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# MILITARY SANCTIONS: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE CASE OF UZBEKISTAN

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*Abstract: States frequently find themselves disbursing or receiving military aid, cooperation, and access to military products. Using foreign policy options like "military sanctions" (the suspension of military projects, aid, cooperation, and access) is a desirable, widely publicized way for one state to express its discontent to another while presumably influencing desired policy changes in the client state. However, the small amount of evidence on military sanctions indicates that they are ineffective, short-lived, and may even be counterproductive. This analysis attempted to elucidate this subject by advancing a theory stating that states will impose military sanctions in response to domestic audience pressures shortly after high-profile examples of undesirable behavior by client states. However, military sanctions will be eased as time progresses and public attention has waned. This analysis qualitatively examined Uzbekistan and its relationship with the US, finding support for this theory. It concluded that following high-profile incidents and periods of undesirable behavior by an aid-recipient state, military sanctions would likely be employed by the state providing the military aid and programs. Further, military sanctions are eased or scrapped as time moves from public incidents and attention involving human rights abuses.*

Keywords: Military Sanctions; Uzbekistan; Conflict; War On Terror; Foreign Policy

## INTRODUCTION

Amongst the tools available for a state to coerce another state, short of war but sterner than a diplomatic rebuke, the use of sanctions is one of the most common. Typically, these are crafted as economic punishments designed to force/coerce states regarded as non-friendly into making policy choices that they do not find desirable. Thus frequently, they are used as an economic weapon for affecting policy choices against non-allies of the sanctioning country. However, research has shown economic sanctions to be largely ineffective, particularly against unfriendly regimes that do not anticipate amicable future relations with the sanctioning state (thus giving it little reason to buckle in the short term). These include using targeted sanctions against individuals or organizations and comprehensive sanctions against an entire state.

However, "military sanctions" against states have been far less studied in international relations. What is meant by this is the suspension of amicable military relations, supplies of military aid, as well as the availability of military hardware which a "sanctioned" state may be allowed to purchase from the sanctioning state. Although the suspension of customary government programs and aid falls into the defined realm of sanctioning activities (Carter 1987), research on the suspension of military programs and aid lags far behind the body of work focused on economic sanctions. What is interesting about military sanctions is that they, by default, can only be used against states allied to the sanctioning state (at least militarily), as

opposed to economic sanctions typically used against unfriendly nations to little effect (Pape 1998). Ironically, it has been found that economic sanctions typically work better when used against a country with whom the sanctioning state has friendly relations with (Cameron 2012).

However, what little research has been published on military sanctions (mostly their use to promote human rights in the sanctioned country) has indicated that not only are they ineffective in achieving their stated objectives (Broder and Lambek 1988; Kucera 2012), particularly in autocracies known for human rights violations (Allen 2008), but typically they are fleeting in their enforcement and existence (Lumpe 2010). In addition, although states often receive military aid with human rights conditions attached to them, this is frequently associated with worse human rights violations by aid-recipient countries (Sandholtz 2016; Christensen and Weinstein 2013). This is problematic, as military sanctions against friendly nations are not as effective as economic sanctions in achieving their stated objectives. So, knowing this, why would states engage in the use of military sanctions (the denial of aid, suspension of access to the sanctioning state's military hardware market, and/or the cut-off of military cooperation) to achieve policy aims like the promotion of human rights if they know that they will be ineffective?

This article advances a theory to explain this behavior amongst states that practice foreign policy choices such as military sanctions despite seeming not to work. It begins with reviewing the literature on sanctions and their effectiveness. Next, it advances a theory regarding the use of military sanctions. After this, it outlines the research design and case study methodology, followed by a case analysis of military aid and sanctioning regarding Uzbekistan. It finishes with a summary conclusion of the paper and suggestions for future research.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

The use of sanctioning activities in statecraft as a coercive tool is an ancient one, with the Athenian use of them against Megara in 432 BC being one of the impetuses which led to the Peloponnesian War (Friedman 2012). That being said, the exact definition of what it is to sanction a country has not seen common international consensus (with some viewing it as an act of war and some states viewing it as a peaceful means for inducing a state to make policy choices). However, Cameron (2012) offers a commonly cited definition of sanctions as the "deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal or threat of withdrawal of customary trade or financial relations" (p. 1). The contemporary use of the term "sanctions" conjures up the images of trade wars and oil embargoes. It may refer to both "smart/targeted" sanctions against small groups, organizations, and individuals, as well as comprehensive sanctions against the entire economy of a state. The main thrust of the research on this subject indicates that both types of sanctions fail to achieve their foreign policy objectives and frequently backfire by enabling the regime to have a greater excuse to double down on their policies by demonizing the sanctioning state (Drezner 2011; Pape 1998). It is conjectured that this failure may be partly because they are used against unfriendly countries and would ironically be more effective against allies (Cameron 2012).

As noted, the conventional use of the term "sanctions" frequently raises commercial connotations, such as the sanctioning of oil. However, the suspension of government programs and aid (such as in the military arena) is also included by nature in the repertoire of sanctioning

activities (Carter 1987), although not receiving nearly as much scholarly attention. This type of sanctioning is known as an act of “retorsion” and is a coercive one that is not in breach of international law (Carter 2003) and is used against countries with whom the sanctioning state is allied. Laws and legislation exist in states that export arms and dispense military aid, which provides for military sanctioning.

One notable example is the United States of America (US). The US is the world’s largest military exporter and provider of military aid (Wezeman, Fleurant, Kuimova, Tian, and Wezeman 2018). It has several related court cases and laws for its suspension. In the case of *United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (1936)*, 299 US 304, in response to a military conflict playing out between Paraguay and Bolivia, the United States Supreme Court upheld a presidential decree barring US companies from selling weapons, ammunition, airplanes, and any other war material to those two countries. Almost half a century later, Congress passed The Arms Export Control Act (1976), PL No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 allowed the authority to sanction the export of weapons, ammunition, and other products for war-making. Arms sales and aid, as noted, frequently come with stipulations (often related to human rights) as to their use and continued disbursement, with violations resulting in their sanctioning based on The Arms Export Control Act (1976) (Tana1986). Thus in the world’s largest purveyor of all things military, the notion of military sanctions has a longstanding place in legislation and laws for its use as a tool of coercion.

However, military sanctions are a significantly complex subject. Although similar to economic sanctions in that a targeted state would have to make up the financial shortfall in their defense budget which would theoretically result from the imposition of military sanctions, there is significant symbolism associated with military sanctioning, which may not be present with economic sanctions. Defense cooperation between states carries with it connotations of state survival, and thus it is often paramount to the leaders of many states. Thus, attaching conditions unrelated to defense to military aid and programs is controversial, despite being utilized to promote policy objectives like economic reform, the promotion of human rights, and fair governance (Murshed and Sen 1995). The United States prides itself as a promoter of human rights and has ostensibly sought to use its clout as a provider of military power to achieve these policies worldwide. These policies include the non-targeting of civilians and noncombatants, especially with the help of military aid provided (such as supplied munitions and armored personnel carriers being used against peaceful protestors, for example). Those practices have long been prohibited by international norms and laws against such conduct (Valentino, Huth, and Croco, 2006). Furthermore, as time has passed, international treaties and legislation against human rights violations (including by one’s government) have only gained in both numbers and momentum (Murphy 2018; Rochester 2006). This has then given rise to the use of sanctions to enforce these treaties, with sanctions (military or otherwise) in this regard being used as an “(...) action against a state considered to be violating international law [designed] to compel that state to conform” (Daoudi and Dajani 1983, 5-8).

The use of military sanctions to achieve humanitarian aims has been utilized in practice by major arms exporters such as the United States. After the end of the Cold War, attention began to be paid to regimes that committed human rights abuses that had previously gotten a pass in the name of the ideological battle being waged during the Cold War. Support for unscrupulous dictators was rife by the capitalist and communist blocs during the Cold War.

However, the evaporation of those rivalries aroused a greater interest in utilizing laws like The Arms Export Control Act (1976) to place humanitarian stipulations on military aid. If these stipulations were not met, in theory, then military sanctions would be put into effect, and military sales/aid would be suspended.

One example of this was the case of pre-collapse Somalia. After the Cold War, the United States Congress began to take umbrage regarding US aid sent to Siad Barre due to Somalia's use of American weapons to kill civilians (Gershoni 1996). As a result, aid was suspended, and Siad Barre eventually had to turn to Libya for military support. Another example is the case of Liberia. According to Gershoni (1996):

Even before the 1990 rebellion, some US congressmen advocated cutting aid to Liberia because of the Doe regime's human rights abuses. In early May 1990, in response to information about atrocities against civilians by government troops, Congress passed a bill suspending US military aid to Liberia. In the post-cold war era, Samuel Doe's regime, once an asset that the US had made great efforts to shore up, was a burden (p. 241).

The interesting thing about military sanctions is that, as opposed to how economic sanctions are often utilized, they are used against allies. Economic sanctions are often used as a tool of statecraft, short of warfare but harsher than a diplomatic rebuke, ostensibly designed to affect policy change in a targeted state. However, literature has shown that economic sanctions seldom achieve their objectives, in part because they are used against unfriendly regimes with little reason to expect friendly treatment in the future and thus have no interest in acquiescing to demands in the short-term (Pape 1998).

Economic sanctions are thought to be more effective against friendly nations (Cameron 2012), which is ironic because they are seldom necessary against states with amicable relations with the potential sanctioning state. It would then stand to reason that military sanctions would effectively achieve their stated policy goals, considering that they are naturally used against friendly nations. However, it would appear that this has not always been the case and that the effectiveness and duration of military sanctions against states have not appeared robust (Broder and Lambek 1988; Lumpe 2010; Kucera 2012). Furthermore, although states often receive military aid with human rights conditions attached to them, this is associated with worse human rights violations (Sandholtz 2016; Christensen and Weinstein 2013) in aid-recipient states. So why would countries such as the United States of America, the largest provider of military hardware and aid in the world, bother employing military sanctions against allies while knowing that they seem ineffective in achieving their stated goals?

The paper below will propose a general theory explaining this phenomenon and advancing two hypotheses regarding the implementation and duration of military sanctions, which were created to achieve foreign policy changes (such as good governance and human rights).

## THEORY

Presuming that countries such as the United States, which furnishes a large amount of the world's military programs and aid, realize that military sanctions do not achieve many substantive or long-lasting achievements regarding their stated objectives, why do they use them on countries which are by nature allies? What literature there has been on military aid and sanctions are troubling. It would appear that rendering military aid, which includes stipulations regarding human rights, is associated with worse human rights violations among aid recipients (Sandholtz 2016; Christensen and Weinstein 2013) and that military sanctions based on these violations are ineffective and short-lived (Broder and Lambek 1988; Lumpe 2010; Kucera 2012).

This article theorizes that a state may utilize military sanctions in response to domestic audience pressures placed upon the leaders of that state to take some action when confronted with undesired behavior by an aid-recipient state. The stated objectives of sanctioning regarding military aid are frequently related to good governance and human rights (Murshed and Sen 1995). The leaders of a state which provides military programs and aid may employ military sanctions as a powerful signal to their domestic constituents that they are taking concrete steps to affect the proliferation of human rights, as military aid can be seen to a state as critical to its very survival, a sanctioned state would feel heavy pressure to conform to their benefactor's policy preferences. Thus military sanctions may follow an especially egregious example of human rights abuses in a country receiving military aid. This should, in theory, appease domestic constituents and ensure the continued tenure in office of leaders. At least 61.7% of the world's military arms exports are by democracies (United States, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Spain, Israel, Italy, and the Netherlands), and thus the leaders are susceptible to being ejected from office during the next election if they are seen as being too friendly with regimes which commit human rights abuses (Wezeman et al. 2018).

For leaders of states who furnish military aid, using military sanctions is a way of avoiding that fate. This is despite their lackluster success at achieving long-lasting policy goals (Broder and Lambek 1988; Lumpe 2010; Kucera 2012). Drezner (2011) noted that economic sanctions "solve the political problem of 'doing something' in the face of target state transgressions. They do not solve the policy problem of coercing the target state into changing its policies" (p. 104). I theorize that military sanctions function similarly; they indicate to a domestic audience that a leader is "doing something" by suspending something as vitally important to a state as military cooperation and aid. Christensen and Weinstein (2013) note that "decisions to restrict foreign support (...) reflect policy makers' reading of (...) domestic (...) incentives (...) domestic concerns are paramount (...) even in partial democracies" (p. 79). The domestic pressure on a leader to punish a state receiving military aid for misbehavior should be highest following an especially visible and egregious example of undesirable behavior (such as mass human rights violations). This leads to the first hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 1:** Military sanctions will likely be utilized following especially high-profile and egregious incidents of undesirable behavior in a state receiving military cooperation or aid.

In this way, the leaders conform to their constituents' immediate desire by acting in a high-profile manner to express displeasure with the now-sanctioned state. In levying these sanctions, the leaders indicate they are willing to risk costs associated with foreign policy failure at home. Thus, they seek to show how seriously they take their selectorate's domestic concerns by acting (Partell and Palmer 1999). However, the attention paid to particular spells or incidents of misbehavior over time tends to wane amongst domestic audiences. Furthermore, in a sector of such critical importance to states as military and security cooperation, over time, national security priorities may supplant desires to achieve foreign policy goals like promoting human rights in the calculus of states' purveyors of military equipment and aid. This may explain the fact that military sanctions are often short-lived in nature. This leads to the second hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 2:** Military sanctions will tend to be eased as time progresses away from high-profile and egregious incidents of undesirable behavior in a state receiving military cooperation or aid.

In testing these two hypotheses, this article seeks to explain the use of military sanctions by states who, presumably, recognize their short-lived and ineffective tenure of activity.

## METHODS

To test the hypotheses, this article employed a case-study approach on military aid and sanctions to Uzbekistan from the world's largest provider of such, the United States. The case-study approach, a detailed examination of a portion of a historical episode to test or develop hypotheses that may relate to other events, is appropriate in several ways: it allows for high levels of conceptual validity, aids in deriving new hypotheses, explore the operation of causal mechanisms in individual cases in fine detail, as well as having the ability to allow for intricate causal relations such as path dependency, complex interactions effects, and equifinality (George and Bennett 2004).

The use of case-study methods in international relations is a useful methodology for various reasons. Bennett and Elman (2007) note that:

One important reason why qualitative methods have been important in IR research is that case study methods, especially the combination of process tracing and typological theorizing, have considerable advantages. The prominence of qualitative methods in IR thus reflects these methods' advantages in studying complex, relatively unstructured, and infrequent phenomena that lie at the heart of the subfield (p. 171).

This prominence of case studies is not without a warrant in international relations, as they can help identify interactions between variables while establishing a chronological series of events (Sambanis 2004). The choice of Uzbekistan and its recipient role for military aid and sanctions for this case study rests on its geopolitically unique position. It is an aid recipient from the world's largest provider of military aid, the United States. This should make its actions high-profile to the US public due to Americans' attention and prominence on human rights and good

governance and the press freedoms enjoyed in the US to broadcast egregious violations. Thus public pressure in the US to pressure Uzbekistan through military sanctions might be expected to achieve desired policy changes.

The US military equipment is modern and sophisticated and requires continued maintenance by specialists trained to take care of military equipment and provide specialized aid. Thus, its suspension might be useful leverage against a country like Uzbekistan, which has the largest military in Central Asia and its largest population (Lumpe 2010). Uzbekistan is of strategic importance to the United States, situated where it is by Russia and Afghanistan. Thus the United States presumably has an interest in consistent, stable, and amicable relations with Uzbekistan on many fronts (militarily as well as in human rights cooperation, for example). To achieve its strategic objectives, successive presidents and other lawmakers have considered this dynamic.

Unfortunately, Uzbekistan is not especially known for upholding human rights. Thus this case provides a good example of states which need each other for various security purposes but also one where high-profile human rights abuses can happen, which may provoke military sanctions as a response on behalf of the supplier of military aid. The next section examines the military aid relationship between the United States and Uzbekistan through the lens of the two hypotheses to test this article's novel theory.

## MILITARY SANCTIONS AND THE CASE OF UZBEKISTAN

Uzbekistan is a place of ancient history thrust into the modern world with the Russian Revolution. At one point, it lay on the Silk Road, but for much of its history, it fell within the sway of Russia. From 1917 to 1920, the Bolsheviks conquered the area, and from 1921-1924 the territories were reconfigured into Uzbekistan and its neighbors (Uzbekistan Profile-Timeline 2018). During Stalin's purges, native Uzbeks were marginalized and replaced with Communist party loyalists. However, from the 1970s to the 1980s, Uzbek Communist chief Rashidov promoted the rise of ethnic Uzbek over Russian officials, reflecting a trend toward nationalism in the area (Uzbekistan Profile-Timeline 2018). His successor, Islam Karimov, took even further steps in shaping the modern state of Uzbekistan. According to Hiro (2009), in 1990, the Uzbek Supreme Soviet "declared its sovereignty in October 1990, which gave primacy to Uzbek laws over Soviet laws, and elected [Karimov] executive president of Uzbekistan" (p. 140), a role he filled until he died in 2016. With the complete collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Uzbekistan became a fully independent nation, but one which had not yet managed to escape the shadow of Moscow.

Due to geographic proximity, Uzbekistan must still consider Russia's actions in considering its security concerns. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Uzbek military considerations have focused on concerns over Islamic militancy, the threat of Russia, and using military cooperation with other governments (particularly the United States) to open up to the outside world. Kucera (2012) notes that:

Uzbekistan, which has strong security forces, appears to pursue military cooperation with the United States out of geopolitical considerations. Related to the desire to balance Russia is Uzbekistan's desire to not be an



international pariah, and the government sees the normalization of US military relations as playing an important symbolic role in that effort (p. 22).

Sharing a border with Afghanistan also gives the Uzbek government cause for concern, with militant groups seldom respecting borders in their efforts. Over the years, Uzbekistan has cracked down on militant Islamists, with the detonation of several bombs in Tashkent in 1999 killing over a dozen people and sparking skirmishes between the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Uzbek military (Uzbekistan Profile-Timeline 2018). However, these crackdowns have also caused international concern and initially gave the United States hesitation in providing military aid to Uzbekistan. However, this largely changed after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The US, for its part, was initially put off by Uzbek overtures on military cooperation following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Akbarzadeh (2007) noted that:

In the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, these overtures were received with unease in Washington US administrations had serious misgivings about associating closely with an authoritarian regime with a very questionable record on human rights. But, to the delight of the Uzbek authorities, these concerns were abandoned after 11 September (p. 109).

With the advent of the Global War on Terror, specifically, the campaign in Afghanistan's concerns over Uzbekistan's human rights record lost priority to the overall security objectives of the conflict. US military aid to Uzbekistan escalated dramatically, including the training and equipping of special forces units which could and were then used against Uzbek civilians and noncombatants with little repercussions (Kucera 2012).

The American military footprint in Uzbekistan and the generous amount of military aid to the country was much more robust than would first appear, despite all the previous concerns over its human rights record. According to Hiro (2009), just one week after 11 September:

Two large US Hercules transport planes, carrying 200 troops and loaded with surveillance equipment to be installed along the Uzbek-Afghan border, landed secretly at a military base near Tashkent. But it was not until 1 October that the government disclosed it would open its airspace to US forces without mentioning that the Karshi base near Khanabad (aka K2) was being made available to the Pentagon. Washington's annual grants to Uzbekistan were to rise threefold to \$150 million, a very substantial amount for a country whose foreign reserves at one point had fallen to \$1 billion (p. 173).

Although US leaders knew that there was an inherent risk in helping the military forces of a country that is known for human rights abuses, that this aid could be turned around and used against their population, after the thunderclap of the terrorist attacks on 11 September this took

secondary importance in the minds of policymakers and the American public (Kucera 2012). Lumpe (2010) observed:

The State Department tried to pursue a dual policy that promoted the strategic aims of the DOD while emphasizing that the cooperation would only be sustainable if Uzbekistan undertook political reforms; funding priorities indicated a significantly greater focus on the counterterrorism agenda than on the democratization/reform agenda (p. 4).

However, incidents of human rights violations would pop up now and again, causing the use of military sanctions as a response. One incident, the Andijan massacre of 2005, in particular, gained high-profile notoriety, leading to the use of military sanctions by the United States.

On 13 May 2005, thousands of Uzbekistan's citizens gathered in the central Babur Square of Andijan. They had assembled to listen to the urgings of speakers against their countries' high levels of corruption and deepening poverty. Soon, about 12,000 troops from the intelligence services, Interior Ministry, and military began arriving in armored personnel carriers of the type provided by the United States in their military aid disbursements to Uzbekistan. The troops began closing off the exits to the square and then allegedly began firing live ammunition from automatic weapons at the gathered civilian protestors, shooting and killing those already wounded and women and children (Hiro 2009). Estimates of the dead range from the official count of 187 to over 800 casualties (Kendzior 2007). The government claimed that the casualties were terrorists and that no innocent people were hurt during the events at Andijan. However, this was merely the most high-profile and egregious example of a pattern of human rights abuses that had not seriously hampered military aid before but had now captured the attention of the world and the American public. Kendzior (2007) observed that since independence, Uzbekistan has:

Embraced an increasingly authoritarian style of rule marked by a powerful police presence, persecution of Muslims who practice their faith in non-state-sanctioned sites, absolute media censorship, and arrest or exile of perceived political opponents. Following the events in Andijan, which attracted (albeit briefly) worldwide attention, Uzbekistan became even more insular and oppressive. Hundreds of Uzbek human rights activists, political figures, journalists, pious Muslims, and apolitical citizens suspected of being any of the above have been arrested, incarcerated, and, sometimes, tortured (pp. 318-319).

The response of the Uzbek government to these allegations following the Andijan massacre was dismissive of any human rights violations, insisting that casualties consisted of terrorists killed and that no innocent civilians were hurt (Kendzior 2007). On 31 May 2005, President George W. Bush publicly requested the Uzbek authorities allow a Red Cross investigation of the massacre, followed shortly after by the public questioning of six US senators of military aid and cooperation to Uzbekistan (Akbarzadeh 2007). Towards the end of July 2005, Uzbekistan formally evicted US forces from their base at K2. In November, a formal condition on US military aid to the Uzbek government was created, requiring an international investigation of

events in Andijan. In May 2006, without being able to certify progress by Uzbekistan on human rights and bowing to enormous public pressure, the United States imposed serious military sanctions on aid and cooperation with the government of Uzbekistan; it would not be until August of 2009 before the Uzbek Minister of Defense Kabul Berdiev and CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus again signed an agreement setting out a program of inter-military contact having to do with training and educational exchanges amongst military personnel (Lumpe 2010).

In response to the egregious example of the Andijan massacre and the enormous public pressure it created, the US sanctioned military aid and cooperation with the government of Uzbekistan, which would last for over three years. This was against the serious backdrop of the Global War on Terror, a conflict in which Uzbekistan had been a willing and valuable participant and a beneficiary of military aid, showing just how serious the imposition of military sanctions was regarded as being. This supports the hypothesis that military sanctions will likely be utilized following especially high-profile and egregious incidents of undesirable behavior in a state receiving military cooperation or aid. However, after the next American presidential election had occurred and US domestic attention to human rights in Uzbekistan had waned, military aid again began to flow into the country as the Global War on Terror continued. This would follow a recurring pattern involving US military aid and sanctions on Uzbekistan. Military aid and cooperation would be suspended for human rights violations for a short period. However, within a few months or years, it has consistently been reinstated with the justification that Uzbekistan is subject to terrorist threats from Afghanistan and is a valued partner in the fight against terrorism (Kucera 2012). The following is a brief timeline of US military aid, as well as its sanctioning, regarding Uzbekistan (Lumpe 2010; Kucera 2015; Putz 2018; Akmatalieva 2021; Kim and Tsereteli 2022):

- August 1995 - Uzbekistan signs a security agreement with NATO a few years after independence.
- March 1997 - President Clinton certifies Uzbekistan is eligible to receive military aid from the US, as authorized by *The Arms Export Control Act*. US Army "Green Berets" train with special forces in Uzbekistan on-field tactics, airborne assault operations, and counterinsurgency.
- February 2000 - The first sizeable arms transfer to a Central Asian country occurs, with the US transferring radios, night-vision goggles, and 16 military transport vehicles to Uzbekistan.
- May 2000 - CENTCOM Commander General Anthony Zinni visits Tashkent, telling President Karimov that he wants a closer military relationship but is being held back because of public human rights concerns.
- 11 September 2001 - Al Qaeda launches multiple terrorist attacks against the United States, sparking the Global War on Terror. One month later, the US began to send troops to the K2 airbase in Uzbekistan.
- March 2002 - The "Declaration on Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework" is signed by the US and Uzbekistan, with the US pledging to re-equip the military of Uzbekistan while Uzbekistan pledges to increase efforts in the realm of human rights.

- August 2002 - In response to public concerns about Uzbekistan's human rights records, military aid to Uzbekistan is conditioned on the secretary of state's certification that Uzbekistan is progressing on human rights.
- July 2004 - Some military sanctions against Uzbekistan are implemented due to publicized human rights violations.
- July 2004 - Shortly after these sanctions were implemented, a suicide bombing against the US embassy in Tashkent led to criticism against the military sanctioning aid and cooperation.
- 13 May 2005 - Uzbek troops open fire on crowds in Andijan, causing a massacre that leads to worldwide condemnation.
- May 2006 - In light of the Andijan massacre, the Secretary of State cannot certify progress by Uzbekistan on human rights. Significant military sanctions against the country are in effect.
- August 2009 - The US and Uzbekistan signed an agreement outlining military-to-military contact involving educational exchanges and training, resuming active military cooperation a little over three years after the Andijan massacre.
- December 2009 - The State Department/Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY 2010 is enacted. Due to renewed public human rights concerns, it contains a prohibition on aid to Uzbekistan.
- January 2010 - The US Department of Defense issues a proposed rule change to permanently alter the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations to allow for the commercial exchange of goods and services with Uzbekistan.
- January 2015 - The United States donates over 300 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles to Uzbekistan, its largest transfer of military equipment at that time to a Central Asian Country.
- May 2018 - After meeting with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, President Donald Trump stated that the US and Uzbekistan were "working together from the standpoint of the military, including his purchase of equipment and military equipment from the United States". He did not mention human rights.
- January 2021 - US President Joseph Biden reaffirms support for Uzbekistan despite continuing low-profile human rights violations. His administration's policy states that stability and security in Uzbekistan "contribute directly to the US efforts to combat terrorism, support regional stability, ensure energy security, and enhance economic prosperity in the region and beyond".
- March 2022 - During his 9 March meeting with Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Komilov, Secretary of State Antony Blinken asserted that "We appreciate the strategic partnership between Uzbekistan and the United States, the work that's being done through that; very much welcome the strong humanitarian support that you have been providing to the Afghans on the one hand and now Ukrainians on the other". Again, no mention was made of Uzbekistan's still troubling but no longer high-profile domestic human rights record, and unimpeded military cooperation and aid have continued to the present time.

As one can see, this timeline contains periods where human rights issues took center-stage and took precedence over American military relations and aid to Uzbekistan, such as during the tumultuous period just after Uzbek independence but before 11 September 2001, as well as following the infamous Andijan massacre, which then resulted in military sanctions. This falls in line with the first hypothesis. After that, although human rights violations occasionally reared their head as an issue in Uzbekistan, American public attention to human rights abuses there began to wane with time. Within a short period, stipulations on human rights requirements were gradually brushed over, and military sanctions were eased as military aid and cooperation between the two countries resumed. This aligns with the second hypothesis that military sanctions will tend to be lifted as time progresses from publicly visible incidents of undesirable behavior in a state receiving military cooperation or aid.

## CONCLUSION

This article has sought to explain states' use of military sanctions against their allies, even though they are ineffective and short-lived in achieving their goals. It theorized that states use military sanctions to appease domestic audiences by appearing to take concrete measures to achieve desirable foreign policy objectives. It hypothesized that domestic pressure to place military sanctions would be at its strongest following an especially high-profile example of undesirable behavior on the part of the state receiving military aid, likely resulting in the implementation of military sanctions, but that over time these military sanctions will be eased as domestic attention to the issues which sparked them wane. To test its hypotheses, the article conducted a case study on military aid and sanctions toward Uzbekistan by the world's largest provider of military aid and hardware, the United States. The analysis supports the two hypotheses. Following high-profile incidents and periods of undesirable behavior by an aid-recipient state, military sanctions will likely be employed by the state providing the military aid and programs.

Further, military sanctions are eased, if not scrapped altogether, as time passes from public incidents and attention involving human rights. A contemporary example can be seen by observing the case of Saudi Arabia after the 2018 assassination of Jamal Khashoggi, which was followed by the subsequent use of military sanctions by the United States and its partner nations towards Saudi Arabia then, followed a few years later by their easing. This example demonstrates the validity of this article's hypotheses.

Case studies, particularly single case studies, occasionally are thought to contain a problem with degrees of freedom, meaning that there is the possible inability to discern between competing explanations based on what evidence there is (George and Bennett 2004). A suggestion for future research on military sanctions, particularly in Central Asia, would be to broaden the study to include other states in the region to draw comparisons. Other Central Asian countries such as Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Iran have many similarities yet stark differences. Conducting a regional case studies analysis might determine whether the theory on the use of military sanctions could be applied to other countries in this part of the world or elsewhere and thus may deepen our understanding of this understudied tool of coercive statecraft.

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