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Common Governance and Socialist Cooperative Institutions in Romanian Agriculture*

Abstract: *The main objective of this paper aims the distribution of finite resources under the imperatives of collectivist institutions and a governance based on the precepts of socializing the means of society. In the first instance theoretical formulas will be used that propose methodologies for governing the common goods from the ostromian perspective (Ostrom, 2007) and alternatives for overcoming the dilemmas of collective action starting from basic concepts (Hardin, 1968), respectively forms of government that can overcome the excesses of users of common goods that inexorably lead to the spoiling and depletion of existing resources. Complementary to this preliminary discussion necessary for further operationalization I will use the theoretical model that explains, as an extension, the typology and functionality of natural resources and according to this link between combined theoretical models I will determine what type of asset each institutional form proposed for governing assets mentioned above.*

The final section will be dedicated to determining which type of institutional alternative, for the governance of common resources, is joined by the socialist ideological approach when talking about the collectivization of agriculture and the institutional form that agricultural associations must take, respectively in which typology could allocate the goods, following the de facto analysis of the agricultural collectivist type organization for the socialist period, in the same way of working – identifying institutional arrangements, typology of goods, in order to identify possible inconsistencies between the normative, declarative ideological model and its implementation in real social space.

The study starts from the socialist ideological assumptions regarding the governance of agricultural households and tries to test whether the factual representation of agricultural cooperatives in Romania and implicitly in the general ideological project overlaps and fulfills the theoretical aspirations regarding the collectivization of agriculture. For these it will be considered to formulate research questions and consult the extensive bibliography in the field of agricultural groups proposed by the socialist frame of reference.

Keywords: *common governance, collectivization of agriculture, self-governing communities, rational choice institutionalism, socialist economy, socialist agriculture, Soviet collectivist models*

I. Introduction

In this paper I will aim an institutionalist approach to the development of collectivist agricultural activities in Romania, respectively I will try

to indicate which types of institutions, among those discussed by Elinor Ostrom (2007) can better explain the Romanian socialist collectivist agricultural forms and their motivation in one of the ostromian alternatives according to the factual data provided by the bibliography in the field.

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I will start the discussion in the first section starting from the common goods tragedy that Garrett Hardin talks about, that is, about the excesses of common goods users that inexorably lead to the degradation and depletion of managed resources, a state that will affect everyone at some point, annihilating the possibility of extraction. of long-term benefits, which would have happened, if we consider it counterfactual, if it had acted by virtue of rules or agreements intended to dose the benefits provided by that good / resource. Therefore in accordance with the instrumental rationality of the actors using a common good and their tendency to reach a “tragedy” of the common goods used I will also present the institutional solutions launched by Ostrom to limit the rational tendencies of individuals and to maintain those goods for as long as possible, somewhat to establish a political and social balance. In accordance with these institutional alternatives I will use the theoretical model that explains, as an extension, the typology and functionality of natural resources and based on them I will determine what type of asset each proposed institutional form addresses.

In the last section I will try to determine what kind of institutional alternative, for the governance of common resources, is joined by the socialist ideological approach when talking about the collectivization of agriculture and the institutional form that agricultural associations must take, respectively in the typology of which type good falls, then I will do the de facto analysis of the agricultural collectivist type organization for the socialist period, in the same way of working – identifying institutional arrangements, typology of goods – to determine if there are deviations from the normative ideological model when it comes to implementation in rural reality.

Therefore after this brief inventory of the theoretical framework and the analysis of factual data, I will be able to formulate the research questions of the paper, the answers to which will be provided after analyzing and operationalizing the theoretical concepts in the last section of results. So I want to find out in which institutional category, among those formulated by Ostrom as solutions to the governance of common goods, can the Romanian socialist agricultural collectives be included? This question is dichotomous because I will look for the generation of two answers, once I will analyze the assumptions of the ideological project that will generate an answer, and then I will go, in the same methodological sense, to analyze the actual de facto organization of these agricultural collectives, by what type of institutions these production structures actually functioned. I will consider the type of institutional input, the organization of activities, the distribution of tasks and results (agricultural production), incentives (sanctions / repression or self-stimulation of self-interest), the manner of joining the farm (consent or forced).

Knowing what the ideological project of socialism proposed about the way of governing farms, then these ideological assumptions were successfully implemented in reality at the level of agricultural cooperatives? But if the ideology involves “expropriating the expropriators”, confiscating agricultural land and turning it into collective state ownership, dismantling agriculture and the rural environment through political and security frameworks, then it means that there was a Leviathan (an external authority) that imposed a set of rules and institutions? Suppose that if there was a need in the initial state to impose a Leviathan to coordinate the process of collectivization and the activities of agricultural collectives in order to establish the ideological project of emancipation and modernization, then this central authority was able to decrease in intensity, according to ideology or tended to perpetuate this behavior?

II. Organizational alternatives on the issue of governance of common goods

Debates over how best to govern the natural resources shared by a large number of people oscillate between state control, which is able to prevent their destruction, and the privatization of these resources (Ostrom 2007, p. 15). But the foundation of this debate is the degradation of overused natural resources and the attempt to find viable ways to rationalize resources so as to temper their overexploitation.

Garrett Hardin proposes a behavioral explanation and gives a reduced model to explain the reasoning of the actors involved in its use. He examines the hypothesis of a common pasture from the perspective of a rational individual. Each individual has a direct benefit from using that land, so everyone will tend to maximize their utility by taking advantage of the free use of the common land. Therefore each individual will use that good as much as possible to extract as many benefits as possible, that is, through each addition of exploitation, he will get a marginal utility added total utilities, but at some point this excessive use of the common good will lead at its exhaustion and all those involved will bear the subsequent costs of this overuse but given that these costs are shared by all users then taken individually the cost will be small so it will be reasonable for each actor involved to exploit as much as possible as long as possible the common good (Hardin 1968, pp.1244-1245).

Therefore Hardin argues that each individual will be part of a system that will cause him to exploit limited resources without limits in order to maximize his individual profit and so will everyone else, so this type of behavior leads to ruin because of the society that proclaimed the freedom to use the common goods (ibidem, p. 1244). So the problem is that everyone's property is not taken for granted, but everyone takes advantage of it because they want to use their resources as quickly as possible to satisfy their personal well-being because this opportunity is quite fragile, does not impose costs and there is uncertainty. in the future (Gordon, 1954, p. 124).

Therefore, in order to find a solution to the problem of excessive use of common goods and practically a solution against the rationality of those who use them, a solution against them in the short term but which will benefit in the long term, it was proposed to generate sets of rules in an institutionalized form for an efficient form of organization and governance of the common goods.

External authority or Leviathan is one of the solutions proposed in the matter of governing the common good. This view presupposes that the problems related to the exploitation of limited resources cannot be solved through cooperation and that an institutional force with major coercive powers and public control is needed for economic efficiency (Ostrom 2007, p. 23. Hardin 1978, p. 314). Ophuls 1973, pp. 228. Carruthers & Stoner 1981, pp. 29).

In the case of the pasture model presented by Hardin, centralized control or Leviathan is a governmental authority that decides which strategy to use the pasture is best to avoid overusing the common good (overgrazing), determines who and how much can use the common pasture. A central authority can accurately determine the capacity of a common resource, allocate that capacity, monitor actions and thus impose negative incentives through sanctions / fines for those who deviate from the rules, so such a central authority can determine the behavior of pasture herders. and thus works as a balance that produces optimum efficiency for shepherds. Leviathan, proposed as a model of resource organization, produces optimal balance only when

it has an accurate information, has monitoring power, penalty capacity and zero cost for administration (Ostrom 2007, p. 24).

Privatization is another possible solution to the dilemmas of governing the commons. The solution proposes the granting of property rights over the goods, thus transforming them from common property to private property. Thus it is assumed that when an individual is given full ownership of a good, implicitly this certification of ownership will make him responsible and therefore invest resources for the maintenance of that good and will manage it in such a way as to get the most out of it. high possible profit from it (Smith 1981, p. 467. Ostrom 2007, pp. 26-27, 36).

Having the property right that excludes non-owners from the arbitrary use of his property, according to Janos Kornai, an owner¹ can use his property through three rights deriving from the property right: a) the residual income right or the full right of to dispose of profit and its use; this right is fulfilled only if the use of the property concerns the owner's own budget; b) the right of alienation and transferability (ability to sell, rent, gift or inherit property); c) the right of control, management, decision-making and supervision of property (Kornai 1992, pp. 65-67).

Self-governing / self-organizing communities. In addition to the two options mentioned, Elinor Ostrom proposes an alternative institutional variant for solving the dilemmas of the common goods, namely the self-governing communities, meaning a strategy of cooperation in a contractual form designed by the users of the common good. Such a form of binding contractual cooperation is usually seen as consistently imposed by an external authority with ancillary penalty instruments, but this median approach requires the agreed agreement of all users on a strategy for sharing the capacity to support the common good. and the costs of implementing the contract, and anyone may reject, while setting the contractual terms, the unfair proposals of the others regarding the administration of the property and the costs associated with its maintenance. Therefore the final form of the contract between them will be a balanced, equitable one that certifies the equal sharing of benefits and costs. Thus none of the contracting parties depends on the information accuracy of any governmental authority and its fairness under a set of rules but will respect and be able to deny contractual terms because they have detailed and accurate information about their ability to support the common good and the behavior of other actors (Ostrom 2007, pp. 29-32).

When the users of a common resource which generates a small number of units, act independently then the total benefits obtained will be lower than if they had cooperated and coordinated their strategies therefore the users dependent on a common resource they get much lower income if they do not organize themselves to take collective action. Organizational processes occur by specifying a sequence of activities undertaken in order and adopting contingent strategies² (compliance with recurring rules and the possibility of changing rules) to generate optimal balances without external constraints. In such a form of organization, individuals are inclined to give up immediate individual gains in favor of greater common benefits because they notice others following the same strategy. It is assumed that the owners have specific information about the common resource and have knowledge about the strategies of others (ibidem, pp. 52-53, 108).

Ostrom identifies a set of fundamental principles underlying the establishment of a self-governing organization for the sustainable management of a common resource by a group of individuals with common interests: 1) clearly established boundaries – establishing individuals with the right to use the common resource; 2) concordance between the rules of appropriation and supply and the local conditions – internal rules related to the establishment of time,

place, way of working, quantity, supply; 3) modalities of collective choice – refers to the operational rules agreed by individuals and their ability to modify or adapt them according to needs and demands in case the situation changes (clearly established limits, well-adapted rules, participation in collective choice); 4) monitoring – tasks assigned to external observers / mediators in charge of supervising the activities of the association in order to carry out the contractual parameters; 5) differentiated sanctions – penalties / sanctions imposed on the owners who violate the operational rules; 6) conflict resolution mechanisms; 7) the minimum recognition of the right to organize – the external governmental authorities to recognize and respect the institutions created by the appropriators and their right to do so (ibidem, pp. 104-116).

Even if individuals share the rules of keeping promises, this agreement and reputation cannot ensure stable long-term cooperative behavior. Therefore in order to strengthen this agreed agreement, Ostrom adds the possibility of involving an external private agent, acting as arbitrator, who will supervise the proper performance of the terms of the contract and impose penalties in case of violation of the legal limits accepted by the parties. In addition this external observer can also act as a mediator between the contracting parties to find ways to resolve any disputes arising from the deviation from the regulation. Had the initial agreements and the reputation of the owners been sufficient, they could have given up investing resources in hiring external actors for monitoring and penalties, but these investments are evident for long-term cooperation activities which validates principles 4) and 5.) proposed by Ostrom (ibidem, pp. 31, 108).

III. Typology of goods in society in the institutional context

In line with the alternatives offered by Elinor Ostrom and neo-institutionalists, I will add a theoretical model that explains the typology and functionality of in-kind resources, which I will try to integrate into common good governance models to determine which type of good it is addressed to each proposed institutional form and what methodology of use each requires.

There are two dimensions to distinguishing goods in a company, in terms of access and use, namely exclusivity and rivalry:

A) *Exclusivity* presupposes the existence of an actor who has the possibility to prevent another potential user from using that good if he does not meet certain conditions. This dimension characterizes all private goods. So the main feature of this is the property.

B) *Rivalry*, the second dimension, also refers to a clause related to the impossibility of using a good but in a different way, meaning that if an actor uses a good, possibly exhausts it, then it prevents another potential user to use it. For example, the apartment where a person lives, with or without other people accepted by him, cannot be inhabited at the same time by other people outside him, because the property is thus considered “exhausted” and extracted from the amount of goods initially available. (Miroiu 2007, pp. 117-118. Kornai 1992, p. 62).

But the rule that the goods are framed in the two dimensions can be falsified and because the two can be combined, for example, we consider the broadcasts of a private radio station – even if the broadcasts belong to a private actor, they can be used without hindrance by anyone. even if an individual “consumes” those radio broadcasts, this does not mean that other subsequent consumers will benefit from a smaller amount, lower quality or not at all, compared to the original user (Miroiu 2007, pp.117-118). It is therefore considered that goods can have several properties and require a more elaborate classification resulting from the combination of exclusivity and rivalry:

1) exclusivity + rivalry = private goods

Private goods are goods owned by an individual who has the ability to prevent another potential user from using them and if he uses them then no one else can use them. From here we can see property rights as a social mechanism that excludes non-owners from arbitrary use of one's property without their consent. This approach is pure because it combines the two main ontological dimensions – exclusivity with rivalry (Miroiu 2007, pp. 118-119. Kornai 1992, pp. 62-63).

2) exclusivity + non-rivalry = toll goods

Toll goods are goods that can prevent someone from accessing them, but even if they are used, others can later benefit from them. This category includes goods intended for the public but which impose conditions of use, for example libraries, theaters, highways, study programs, TV programs, all imposing a fee to have access to them (Miroiu 2007, pp. 118-119).

3) rivalry + non-exclusivity = common goods

Common goods cannot prevent anyone from using them, but once used, no one else can use them. These goods are similar to the example of “Hardin's pasture”, or fish caught in a lake or water used for irrigation (Miroiu 2007, pp. 118-120).

4) non-exclusivity + non-rivalry = public goods

Public goods cannot prevent anyone from using them, and even if they are used, then others can use them as well. This combination is, like 1), a pure one because it combines two similar characteristics, opposite to the first, respectively they are not restricted by anything, while the first one presents total prohibitions. This category can include national defense, infrastructure, public order, public sanitation services because no individual is excluded from their benefits, these benefits are equally for all and also can never be established the property of anyone (Miroiu 2007, pp. 119-120. Kornai 1992, p. 62).

IV. Combining institutional models of resource governance with the typology of natural assets

Therefore after explaining the types of goods existing in society, their destination, access to them and the conditions of access, I will try to assign to each form of governance of common resources, proposed by Elinor Ostrom, a type of goods, described above, to determine what distribution methodology each operates with.

I) The first institutional form we talked about, the *external authority* or *the Leviathan*, presupposes the existence of an external governmental authority that establishes the strategy and the set of rules according to which a common good must be used by individuals. Even if Leviathan is the symbol of a public governing institution and intuitively such a structure generates public goods and services designed to serve the interests of citizens, in this case such an institutional arrangement does not operate with *public goods*³, because they allow unlimited access anyone without special costs / conditions and also does not deprive other potential users if they have been used once; nor can we combine the category of *common goods*⁴ here because they do not restrict anyone's access to them and can no longer be used by others. Even if we are talking about common goods here, the institutional model analyzed here involves regulations through sets of rules and regulations.

Therefore, the two categories of goods cannot be discussed because the institutional model of Leviathan presupposes that that external regulatory authority determines who and how much it can use from the common good and also can impose negative incentives for those who deviate from the rules and determine the behavior. users under predefined conditions, so the criterion of exclusivity appears. However, the goods used here are not rivals because if someone uses them, later others can benefit from them to the same extent, depending on how the authority empowered to strike a balance decides. In conclusion, the Leviathan-type institutional arrangement / external authority operates with the class of *toll goods*⁵.

II) In the following case of institutional arrangement, namely privatization as a solution to the dilemma of common goods, it is proposed to grant property rights for various assets in the company thus transforming a property with common resource units into a private one. Therefore, the type of goods compatible with this approach are *private goods*⁶ because the one who is granted or acquires ownership of a good will become the direct beneficiary of that good and implicitly will bear the costs of its maintenance, therefore. its property will gain exclusive value (it will be able to prevent others from using it) and also rival (once used, no one else will be able to use it).

III) In the case of self-governing / self-organized communities, determining the type of assets they administer is difficult to determine because by definition this institutional arrangement combines models of government transplanted from private, government centralism but also free common use.

According to the criterion of relativity (“more or less”) the exclusivity and rivalry of some goods are not always categorical dimensions, meaning that they can represent a good to a certain extent. A good can have different degrees of ownership, and that property can change depending on the context, time or place. For example the quality of the non-rivalry of a good can decrease when there are many consumers who use it and the phenomenon of agglomeration occurs; or the quality of the non-exclusivity of the property depends on the institutional arrangements applied, meaning a common good can become private (in the case of privatization when free access is restricted) or cleared (when access is restricted but you can use the same amount of goods only by fulfilling conditions imposed by the owner) (Miroiu 2007, pp. 124-125).

Therefore, in order to clarify why ontological values are nuanced in a self-governing community and why we consider the model to be a symbiotic one, I will consider 2 hypotheses from which I will postulate the answer regarding the type of goods indexed to a self-governing community. Initially I will consider the resemblance to the model of private goods⁷:

Hypothesis 1) if we consider that a self-governing community is privatized, in a broad sense, by the contract agreed by all members of the community on the rules of resource use (rare, non-renewable, etc.) and thus that community has the ability to determine who and how much can use resource units, and the resources used by members can no longer be used by anyone else, then the criteria of exclusivity and rivalry are met and we take into account the hypothesis that a self-governing community operates with private goods. The idea is that from a common or public good (depending on the abundance of the resource taken into account) the principle of non-exclusivity decreases because a contract was introduced based on a set of rules where the owner becomes the community as a regulatory authority, as well as non-rivalry⁸ (in if they were public goods) decreases because the phenomenon of congestion has occurred and the good can no longer equally satisfy the demand of users.

Hypothesis 2) if we consider that a self-governing community, through the contract agreed by its members in which rules and regulations for the use of the previously disputed resource were established, has a functionality similar to that of Leviathan – determines who and how much can use the common good, provides sanctions for whistleblowers or those who deviate from the rules and determines the behavior of users, all unanimously accepted – then meets the principle of exclusivity. But it is assumed that that collective agreement establishes and maintains a balance and fairness in the use of the good, therefore members will benefit from an equal amount of resource units, which means that once some units are extracted from the total amount initially available, the others they will benefit from an equally large and good number of units due to contractually established algorithms⁹ (non-rivalry principle). If we consider this hypothesis by which the principles of exclusivity and non-rivalry meet, then the community operates with toll goods.

Following the statement of the two hypotheses, we can establish what type of assets can be included in the case of the institutional arrangement of the governed community type. When we talk about that cooperation strategy conceived in contractual terms agreed by the users of a common resource, we are practically talking about a legitimate authority that can award the quantity of goods per capita in order to establish an optimal and fair balance for the contracting parties as previously presented, that the resource becomes exclusive. But if we consider the criterion of rivalry, it is not met in the case of a self-governing community because each beneficiary, as a member of the contract, will be able to use the same type of resource and the same number of resource units, as the other partners even if it was initially extracted from the total amount of goods initially available, a certain amount, because when establishing the cooperation strategy, instruments related to distributive justice or fair cooperation will also be established^{10, 11}

Take the example of a large area of land commonly governed by a community. Suppose the construction of a residential neighborhood is established. So the land will be used only by those in the community, the contract will determine who has the right to use so it will be exclusive and indeed, if a plot is used by an individual that will not be able to be used by a potential and we can suspect that the criterion of rivalry is met, but as long as and other are accepted by the other co-owners of the contract (seen as the legislative authority) they will have equal housing rights and will benefit from an equal amount of good as individual (in special cases compensation instruments will be applied for a balance of benefits).¹² Therefore, based on the example above and using the criterion of relativity (“more or less”) which says that the dimensions of “exclusivity” and “rivalry” are not categorical, then it can be said that in the case of a self-governing / self-organized community operates with *toll goods*.

V. The model of the institutional arrangements within the socialist agricultural cooperatives and the typology of the managed goods. The ideological project versus the de facto organization of agricultural collectives

In the previous sections we covered the topic of governance alternatives on the issue of common goods, then the typology of goods found in society according to their level of accessibility and use -exclusive / non-exclusive, rivals / non-rivals- combining in the next section the theoretical models presented above to determine the type of asset to which each institutional

arrangement made by Elinor Ostrom is addressed. In this section I will try to determine what kind of institutional alternative, for the governance of common resources, is joined by the socialist ideological approach when talking about the collectivization of agriculture and the institutional form that agricultural associations must take, respectively in what type of good falls, then I will do the de facto analysis of the agricultural collectivist type organization for the socialist period, in the same way of working – identifying institutional arrangements, typology of goods – to determine if there are deviations from the normative ideological model when it comes to implementation in rural reality.

Therefore at the end of the paper I will indicate the institutional category in which, among those proposed by Ostrom, respectively the printing of goods, an agricultural association as it is presented at a theoretical level by the communist ideology, and secondly in which category it can be an association of this type is framed when it is analyzed from the perspective of its implementation in reality. Thus a comparative study is attempted in order to indicate the possible dissonances between socialist theory and praxis within collectivism in Romania.

VI. The view of the socialist ideology on the institutional organization of agricultural cooperatives

Socialist property referred, ideologically, to the relations established between members of society regarding the ownership and joint use of the means of production and the social appropriation of the results of production, in order to increase the material and spiritual well-being of the whole people. Socialist property wanted a high degree of socialization and union of individual producers, at the level of society or community, their equality, their contribution according to their possibilities, the exclusion of mutual exploitation and the direct union of the human factor with the material factors of production. Thus those who form a production cooperative (at company or community level) will have the quality of owners, producers and direct beneficiaries of the production results, thus creating relationships of collaboration and mutual help. The goods produced in the production units will no longer be the result of the work of some private producers but of the work of the united socialist producers (Burtan et. al. 1985, pp. 76, 85, 99, 130).

In the socialist economy, as a result of the existence of socialist property over the means of production, there is the possibility and necessity of distributing the individual consumption fund according to the quantity and quality of work submitted by each member of society. Therefore, *the individual consumption fund*, created by self-employment, is objective and is distributed according to the work submitted and not according to needs¹³, it is calculated according to the submitted work-physical or intellectual, qualified or unskilled, heavy or light, industrial or such distribution criteria are taken into account because, in the collective consciousness of the socialist stage, individualistic retrograde mentalities and tendencies of parasitism and evasion of social obligations still persist. Therefore, the share obtained by each worker in the total income will be directly proportional to the quantity, quality and socio-economic importance of the work submitted (ibidem, pp. 130-132).

The distribution by work will ensure the combination of general (collective) interests with personal material interests. Personal material interest contains two indissoluble aspects – 1) *material stimulation* – ensuring a remuneration depending on the results obtained; 2) *material liability* – the obligations resulting from the economic relations regarding the employment

and the worker-unit relations. Thus the work of those who belong to a production cooperative is no longer considered a commodity and the monetary expression of its value is no longer taken into account – the salary, but what is produced is transformed into a remuneration equal to the work submitted (individual contribution in the sense quantitative and qualitative) (*ibid.* pp. 131-133, 137).¹⁴

Remuneration according to work in the agricultural cooperative units is announced by the party's program in the same way: 1) first, the remuneration of the work is made in cash or in money and products, 2) the amount of remuneration at the cooperative level differs depending on the size, the production potential and the income realized by the cooperative unit of which each individual is part, 3) the size of the income (money or nature) obtained by a member depends on the training and contribution brought, materialized in the number of work norms performed and economic results (*ibid.* pp. 135).¹⁵

In the Marxist-Leninist conception, the nature of property serves social production. Therefore, the Communist Party of Romania also established and developed the principle of workers' self-leadership. The concept expresses the autonomy of socialist property and the process of direct participation of workers in the organization and management of the socio-economic activity of the collective enterprise, so each individual in a cooperative / collective enterprise has the quality of owner, being involved in production management, considering that the proletarians have experienced a professional, political and socio-cultural development, have developed the capacity to manage the means of production efficiently and are able to govern themselves (*ibid.* pp. 156-158).¹⁶ The general assembly, as a basic form of workers' self-management, is organized with the direct participation of all workers, and here the production plans, budgets, expenses and assignment of work tasks are debated and approved. The staff of each economic unit is responsible for the management of the unit. This self-management carries the task of covering the production costs and the expenses necessary to satisfy the socio-cultural needs, obtaining benefits for one's own development and the general development of the society, creating benefits for the working people (*ibid.* pp.157-159).

Summarizing the features provided by the Communist Party's program on self-government of collective enterprises, it is observed:

- 1) autonomy, independence in carrying out economic activity
 - a) autonomy of use of production funds
 - b) the right to draw up the tasks and the production plan
 - c) the autonomy of the production organization
 - d) the right to have one's own budget
 - e) the right of accounting and opening of bank accounts
- 2) autonomy in setting up and using own funds
- 3) autonomy to have economic and legal relations with other units
- 4) co-interest and material responsibility for the activity submitted
- 5) evidence and control (*ibid.* pp. 159-161).

Therefore, on the basis of these principles officially enunciated by the ideology of the Communist Party of Romania, in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist axiological line, it encouraged small and medium producers to unite voluntarily in production cooperatives, thus creating socialist property co-operative, they are responsible for maintaining self-governing property, for its development. Their main duty will be to obtain the best results, with the avail-

able means and full collective participation, to ensure the self-financing of the collective enterprise, to ensure their needs and to share the benefits. This form encourages collaborative relationships and mutual aid, determines working together and equal rights at work (Burtan et al. 1985, p. 86).¹⁷

The program for the emancipation of the poor peasantry had a propagandistic profile as collectivization was announced as a process of uniting the forces of the working class with the poor peasantry.¹⁸ Party leaders felt that the experience of the Soviet Union's collectivization campaign could be used as a model for setting priorities on the ground. The propaganda apparatus, together with the legal regulations and the local administration, focused only on the wealthy peasants (*chiaburi*) because they represented the expression of greed and exploitation, and by removing them they would have returned the resources of the community that really needed them.¹⁹ It was based on Engels' idea that the task of the state towards the small peasant is to transform the private household²⁰ in a cooperative one by the power of example and by the support of society for this purpose (Marx & Engels 1955, p. 473. Ivan 2009, pp. 78, 85). The idea was that in addition to the nationalization of important economic sectors (energy sector, mining sector, transport, internal / external trade, banking system, etc.) which in fact represented the wealth of the people, agricultural cooperatives should be established that were distinct from state-owned companies. They were decentralized and did not fall under the state, according to ideology, meaning that they were owned by community members, voluntarily associated and socializing the means of production (Kornai 1992, pp. 71, 77, 79).

According to the 1952 *Scînteia* newspaper, in the construction of socialism, the goal pursued by members united in agricultural collectives, with common means of production and collective labor, is to ensure victory against the peasants, exploiters and enemies of the working class, to remove retreat from individual farms. and get as much production as possible (Kligman & Verdery 2011, p. 88). The problem of disintegration of peasant property has been debated since the interwar period and the formula of merging small peasant property into cooperatives formed by voluntary membership was a solution to the problems of Romanian agriculture, a solution taken over by communist ideology and transmitted through the propaganda apparatus (Ivan 2009, p. 92).

Initial collective farms or GACs had to be created by *free consent*²¹ of people who voluntarily donated land for joint administration and ownership. Party leaders saw this principle as vital to legitimizing the party, communist ideology, and the legality of their actions:

“[...] Our party strongly emphasizes that the entry of working peasants into the collective household must be done voluntarily, that is, on the basis of free consent. Collective agricultural holdings must be established only on the basis of the desire, the decision of the working peasants [...]”²²

Even during collectivization, the leaders wondered if this principle was respected and the documents from the first years of collectivization in Romania indicate a concern of the central authorities for legality and respect for the principles of free association by consensus in agriculture²³. Gheorghiu-Dej recommended that a small number of GACs be set up at the beginning, and that accession be through the principle of “free consent”²⁴ thus the peasants will be convinced of the efficiency of the new type of common agricultural organization governed by their own community. He argued that this principle, of voluntary entry into associations or collective households, was fundamental to the socialist transformation of agriculture, and only the

deep conviction of the peasantry about the benefits of such an association could serve as a starting point for lasting households: „*The party is fighting resolutely against any violation of the principle of free consent in the organization of collective households*”.²⁵ (Kligman & Verdery 2011, pp. 125, 141. Roske & Cătănuș 2000, pp. 18-19. Ivan 2009, p. 92. Roske & Cătănuș 2005, pp. 165-166).

The model statute of the collective farm said that a collective farm is one in which the working peasants unite voluntarily, put together their land and their main means of production, based on public ownership of the means of production, collective work. and full ownership of the production obtained. Thus, “*the collective household is therefore a great household, whose owners are together all the collectivists and whose fruits serve to improve the life of each of them*”.²⁶

The formation mechanism of the GAC did not yield the expected yield and did not enjoy real success, so the party introduced at the end of 1951 another way of association, namely “*agricultural fellowship (întovărășire agricolă)*” which meant voluntary association but with retaining ownership of the land. The grounds for “*fellowship (întovărășire)*” were private but shared to facilitate collective labor and production. This type of association was easily assimilated in the rural mentality because it did not break the traditional link between the peasant and his goods and allowed the communities to work together. The idea was to keep the illusion that the legal guarantees on the use of the property were not lost, as those who opposed the collectivization invoked. Thus the contractual terms of the agricultural association proposed the distribution of goods and income according to the land area of each family and according to the work done. Therefore this practice proved that the partners who carried out the joint work and used agricultural machinery and equipment obtained higher yields per hectares of land (Roske & Cătănuș 2000 p. 26. Ivan 2009., pp. 94-95. Kideckel 2006, pp. 77 -78).

Analyzing the situation it is found that in 1952 there were more peasant families adhering to the GAC than those in the associations, but following the benefits of the self-organized communities through the form of association, in 1956 the proportions changed in favor of the associations comprising 452,100 families while the GACs had 231,600 families. In 1958 there were only 2,756 GACs with 398,246 families, compared to the increased number of companions of 11,431 with 1,125,082 families; in 1959 this type of association represented 75% of the total collectivist structures and 53% of the agricultural area (Ivan 2009, p. 95).

VII. De facto organization of agricultural cooperatives

In socialist countries the economy was *centralized-planned*²⁷, and this planning was done by the strongest bureaucratic agency – the national planning office – supported by the Central Committee on behalf of the party and the government on behalf of the state. The implementation of the plan was mandatory, and it came from the National Planning Bureau and the planning departments of ministries, directorates, companies and institutions (Kornai 1992, pp. 111, 114).

The plan was the biggest constraint in the socialist system, as well as in Romania, because it imperatively established the results that must reach the production, the annual quantity of priority goods produced, then the interventions during the year to modify the production plan, allocation planning raw materials. According to this plan, labor and working time were allocated, for example workers could be transferred from one office to another, companies were required to increase or decrease the number of workers and wages were calculated according

to the number of minutes worked by the workers. Another directive of the plan was related to the capacity of technological development, so depending on it and the higher authorities could proceed to the mechanization of specific processes, the allocation of funds for technological modernization, automatic production facilities, the introduction of new products (ibidem, pp. 114-116).

In order to carry out the proposed plan at the central level, subordinates from everywhere received directives from senior bureaucrats (“the transmission belts of domination and central power”)²⁸, the equivalent of smaller plans that aimed at a shorter period of time for implementation, but all together were intended to make the plan issued from the central level. In order to carry out these directives / production plans, the superiors intervened daily in every detail of the subordinates’ activity, so there was a centralized bureaucratic control (ibidem, p. 117).

In 1949, the mandatory quota system was introduced²⁹ which obliged the owners of collective households to deliver to the state fixed quantities of products, established by the single national plan, regardless of the harvest obtained. In 1945-1948 this policy was looser, but after the imposition of quotas, the state had the authority to take over the entire harvest. In addition to quotas, the state imposed the supply of other quantities of products at reduced fixed prices (Roske & Cătănuș 2000, p. 22).

From the beginning of the collectivization process in Romania, the supervision of the collectivization process was entrusted to a commission set up in March 1949, respectively the Agrarian Commission³⁰, subsequently in the Plenary C.C. in January 1950 it was decided to set up an Agrarian Section within the Central Committee under the leadership of Ana Pauker³¹. The orders of the Agrarian Section were transmitted hierarchically through the agrarian sections of the county party committees and at the local level through the village party organizations that collaborated with the agricultural commissions set up under the People’s Councils, and to repress the party’s policy they also had the function of supervising those in charge of organizing collective households. In the summer of 1950, with the abandonment of the “small steps policy” initially adopted and the acceleration of the establishment of G.A.Cs, the party launched directives at the central level and imposed standards for the establishment of collective households³², for example, it imposed a minimum number of founding families (35), which should have an area equal to the average area owned by a family in the commune and a minimum agricultural inventory³³ (Ivan 2009, p. 93. Roske & Cătănuș 2000, pp. 17-18).

The constitutional guarantee that gave full leadership powers to the party, facilitated the control of activities over institutional decisions and the division of labor, so workers and management were controlled by central institutions such as the National Union of Agricultural Production Cooperatives, which represented the peasants. by a party secretary who controlled and supervised work on all farms in a region. The state was extremely dependent on local workers, and so the stronger the state’s control over resources, limited property, and economic options, the greater the significance of individual actions for the state plan. Employees of such a state-owned enterprise (cooperative or enterprise) were not allowed to leave their jobs if they were dissatisfied with working conditions or excessive controls, because they had to receive approval from the sole employer, namely the state (Kideckel 2006, pp. 63, 66. Kornai 1992, p. 100).

Also here, the peasants from the agricultural cooperatives could not choose, in the initial phase, not to join the association, and then they did not have the right to leave the association, and some even if they were not collectivized, were forced to actively participate in the life of the cooperative. central authorities. Thus, everyone had to register (or get hired) as a member

of the agricultural team in order to have the possibility of cultivating personal land, confiscated³⁴ by the state (Kornai 1992, pp. 79-80).

Although at the central level the principle of “free consent” was upheld, at the local level it was systematically violated by repressive instruments to persuade the peasants to join the agricultural cooperative, as they resisted the pressures. Central cadres have withdrawn the power of local authorities, reversing the poles of power to re-establish central authority over the process of collectivization (Kligman & Verdery 2011, pp. 128-130, 133-134, 138).

Not only the argument of the collectivization campaign was of an ideological nature but also the repression; although it was originally announced as an alliance program with the poor and working peasantry, the ally of the working class, in reality no social category was exempt from repression, including ideologically protected peasants. Peasants who refused to join the GAC were arrested and subjected to violent moral and physical pressure, so they had no choice but to sign the GAC application or be declared saboteurs, arrested and prosecuted („either here or on Canal “) (Ivan 2009, pp. 96-97).

Although the central authorities were in a hurry to confiscate rural resources by coercive methods, including human resources, in the Model Statute of the Farm, considered a propaganda document that embodied the ideal of collectivization, thresholds for accession to the GAC were set and defined in ideologically the profile of the adherent: “[...] *Only small and medium-sized peasants, landless peasants and other laborers necessary for the household can be admitted to the household – so only people who live from their work and do not exploit the work of others*”.³⁵

Indeed, despite the fact that the propaganda model (presented above) is antithetical to the practice of collectivization, in the sense that not everyone is accepted in the farm, but in reality the authorities were facing an acute shortage of labor or were in I use this status here as an additional argument to demonstrate the nature of the Leviathan-type organization of households – with directives from the center, sets of rules and official measures external to households, etc. – because it imposes rules and formalizes practices discriminatory on the basis of social status criteria, without allowing autonomy at the community level

Any activity of any organization or individual was controlled by several superior organizations / individuals in the hierarchy. The state / party apparatus and their auxiliary organizations oversaw and controlled the activities of all organizations and institutions to eliminate any trace of political association or allegiance, so party leaders engaged the political police to initiate frequent checks in this regard. In the case of the administrative sector, the party officials within the union also carried out checks and any irregularities were transmitted to the over-ordered structures. Thus we can identify another proof that the practical system contradicts and rejects any form of criticism or constructive opinion for improvement, from the base of society to the top³⁶. (Kornai 1992, pp. 98-100).

Following the central plan, the communes in which the new GACs were to be established were established, and the mechanism established at the central level was applied at the level of each county, the district committees tried to set up 1016 households by any method and at any cost to satisfy directives of the Central Committee, this campaign also called for the involvement of the Militia and the Securitate forces, generalizing the practice of bringing the peasants to the People’s Council and persuading them to join the GAC through violent methods of persuasion.³⁷ Therefore, the production was planned and centralized from the beginning, the local community not being able to decide on the type of crop or quantity. Collective

households (GAC) were subordinated to a bureaucratic apparatus that developed development policies according to the political orientation of the time, and the type of agricultural crops were established by party directives, for example in May 1955, Gheorghe Apostol demanded the first secretaries as outside land cultivated with technical plants, all other areas to be cultivated with corn, including plots next to the house (Ivan 2009, pp. 94, 103).

Even if the official ideology spoke of the autonomy of enterprises and the self-government of any type of cooperative, the same ideology is confused because it claims that the return of the peasants and their limited vision of information deficiencies made them unaware of their interest and therefore oppose collectivization, and their resistance to change must also be fought vigorously, against their will, because in the end it is for their own good and interest. This confiscation of private property by the socialist state practically legitimizes the power of the party and gives a paternalistic meaning to the real practice of collectivization (Kornai 1992, p. 88).

Individual peasant households fought against state domination and the dissonance between the promises of organizational autonomy and the practice of strengthening central authority through the directives of party and state structures. The structure and requirements of Romanian socialism – collectively and in the factory – limited cooperation and encouraged division, misunderstanding and division, so that there was intra-community competition rather than a promotion of the logic and legitimacy of centralized accumulation (Kideckel 2006, p. 121).

The abuses committed and the exaggerated guidelines issued by the socialist state authority and the P.M.R were acknowledged and condemned even by the Soviet leaders. Thus, the PMR leadership, convened in Moscow in July 1953, was forced to adopt the principles of the “new course”, a relaxed form of post-Stalinist socialist policy, and was harshly criticized for poor agricultural performance and “wrong, grammatical policy.” and dangerous “practiced until then: „*To direct politics in relations with the peasantry, to liquidate the established policy*”.³⁸ The severity of product quotas and impossible production plans, the abuses of land consolidation for collective households, the repression of the peasants, the administrative pressures on the peasants and their deprivation of agricultural products were recognized (Roske & Cătănuș 2005, pp. 9-13).

Centralism and planned production were not abandoned even after the end of collectivization: Ceausescu pointed out that the implementation of the program to increase agricultural and vegetable production requires continuous improvement of the planning, management and guidance of all agriculture. He argued that the essence of centralism in agriculture was the C.A.P. as the basic unit of socialist agriculture which must focus on the realization of planned production. The agricultural production cooperative (CAP), at the ideological level was under the ownership and control of its members who merged their land and resources, practically outside the scope of state control but produced a wide variety of resources that were used to meet the needs of its members but also for the central accumulation of the state. Although the CAP was owned by members, the state controlled production through legal regulations that prioritized, through regional agro-industrial councils: 1) fulfillment of mandatory state contracts, 2) creation of reserves, 3) reserve fund for difficult years, 4) helping orphans, the elderly, the sick, 5) selling products in domestic markets, 6) paying the balance for members (Ivan 2009, pp.103-104. Kideckel 2006, pp. 58-60).³⁹

The study program of the political economy of the Romanian Communist Party of 1985, according to the traditional Marxist-Leninist line, claimed that the central place in the system of planned economic management is occupied by the party as a central authority issuing plan-

ning guidelines, “as a result of increasing the complexity and the qualitative level of the tasks of economic and social development “. The party and the socialist state play a leading role, are in charge of perfecting the instruments of production and are responsible for the political control over the organizations “for the achievement of the established objectives”. The study program states that the state administers all material means, ensures the mobilization, use and distribution of resources, exercises the leadership of the entire economic and social activity: „Achieving the objectives of the next five years and the future development of Romania [...] requires, as an objective necessity, an even stronger growth of the role of the state in the planning, organization and unitary management of all economic and social activity, based on the single plan” (Congress Report al XIII-al al PCR, 1985) (Burtan et. al 1985, pp. 108-109). Report of the XIII Congress of the PCR, 1985) (Burtan et al. 1985, pp. 108-109).

Law no. 8/1972 on the planned economic and social development of Romania presents disagreements regarding the establishment of legislators or those who elaborate the plan, because, since the introduction of the legislative act it is specified that „The Romanian Communist Party – the leading political force of society – elaborates of the country, establishes for each stage the fundamental objectives of the whole activity, guides and organizes the process of shaping the socialist society [...] “, „economic and social development is based on the single national plan”, which is also issued by the party and state, in Art. 23 recalls that „the planned leadership of economic and social development is based on the principle of democratic centralism”, and even in the introduction and later to the annals of the law is invoked the leading role of the working class, „engaging the whole people in party politics” and broad and direct participation of the working class in alliance with the peasantry in the elaboration and realization of the unique national plan (Art. 23).⁴⁰

It is true that the same law states in its infancy that „the program of the Romanian Communist Party is the most faithful expression of the interests of the working class, the peasantry and the intellectuals, of all working people [...]”, which could remove any suspicion of the role of Leviathan or the dominant authority of the Romanian socialist party and state, but later, the following articles contradict the initial idea and state that „planning must achieve the current activity of all socialist units [...]in the joint effort to carry out the general political line of the Romanian Communist Party”(Art. 30) or „The five-year plans for economic and social development include the objectives set for that stage by the Romanian Communist Party [...]” (Art. 34)⁴¹.

Therefore, the relatively confusing legislation reveals the leading role of the state party in coordinating the production of any kind, including agricultural cooperatives, a fact validated once again by the study program of political economy of the PCR (Burtan et. Al 1985) where It is stated that even if in the elaboration of the plan the enterprises conclude with the center, the proposals coming from the local level are centralized and analyzed by the State Planning Committee (CSP) and the Ministry of Agriculture, with the county bodies annexed to it and subsequently establishing the draft production plan in accordance with the central decisions of the C.C Plenary of the P.C.R. and the opinions of the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Council of Economic and Social Development (Burtan et. al. 1985, pp. 109-110).

There is a dissonance between the Marxist-Leninist ideological theoretical framework and the praxis of state organs, ie public property and nationalization are in fact instrumental values that want to lead to welfare, social justice and ensuring freedom, and if there are forms of

private property that ensure these purposes then their abolition is not necessary, but the practice contradicts the ideological line of argument (Kornai 1992, p. 88).

VIII. Analysis results

Following the introspection in the Romanian socialist project on the collectivization of the agricultural sector, I will use the institutional models of governance of common goods proposed by Ostrom and the typology of assets in society to explain the institutional alternative of organization and the type of assets administered as proposed by the ideological plan.

Therefore, in the theoretical model of agricultural collectivization, socialist ownership is defined by relationships established between members of society / community regarding the ownership and sharing of the means of production and the social appropriation of production results, in order to increase material and spiritual well-being, and Ostrom in The model of self-governing communities assumes that all members involved in a self-governing association devise a cooperation strategy for the use of the common good (here agricultural land), so we will have a consensus of all users on a strategy to share the common good and of the costs of implementing the contract. Another element of similarity, which can be explained by Ostrom's model, is the agreed consent to the association, as provided by the official regulations of the Communist Party, namely the meeting of the principle of "free consent" of each peasant before joining the agricultural cooperative.

The Marxist-Leninist line encouraged small producers and individual peasant households to unite, voluntarily in production cooperatives, to create a cooperative and self-organized socialist property in each community, giving the peasants the opportunity to take responsibility for maintaining self-government property, for its development. Their main duty is to achieve good results, with the means available and full collective participation, to ensure the self-financing of the collective enterprise, to meet their needs and to share the benefits equally. The Ostromian assumption also talks about strategies for sharing the capacity to support the common good and the costs of implementing the contract between members, and the final form of the contract between them will be a balanced, fair one that certifies the equal sharing of benefits and of costs.

The statute of the cooperative organization provided for the possibility of leaving the collective farms by the peasants in case of violation of their rights of use, non-compliance with the initial agreement by and dissonance of the actions of others with respect to contractual terms or simply, considering unprofitable. This clause is also formulated in the model of self-government which states that anyone can reject contractual terms, in case of conflicts of interest, unfair proposals of others on the administration of the property and its maintenance costs, and justice in this case will be by virtue of a set of rules. because the adherents will have detailed and precise information about the capacity to support the common good and about the behavior of the other actors.

Following the expertise of the socialist ideological plan for collectivization of agriculture in Romania, analyzed and explained with the Ostromian models of institutional arrangements, it can be said that, theoretically, collectivization / self-government of agricultural areas provided similar criteria to Ostrom, respectively 1) limits clearly established (who uses), 2) concordance between the rules of appropriation and supply and local conditions, 3) ways of collective choice (agreed rules and the possibility of changing them (here the exit from the

household), 4) monitoring-observer and external mediator for compliance the terms agreed by the peasants (here the party and the state), 5) differentiated sanctions, 6) mechanisms for resolving conflicts; 7) the minimum recognition of the right to organize.

Given the combination of models of Ostromian institutional alternatives with the typology of types of goods in nature and their classification on a certain pattern of government (see subchapter 2.3) then we can say that socialist agricultural groups also, according to the ideological plan, operate with toll goods.

In the section “De facto organization of agricultural cooperatives” we talked about the practice of the collectivization process and the real proceduralism of the establishment of collective households, imposed by the state policy of the socialist party. Therefore, in the presentation of the de facto organization of agricultural cooperatives, we identified a paternalistic behavior practiced by the state during the implementation of measures to cooperate in agriculture. First of all, we identified a general feature of socialist economies – the centralization and planning of production and consumption – which was a mandatory, generalized measure that imperatively established the results to be achieved by production, the annual quantity of priority goods produced. Then we identified a systematic coordination and transmission of directives in agriculture, from the central level to the periphery, through the “transmission belts”, respectively bureaucrats. There is intervention and control over activities over institutional decisions and the division of labor through central institutions (see Commission or Agrarian Section), then the system of mandatory quotas that obliges owners of collective households to hand over fixed quantities of products to the state.

This paternalistic behavioral model can be explained by the model of Leviathan or external authority, proposed by Ostrom because at the level of the model is located an institutional force with major coercive powers and public control for economic efficiency, which is observed in the case of real practice of collectivization of agriculture. in Romania, where we identified directives, central institutions, bureaucrats / hierarchically organized organizations, coercive and control system that directed any activity. The state plan imposed sets of rules that centrally coordinated the organization of communities operating with common goods, such as imposing the minimum number of founding families of the G.A.C., the minimum area for membership, and the minimum means required.

Another feature of the Leviathan model is the establishment and imposition of a strategy considered the best⁴² for use of resources, therefore the dominant external authority determines who and how much can benefit the good of the community. The same happened in the case of agricultural groups where the state was dependent on labor and forced the peasants, contrary to their preferences, to join the association, and then revoked their right to leave the association, and others, even if they were not collectivized. , were forced to perform for the benefit of cooperatives. Practically, the principle stipulated in the official statute, namely “free consent”, was violated, and this contributes more to paternalism and the involvement of the authority in community activities. But there were also rejections of applications for association, as the Model Statute of the Farm, seen as one of the sets of state (and party) rules, imposed rules and formalized discriminatory practices based on social status criteria, as a process of selection of those which entered the agricultural collectives, without allowing an autonomy at community level.

The collectivized peasants were determined the amount of remunerated products according to the indicators predetermined by the central authority (number of points accumulated through work, number of hours worked, production per ha, land donated to the association per

household, etc.). The paternalism of the socialist state was justified by the consideration of the return of the peasants and their vision limited by the lack of information that did not allow the knowledge of interests, so the Leviathan had to adopt a strategy for the common good.

The central authority accurately determines the capacity of common resources and establishes methods of use, says the Ostromian model, which is similar to the centralized-planned nature of production, and the inability of the local community to make decisions about the type of crop or the amount paid (in May,1955 Gheorghe Apostol asked the first secretaries that apart from the lands cultivated with technical plants, all the other surfaces be cultivated with corn, including the lots next to the house).

A last aspect of Leviathan would be the ability to impose negative incentives through sanctions / fines for those who deviate from the rules, so such a central authority can determine the behavior of users of the common good, which we identify in the case of collectivization where the state has engaged militia and security forces to use violent persuasive methods of joining agricultural cooperatives or sanctioning opponents / reactionaries. The repressive apparatus – the Militia and the Security – had the function of supervising those in charge of organizing the collective households and dealt with the prevention of possible deviations from the process of collectivization or production itself, which translates into Ostrom's model with precision of the information held by state, monitoring power, penalty capacity and zero cost for administration.

Following the analysis and use of the particularities of Ostrom's institutional models, on the real organizational behaviors and practices within the collectivization process and the subsequent socialist agricultural activity, it can be concluded that in reality, the socialist state together with the only existing party functioned as the issuing central authority. of imperative rules and directives on a process of socialization of agricultural production which had been announced as a freely consented and staged one. Therefore, there is a dissonance between the Marxist-Leninist ideological theoretical framework and the praxis of the state organs, and the procedure of collectivization of agriculture in the socialist period was a Leviathan-type one with external central directives.

Considering also the combination of the models of the ostromian institutional alternatives with the typology of the types of natural goods and their framing on a certain pattern of government (see the section "Combining the institutional models of resource governance with the typology of natural goods") then we can say that the de facto organization socialist agricultural collectives, under the domination of a foreign central authority, operate with toll goods.

Notes

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¹ Owner can be a natural person (individual, family, specific group of people) or legal entity (firm, university, state organization, government, local authority)

² Strategic stakeholders will comply with a set of rules when, following repetitive situations, the collective goal is reached and when the other actors involved comply with the regulation (see Levi 1988. pp. 52-53).

³ See „Public Goods” (Miroiu 2007, pp. 119-120)

⁴ See „Common Goods” (ibidem. pp. 118-120)

⁵ See „Toll Goods” (ibidem. pp. 118-119)

⁶ See „Private Goods” (ibid.)

⁷ It must first be established that at a time before the resources were managed by such an institutional arrangement (self-governing associations), they were common goods, meaning that anyone who had access to them but once extracted a number of resource units from this good, other users could no longer use the same amount. That's why I chose to talk about self-governing communities and identify the kind of goods they operate with because such an alternative is supposed to revolve around a dilemma of using a rare, unmanageable, or slightly perishable resource that everyone has access to. and overexploitation is achieved (rivalry ownership is fulfilled).

⁸ Or "rivalry" (if they were common goods) decreases because once the regulatory institution is introduced – the collective agreement of the self-governing community – then a balance will be created through the system of rules by which members will benefit from the same number of units. resource (even if it is quite rare, non-renewable or difficult to regenerate)

⁹ This type of self-government contract could be based on the principle of fairness to others, which requires a weighted consumption of resources and their care to leave as much and as good a quantity as it was used in initially (see Locke's 1924 Lockean Clause, pp. 130-131).

¹⁰ Even if a resource is scarce, non-renewable or difficult to regenerate, balanced use tools will be developed for all beneficiaries, for example in the case of arable land the method of crop rotation will be used, or in the case of extensive land where in a season the weather is favorable and sometimes not, then the co-owners will use the land by rotation or will use redistribution tools for compensation

¹¹ See the example of the fishing community in Alanya, Turkey, and the regulation providing for compensation and balance systems between members or the case of the philanthropic communities in the Philippines (Ostrom 2007, pp. 33-34, 101-103. Berkes 1986, pp. 73-74 Siy 1982, pp. 141,146).

¹² The analogy with the land intended for housing construction is based on the example with the apartment in the explanation of the dimension of "Rivalry" from *Miroiu, Adrian. (2007). Fundamentals of Politics: Vol. II: Rationality and Collective Action. Polirom. Iasi. pp. 118*

¹³ It is assumed that the level reached by the development of the productive forces in the stage of classical socialism, cannot yet ensure the abundance of products and services necessary for the repression according to needs, according to the last communist stage. Therefore, the principle "each according to possibilities, each according to needs" will be replaced in this intermediate stage with "from each according to capacity, to each according to work" (see Burtan et. Al. 1985, pp. 130-131).

¹⁴ Law no. 2/1983 on the basic principles of improving the system of remuneration of work and distribution of income of working people

¹⁵ Law no. 1/1982 – Law on the remuneration of workers in cooperative agricultural units, adopted by the Great National Assembly, <http://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliuDocument/46543> (accessed 1.06.2016)

¹⁶ The principle that gives enterprises the capacity for self-organization / self-government is validated by Law 5/1978 on the organization and leadership of state socialist units through the general assembly of working people, <http://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliuDocument/28283> (accessed 1.06.2016).

¹⁷ Law no. 3/1982 on the participation, with social shares, of the workers from the state economic units in the establishment of the economic development fund, <http://www.monitoruljuridic.ro/act/lege-nr-3-din-20-noiembrie-1982-republicata-privind-participarea-cu-parti-sociale-a-oamenilor-muncii-din-unitatile-economice-de-stat-la-constituirea-fondului-de-dezvoltare-economica-22099.html> (accessed 1.06.2016).

¹⁸ V.I. Lenin: "*Reely on the poor peasantry, make a lasting alliance with the middle peasant, never cease to fight the squabble. For it is only by applying this slogan that the main masses of the peasantry can be drawn to the path of building socialism.*" (see Stalin 1951, pp. 106-107. Roske & Cătănuș 2000, p. 63).

¹⁹ Socialist politics wanted a "fragmentation" of society, as an ideological tactic and not a real effort to redistribute the lands of the peasants, which fueled the class conflict in rural areas, the poor peasants and middlemen were instigated against the peasants chiaburi and so made a conceptual separation of the rich from the rest of the community by stigmatizing and weakening their authority (Jowitt 1971, pp. 110-111. Kideckel 2006, pp. 75-76).

²⁰ Before collectivization under classical socialist rule, there were agricultural cooperatives organized in the form of small family undertakings where the family used its own labor force but later "private firms managed by owners with unlimited liability" or "joint stock companies" appeared private property "which had the

possibility of employing external labor, the latter two falling into the category of exploiters or kulaks. The elimination of private property and small family businesses meant, in an ideological sense, the elimination of the “virus” of the “petty bourgeoisie’s” self-interest, the damage and evasion of work for the common good of the community; small family farms could have encouraged the spirit of accumulation and were potential capitalist properties (Kornai 1992, pp. 67-70, 81-84).

²¹ Eng. „free consent”. the principle of free consent was vital to legitimizing the party and the legality of its actions, which demonstrated popular support for it. see Gail Kligman & Katherine Verdery. 2011. pp. 125.

²² Excerpt from the P.M.R Propaganda Work with indications on the establishment of collective farms. 1953. in Roske & Cătănuș 2005, p. 165.

²³ Concern for deviations from the peaceful plan of collectivization and for “wrong methods” in the meeting of the C.C. Secretariat of the P.M.R. of October 10, 1950 in which the report on the deviations from the party line in the issue of the creation of new collective farms was analyzed. in Roske & Cătănuș 2000, pp. 181-220

²⁴ Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Plenary Session 1951: “Only those who are convinced that the collective association is better than the small individual farm must enter. Slowly, slowly, others will be convinced and will come voluntarily, not forced. A collective cannot be forcibly realized ... Coercive methods are foreign to us and are detrimental to our party “(see ANIC, PCR-Chancellery CC Fund, tab 23/1951, p. 5 in Kligman & Verdery 2011, p. 125) .

²⁵ – The speech of Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej at the Congress of leaders in collective farms. May 24, 1953. in Roske & Cătănuș 2000, p. 326. Roske & Cătănuș 2005, p. 36.

– P.M.R.’s propaganda work with indications regarding the establishment of collective farms. 1953. in Roske & Cătănuș 2005, p. 166.

²⁶ P.M.R propaganda work with indications regarding the establishment of collective farms. 1953. in Roske & Cătănuș 2005, pp. 168-169.

²⁷ According to the Marxist-Leninist ideological concept of “*Centralization and economic planning*” in the context of centralized-planned economy and its theoretical assumptions.

²⁸ According to Hannah Arendt, among the marks of totalitarianism (monopoly of absolute power, hierarchies, security of complete independence of the dictator) is the administrative apparatus consisting of bureaucrats, party leaders and repressive structures called “belts of domination and power” (see Arendt 1973, p 460).

²⁹ Decree No. 306 of July 20, 1949 for the collection of grain, <http://idrept.ro/DocumentView.aspx?DocumentId=00027855> (accessed 6.06.2016)

³⁰ Consisting of the Minister of Agriculture, party activists, secretaries of state in the Ministry of Agriculture and a Soviet adviser

³¹ See Minutes of the meeting of the C.C. Secretariat of the P.C.R in which Ana Pauker was appointed to lead the commission for the establishment of collective households. March 28, 1949 in Roske & Cătănuș 2000, pp. 114-117

³² See Decision on the timely preparation and execution of the harvest and the execution of the collection plan for 1959. in Roske & Cătănuș 2000, pp. 133-137

³³ Report of the Political Bureau of the C.C of the P.M.R presented by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej at the plenary session of the C.C of the P.M.R 3-5 March 1949. in Roske & Cătănuș 2000, pp. 65-66

³⁴ About deviation from the principle of free consent and unforeseen confiscations in the Meeting of the C.C. Secretariat of the P.M.R. of October 10, 1950 in which the report on the deviations from the party line in the issue of the creation of new collective farms was analyzed. in Roske & Cătănuș 2000, pp. 181-220.

³⁵ P.M.R propaganda work with indications regarding the establishment of collective farms. 1953. in Roske & Cătănuș 2005, p. 167.

³⁶ Eng. „from bottom to top”

³⁷ Through these coercive methods, over 30,000 peasant households were forcibly joined in the GAC, so that at the beginning of the collectivization process (until the spring of 1950) there were 176 collective households, and by the end of the same year they were established. 961, mostly non-functional; out of the total of the 3,067,000 peasant families in 1952, 120,000 had entered the collectivist structures, ie 3.1% of the total households (Ivan 2009, p. 94).

³⁸ – The transcript of the discussions between the P.M.R. delegation and the P.C.U.S leadership regarding the application of the “new course” in the economic policy of the Bucharest regime. July 8-13, 1953 (Transcripts of meetings of the P.C.U.S and P.M.R leadership of the Kremlin. July 1953 from the Archive of the C.C. Political Bureau of the P.M.R. No. 83/1953). in Roske & Cătănuș 2005, pp. 45-53

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³⁹ Ministry of Justice of the Romanian People’s Republic (1956). Legislation on collective farms and agricultural associations. Bucharest. pp. 65-66. in Kideckel 2006.

⁴⁰ Law no. 8/1972 on the planned economic and social development of Romania, <http://lege5.ro/Gratuit/gydsobw/legea-nr-8-1972-privind-dezvoltarea-economico-sociala-planificata-a-romaniei> (accessed 3.06.2016)

⁴¹ Law no. 8/1972 on the planned economic and social development of Romania, <http://lege5.ro/Gratuit/gydsobw/legea-nr-8-1972-privind-dezvoltarea-economico-sociala-planificata-a-romaniei> (accessed 3.06.2016)

⁴² Here the best strategy is calculated on the basis of ideological imperatives and grounds.

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