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Ahmad, Araz Ramazan; Othman, Gardwn Tahir

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THE IMPACT OF ISIS ON IRAQ'S NATIONAL SECURITY: REVIEW OF THE PERIOD FROM 2014 TO 2017

Araz Ramazan Ahmad^{1*}, Gardwn Tahir Othman²

¹Department of Administration, College of Humanities, University of Raparin, Ranya, Kurdistan Region, Iraq; Diplomacy and Public Relations Department, College of Law and Politics, University of Human Development, Sulaimani, Kurdistan Region, Iraq

 <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4350-1086> ✉ araz.ahmad85@gmail.com

²Freelance Researcher, Erbil, Iraq  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6345-9981> ✉ gardoontahirr@gmail.com

Abstract: *In the post-Ba'athist era, stability and national security remain the two key goals. Iraq has suffered from many extremist terrorist groups on several separate stages from 2003 to 2017. The most threatening terrorist group was ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), which has enormous impacts on Iraqi society, given the vast geographical areas that it controlled, and the dangers, crimes and violations suffered by the Iraqi people with all its components. The main aim of this study is to determine the impacts of ISIS on Iraqi national security. The study relied on Content Analysis Method to analyze the collected data and achieve its aims. Also, the primary research question is about the impact of ISIS on Iraq's national security from 2014 to 2017. Correspondingly, an international coalition of more than a hundred countries was formed to stop the rapid expansion of ISIS. The number of victims who lost their lives and were affected at the psychological and humanitarian levels was explained in this study. According to the research results, ISIS was seeking long-term goals. The most important was the preparation for disseminating this new extremist ideology. The intelligence and the exploitation of poverty, ignorance, and political conflicts that ISIS used aimed to implant the extremist mentality in the most significant number of attention.*

Keywords: *Iraq; ISIS-ISIL; National Security; Terrorism; International Coalition*

INTRODUCTION

Terrorist organizations continued to attack Iraq from 2003 until 2017, in a big way, as many forms of terrorism and its sects appeared in this country due to its confused political situation (Stern and McBride 2013). Some of them were of a Sunni Islamic background, such as the famous al-Qaeda organization led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, which carried out many terrorist operations and was characterized by its suicide operations with car bombs and explosive devices. The activities of this organization target all other components except for the Sunni component and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), which was targeting the same groups that were targeted by al-Qaeda (Middle East Monitor 2015) but intends to establish an Islamic caliphate according to their vision that they clarified through the statements of their leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Counter Extremist Project 2022) and there is another type of terrorism, which is the regional-backed forces such as the Iraqi Hezbollah, Asa'ib al-Haq and

other militias that it committed the most heinous crimes against the Sunnis and tried to insult the Kurds in northern Iraq. Iraqi people paid many innocent lives between 2003 and 2017 without guilt, and the only reason for these losses is the conflict between political parties among themselves. Political parties adopted the proxy war principle with each other by supporting these extremist organizations in support of one another (Byman 2007).

ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), also known as ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), is a Sunni Jihadist Organization that claims religious authority over all Muslims and declares itself a caliphate. Al-Qaeda inspired it; however, it was formally dismissed from the organization. The Islamic State is not the same as Al-Qaeda. It has administrative control of civil society (some 10 million people), control of territory in both Syria and Iraq, unrivaled financial independence, sophisticated control of military expertise, and control of much of the infrastructure and lines of communication in the area, thanks to its 30,000 fighters. With this in mind, it may be claimed that the Islamic State (IS) is a terrorist organization leading a fictitious state if it is anything (Martin 2021).

In Iraq, there have been two significant peak periods of terrorism: the first began in 2007 and ended with the US troop surge; the second began in 2011 and has been dominated by ISIL's ascent. The group's expansion took advantage of rising sectarian tensions between Shi'a and Sunnis, an ineffective Iraqi military, and the onset of the Syrian civil war. ISIL committed substantial acts of terrorism in Iraq in 2014, capturing and consolidating territory. By 2015, the organization had taken control of significant swaths of land and was concentrating on establishing its self-proclaimed caliphate. ISIL, on the other hand, increased its attacks significantly in 2016. Three-quarters of all terrorist incidents in Iraq that year were caused by this surge. ISIL carried out nearly 1,000 strikes. This represents a 22 percent increase over 2015, with 7,351 deaths. ISIL is Iraq's deadliest terrorist organization, killing over 18,000 people between 2013 and 2016. In 2016, forty percent of these deaths happened (Global Terrorism Index 2017).

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which surged swiftly during the Syrian Civil War, took Fallujah in Anbar Province in January 2014. This operation was regarded as ISIS's first major victory in Iraq. Iraq is in the Middle East, and its neighbors include Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Iraq is divided into 18 provinces, with Baghdad as the capital and Mosul as the second most populous city. Northern Iraq has suffered a significant humanitarian crisis due to the Iraqi Civil War (2014-2017), with more than 60,000 deaths and more than three million internally displaced people (Spencer 2018). By June 2014, ISIS had taken control of several northern Iraqi cities and villages, including Mosul and Tikrit. ISIS announced the formation of a new caliphate, the Islamic State (IS), on 29 June 2014, with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as its caliph. While in control, ISIS was responsible for many massacres (such as the Sinjar massacre) (Spencer 2018).

However, by the end of 2013, the country's security situation had deteriorated. With 7,818 slain, the total number of civilian and police casualties has risen to its highest since 2008 (compared to 6,787 in 2008). May 2013 was the most violent month, with 3,154 civilian casualties, including 963 dead and 2,191 injured. Salah al-Din, Diyala, Ninewa, and Anbar were the governorates with the most damage. After Iraqi government forces stormed a protest camp suspected of hiding Sunni insurgents on 30 December 2013, violence erupted in Ramadi, the capital of Anbar Governorate. This incident sparked Anbar's crisis, culminating in retaliation and

fighting. Like the 2006 Samarra bombing, this incident is primarily the catalyst for the 2014-2017 crises (IOM 2018).

ISIS took Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city, in June 2014, when the Iraqi Security Forces abandoned their posts and refused to fight. The loss of Tikrit and other northern Iraqi cities followed as ISIS solidified its grip on northern and western Iraq. ISIS, now known as the Islamic State, acquired roughly 1,500 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) from the US and other weapons and artillery. The Islamic State replaced its losses rapidly by releasing captives from the Government of Iraq with just about 10,000 fighters (Prothero 2014).

The United States invaded Iraq in 2003 in response to a threat that did not exist and with no preparation for what would happen once Saddam Hussein was deposed. It engaged in a chaotic and continuously changing exercise in nation-building, as it did in Afghanistan. It abruptly left Iraq in 2011 and appears to be repeating the same in 2021. It has fought two major wars in Iraq, first against Sunni insurgents and later against ISIS, without establishing a fully functional Iraqi government or a viable growth pattern. Rather than counter-terrorism, the US campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan has been guerrilla and irregular warfare. Iraq's first war since 2003 was against internal and sectarian, and the country's second war was against a terrorist organization like ISIS (Cordesman 2021).

METHODS AND DATA COLLECTION

A qualitative methodology is applied in this study. The article uses a thematic design and the deductive technique to promote consistency and reliability. Primary sources from scholarly publications, papers, and news organizations are given priority. To provide socio-historical background for ISIS's actions and their effect on Iraqi national security, some secondary source materials created by research papers and trustworthy international data sources were employed for analysis. This study relies on the content analysis method for analyzing the gathered by depending on an online exploratory search from 01 December 2021 to 20 February 2022 on terrorist groups, the number of impacted residents, the number of attacks, and the sorts of attacks. In addition, the Global Terrorism Index data was used. The data was coded, tabularized, and presented descriptively. The descriptive statistical data analysis was performed using frequency, percentage, and maps to determine the study's results.

TERRORISM AND IRAQI NATIONAL SECURITY

Iraqi national security faced several challenges due to terrorism, the most important of which was in the period after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime or the so-called Ba'ath regime, and the period of the emergence of ISIS or the so-called Islamic State and its activities began in Iraq, as the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003 opened the way for many terrorist organizations appeared and practiced violence against Iraqis and non-Iraqis from the United States forces that were still present in Iraqi lands at the time to ensure the progress of the transitional phase and the formation of the new government. The most prominent of these organizations was al-Qaeda, which carried out many operations against Shiites and US forces. Then Iranian-backed Shiite militias appeared and had their share of terrorist practices as well,

leading to the most significant danger, which is ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), which is considered the biggest terrorist threat to Iraqi national security to this day, as the year 2014 is an important turning date for Iraqi national security. , where the Iraqi government lost control of the second largest Iraqi city, which is the city of Mosul, known for its vast population after the capital Baghdad, and then the organization continued its operations To succeed in controlling many other cities in the north and west of Iraq, to control more than 40% of the Iraqi land area, which is considered the most substantial threat was facing the Iraqi national security, as any country loses control of this massive amount of its lands. Hence, its national security is inevitably in grave danger (Leaver and Shamoo 2006).

THE IMPACTS OF ISIS ATTACKS ON IRAQI'S NATIONAL SECURITY

The ability of a state to provide for the protection and defense of its citizens has been defined as national security (Williams 2008). The apparent rivalry between national security and human rights criteria was debated in the 1970s. By the 1990s, there appeared to be a widespread international agreement, as evidenced by the increase in multilateral humanitarian operations, that human rights compliance was one of the most critical safeguards for enhanced national and international security. The Sawyer Seminar debunked the assumption that national security and a robust human rights posture are mutually exclusive, concluding they are mutually helpful. Indeed, the assessments provided during the conference consistently underlined that a solid commitment to human rights at home and abroad were more likely to ensure national security than a weak commitment.

11 September reawakened a strongly ideological image of national security and a belief among some that human rights could be sacrificed in the name of national security. Indeed, it has created a political environment where human rights and security are increasingly considered as competing objectives rather than complementing each other (Sanger 2002). Concerns about human rights were a secondary reason for the invasion of Iraq. It was supported by the Bush administration principally on national security and proper implementation of Security Council decisions (Sanger 2002).

Terrorism is a systematic danger to economic progress (Mahmud 2020). It has reached an all-time high in Iraq. Terrorist attacks have hampered Iraq's progress in recent years. Due to terrorism attacks, Iraq's economic position will be destroyed, particularly in education, health, and *per capita* income, which are the most significant axes of human growth (Mahmud 2020). Between 2003 and 2018, Iraq was the country most affected by terrorism. As a result of the US invasion of Iraq, followed by waves of high-intensity hostilities, Iraq was the country most hit by terrorism for 14 of the 15 years from 2003 to 2018. Following the defeat of ISIL in 2014, terrorism in Iraq has decreased. On the other hand, Iraq remains one of the world's most terrorist-infested countries (Bardwell and Iqbal 2020).

THE IMPACTS ON THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

Iraq's current state of affairs is the outcome of three major strategic blunders. First, the US, notably its military, made mistakes in determining the nature of the conflict at the outset and then neglected to reassess the situation as events unfolded. Second, the government failed to balance goals, methods, and resources. Third, the government chose the incorrect course of action. Rather than implementing a plan that addressed the intricacies of a multifaceted conflict that included aspects of civil war, insurgency, and terrorism, decision-makers opted for a counterinsurgency strategy. Decision-makers have failed to understand the facts of the situation and adapt and anticipate them (Reider 2007).

Persistent sectarian tensions in Iraq between Sunni and Shiite factions, as well as tensions between Kurdish parties in the north and the government in Baghdad, aggravated the war to drive out the Islamic State following the US invasion in 2003 and the fall of Saddam Hussein. These tensions are now threatening the stability of the new Iraqi government, which is working to reconstruct the country and prevent the Islamic State from regaining power. Iraq confronts tremendous obstacles in its recovery from the Islamic State's fight. Following the nearly four-year war, more than two million people remain internally displaced, with nearly nine million needing humanitarian aid, and rehabilitation is expected to cost at least \$88 billion (Reider 2007).

Apart from reintegrating liberated Sunni communities into the political system, the new government must also deal with the demobilization and integration of powerful Shiite militias formed during the fight against the Islamic State into Iraqi security forces, as well as ongoing tensions with Kurdish groups seeking greater autonomy in the north following a failed independence referendum in October 2017. The Iraqi Security Troops (ISF), militant organizations, and Kurdish forces (also known as 'Peshmerga') fought ISIS from 2015 to 2016, retaking cities such as Tikrit. The ISF launched an attack in Mosul in October 2016, dubbed 'We Are Coming, Nineveh', with the help of ally militias and an international alliance. After protracted and bloody battles in Mosul, the Iraqi government declared victory over ISIS in July 2017, signaling the group's near-total demise in Iraq.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) began a violent assault on Sinjar on 03 August 2014 (Okoth-Obbo 2020). ISIL took control of Sinjar City and its environs and carried out horrific atrocities against the civilian population, including mass murder, forced religious conversions, abductions, and forced slavery of thousands of people, especially women and girls. Thousands of people evacuated the area and were relocated across Iraq, with some emigrating. The United Nations Human Rights Council has declared that ISIL perpetrated genocide against the Yazidis and committed war crimes and crimes against humanity in Sinjar and other parts of Iraq during its reign of terror. Up to 200,000 Yazidis are still displaced after six years (Okoth-Obbo 2020). Some are still living in deplorable conditions on Mount Sinjar, where they fled to flee, while the bulk is housed in IDP camps in Iraq's Kurdistan Region (Okoth-Obbo 2020). Since the ISIL fight was officially declared over in 2017, the return to Sinjar has been delayed, owing to the extent of destruction done in 2014. ISIL destroyed up to 80% of public infrastructure and 70% of civilian residences in Sinjar City and neighboring areas, and many important religious sites, in addition to the human tragedy (Okoth-Obbo 2020).

The killing occurred three months after the Islamic State took Mosul in northern Iraq and declared it the capital of their self-proclaimed caliphate in 2014. ISIS fighters encircled Kojo, a small rural town near Sinjar Mountain. Some of the fighters came from adjacent Arab Muslim villages with whom the Yazidis had long been friends. It took nearly three years for US-backed Iraqi forces to push ISIS out of Iraq and another two years for US-led forces and Syrian Kurds to retake the final ISIS area in Syria (Arraf and Prickett 2021).

The cost of deaths, injuries, property damage, and GDP losses related to terrorism make up the economic impact of terrorism. If a country's GDP losses from terrorism surpass 1000 deaths per year, the country's GDP losses are estimated. The economic cost of terrorist kills accounts for most of the total cost of terrorism borne by countries, owing to the high economic value put on human lives. The economic impact of terrorism in Iraq in 2014 was equal to 27% of the country's GDP. In 2018, Iraq had the second-highest economic cost of terrorism as a proportion of GDP, accounting for 4% of GDP (Bardwell and Iqbal 2021).

Since 1980, Iraq has faced war or war-related difficulties, affecting the country's economy. The previous battles have severely hampered Iraq's economic progress and created sectarian and ethnic divisions, dividing the country along sectarian and ethnic lines and creating large areas where the impact of violence has created their economies and divisions. Many aspects of Iraq's current economic problems are challenging to quantify. Still, it is clear that the war is exacerbating them, that they are playing a significant role in dividing the country, and that defeating ISIS will not end the divisions and pattern of violence in Iraq without far more government action and reform than has been planned thus far (Cordesman and Sakayan 2015).

THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES

Due to the highly politicized nature of the battle and the Iraqi government's incapacity to give cash compensation to impacted households, the problem of paying people who have lost their homes is highly complicated. Property restitution will also be difficult, considering that property frauds are likely to have occurred on a big scale. Iraq has had a tumultuous recent past. The previous regime's authoritarian and discriminatory policies, Iraq's wars with neighboring countries and the resulting international sanctions, sectarian and ethnic conflict in the post-2003 period, and, most recently, ISIL's occupation have all significantly impacted the lives of many people in Mosul and Iraq. ISIL's two years in power have resulted in an intellectual and economic standstill and educational, physical, and psychological issues.

In Mosul, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the establishment of an Islamic State and declared himself caliph. Rape, kidnappings, executions, mass murder, pillaging, extortion, seizure of public resources, and smuggling were all part of the terror campaign. The rise of ISIS exacerbated Iraqi society's divisions. The Shia world's top 'religious reference', Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, issued a fatwa calling on Iraqis to take up guns in response to the Sunni jihadist activity. Hundreds of thousands of men, predominantly Shia, have enlisted in new and old militias, many of which are backed by Iran. The Popular Mobilization Forces combined more than 60 armed factions under one roof (PMF). The advent of ISIS prompted the second round of foreign intervention. Iran was the first to provide military aid because Sunni jihadists had approached within 25 miles of its border (Hamasaheed and Nada 2020).




Figure 1: Information about Some of the Significant Terrorist Incidents That Occurred in Iraq
(Source: SIGIR analysis of open-source 12.10.2011 to 15.01.2012)

Iraq is a war-torn country with significant security and justice issues, including many internally displaced people and fears that destroyed ISIL cells are hiding in rural areas. While Iraq's youth protest for a brighter future with less corruption, better administration, and lower unemployment, security forces are accused of utilizing armed violence against civilians. With ISIL defeated, Iraq can now focus on peace, recovery, security, and justice sector reform to effectively tackle the country's difficulties. Security sector reform and governance are critical for the country's long-term stability and peace. Although the SSR process in Iraq was officially launched in 2015, there are still significant obstacles in the security and justice sectors (International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) 2020b).

Iraqi society is today confronted with many issues and rapid changes in many areas of life. This is a problem that most Arab countries, like the rest of the globe, face. The legacy of the former regime, the rapid transition from dictatorship to democracy, and changes in the strategic environment are all characterized by violent political conflict, corruption, the outbreak of sectarian violence, terrorism, and crime, and all serve to weaken the social structure, which accelerates insecurity and instability (Dechow 2017). Terrorism, extremism, and intellectual deviation are challenges arising from the Islamic community's abandonment of the ideals of tolerance and moderation, which are among the most severe issues confronting the international community. Because terrorism threatens Iraq's national security, it is vital to allocate resources to research and study to find effective remedies (Sa'aed 2018).

THE CULTURAL CASUALTIES

The first three Iraqi sites on the UNESCO World Historical List (Ashur, Hatra, Samarra, and Erbil Citadel) are classified as World Heritage in Danger by UNESCO, indicating their integrity as sites of significant cultural heritage significance is in jeopardy. At least two globally significant sites (the Assyrian capital towns of Nimrud and Nineveh) have been subjected to substantial episodes of devastation by ISIS during their occupancy of the Mosul region, out of the 11 Iraqi sites on the UNESCO World Heritage Tentative List. The Islamic State has destroyed numerous notable physical relics since its inception in 2014, including the grave of the biblical prophet Jonah in Mosul and ancient ruins in the former Assyrian capital of Nimrud. The group considers its acts consistent with the Salafist-Jihadist interpretation, which calls for eliminating polytheistic societal influences. These dramatic attacks catch the world's attention, maintain its appearance of invincibility, and provide funding for its actions through underground antique markets. UNESCO considers the deliberate destruction of cultural heritage a war crime, but ISIS has been known to do just that. As a result of the group's idolatry of representational art, art pieces in museums, mosques, and churches have been targeted with hammers, axes, bulldozers, and bombs. The organization also continues to desecrate and loot archaeological sites, selling the artifacts on the black market to fund their activities - even though researchers have been unable to quantify how much money these transactions generate (Buffenstein 2017).




Figure 2: Map of Destroyed Sites of Iraq in 2016 (Map and legend: RASHID International e.V)

THE IMPACT ON NATIONAL UNITY

The Iraqi government is facing significant security challenges. The first is about state-imposed weapons limits, which the prime minister stated clearly in his government program. The second issue is to combat ISIS's revival. The most visible problem facing the new government, directly linked to security, political, and even economic rewards, is the control of competing armed organizations in the country. The primary goal is to keep track of non-governmental actors, mainly armed factions and groups, who have gathered a considerable military force and a political and security function that allows them to move, act, and influence freely. Because al-Kadhimi comes from a powerful security organization, there are local and international expectations that the fight against ISIS will make significant progress (Thgeel 2020).

According to the Iraqi National Security Strategy (NSS), the main problem is to defend the people from terrorism rather than the nation-state from foreign attack. The Iraqi Security Sector could not protect Mosul residents from the relatively fewer foreign ISIS radicals in June 2014. This failure showed the costs of hiring government employees based on ideological commitment rather than professional merit, as well as the ramifications of corruption and mismanagement that went unchecked. Furthermore, it showed the Iraqi Security Sector's lack of public trust, respect, and confidence. The challenge is not to destroy ISIS as an occupation force in Iraq and Syria but to create a long-term security and safety environment in which the Iraqi Sunni populace is no longer exposed to extremists' siren call of violent rejection of the Iraqi Nation State (Abbas and Trombly 2014). In August 2014, the United States initiated airstrikes against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria to avoid the collapse of Irbil, and President Barack Obama organized a multinational coalition to combat the Islamic State. The United States is now playing a more prominent role in Iraq, and CTS is a big part of it. CTS has maintained a close relationship with the United States, particularly the USSF (United States Army Special Forces). CTS is the starting point for stronger US cooperation in the battle against the Islamic State since it provides the US with dependable eyes and interlocutors in any operation. CTS has a tumultuous history, but it is the most capable military partner the US has within the Government of Iraq.

Counter-terrorism is an integral part of counterinsurgency, but because no single institution was responsible for coordinating it, numerous units, such as the Ministry of Interior's (Ministry of Interior) Emergency Response Brigade and MoD (Iraqi Ministry of Defense) units, undertook it in addition to CTS (Counter Terrorism Service). There was no military unity of command to direct counter-terrorism efforts. The Iraqi National Counter Terrorism Strategy formally assigned CTS to coordinate and lead all counter-terrorism actions, but resource competition, power consolidation, and anti-coup concerns outweighed CTS's responsibility. Lack of cooperation and coordination, failure to share intelligence, and attempted monopolies of one ministry over another contributed to Iraq's 2014 security disaster (Bowen Jr. 2007).

The Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) in Iraq is currently assisting Iraq in defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), a pressing security concern. On humanitarian, stability, and economic matters, the international community (IC) is enabling. Looking ahead five years, the primary issue is how the international community can help Iraq break its historically cyclical pattern of internal conflict-post-conflict disorder-

suppression-conflict, which is insufficient to secure strategic interests. This significant issue is compatible with Gray's Maxim 3, which declared that conflict must be engaged to mold the following peace, yet building peace is more challenging than making war (Gray 2007).

In Iraq, USSF was tasked with forming an Iraqi counter-terrorism force modeled after the US Special Operations Forces. Several other Ministry of Interior (Mol) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) units were part of anti-terrorist operations. The main problem was that no single body with actual counter-terrorism duty and several entities had overlapping power. On the other hand, the military instrument was the least important of all the counter-terrorism measures because it couldn't address the underlying socioeconomic conditions that led to terrorism. Iraq needed national reconciliation, the abolition of Sunni disenfranchisement, and the alleviation of Shi'a anxieties of being persecuted by Sunnis as they had been under Saddam. The United States may have acted as a facilitator in this process. Still, without genuine Iraqi political and societal commitment, no US assistance would solve the country's terrorism problem.

International support in Iraq is focused on refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), violent extremism, regional instability, border control, local administration, and the reintegration of non-state armed groups. Several donors want to offer more funding over the next few years to aid in the relief of the refugee crisis, reconstruction, and the repatriation of Iraqi IDPs to their homes. While demining and border control remain top priorities in Iraq, donors risk losing sight of the necessity of maintaining efforts to achieve a mine-free Iraq ready to resume business, growth, and reform as the country emerges from the humanitarian catastrophe. Historically, state security forces have been underequipped and undertrained. Young men volunteer to join the police and defense forces due to high unemployment rates. The police have been suspected of arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial deaths. Several armed gangs have lately attacked police officers and police stations. Oversight of the army and the police has been difficult due to a lack of experience and resources in Parliament (International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) 2020a).

Terrorists see Iraq as a key battleground in their fight against humanity. We must also acknowledge Iraq as a critical battlefield in the war against terror. Is ceding ground to terrorists (in one of the world's most vital locations) going to pose a long-term threat to the global economy and America's security, growth, and prosperity? A nascent democracy in Iraq will alter the regional status quo, which has bred estrangement for decades and given rise to the transnational terrorism that now threatens us. In Iraq, the opponent is a mix of rejectionists, Saddamists, and Al Qaida-affiliated or inspired terrorists. These three organizations have a similar antagonism to the elected Iraqi government and the presence of Coalition forces, but their goals are otherwise distinct and, to some extent, contradictory (Hubner 2006).

After years of fighting ISIS, the Iraqi military has more experience and effectiveness. ISIS has also failed to recreate the incubator that helped it prepare its ranks before the events of 2014, and it has discovered that these places are better prepared to oppose it. ISIS isn't as strong as before 2014, when it struggled to gain traction in the early phases of its eventual comeback from defeat. The Global Coalition Against Daesh (GCDD) has stated that it will continue to fight ISIS in Iraq and Syria and provide the conditions for the terrorist group to defeat (Thgeel 2020).

Since the group's last bastion was lost in 2017, security experts have warned about the threat of a rebirth. This risk can be reduced by addressing reconciliation and grievances with and within Iraq's Sunni community, which is currently not happening. The opposite is true, as a public revenge movement has been followed by a government strategy of more profound neglect (Taub 2018).

Negotiating a ceasefire between the various factions and agreeing on the terms of compliance will be one of the first stages in altering strategy. The diplomatic focus should shift away from government capacity building and toward brokering a truce and ending the violence while allowing Shia, Sunni, and Kurd factions to negotiate their political solutions. National power's economic instrument can be a potent motivator and should be used as such. Microloans, debt forgiveness, direct loans, and other economic programs might operate as a carrot to motivate the factions to negotiate a truce and maintain compliance. Baghdad must be prioritized in terms of security. A zone of separation (ZOS) between factions in and around the city should be established and controlled by military personnel. These methods are the most effective means of establishing and maintaining peace and stability as political processes work toward long-term solutions (Reider 2007).

ATTACKS, DEATH TOLL, AND INJURIES BY ISLAMIC STATE (2014-2017)

Table 1: The US Troops, the UK Troops, and Non-Military Fatalities in Iraq, 2014-2017

(Source: Gollub and O'Hanlon 2020)

Year	US Troops	UK Troops	Journalists/Media Workers	Humanitarian/ NGO Workers
2014	4	0	5	0
2015	8	0	6	0
2016	20	0	6	1
2017	22	1	8	3

Table 2: Civilian Deaths by Province Due to Suicide Attack, 2014-2017 (Source: Gollub and O'Hanlon 2020)

Year	Baghdad	Anbar	Salah ad Din	Diyala	Ninawa	Tamim	Babylon
2014	632	173	268	167	44	95	119
2015	295	117	135	284	0	7	15
2016	962	58	172	138	105	25	246
2017	78	4	7	6	64	0	0

Table 3: Iraqi Civilian Fatalities since 2014 (Source: Gollub and O'Hanlon 2020)

Year	Iraqi Civilian Fatalities Due to Violence
2014	20,218
2015	17,578
2016	16,393
2017	13,183

Table 4: Most Frequent Attack Targets in Iraq, 2013 to 2017 (Source: World Data.info 2020)

Target	Attacks	Killed	Injured	Hostages
Private Citizens	6142	21,399	36,170	13,695
Police	2073	6,887	7,585	1,681
Business	1431	3,761	9,390	334
Non-State Militias	874	3,688	3,488	411
Government	866	1,378	2,010	497
Military	655	4,132	3,576	1,338
Religious Institutions	284	1,064	2,116	30
Utilities	230	370	137	98
Transportation	228	452	1,090	9
Educational Institution	126	142	450	65

Table 5: Most Affected Regions, 2013 to 2017 (Source: World Data.info 2020)

Region	Attacks	Killed	Injured	Hostages
Baghdad	3821	8,842	25,064	154
Saladin	2210	5,482	8,986	943
Al Anbar	1985	6,582	5,372	4,291
Diyala	1725	3,703	7,459	395
Nineveh	1671	8,396	3,220	5,932
Kirkuk	847	1,743	3,945	5,381
Babil	592	1,599	3,659	268
Basra	80	108	237	6
Arbil	48	409	114	90
Wasit	47	110	334	2
Karbala	44	116	290	0
DhiQar	29	129	253	3
Al Qadisiyah	23	20	113	0
Sulaymaniyah	20	19	22	2
Najaf	12	26	82	0
Muthanna	11	53	123	26
Maysan	7	18	83	1
Dihok	5	1	1	1

Table 6: Terrorist Organizations in Iraq, 2013 to 2017 (Source: World Data.info 2020)

Organization	Attacks	Killed	Injured	Hostages
Islamic State	3803	22,127	20,966	15,106
Al-Qaida	74	350	927	2
Asa'ib Ahl al-Haqq	57	111	37	91
Al-Naqshabandiya Army	23	123	113	0
Mukhtar Army	4	35	130	0
Pro-Government Extremists	4	4	0	0
Kata'ib Hezbollah	3	49	600	1,527
Ansar al-Islam	2	10	6	1
Muslim Extremists	2	4	0	1
Badr Brigades	2	0	0	2
Al-Nusrah Front	1	8	0	0

CONCLUSION

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria is not similar to any extremist Islamic organizations that preceded it. This organization had oil and commercial lines, and in addition to the antiquities, it looted from both countries. It left challenging to remove traces, even with the organization's demise. The organization's leadership and its members claim that they are defending the Sunni component and convincing the people of the Sunnis that the Shiite component will not have mercy on them. ISIS threatens Iraqi national security in a way that Iraq has never witnessed from an extremist organization. Besides, by answering the research questions, the researcher shed light on the issue of sectarian differences before the emergence of ISIS, describing them as one of the reasons for the strength of this organization.

ISIS was seeking long-term goals, the most important of which was preparing to disseminate this new extremist ideology. The brain and the exploitation of poverty, ignorance, and political conflicts that ISIS used aimed to implant the extremist mentality in the minds.

The only solution is to fill the gaps that allowed ISIS to emerge and obtain its power. These gaps are represented by working to unify the military forces inside Iraqi territory. This can only be done by eradicating the hostility and sectarian dissonance among the components of the Iraqi political parties and groups. The real danger is not the number of individuals or the military and economic strength of terrorist organizations, but rather the danger lies in the extremist terrorist ideology. The world and the international community should understand that this danger has not gone away yet and that protecting the national security of Iraq or other countries that have suffered from ISIS is a top priority. The international community should develop policies to support parties that have proven to be resistant to and combating terrorism.

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