

### Professional Military Leadership Development from the Perspective of National Resilience

Codreanu, Aura; Vasilescu, Cezar

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## PROFESSIONAL MILITARY LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF NATIONAL RESILIENCE

*Associate Professor Aura CODREANU, PhD*

*Colonel Professor BEng Cezar VASILESCU, PhD*

*Regional Department of Defence Resources Management Studies, Braşov*

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*Leadership, along with discipline, ethics, organisational culture and specific socialisation practices, is one of the most important pillars (Brown, Treviño, 2006) of the military profession. As such, professional military leadership is one of the key aspects emphasised at strategic level. One prominent example in this respect is the Romanian Military Strategy of 2021 (2021, pp. 3-4) which views it as one of the means of securing organisational and national resilience in a volatile, complex, and uncertain environment. Furthermore, as the 2020-2024 Romanian National Defence Strategy states (2020, p. 32), resilience is one of the key areas targeted by the NATO-EU cooperation agenda where Romania pledges to contribute. Following the strategic acknowledgment that professional military leadership is needed in order to meet future challenges in the defence and security field, the current article discusses the ways and means by which professional military leadership development can further the end of securing organisational resilience in the defence and security field, and hence that of consolidating national resilience.*

*Keywords: military professionalism; leadership development; national resilience;*



## INTRODUCTION

The definition of *resilience* can be established and delineated in relation with the target of resilience efforts. From this perspective, resilience is associated with the national dimension – national resilience – or with the line of demarcation between personal and public space: individual, community, social, organisational etc. resilience or with the type of adversity against which a subject or interdependent entities prepares, like CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives) resilience, conflict resilience, disaster resilience etc. Consequently, resilience conceptualisation is context-dependent, representing a feature of dynamic systems (Kourti, 2017) and is multi-dimensional. What is more, it can be better expressed as an outcome (Gibson, Tarrant, 2010), rather than output. As such, resilience is the ability to grow, develop along change and its uncharted territories, and not despite it. From such a perspective, the concept is associated with flexibility and ever-changing conditions that require systems of management that nurture these qualities over maintaining stability (Ib.). A system level approach to defining resilience equates it to the capacity to adapt system responses and strategic approaches when confronted with changing, unpredictable and highly interconnected environments (Havránek, 2018).

Resilience is also viewed as a never-ending journey between the “*resilience of the old*” and the “*resilience of the new*” (Folke, 2016), and the determined departure from the former and transition and consolidation of the latter through periods of gradual adaptation and times requiring fundamental transformation and change. Such a two-fold perspective involves merging the capacity of a system to go back or “*bounce back*” to its old way of functioning after having undergone major events, with the same system’s capacity to move forward and mould a new way of existence. The key words assuring the link between “*resilience of the old*” and “*resilience of the new*” are *response* and *recovery*.

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The literature in the field differentiates between *general resilience* (Walker et al., 2009, Biggs et al., 2012, Carpenter et al., 2012) and *specific resilience*.

*General resilience* provides the necessary collective memory of the past, along with the necessary flexibility, innovation required for change, and transformation by which threats and risks can be treated as opportunities. The enablers of general resilience are: diversity, modularity, openness, reserves, feedback, nestedness, monitoring, leadership, trust (Carpenter et al., 2009). It is a long-term effort that incurs short-term and medium-term costs.

*Specific resilience* is concerned with identifying the actions to be undertaken, or the what-to-do component (Carpenter et al., 2001) and the target beneficiary (Lebel et al., 2006, Robards et al., 2011, Brown, 2014). Worth noting though, in relation with specific resilience, is that even when contextualised by particular organisations, its main components incur general elements identifiable regardless of particular system characteristic. For example, resilience associated with national security is viewed as the maintenance of vital services and the continuation of life as close as possible to the normal after actions aimed at preventing or countering the effects of attacks or of disasters (House of Commons Defence Committee, 2009, p. 4). In the same line, resilience in the context of emergency preparedness is defined as the “*Ability of the community, services, areas or infrastructure to detect, prevent, and, if necessary to withstand, handle and recover from disruptive challenges*” (Cabinet Office, 2012, p. 23).

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) definition of resilience focuses on the capacity of a society to withstand and recover from a major disruptive event such as natural disasters, critical infrastructure failure, and armed attack in no time (Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security/CDS, 2021).

Three key words are associated with resilience as a defining element of social-ecological systems, namely: adaptability, transformability and persistence. They actually concern answering the question “*what for?*”. Thus, resilience acquires meaning when associated with terms in phrases like: “*resilience for adaptability*” and “*resilience for transformability*” (Folke, 2016).

One of the main goals underlying the effort of building resilience lies in the fact that regardless of how well designed a system may be,

there are always blind spots that allow for its disruption and, possibly, destruction. Focusing on resilience is focusing on how to resist, recover and adapt when confronted with adversity.

Secondly, it is worth noting that *“Resilience is embedded in people’s behaviour, and it is built by proactive approach to mobilising resources, abilities to respond and perform under a variety of conditions”* (Tasic et al., 2019). As such, increasing attention to leadership development and institutional consolidation from a resilience perspective becomes another major goal.

It is noteworthy that resilience thinking runs counter stability, predictability. It is the outcome of employing various types of capabilities and strategies that are context-dependent to survive disruptive events or to adapt to incremental changes, achieve robustness coupled with agility and thrive in the long run. Nonetheless, as a British Standard 65000, Guidance for Organisational Resilience (BSI) report on 2018 trends in business across the world (BSI, 2018, p. 16) unveils, in times riddled with continuing uncertainty, securing product resilience via innovation, horizon scanning and adaptation is not under the radar of organisations. In this respect, we can also state that, given the current Covid-19 challenges, it is difficult to assume that, at this moment, organisations all over the world, the military one included, can take clear-cut steps towards building resilience as a way of thinking and acting while struggling to secure the *“resilience of the old”*, namely what granted stability and predictability before uncertainty and volatility began to manifest as disturbing factors. In the mentioned situation, resilience defined as the capacity to bounce back is being tested by the unfolding events. Hence, resilience defined as moving forward towards adaptation and transformation is not necessarily openly considered yet. What is more, according to De Smedt, Giovannini and Radermacher (2018), the capacity of a system to bounce back from a shock is not necessarily a positive aspect if previous system direction was not sustainable. In our opinion, the same statements and evidence stand true for the defence and security field and, inherently, for defence establishments, too.

Concerning the approach to resilience at the state level, the *Romanian National Defence Strategy 2020-2024* (RNDS, 2020) regards resilience from the perspective of what it takes to assure the concept



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*Resilience as an outcome is defined by the remarks made concerning the features contributing to making a state resilient in what we may call a “reading between the lines” conceptual approach stating the following: “...a resilient state, capable to efficiently, proactively and adequately adapt to the unpredictability of the evolutions (i.e. conventional, economic, financial, and also cyber, hybrid or associated to pandemics and environmental changes) in the global security environment and able to manage in a consistent and efficient manner any associated risks and threats”.*

becomes an outcome, as well as from the perspective of resilience as capacity.

Resilience as an outcome is defined by the remarks made concerning the features contributing to making a state resilient in what we may call a “reading between the lines” conceptual approach stating the following: “...a resilient state, capable to efficiently, proactively and adequately adapt to the unpredictability of the evolutions (i.e. conventional, economic, financial, and also cyber, hybrid or associated to pandemics and environmental changes) in the global security environment and able to manage in a consistent and efficient manner any associated risks and threats. To that end a powerful state is needed to assure an optimal framework for the development of participative democracy, assurance of citizens’ rights and liberties, and to encourage people and civil society’s participation in solving all societal problems, those concerning national security included”. (Ib., p. 8). Furthermore, resilience in relation to the existence and actions of a “powerful state” is enabled by rapid and efficient reaction mechanisms, along with the development of solid security culture, and hence with the observance of national security values (Ib., p. 10). Resilience as an outcome is viewed in association with good governance. Inherently, such a relationship is consolidated as a result of employing strategic leadership principles like flexibility, adaptability and rapid reaction capacity, which contribute to anticipating, planning and preparing for the worst-case scenario. (Ib., p. 6).

Resilience as capacity concerns the inherent ability of various entities (i.e. individuals, communities, regions and states) to resist to various disturbing events and to “bounce back” to a normal state. To that end, the multi-layered collaboration among private-public, citizen-community and civil-military entities becomes a stringent necessity. Furthermore, positive transformation targeting sustainability is also an important part of national resilience. (Ib., p. 11).

National defence capacity and Romania’s membership of NATO are viewed as guarantees to securing the state’s security posture. Additionally, as part of Romania’s approach to national resilience in relation to the defence field, the strategy mentions, among other courses of action, the facilitation of the implementation of the cooperation agenda between the European Union and NATO in the fields of “cyber defence, countering hybrid threats, resilience, strategic

*communication and military mobility”* (ib., p. 32). Consequently, we deem necessary to conduct a conceptual investigation into the definitions of national resilience provided by the EU and NATO in order to better identify the premises that underlie professional military leadership development from the perspective of the aforementioned concept.



## NATIONAL RESILIENCE THROUGH THE LENSES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO

### • THE EU PERSPECTIVE ON RESILIENCE

From a defence and security perspective, resilience is conjured up as the result of a *“whole of society approach”* (CDS, 2021), or as *“total defence”*. Both presume that the values of democracy are promoted and upheld by state authorities, while the latter work together with defence and security organisations, civil and private entities, and the population, to counter potential threats in a logic resembling the logic of diminishing returns. The policies in the area of total defence aim at strengthening civil preparedness in order to secure the continuity of government functions regardless of how disruptive events may be. They target the enhancement of civil protection for times of conflict/war, on the one hand, and crisis preparedness for preventing and managing crises in times of peace, on the other hand. Examples of explicit and committed adoption and use of the two concepts are Estonia, Norway, Finland, Israel, Sweden, Switzerland and Singapore.

At the level of the European Union resilience is defined as the ability of an individual, community to resist, adapt and recover fast from adverse conditions and major shocks. Resilience in EU’s approach is a complex concept that encompasses society as a whole (European Commission, 2014): *“...understanding and building resilience requires taking a broader perspective and considering society as a whole. Such a <system view> should encapsulate the entire production process of societal well-being, to ensure that not only economic, but natural, social and environmental resources are also harnessed in an efficient, sustainable, fair and responsible manner”* (Alessi et al., 2018, p. 5).

Furthermore, state resilience is based on democratic values, people’s trust in institutions and sustainable development (European External Action Service, 23 June 2016), and societal resilience depends on government accountability, education, culture and youth. In terms

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*Adaptive capacity consists in the ability to be flexible and generate incremental changes that do not contribute in any way to increasing the level of discomfort already manifest, whereas transformative capacity is required when the extent of damage inflicted or the time length the disturbance lasts makes it no more possible to manage the system in an as is form and hence generates the need to engineer large scale changes.*

of its purpose, resilience at the EU level is acknowledged as a guarantee of peace, security and development (European External Action Service (26 June 2016).

Concerning the behaviour of the EU member states when confronted with the financial and economic crisis unfolded between 2007 and 2012 (Alessi et al., 2018) from a resilience perspective, and hence the approach to socio-economic resilience as an after-action evaluation informing on the main takeaways, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) proposes a resilience framework (Manca, Benczur, Giovannini, 2017). The definition the latter builds upon regards resilience as the ability of society or of a system to continue delivering well-being sustainably despite de major shocks or hindrances it may encounter.

According to the JRC framework, societal resilience requires three types of capacity, depending on the level of stress induced (i.e., “disturbance intensity”) and the time the latter manifests (i.e., “time of exposure”), namely: absorptive capacity, adaptive capacity, and transformative capacity. Absorptive capacity requires the employment of capabilities to resist the stress of an event that manifests at a rather low level of intensity and for a short period of time. Adaptive capacity consists in the ability to be flexible and generate incremental changes that do not contribute in any way to increasing the level of discomfort already manifest, whereas transformative capacity is required when the extent of damage inflicted or the time length the disturbance lasts makes it no more possible to manage the system in an as is form and hence generates the need to engineer large scale changes. The strategies for sustaining the three types of capacities are prevention (e.g., mitigation or transfer measures to reduce identified risks), preparation/ protection (e.g., management reserves for unforeseen situations, establishment of coalitions/agreements), promotion (e.g., investments in assets, policies aimed at facilitating flexibility in various socio-economic areas) and transformation (e.g., policies focused on an outcome and their inherent gradual implementation). Depending on the envisaged capacity, the strategies can be coupled. Thus, to maintain the existing stability, prevention, preparation/protection, and promotion strategies are needed. To achieve stability after a stressful event, as well as to ensure flexibility to adapt, preparation/ protection and promotion strategies must be put in place. Last but not least, to enhance transformative capacity, protection, promotion



and transformation initiatives must be employed. Worth mentioning in relation to the three types of capacity is that they are not necessarily sequential, nor opposing or competing one another. They are supposed to work together on multiple levels (e.g., individual, organisation, community, state, region etc.) at various degrees of intensity (i.e., low, medium, high) (De Smedt, Giovannini, Radermacher, 2018).

One important idea expanding the concept of resilience proposed by the JRC framework is that of *“bouncing forward”*, namely the capacity of an entity to seize the opportunity and develop better in comparison with the pre-crisis situation (European Commission, 2018 a).

According to the same study, (European Commission, 2018 b, p.13) a country’s resilient behaviour can be analysed in terms of a number of indicators that can be broken down from a set of general resilience characteristics describing the respective country’s education, digital development, innovation and R&D, labour market policies and support, gender equality, government expenditures, macro-economic performance, financial performance, market development and regulation, quality in government, quality of life, regulatory environment, people’s trust in state institutions.

Measuring resilience in times of stability and comparing different individuals, organisations, nations against a number of fixed parameters does not yield valid, relevant, reliable, all-encompassing conclusions, and nor does it when crossing a crisis. A case in point are the results of a study analysing the level of resilience to the economic crisis of 2007 of the EU member states, which show that, for example, even if from an economic and financial perspective some countries were better off during and after the crisis, when looking at social aspects like income distribution or expenditures on health and education, the same countries experienced negative results (Ib., pp. 17-18).

Worth noting though is that regardless of acknowledgment of the strategic importance of resilience at the level of the European Union, there are voices arguing that the concept is too vague to actually clarify how it relates to national preparedness and to the employment of a *“whole-of-society”* approach (Wigell, Mikkola, Juntunen, 2021). Nonetheless, the document titled *“Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s External Action”* (European Commission, 2017) highlights some key pre-requisites for building/maintaining/consolidating



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such a perspective, namely: inclusive and participatory societies; socio-economic resilience aiming at reducing inequalities, vulnerabilities and their root causes, prevention of violent conflict; reliance on good governance structures; respect for democratic values, human rights and rule of law.

#### • NATO APPROACH TO RESILIENCE

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation definition of resilience focuses on the capacity of a society to withstand and recover from a major disruptive event such as natural disasters, critical infrastructure failure, and armed attack in no time. NATO acknowledges resilience-building as a national prerogative, but it contributes to its consolidation in various ways (CDS, 2021, pp. 1-2).

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During the 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government formulated their common “*Commitment to Enhance Resilience*”. The latter acknowledges the need for a whole of government approach, the necessity to involve the private sector and to cooperate with international organisations in order to secure critical civilian and military capabilities in case of disruptive events. The document lists NATO basic requirements in terms of building national resilience, and they are, according to CDS, (Ib., pp. 7-8): assurance of government continuity, as well as of critical government services in relation with the assurance of the continuation of the decision-making process, communication of decisions and capacity to enforce them in times of disruptive events; energy supplies in terms of putting up back-up plans and establishing power grids; effective management of uncontrolled migration; food and water resources and their safeguarding against sabotage and disruption; capacity to sustain mass casualties by the civilian health systems and the assurance of sufficient medical stocks and supplies; civil communications systems (e.g., telecommunications and cyber communications capacity to function in times of crises); transportation systems and the capacity they provide for swift action during disruptive events.

In the same text, the heads of state participating in the meeting note that resilience in the face of new military and non-military threats requires Allies to “*maintain and protect critical civilian capabilities, alongside and in support of military capabilities, and to work across*

*the whole of government and with the private sector”, as well as to cooperate with other international organisations, in particular the European Union and partner countries (NATO, 8-9 July 2016).*

The key prerequisites needed for building resilience are identified in a 2017 conference on the issue organised by the Allied Command Transformation as follows: persistence (i.e., continuing the efforts of building, enhancing, consolidating resilience even after the recovery efforts following a dramatic event are over), treating resilience as a capacity, resorting to experiments and models, and applying an integrated approach to education and training (Havránek, 2018). Another conference of the same entity organised in 2019 stresses the importance of relying on collaborative efforts to assure resilience, whereas the main tools employed in consolidating this feature are experimentation, war-gaming and interaction testing (Allied Command Transformation, 2019).

In 2021, during the NATO Summit in Brussels, *“improved resilience”* is one of the key points included in the NATO 2030 document meant to drive the efforts of allied nations towards securing NATO core tasks of collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security in an increasing competitive and unpredictable world order. As part of the proposal, the Alliance emphasises the role of nations in building resilience and associated competences, governance structures, processes and obligations. Nonetheless, fulfilling the minimum NATO requirements in the field of resilience is the baseline for all allies, as already agreed (NATO, June, 2021).

In terms of its own resilience, the Alliance notes the need to strengthen its internal ability for common consultation, decision-making, swift and decisive action and adaptation as needs may require. The approach proposed for building on allies national resilience is a whole of government approach that involves not only national governments, but also private entities, societies and populations at large (NATO, 14 June 2021): *“Disruptive events that bring about a lot of cascading effects (such as blackouts, disruptions of public transportation etc.) do not discriminate among the state actors: resilience is therefore needed at the state and institutional level, but civilians have a role in stepping up resilience as well”* (Havránek, 2018, p. 21). Nonetheless, the shared values of the Alliance remain at the basis of all resilience building efforts and these values are: democracy,



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*The BSI is an industry-focused document endorsed by the British Government. It is the first standard focusing in precise terms on the ways and means by which resilience can be developed and maintained at organisational level. ISO 22316 was developed later than the British standard and it claims to have a more general approach that can be applied and harmonised with any size and type of organisation.*

the rule of law, individual liberty, and human rights, as highlighted by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in a speech delivered before the 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels.

The purpose of NATO in securing resilience is to grant credibility to the defence posture assumed by the Alliance, as well as to the Alliance capacity to fulfil its basic tasks. Therefore, the areas where resilience is sought by the Alliance are civil preparedness; government continuity; critical infrastructure protection; cyber defence; military capabilities investments; CBRN threats preparedness.

## STANDARDS FOR ORGANISATIONAL RESILIENCE AND THEIR RELEVANCE FOR LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT

The most relevant international standards for organisational resilience supporting the aim of this article are the British Standard 65000, Guidance for Organisational Resilience (BSI, 2014), and the ISO 22316:2017, Security and resilience — Organisational resilience — Principles and attributes (ISO 22316:2017).

The BSI is an industry-focused document endorsed by the British Government. It is the first standard focusing in precise terms on the ways and means by which resilience can be developed and maintained at organisational level. ISO 22316 was developed later than the British standard and it claims to have a more general approach that can be applied and harmonised with any size and type of organisation (ISO 22316:2017). However, both standards are complementary and share a number of concepts, principles and approaches to resilience at organisational level (Business Continuity Institute/BCI, 6 April 2017).

While the BSI defines resilience as an organisation's ability to "anticipate, prepare for, respond and adapt" to changes and disruptions that assures its capacity to survive and thrive (British Standards Institution, 2018), ISO 22316 equates the concept to the ability of an organisational entity to "absorb and adapt in a changing environment to enable it to deliver its objectives and to survive and prosper" (ISO 22316:2017).

Placing resilience at strategic level is viewed by ISO 22316 as an outcome of good business practices and effective risk management. Furthermore, the standard takes a behavioural approach to resilience. It specifies that even though the concept itself is the sum of established management disciplines, the interactions among people,

the way uncertainty is tackled, the manner in which decisions are made and enacted are the stepping stones for resilience building. Last but not least, the standard lists and then describes the main features characteristic of resilient organisations, as follows:

- shared vision, purpose and values guiding decision-making at all levels;
- understanding the organisation's external and internal environment in order to guide priority-based decision-making;
- leadership effectiveness demonstrated via employment of a diverse set of knowledge, skills, tools to achieve organisational objectives, along with leadership empowerment to adapt to changes when needed;
- organisational culture anchored in shared values and promoting positive behaviour and attitudes;
- use of accessible, adequate, understandable, timely conveyed information and knowledge as critical resources for learning and decision-making within the organisation via established systems and processes;
- prioritisation and allocation of resources in accordance with the organisation's vulnerability status and its needed capacity to respond in times of change;
- the design, development and coordination of management disciplines contributing to achieving organisational objectives from an uncertainty-based perspective;
- a living performance management system focused on ongoing improvement and whose measurement criteria reflect the changing conditions;
- change management, while continuing to deliver on organisational values and vision.

In the case of BSI, leadership plays the key role in building and securing the excellence of an organisation's product or service, the reliability of its processes and the moulding of people's behaviour. Nonetheless, for an encompassing approach to organisational resilience, leadership alone is not enough. It has to be associated with specific action targeting people, processes and products.

Consequently, the knowledge, tools and techniques associated with leadership, product, process and people describe 16 areas of concern for any organisation, as briefly presented in *table no. 1* (British Standards Institution, 2018 a, slide 3; 2018 b, p.10).



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


Figure no. 1: Key elements of organisational resilience

Table no. 1: Areas of organisational resilience

LEADERSHIP	PEOPLE	PROCESS	PRODUCT
<b>Leadership</b> (i.e., “culture, visibility and performance of senior business leaders”)	<b>Culture</b> (i.e., shared values and behaviour, consolidation of trust and employee engagement)	<b>Governance and Accountability</b> (i.e., clear governance policies and senior leaders ‘accountability to stakeholders)	<b>Horizon Scanning</b> (i.e., the regular habit of the organisation to analyse and identify future threats, risks, opportunities)
<b>Vision and purpose</b> (i.e., definition and communication of purpose and its alignment to strategic resource allocation)	<b>Community</b> (i.e., the organisation’s relations as part of a community, social responsibility)	<b>Business Continuity</b> (i.e., the existence and qualitative formulation of a framework and related policies and procedures)	<b>Innovation</b> (i.e., innovation is part of the organisation culture)
<b>Reputational risk</b> (i.e., the approach of the organisation to reputational risk management)	<b>Awareness and Training</b> (i.e., viewed by levels)	<b>Supply Chain</b> (i.e., the governance, security and management of the supply chain from a qualitative perspective)	<b>Adaptive Capacity</b> (i.e., ability to immediately and effectively adapt when confronted with change and uncertainty)



LEADERSHIP	PEOPLE	PROCESS	PRODUCT
<b>Financial management</b> (i.e., in terms of qualitative management of an organisation’s financial aspects )	<b>Alignment</b> (i.e., in terms of exogenous factors influence and their related threats, risks, opportunities)	<b>Information and Knowledge</b> (i.e., information capital and knowledge sharing measured qualitatively)	
<b>Resource management</b> (i.e., effective management and deployment of resources as needed)			

*Any organisation aiming at its survival and sustainability also focuses on progress, and as part of that it resorts to methods by which to optimise its performance and adapt via innovation.*

One of the tools employed along with the guideline is the *The Organisational Resilience Tension Quadrant* (Denyer, 2017, p. 5; British Standards Institution, 2018 a), which acknowledges the basic tensions organisations face when confronted with novelty, uncertainty and shocks. On the one hand, there is the need of every organisation to prove its robustness via defensive techniques aimed at protecting its product/services like preventative control and mindful action. On the other hand, any organisation aiming at its survival and sustainability also focuses on progress, and as part of that it resorts to methods by which to optimise its performance and adapt via innovation. Worth mentioning is that regardless of the predominant approach, consistency and flexibility are core areas present in both circumstances. Thus, consistency of goals, processes, practices is assured by preventative control and performance optimisation, whereas flexibility of ideas, perspectives, initiatives is rendered by mindful action and adaptive innovation. Building strong defensive, agile and adaptive capacity requires the ability to manage the tensions arising from the simultaneous and balanced management of these types of capacities. Consequently, the organisations capable of doing that thrive by proving their capacity to think in a paradoxical way, while those who cannot are “as strong as their weakest link”. Nonetheless, as the 2018 BSI report shows, even though the guideline focuses attention on four key areas,



*The application of the BSI standard can be viewed as both a progressive approach and overlapping knowledge, tools and techniques with organisational best practices, depending on the maturity level of an organisation in terms of securing resilience. Thus, for resilience defined as an organisation's capacity of "bouncing back", the most elementary actions concern preventative control, mindful action, and performance optimisation.*

namely leadership, people, process, product, factors like the need to juggle with the tensions inherent in the dynamic environment an organisation is part of (i.e., taking a defensive action and maintaining consistency of approach while also showing flexibility and willingness to seize opportunities) leads to taking time and attention away from other priority areas.

Based on the BSI guideline for securing organisational resilience, a study published in 2017 (Denyer, 2017) proposes that in the case of leadership, besides the *Plan-Do-Check-Act* methodology that assures the consistency of approach, a 4Sight methodology (foresight – anticipating, predicting and preparing for what is to come, insight – interpreting and acting on the as is context, oversight – monitoring, reviewing and analysing change and hindsight – learning relevant lessons from the experience gained).

The application of the BSI standard can be viewed as both a progressive approach and overlapping knowledge, tools and techniques with organisational best practices, depending on the maturity level of an organisation in terms of securing resilience. Thus, for resilience defined as an organisation's capacity of "bouncing back", the most elementary actions concern preventative control, mindful action, and performance optimisation. However, for an organisation to move forward and thrive, adaptive innovation and paradoxical thinking are required, as proposed by the taxonomy of resilience-focused actions at organisational level presented in *figure no. 2*.

Besides listing the principles and elements contributing to organisational resilience, both standards list a number of management disciplines that need to be developed and consolidated at the level of an organisation, depending on its profile, maturity and definition of resilience. Most of these disciplines overlap fully or partially, while there are few mentioned on an individual basis by the standards, as it is shown in *table no. 2*.

In our opinion, *table no. 2* is representative and could be very well used when analysing the development frameworks for organisational managers and leaders. Thus, from the common core of disciplines (i.e., column one in the table), as well as from the different disciplines listed on an individual basis by each framework (i.e., columns two and three in the table), we advance the proposition that, based on the three traditional levels by which leadership development is approached






Figure no. 2: A BSI organisational resilience guideline-based taxonomy of action for building organisational resilience

Table no. 2: List of management disciplines contributing to organisational resilience according to the British Standard 65000, Guidance for Organisational Resilience (BSI, 2014), and the ISO 22316:2017, Security and resilience — Organisational resilience — Principles and attributes (ISO 22316:2017).

<b>Common disciplines in BSI, 2014 and ISO 22316:2017</b>	<b>BSI, 2014 particular management disciplines</b>	<b>ISO 22316:2017 particular management disciplines</b>
asset management	stakeholder and collaboration management	communications management
business continuity management	human resource planning	human resources management
crisis management	information, communications and technology continuity	information, communications and technology
cyber security management	reputation management	governance
emergency management	horizon scanning	strategic planning
environmental management	change management	



*In the case of the Romanian military, professional leadership development is subject to a number of external drivers and internal enablers as part of the professional military education system.*

*Romania's membership in NATO and the European Union establishes from the very beginning a set of expectations generating specific roles and responsibilities at the level of the overall public administration structures in general, and for the military in particular.*

Common disciplines in BSI, 2014 and ISO 22316:2017	BSI, 2014 particular management disciplines	ISO 22316:2017 particular management disciplines
facilities management		
financial control		
fraud control		
health and safety management		
information security management		
physical security management		
quality management		
risk management		
supply chain management		

(i.e., strategic, operational and tactical), the first column could be used for tactical and operational levels, whereas the disciplines in columns two and three could be used for operational and strategic levels. Obviously, depending on every defence establishment's core missions and its subsystems' features, some of the disciplines may be more prominent than others. Nonetheless, what remains valid, regardless of the standard chosen to guide resilience building efforts, it is noteworthy that the selection and prioritisation of a given standards' management disciplines and their deployment via educational and training solutions must depend on the direction provided by the strategic framework of the organisation and the competences needed to accomplish that organisation's mission.

### KEY PREREQUISITES FOR PROFESSIONAL MILITARY LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF NATIONAL RESILIENCE

In the case of the Romanian military, professional leadership development is subject to a number of external drivers and internal enablers as part of the professional military education (PME) system. In terms of the most important external drivers, Romania's membership in NATO and the European Union establishes from the very beginning

a set of expectations generating specific roles and responsibilities at the level of the overall public administration structures in general, and for the military in particular.

In relation to the concept of national resilience, both NATO and EU approaches emphasise the importance of values. For example, the EU acknowledges the importance played by values like democracy, people's trust in public administration entities, sustainable development for the state resilience, while whole government accountability, education, culture and youth represent major pillars contributing to societal resilience. As for NATO, the organisation promotes values like human rights, equality, rule of law, democracy expressed through free, open elections, recognising those as the backbone of any nation or system. The key to making the mentioned values work towards securing a resilient approach and mindset is their sharing, acceptance and practice in a coherent and all-encompassing manner, since *"The resilience of our core values and principles depends on how strongly we believe in them, and how much we are willing to sacrifice to maintain them"*. (Havránek, 2018, p. 17). Consequently, considering the topic of the current article, we believe that the promotion of these values as an integrated component of the professional development of military leadership in the Romanian armed forces is one of the key pillars of any approach in this area. Furthermore, we deem that the promotion of these values as part of a cross-cutting approach at the level of the disciplines covered at tactical, operational and strategic level is the best way of meeting the pre-requisite.

Another common thread at the level of NATO and the EU concerns the system approach, which generates the need for employing an integrative perspective on the roles, responsibilities and the actions of the actors with a role in securing national resilience. Furthermore, the same system approach mandates the values to be upheld in resource allocation and use, namely efficiency, sustainability, fairness, responsibility. In this respect, the key prerequisites contributing to developing and sustaining such a perspective have been delineated in the Allied Command Transformation conference of 2017 and they concern the need for persistence, the employment of experiments and models, the use of and the integrated approach to education and training and, the most important in our opinion, a capacity-based approach to resilience. From this perspective, the aforementioned values represent the key element assuring organisational resilience. Consequently,



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*Another common thread at the level of NATO and the EU concerns the system approach, which generates the need for employing an integrative perspective on the roles, responsibilities and the actions of the actors with a role in securing national resilience. Furthermore, the same system approach mandates the values to be upheld in resource allocation and use, namely efficiency, sustainability, fairness, responsibility.*



they add up to the values defining the necessary premises for assuring national resilience and as such they must be emphasised as part of the professional development of military leaders.

The values and the approaches identified as the salient features of NATO and the EU outlook on national resilience can become reality under the condition of national systems' focus on assuring their own alignment, adaptability, compatibility and interoperability at strategic, operational and tactical level. The latter represents another important pre-requisite that generates added value for the design/re-design/review of the educational and training system targeting the development of professional military leaders. One important note in this respect is the fact that the acknowledgment of the need to develop leadership as a capacity securing national and organisational resilience must be highlighted in all strategic documents that drive the direction of the military system and enable its mission accomplishment.




Figure no. 3: External drivers and national enablers of the Romanian professional military education system

In relation to the internal enablers of the professional military educational system, they are determined by the mission and structure of the armed forces as driven by the Romanian military system strategic documents: the 2020-2024 Romanian National Defence Strategy (2020), the Romanian Military Strategy of 2021, and the Defence White Paper (2020). Furthermore, as a result of the military representing an important part of society, several more frameworks drive its PME system, namely the legal provisions of the Ministry of Education established through Law no. 1/2011 and its subsequent changes and additions,



the quality requirements established for educational systems by the Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance, the professional standards established by the National Qualifications Authority. Last but not least, the MoD specific framework and its features play an important role in shaping the PME. Worth mentioning is that all initiatives and actions concerning the latter target the achievement of a balance between the need for alignment, harmonisation with the national educational requirements and standards, on the one hand, and meeting the demands in the defence field, on the other hand.

**• LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT AS PART OF PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION: KEY ASPECTS**

Leadership development is part of the professional military education system. The latter is developed and sustained by the existence of a number of capacities, as follows: a strategic framework; baseline funding in budget estimates (i.e., resources); an integrated human resource management system; a professional development system; a competence model in line with a formally acknowledged definition and understanding of military professionalism/educational standards; integrated education and training (E&T) policy, processes and systems.




Figure no. 4: PME system requested capacities

Concerning the strategic framework and its relation with the development of military professional leadership as part of a national approach to resilience, we can notice that essential documents like



*An integrated human resource management system is also necessary as an important pillar sustaining the strategic approach to professional military leadership development.*

the Romanian National Defence Strategy (2020), the Romanian Military Strategy (2021), and the Defence White Paper (2021) establish the minimum necessary framework in this respect. Nonetheless, what we believe as being further necessary is an open discussion with all relevant stakeholders about the concept of professional military leadership from the perspective of national and organisational resilience and as part of the professional military education system. Based on that, a formally acknowledged position in the form of a concept-based approach that takes into account the integration and further breakdown of the strategic framework directions in terms of the defence establishment's major role in securing Romania's security posture into clear-cut needs and requirements driving the tailoring, development, refining of existing/new educational and training solutions for leadership at all levels is necessary.

An integrated human resource management (HRM) system is also necessary as an important pillar sustaining the strategic approach to professional military leadership development. The key to consolidating such a system is the integration of the top four functions of HRM characteristic to traditional military, namely recruitment/conscription, selection, education and training, career management with strategic policies in the HRM field reflecting the evolutions on the labour market and the impact of environmental factors on the military system, HR planning, compensation and benefits, performance management and release of personnel.

We believe that an integrated human resource management system is able to provide for the professional development system the necessary end goal based on which basic accession requirements into the system are better delineated. Moreover, an integrated system drives an intrinsic match between the educational and training offer, on the one hand, and the tactical, operational and strategic requirements, on the other hand. Last but not least, the same system – anchored in a formalised approach to professional military leadership development – assures the successive, orderly, consistent multi-level development of competences.

Furthermore, integrated education and training policies, processes and systems establish specific requirements. They assure that the professional military education system and, inherently, professional military leadership development is built as a continuum. Additionally, the policies, processes and systems in the educational and training area of the HRM overall system are also supported by competence




Figure no. 5: Functions of Human Resource Management from the perspective of demand and supply

[Adapted from Bucur-Marcu, Fluri, Tagarev (eds.) (2009) Defence Management: An Introduction. Security and Defence Management Series, no. 1. DCAF]



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*The policies, processes and systems in the educational and training area of the HRM overall system are also supported by competence models/ educational standards reflecting both the needs of the system, and also the new requirements acknowledged at strategic level, national resilience being a case in point.*

models/educational standards reflecting both the needs of the system, and also the new requirements acknowledged at strategic level, national resilience being a case in point. Concerning the latter aspect, we believe that a depiction of the continuum of education and training similar to the approach proposed by the BSI organisational resilience guideline-based taxonomy of action for building organisational resilience depicted by *figure no. 2* would be extremely useful in guiding decisions. In addition, a reflection and discussion of the list of management disciplines contributing to organisational resilience proposed by the two internationally used standards in the field of organisational resilience (i.e., *table no. 2*) would be a good framework towards identifying the areas of concern for professional military leadership development from a resilience perspective.

A qualitative approach to the PME and professional military leadership development also incurs three more major milestones. The first one concerns the employment of a student-based model of learning in the sense of clearly establishing students' performance criteria by level of complexity and henceforth designing the curriculum and assessment methodologies. That should be complemented by clarifying the role of scientific research in terms of generating value-added products based on the formulation of clear-cut needs and requirements. The second milestone is related to academic instruction



and management, which refers not only to the quality and mix of the academic staff (e.g., instructors, civilian academics and subject matter experts), but also to the role played by agile support structures and processes. Last but not least, accreditation of the PME system components not only at national level, but also in terms of Romania's membership of the EU and NATO would consolidate the qualitative approach to education and training in the military.

## CONCLUSIONS

The contribution of the Romanian defence establishment to securing and guaranteeing national resilience through its approach to leadership development is and could continue to be multi-fold. Firstly, taking a resilience-based approach to defining the competences of the future military leaders can better ensure armed forces' competitive advantage by linking capability requirements with learning outcomes. Secondly, the development of a professional military force means developing learning individuals and providing people in decision-making positions and not only with the necessary skills and knowledge to discharge their service responsibilities effectively. Last but not least, further reflection on professional military leadership development from the perspective of national and organisational resilience can enhance the culture of professional development and personal responsibility in the armed forces.

*The development of a professional military force means developing learning individuals and providing people in decision-making positions and not only with the necessary skills and knowledge to discharge their service responsibilities effectively.*

The success criteria by which interventions in the field of professional military leadership development can be assessed are their relevance to the strategic framework, their timeliness and feasibility.

According to Biggs et al. (2012, 2015) there are seven principles that can guide the building and consolidation of resilience and they are as follows:

- (P1) maintaining diversity and redundancy, but not at too high levels though in order to encourage options that can be managed for adaptation and transformation;
- (P2) managing connectivity by managing the sources of information, their reliability and by observing the tension between too much connectivity and modularity;
- (P3) managing slow variables and feedback;
- (P4) encouraging the understanding of the system as a complex adaptive one;
- (P5) encouraging learning and experimentation;
- (P6) enlarging participation;
- (P7) promoting polycentric governance systems.



The use of the aforementioned principles in the Romanian professional military education system would encourage its capacity to absorb new concepts, like national and organisational resilience, and hence continue to remain relevant and provide added value even in times of change and disruption.

To conclude, the basic requirements leading to approaching professional military leadership development from the perspective of national resilience are:

- A strategic approach to leadership development generated as part of a comprehensive consultation and collaboration of stakeholders;
- The allocation of resources to support the building, consolidation and/or enhancement or maintenance of a resilient posture from the perspective of the relationship between needs, requirements and educational and training solutions;
- The development of adequate instruments to support a resilience framework in the field of education and training and the provision of the necessary checks and balances by which the framework is maintained at optimal standards.

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