts/10214576218637745>
- Fb user Sherif Aga, 10 October 2020, <https://www.facebook.com/sherif.agayar/posts/3252447788142185>
- Fb Karel Schwarzenberg 12 October 2020 <https://www.facebook.com/karel.schwarzenberg/posts/10157914908808925>
- Fb user F. Hasanzade 17 October 2020 <https://www.facebook.com/familhasanzada/posts/3466557600080502>
- Fb user Emin Milli 28 December 2020 <https://www.facebook.com/emin.milli.3/posts/3517385975047466>
- Azernews, 12 October 2020 <https://www.azernews.az/karabakh/170492.html>
- Aravot, 30 March, 2019, <https://www.aravot.am/2019/03/30/1032523/>