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Factional Dynamics in Philippine Party Politics, 1900–2019

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Abstract

The Philippines is a rich case study in the examination of intra-party factions and factionalism in competitive party systems of Southeast Asia. Intra-party factionalism is a recurring, yet understudied, aspect of Philippine party politics. The factional nature of Philippine party politics has endured through time – from bifactionalism of the post-war two-party system to the multi-factionalism of the post-authoritarian multi-party system. All the major political parties that have dominated politics at different historical epochs have experienced intense factional splits. Intra-party factionalism remains a consistent feature of party politics and has become more complicated over time. The number of factions has increased at every period of party system development, while the level of party institutionalization has remained generally low. This article seeks to address this puzzle by tracing the history of political factionalism in the Philippines. It maintains that factional resilience in Philippine party politics is an outcome of combined institutional and structural factors rooted in history. Adopting a historical institutional approach, it will delineate the path-dependent trajectory of intra-party factionalism at critical political junctures. Moreover, it will examine the role of intra-party factionalism in the under-institutionalization of the Philippine party system.

Keywords

Philippines, political parties, elections, democracy, factions

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Introduction

Intra-party factionalism is a recurring, yet understudied, aspect of Philippine party politics. During the colonial era, the Nacionalista Party (NP) – the country’s Grand Old Party founded in 1907 – split into two factions twice, in 1922 and 1933. In 1946, the Liberal Party (LP) emerged from a faction that split from the NP. Both the NP and LP experienced intense factional splits during the twenty-five years it alternated in power under a two-party system during the post-war period. The Philippine political party system originated from factions of the elite. Intra-elite competition, in turn, was earlier driven by local land-based political clans, which formed the building blocks of Philippine party politics. Later, transformations in the country’s political economy impacted the nature of factional leadership within the major parties. The authoritarian period under the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos disrupted the elite-based factional competitions within parties, allowing for nonlanded politicians to mobilise their political machines within and outside the dictator’s dominant party. Since then, a multitude of parties has been organised around the split and mergers of elite-based political factions that have shaped the multi-party system in the post-authoritarian period.

The Philippines is a rich case study in the examination of intra-party factions and factionalism in competitive party systems of Southeast Asia. As mentioned by Chambers and Ufen (2020), factionalism “is understood as the interplay of collective actors within parties, competing for power resources.” Party factions in Southeast Asia are usually ad-hoc organisations organised informally among political personalities. It may have both positive and negative effects on parties or party systems despite the level of party system institutionalisation. Intra-party factionalism can help maintain party unity amidst a diversity of political interests. Alternatively, it may incite the splintering of parties and coalitions, further undermining the authority and effectiveness of party leadership.

The Philippines has gone through four party systems with varying levels of party institutionalisation. Historically, the Philippines has experienced four party systems: a predominant party system during the American colonial period (1900–1935); a formal two-party system during the post-war republic (1946–1972); an authoritarian dominant party system during the Marcos dictatorship (1978–1986); and the current multiparty system (since 1987) (Tancangco, 1988). However, intra-party factionalism remained a consistent feature of party politics and has become more complicated over time. The number of factions has increased at every period of party system development, while the level of party institutionalisation has remained generally low (Hicken, 2014). This article seeks to address this puzzle by tracing the history of political factionalism in the Philippines. It maintains that factional resilience in Philippine party politics is an outcome of combined institutional and structural factors rooted in history. Adopting a historical institutional approach, it will delineate the path-dependent trajectory of intra-party factionalism at critical political junctures. Moreover, it will examine the role of intra-party factionalism in the under-institutionalisation of the Philippine party system.

The introduction of political parties and elections as institutional mechanisms for selecting representatives to the legislature created an avenue for fostering national linkages among local political clans in the country. The dependence of national-level

politicians (i.e. president and senators) on factions of local political clans as channels for clientelistic exchanges provided a strong disincentive for the institutionalisation of political parties (Teehankee, 2018). Hence, “[f]ar from being stable, programmatic entities, [Philippine political parties] have in practice proven to be not much more than convenient vehicles of patronage that can be set up, merged with others, split, resurrected, regurgitated, reconstituted, renamed, repackaged, recycled, or flushed down the toilet anytime” (Quimpo, 2008: 128).

Rethinking Factionalism and Factional Dynamics in the Philippines

Factionalism has long been considered as part of the pathology of politics (Waller, 1995). Intra-party factions are common (yet understudied) aspects of political party politics (Ceron, 2019). Key (1949) was first to refer to factions as intra-party groups in his analysis of primary election of US Southern Democrats. For Duverger (1951), factions are manifestations of diversity within parties. The structure and organization of the party determines the degree of tolerance for factionalism: toleration in heterogeneous parties, while restrictive in homogeneous parties. Rose (1964) differentiated “factions” from “tendencies” in his study of the two major British parties – Conservative and Labour. He noted that the Conservatives were predominantly a party of tendencies which he defined as stable sets of attitudes, rather than a stable group of politicians. On the other hand, Labour was a party of factions that persisted through time and are self-consciously organized with cohesion and discipline. The first wave of factional studies emphasised a “growth theory of parties” in which factions are considered as “pre-party” entities that presage the formation of institutionalised political parties (Belloni and Beller, 1976; Chambers, 1963; Huntington, 1968). The interest in factions dates back to the eighteenth century in the writings of Edmund Burke, David Hume, and James Madison as a precursor of political parties. Foremost among this wave of studies was the historical analysis of Chambers (1963) on the emergence of factions in pre-independence America. He proposed an evolutionary theory that linked factions and parties to the level of political development of a country. Factional formations initially waged the struggle for power, and as the political system developed, these factions gradually evolved into parties. Aside from Chamber’s historical analysis, Nicholas (1965) examined the anthropological, sociological, and structural features of factions. He asserted that factions are “leader–follower groups” with well-defined roles: followers render support to their leader in parliament and intra-party struggles, and the leader dispenses positions, funds, and other material inducements to the followers. Factions are primarily composed of individuals recruited by party leaders to bolster their political power. The leaders’ recruitment appeals ranged from patron–client relations to kinship ties, to religious belief, to economic interest, or combinations of these. Factional mobilisation is facilitated through the party leaders and their lieutenants, who exercise broad political discretion. Ultimately, the longevity of factions is dependent on the life of the leader. In most cases, party existence outlives factional leaders.

The second wave of factional studies considered factions not as pre-party entities but as products of political divisions that emerged from already developed party organisation. From this perspective, factions are treated as intra-party units (Belloni and Beller, 1976). Aside from the focus on the organisational features of factionalism, these studies emphasised classifications and typologies based on factional size, origin (parliamentary arena or party body), level of organisation (i.e. the presence of a factional press and headquarters), pervasiveness (local or national), aim (ideology, clientele, leadership support), and duration (longstanding groups or temporary fluid aggregations) (Ceron, 2019). In his path-breaking work on the anatomy of parties and party systems, Sartori (2005) placed factions (or fractions) as specific power groups within party subunits. Following Hume, he distinguished two types of factions: the spoils-power group (factions of interest) and the idea-promotional group (factions of principle).

The third wave in the study of factions shifts the focus from typologies to factional dynamics or the “dynamic process of subgroup partitioning” (Boucek, 2009: 469). While typologies are useful for heuristic purposes, they are less useful in accounting for the dynamics of change and adaptation. As Belloni and Beller (1976: 448) asserted, “what is significant about factions ultimately is not their structural properties but their activity and its consequences[...] their dynamics and competitive politics.” This shift in focus underscores factional transformation through the interplay among factions, their host parties, and the voters. Conceptualising factionalism as a process implies that factions considered differently (i.e. factions of interests vs. factions of principles) may act similarly (cooperate or compete). Hence, “factionalism may acquire different faces in different parties at different times[...] depending on the structure of incentives and on the incidence and importance of internal conflict, it is suggested that destructive cycles of factionalism may occur” (Boucek, 2009: 469). Factions that share the same characteristics may act differently at different times, like the spoils-power factions of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan, which cooperate electorally at the district level and compete for party-government leadership, policy positions, and pork-barrel funds inside parliament. In the case of the defunct Christian Democratic Party (DC) of Italy, the competition among a dozen institutionalised factions resulted in its implosion in 1994 (Boucek, 2009).

Based on the brief literature review above, it is possible to conceive the organisation of intra-party factions as a continuum of three ideal types: (1) cliques and tendencies, (2) personal, client-group factions, and (3) institutionalised, organisational factions. Factional cliques and tendencies have very little structure and are usually adhoc organisations set up for contesting power. Personalised factions are structured around clientelistic ties and organised around the identity of the leader as chief patron. Lastly, institutionalised factions are characterised by a developed organisational structure and a higher degree of bureaucratisation. A dynamic approach to the analysis of intra-party factionalism would take into account changes that would lead to growing or diminishing complexity of factions. Hence, personalised factions may undergo a process of institutionalisation in time, or institutionalized factions may degenerate into personalised factions (Köllner and Basedau, 2005). However, intra-party factions in the Philippines have

not obtained the degree of institutionalisation akin to those in advanced democracies (i.e. the LDP in Japan and the defunct DC in Italy).

Landè (1965) popularised an enduring approach to the study of Philippine party politics that viewed power relations within the context of the patron–client factional framework.¹ In his view, local factionalism constituted the organisational base of national parties. Filipino social relations were not structured by organised interest groups or individuals who perceived themselves to be part of a specific social class as in Western democracies. What existed was a network of mutual aid relationships between a pair of individuals that he called “dyadic ties”. The dyadic ties that are reflected in Philippine politics are vertical and unequal, an bind prosperous patrons who dispensed material goods and services, and dependent clients who recompensed with their support and loyalty. The two-party system that existed from 1947 to 1972 was anchored on the dominance of only two factions in local areas, which allowed for only two national parties.²

Mirroring the growth theory of parties, Machado (1974) argued that local factions in the Philippines had been transplanted by “political machines” that will eventually form the core of institutionalised political parties. The emergence of the machine, which he defined as “an organisation devoted primarily to the political support of its leader and the maintenance of its members through the distribution of immediate, concrete and individual rewards to them” (p. 525), was closely related to interrelated changes in the traditional pattern of local leadership recruitment and faction organisation. Accompanying these changes was the decline of local considerations in the faction’s character and political action and the increase in the importance of provincial and national considerations due to the machine’s growing reliance on resources provided by politicians in higher arenas in exchange for votes.

Kimura (1989, 1991, 1992, 1997, 1998) attempted to bridge the first and second wave of factional studies by consistently and systematically tracing intra-party factionalism from the local level (with extensive ethnographical study in Lipa City in Batangas Province) to the national level. His studies concluded that elite-dominated factions and their bifurcated inter-familial rivalries had been replaced by local political machines geared towards multi-factionalism, characterised by the alliance of factions into temporary blocs. This trend was reinforced by the breakdown of the two-party system during the authoritarian period under the Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos and the emergence of a multi-party system in the post-authoritarian period.

The patron–client factional framework introduced by Landè and modified by Machado and Kimura continues to be prominent in most analyses of Philippine party politics despite the deep criticisms it has received through the years. The approach has been heavily criticised as being overly simplistic, untextured, ahistorical, and even static. It also tends to focus on “preparty” elements such as reciprocity, smooth interpersonal relationship, kinship, and fictive kinship bonds (Kerkvliet, 1995). Unfortunately, there is a wide gap in the literature on Philippine factionalism. Several studies have only tangentially discussed intra-party factional competition in relation to other aspects of Philippine politics, such as the history of political parties (Liang, 1971); colonial-era politics (Cullinane, 2003; Paredes, 1989); political development (Wurfel, 1988); electoral

politics (Tancangco, 1988; Teehankee, 2002); political families (McCoy, 1994); local politics (Hicken et al., 2019, Kawanaka, 1998, 2002; Lacaba, 1995); regime transition (Franco, 2000; Thompson, 1996); democratic deficit (Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003); left-wing politics (Quimpo, 2008); presidentialism and pork-barrel politics (Kasuya, 2005, 2009); and clientelism (Teehankee, 2013).

Regrettably, to this author's knowledge, there is no recent academic study in the literature of political science that has exclusively focused on classifying and explaining national level intra-party factional dynamics in the Philippines. This article is a modest attempt to fill this gap by bridging the second and third wave of factional studies in the Philippine context. The following section will trace the ebb and flow of factional dynamics in the Philippines at critical historical junctures, highlighting the causes, characteristics, and consequences of intra-party factionalism.

Factional Politics Under American Colonial Rule: 1900–1941

Philippine party politics was established during American colonial rule. It was built upon the clientelist interactions between the Filipino politicians and their American colonial patrons. Characteristic of most colonial regimes, the Americans implemented a system of indirect administration utilising dependable native clients. The measure of success for an American colonial official was their ability to cultivate and manipulate capable local clients in implementing American policies. Hence, the early political parties became the arena for factional infighting among the Filipino elites as they compete for colonial largesse (Paredes, 1989).

The first political party to be organised in the Philippines, the *Partido Federal* (Federal Party), was established in 1900 by Filipino politicians to facilitate clientelistic relations with their American patrons. The party was organised long before the holding of the first national election under American colonial rule (Paredes, 1989). It was founded by a faction of the local elites who defected from the Filipino revolutionary government established in Malolos in 1899. Led by Manila-based elites Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera and Benito Legarda, this faction advocated “autonomous government under an American protectorate” (Cullinane, 2003).

American colonial rule fostered the development of the Filipino party system by introducing elections as mechanisms for leadership recruitment and co-optation from the municipality (1901), to the province (1903), to the national legislature (1907), and culminating in presidential elections under the Philippine Commonwealth (1935) (Paredes, 1989). Initially, the ban on any political parties advocating autonomy or independence from US rule resulted in the emergence of a non-competitive dominant party system. When the colonial government lifted the ban in 1906, several new parties like the *Partido Independista* (Independence Party), *Partido Urgentista* (Urgency Party), and the *Comite de la Union Nacional* (Committee for National Unity) rallied the electorate behind the objective of independence. The latter two parties merged to form the *Partido Union Nacionalista* (Party for Nationalist Unity). The *Unionistas* favoured “early independence with self-help,” while the *Independistas* advocated “immediate independence

with foreign assistance.” The NP was formed on 12 March 1907, as a merger of the two pro-independence parties (Figure 1) (Liang, 1971).

By the time the first election for the national legislature was held in 1907, colonial support had already shifted to the younger set of provincial-based political leaders who formed the NP. The key Filipino politicians who emerged to challenge Pardo de Tavera and his *Partido Federal* were Sergio Osmeña and Manuel Quezon.³ The NP dominated electoral politics throughout the colonial period that ushered a period of the predominant party system.⁴ It continued its dominance from the inauguration of the Commonwealth government in 1935 until the establishment of the Third Philippine Republic in 1946. However, the party’s structure followed the elitist electoral process and was therefore elitist. Both the leadership and membership of the party were composed of a small elite group of wealthy landowners. Since disagreement among party members on issues of policy was unlikely, the party contributed to the preservation of the semi-feudal economic set-up under the American regime. Hence, the “strength of a party like the NP was largely dependent on a network of relationships that were based on patronage which its leaders and members established with local elites, interest groups, party supporters, and the masses” (Tancango, 1988).

As the NP’s power grew, it was divided between the followers of Sergio Osmeña and those of Manuel Quezon. The two factions first split over the issue of party leadership. Up until then, Osmeña had been the undisputed party leader since the formation of the party (with Quezon as his second). Upon being elected president of the newly established Senate, Quezon took the opportunity to challenge Osmeña – the erstwhile speaker of the national assembly. Both factions competed against each other in the 1922 legislative election but reconciled in 1924 to form the *Partido Nacionalista Consolidado* (NP Consolidated). In their joint convention, Quezon was elected party president and Osmeña vice president. This outcome signalled the shift of power and influence from Osmeña to Quezon. In 1933, the NP again split between the Quezon and Osmeña factions. Quezon led his faction against the ratification of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act – the independence law secured by Osmeña from the US Congress. Quezon’s “anti” faction criticised the law’s unfair economic provisions, while Osmeña’s “pro” faction accused Quezon of attempting to jettison Philippine independence for his political ambitions. Osmeña organised his faction into the *Partido Pro-Independencia Nacionalista* (Pro-Independence Nacionalista Party), while Quezon renamed his faction as the *Partido Nacionalista Democrata* (Democratic Nacionalista Party). The bicameral Philippine Legislature eventually rejected the law. Quezon then secured the Tydings-Mcduffie Law from the US Congress, which finally granted the Philippines independence after a ten-year transition under the Philippine Commonwealth. In the 1935 elections, both factions of the NP eventually united and successfully fielded Quezon as president and Osmeña as vice president of the Commonwealth (Liang, 1971).

Despite its factional splits, the two factions of the NP opted to reunite, instead of merging with other parties or permanently forming a new party. The factions provided the main opposition within the party. The structure of colonial politics provided centripetal incentives for the two factions to continue cooperation and restore party unity. These




Figure I. Party Factionalism Under American Colonial Rule: 1900–1947.

incentives include: (1) the astute leadership of Quezon and Osmeña, who were the symbols of Filipino representation in the colonial set-up; (2) a well-organised party machinery/structure that extended to the remotest parts in the Philippines; and (3) clientelistic ties with the American Governor-General who provided access to a supply of patronage resources (Milne, 1961). Ultimately, the promise of Philippine independence provided an impetus to continue cooperation by both factions as they took a “duplicitous posture – rhetorical militance before their mass clientele and cosy cooperation in private with their American patron” (Paredes, 1989: 9).

Factional Politics in the Post-War Republic: 1946–1972

During the Second World War, Quezon died while in exile in the United States. Osmeña succeeded him as the President of the Philippine Commonwealth. After the war, Osmeña made known his intention to seek the presidency under the independent Philippine Republic. He was challenged by a faction within the NP led by Senate President Manuel Roxas, who formed the NP-Liberal wing. The Roxas faction was composed of colonial-era politicians who identified with Quezon. After the split, Osmeña retained the name Nacionalista for his ticket but was no longer the candidate of the NP as a whole. Roxas and his faction overwhelmingly defeated Osmeña’s faction in the 1946 elections. The Liberal Wing of the NP eventually changed its name to the LP.

Hence, the election of Roxas merely perpetuated the political hegemony of the old Nacionalista, though under a new label and new conditions (Chapman, 1946).

Philippine post-war politics was characterised by an “indistinct two-party system” with the intense competition between the NP and the LP (Tancangco, 1988). The rivalry between the two parties dominated Philippine politics from 1946 until 1972. Both took turns in capturing the presidency, controlling both chambers of Congress, and winning local government seats. This period also saw the rise of party switching (colourfully labelled by the Philippine press as “turncoatism”) and factional splits, which evolved into separate parties that attempted to challenge (but were eventually absorbed by) the two major parties.⁵ (Figure 2)

The NP and the LP alternated in power from 1946 to 1972. However, each party suffered from factional splits at critical historical junctures. In 1948, Senate President Jose Avelino led his faction of the LP to challenge President Elpidio Quirino. In 1953, Defence Secretary Ramon Magsaysay bolted the LP to become the NP standard-bearer against Quirino (Liang, 1971). In 1965, Senate President and LP stalwart Ferdinand Marcos captured the NP nomination and won against erstwhile party mate President Diosdado Macapagal. On the other side of the political camp, Tarlac Governor Benigno S. Aquino Jr., whose political career started with the NP, shifted to the LP upon the invitation of Macapagal and was eventually elected as Senator under its banner (Martinez, 1984).

The 1935 Constitution provided for a presidential form of government that was eventually established in 1946. The post-war Philippine Congress was a bicameral body with a Senate and a House of Representatives. The first-past-the-post election for the House




Figure 2. Party Factionalism Under Philippine Postwar Republic: 1947–1972.

and popular election of a powerful president served as significant legal reinforcements for the maintenance of the two-party system. Both the NP and the LP can be classified as “cadre parties” since they did not seek mass membership, only mass support, and were administered by a small group of incumbent and non-incumbent public officials and professional politicians (Wurfel, 1988).

Internal weakness, coupled with the absence of ideological differentiation, contributed mainly to intra-party factionalism. Political competition was fought more exclusively along with factional and personal issues that emerged in the pursuit of favourable access to the state machinery (De Dios and Hutchcroft, 2003). Tancangco (1988) observed: “where the NP and LP alternated as the majority party, the co-ordinating and carrying out of official policy became increasingly difficult when the parties and their various factions in office used the so-called separation of powers between the presidency and congress inventively to strengthen their bargaining power against each other.” The intensification of intra-factional competition has brought the country to a political brink.

Consequently, the existing institutional mechanisms for political aggregation through electoral and party competition became inadequate in channelling new modes of mass mobilisation that emerged from economic differentiation, urbanisation, and rapid economic growth (Hedman and Sidel, 2000). A combination of economic crisis and mass protests in the late 1960s and early 1970s serve to build up political tension that fuelled the polarisation of classes and a decline in the legitimacy of elite rule. President Ferdinand Marcos took advantage of the legitimisation crisis to declare Martial Law and ushered in an extended period of authoritarianism.

Factional Politics Under Authoritarian Rule: 1972–1986

President Ferdinand Marcos declared Martial Law on 21 September 1972, ostensibly to save the Republic from the communist rebellion from the Left and oligarchic domination on the Right. Martial law resulted in the cancellation of elections for six years, thereby halting all party activities and intra-elite competition. At the height of the Marcos dictatorship, droves of former NP and LP members transferred their loyalties to the *Kilusang Bagong Lipunan* (KBL) – the dominant party organised to consolidate authoritarian rule. Marcos appointed the most influential provincial clan leaders and warlords to serve as members of the Central Committee of the KBL. They included Benjamin Romualdez of Leyte, Ali Dimaporo of Lanao del Sur, Jose Roño of Samar, Felicisimo San Luis of Laguna, Felix Fuentebella of Camarines Sur, Lorenzo Teves of Negros Oriental, Vicente Cerilles of Zamboanga, Roberto Benedicto of Negros Occidental, Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. of Tarlac, and Antonio Floreindo of Davao (Wurfel, 1983-1984).

Utilising its unbridled control of state power and resources, the KBL dominated all the lopsided elections organised under the Marcos dictatorship, such as the 1978 *Interim Batasang Pambansa* (Interim National Assembly) elections; the 1980 local elections; the 1981 presidential elections; and the 1984 Regular *Batasang Pambansa* (Regular National Assembly) elections. Marcos succeeded in consolidating all political power and authority around himself and his wife, Imelda. The couple dominated the KBL as an instrument of their “conjugal dictatorship”. Hence, the authoritarian presidency provided a centripetal force that hindered the growth of factionalism within the dominant party (Tancangco, 1988).

This ironclad domination of the party was slowly eroded with the suppressed news of the dictator’s failing health in the early eighties. Factions within the ruling KBL began




Figure 3. Party Factionalism Under the Authoritarian Regime: 1972–1986.

to jockey for the possibility of succeeding Marcos. The most prominent faction was led by the First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos and challenged by the factions of Defence Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and top crony Ambassador Eduardo “Danding” Cojuangco Jr. (Wurfel, 1983–1984).

The imposition of authoritarian rule by Ferdinand Marcos from 1972 to 1986 effectively intensified intra-elite factional politics in the Philippines. Through the closure of Congress, the restriction on extravagant elections, and the curtailment of mass demands, Marcos was able to rupture the post-war two-party system. After the establishment of the KBL, various opposition groups in the country established several new parties. However, most of these parties were organised as regional parties that fielded candidates for specific regions instead of a national constituency (Tancangco, 1988). Both the NP and LP were splintered into several factions. (Figure 3)

While Marcos absorbed the NP into his dominant KBL, he allowed a faction led by former Senate President Jose Roy to serve as his “loyal opposition”. The NP-Roy wing fielded token candidates in Marcos’s rigged elections often boycotted by the genuine opposition parties. Another faction of the NP led by former House Speaker Jose B. Laurel Jr. became the core of the opposition party – the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO). The LP split into two factions over participation in the 1984 legislative elections: one faction led by former senator Jovito Salonga opted for continuing the boycott, and the other faction, led by former senator Eva Estrada Kalaw, decided to contest the elections (Salonga, 2006). With the decimation of the two major post-war parties, various opposition groups in the country opted to form regional parties that fielded candidates for specific regions, instead of a national constituency. The alliance of factions into multi-factional “blocs” paved the way for the emergence of a multi-party system in the post-authoritarian era (Kimura, 1992; Tancangco, 1988).

Factional Politics in the Post-Authoritarian Era, 1986–Present

The assassination of opposition leader former senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino at the Manila International Airport on 21 August 1983 opened the floodgates of street protests organised by civil society organisations that led to the people-power uprising in 1986. The restoration of democracy after the ouster of the Marcos dictatorship saw an increase in intra-party factionalism in the post-authoritarian party system. The 1987 Constitution provided institutional incentives for the development of a multi-party system under a presidential form of government.⁶ This provision further exacerbated the factional nature of Philippine party politics in the period of democratic transition (Figure 4).

In accounting for the reasons why the Philippine party system changed from a stable two-party system to a fluid multi-party system in the post-authoritarian period, Kasuya (2009) noted that the increased number of parties competing mainly in legislative elections was a result of the increase in the number of viable presidential candidates in the post-authoritarian period. In her “presidential bandwagon framework,” the introduction of a single-term limit for the office of the presidency has destabilised the legislative party system since legislative candidates tend to affiliate with the most viable presidential candidates by switching parties.

Party switching has fuelled the rise of KBL-like dominant parties such as the *Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino* (LDP) under the administration of Corazon Aquino; the Lakas NUCD-UMDP under Fidel Ramos; the *Lapian ng Masang Pilipino* (LAMP) under Joseph Estrada; the Lakas-Kampi-CMD under Gloria Macapagal Arroyo; the LP under Benigno Aquino III; and the *Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan* (PDP-Laban) under Rodrigo Duterte. These “dominant presidential parties”, however, were built mainly around factions of well-entrenched political clans and dynasties that regularly switch their affiliation from one presidential party to another in order to gain access to state resources and patronage. Patronage is the political glue that keeps the fragile factional alliance of party switchers and political dynasties within the dominant presidential parties in the Philippines (Kasuya, 2009; Teehankee, 2013).




Figure 4. Party Factionalism in the Post-Authoritarian Era: 1986–Present.

Post-authoritarian party systems usually “have their origins in factions either of the previous ruling party or of movements of opposition to the party-state” (Lomax, 1995). The major opposition parties that supported the anti-Marcos movement jockeyed for key positions in the presidency of Corazon “Cory” Aquino (widow of slain opposition leader Ninoy Aquino). These parties included UNIDO and the PDP-Laban. The former was an umbrella organisation of twelve political parties and movements, formed in 1979 when NP stalwart Salvador Laurel split from the KBL. The latter was a product of a merger in 1983 between the social-democratic, grassroots-oriented and Mindanao-based PDP, and

the Luzon-based Laban founded by Cory's husband, former senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino in 1978 to participate in the *Interim Batasang Pambansa* elections (Tancangco, 1988).

Aquino ascended into power with the unification of anti-Marcos parties under the coalition of the UNIDO, headed by former NP senator and Aquino's vice president Salvador Laurel Jr., and the PDP-Laban, headed by staunch Aquino ally and Cagayan de Oro mayor Aquilino Pimentel Jr. The tenuous alliance among the pro-Aquino parties, however, proved to have been short-lived due to disagreements over the distribution of political spoils.⁷ Relatives of Aquino, led by her brother Jose "Peping" Cojuangco Jr., moved to consolidate political power by recruiting turncoats from other parties, including notorious elements from the KBL and a large pro-Aquino faction of UNIDO that distanced itself from Laurel to form *Lakas ng Bansa* (Lakas). Lakas would then merge with a faction of the PDP-Laban led by House Speaker Ramon Mitra Jr. and presidential brother-in-law Paul Aquino to form the LDP in 1988. The highly decimated PDP-Laban allied itself with the LP in the 1992 presidential election (Teehankee, 1995).

Despite its predominance, the LDP was divided into several factions that revolve around specific political personalities.⁸ The party's lack of cohesion was further put to the test with the entry of former Defence Secretary Fidel Ramos into the party to contest its presidential nomination. Given the tight hold over the party he helped organised, Mitra expectedly defeated Ramos in the nominating convention. This outcome resulted in key members, supportive of the former Defence chief's candidacy, bolting the party. One group, led by Representative Edelmiro Amante, formed the *Partido Lakas Tao*, while another, led by Representatives Sumulong and de Venecia, founded the EDSA-LDP party. These two political groupings merged into the Lakas ng EDSA and further merged with Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus' party – the National Union of Christian Democrats-United Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (NUCD-UMDP) – to form the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP (Kimura, 1992).

Other parties at this time also faced intra-party factionalism and party switching. Some LDP members in the House shifted their support for the presidential candidacy of Marcos crony and Aquino's estranged cousin Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco. These congressmen joined the political party organised by Cojuangco out of a faction of the Nacionalista Party – the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC). There were several attempts to revive the moribund NP in the early post-Marcos period. The post-Marcos NP was divided into four factions: the Roy wing taken over by former Defence Minister Juan Ponce Enrile; the faction headed by Vice President Laurel; a faction of former governor Isidro Rodriguez which backed Cojuangco; and a faction known as the *Partido Nasyonalistang Pilipinas* headed by former Marcos Labour Minister Blas Ople. Attempts were made to unify all factions of the NP in 1991. These attempts failed because of the ambitions of the faction leaders to be the NP presidential nominee in the 1992 election. In the end, Laurel won a Supreme Court decision naming his faction as the sole legitimate NP (Crisanto and Crisanto, 2007).

Ramos won in the 1992 presidential election. From being the major administration party under the Aquino administration, the LDP found itself acting as the opposition in

the Ramos administration deprived of access to patronage. The Lakas-NUCD-UMDP was no different from its predecessors – the KBL and LDP. It was primarily organised to fit the political agenda of the incumbent president. The LDP reorganised itself under the leadership of Senate President Edgardo Angara and became the primary opposition party under the Ramos presidency. It briefly entered into a coalition with Lakas for the 1995 mid-term elections to form the Lakas-Laban coalition (Teehankee, 1995).

Factional cracks also split the LDP in anticipation of the 1998 general elections. Followers of Senator Gloria Macapagal Arroyo organised a new party called the *Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino* (Kampi), while Senator Raul Roco also formed his party the *Aksyon Demokratiko*. Angara, in turn, orchestrated the coalition of three opposition parties – Laban, NPC, and the *Partido ng Masang Pilipino* (identified with movie actor turned politician Joseph Estrada) – into the formation of the *Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino* (LAMMP). A large number of politicians affiliated themselves with Lakas to gain campaign financing, while secretly supporting the presidential candidacy of the extremely popular vice president, Joseph Estrada, of the opposition LAMMP. This clandestine support for Estrada largely contributed to the defeat of Lakas presidential candidate Speaker Jose de Venecia Jr. LAMMP was reorganised into *Lapian ng Masang Pilipino* (LAMP) and emerged as the new dominant party after the presidential victory of its candidate Joseph Estrada. Soon after, members of Lakas and other parties defected to LAMP to elect former Lakas member, Manuel Villar, as the new speaker (Teehankee, 2002).

Despite having been elected with the broadest electoral margin in the post-1986 period, Estrada was plagued by allegations of abuse of power, a lavish lifestyle, and corruption. These allegations led to his impeachment and subsequent ouster in a second people-power uprising in 2001. According to Kasuya (2005), the decision of some LAMP members (led by Speaker Villar) to endorse the impeachment of Estrada was influenced mainly by their past and future considerations regarding presidential patronage. The defecting faction (composed of party switchers) did not benefit from campaign financing and did not expect to gain more political benefits in the future, given Estrada's damaged presidency.

Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was then installed to succeed Estrada. However, Arroyo's term in office was punctuated by severe challenges to the legitimacy of her government.⁹ Intra-party factionalism became more complex as the need for patronage distribution increased in order to ensure her government's survival (Hutchcroft, 2008). Fluid intra-factional splits and cross-party alignments characterised party politics during this period. Arroyo assembled several multi-party coalitions in the four significant elections held under her presidency. For the 2001 mid-term elections, the Arroyo administration fielded a coalition of all the parties and personalities that had participated in the struggle against President Estrada – the People Power Coalition (PPC). On the other hand, LAMP was dissolved when the NPC distanced itself from the fallen president. Thus, the LDP, together with remnants of the PMP, formed the core of a loose opposition alliance called the *Pwersa ng Masa* (PnM, or Force of the Masses).

Arroyo stood for re-election in the 2004 presidential election despite claiming numerous times that she would not.¹⁰ The administration coalition was organised as *Koalisyon ng Katapatan at Karanasan sa Kinabukasan* (Coalition of Fidelity and Experience for the Future, K4). On the other hand, the opposition coalition formed the *Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino* (Coalition for National Unity, KNP), which supported the candidacy of popular movie actor Fernando Poe Jr. – a close associate of deposed populist president Joseph Estrada. A faction of the LDP led by Representative Agapito “Butz” Aquino (brother of Ninoy) opted to support the candidacy of former Estrada top cop and opposition senator, Panfilo Lacson. The NPC split its ranks to support both the administration and opposition coalitions.

The 2007 mid-term election again saw the emergence of two significant coalitions: the administration Team Unity and the Genuine Opposition. The Genuine Opposition was originally an initiative to form a united front among the anti-Arroyo forces. It was initiated by Makati Mayor Jejomar Binay with the tacit support of ousted president Joseph Estrada. For the 2010 presidential elections, Arroyo engineered the merger of Lakas with her original party Kampi to form the Lakas Kampi CMD (LKC). Kampi was formed in 1997 by then-senator Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a breakaway faction of the LDP to launch her presidential candidacy. However, she opted to coalesce with Lakas, support Speaker De Venecia’s presidential candidacy, and run as his vice president.

The two oldest political parties – the NP and the LP – managed to rebuild themselves gradually. Going into the 2007 mid-term elections, the formerly moribund NP was revived and began increasing its membership by raiding other parties. Former speaker and senate president Manuel Villar, a self-made billionaire, was responsible for rebuilding the NP in preparation for his presidential candidacy in 2010. On the other hand, the LP has consistently served as a coalition partner of all the post-Marcos presidents from Aquino to Arroyo. It suffered a split at the height of the impeachment trial against President Joseph Estrada between the prosecution faction headed by Representative Florencio Abad and the defence faction led by Governor Raul Daza. The LP managed to consolidate its ranks by capitalising on its alliance with President Arroyo. The party cleverly supported the candidacy of President Arroyo in 2004 and became the principal partner of the ruling Lakas CMD in the K4 coalition. However, it suffered another split when a faction led by Senate President Franklin Drilon decided to withdraw support from the Arroyo administration. Another faction led by Manila Mayor Lito Atienza maintained its support for the president. This split led to the emergence of the Drilon wing and the Atienza wing of the LP. The Supreme Court decided in favour of the Drilon wing as the legitimate LP (Teehankee, 2006).

Given Arroyo’s adept mobilisation of patronage for regime survival, the country’s fractious party system was consolidated in three electoral cycles into two major coalitions representing the administration and opposition forces. By 2010, however, the post-authoritarian trend towards two major coalitions contesting national and local seats was shattered as Arroyo faced the end of her presidential term. Factions within the major parties began realigning in preparation for the next round of elections. The LP positioned itself to be the major opposition party challenging Arroyo’s party. It initially fielded

Senator Manuel Roxas II – the grandson of former Philippine president and LP founder Manuel Roxas – as its presidential candidate. However, he struggled in the election surveys. The death of Corazon Aquino in 2009 sparked a wave of sympathy for her son, LP Senator Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III, who was forced to heed public clamour for him to contest the presidency. Roxas opted to run as vice president but was defeated by long-time Makati City mayor and staunch Aquino ally, Jejomar Binay.

At the height of the 2010 elections, two prominent factions within Aquino’s coalition emerged: the “Balay” and “Samar” groups. While both of these factions supported Aquino’s presidential candidacy, the two factions supported different vice-presidential candidates (Sisante, 2010). Named after the Roxas-owned property in Cubao, Quezon City, which served as the official headquarters of the Aquino-Roxas ticket, the Balay faction supported Roxas’ bid for the vice presidency (Hofileña and Go, 2011). On the other hand, the Samar faction, which was named after their headquarters on Samar Avenue, Quezon City supported a “Noynoy-Binay” or “Noy-Bi” ticket in the 2010 elections (Esposito, 2012). The intra-factional rivalry intensified upon the victory of Aquino, with his administration divided between the two factions (Cabacungan, 2012). The factional rivalry continued in the 2016 presidential elections. Although members of the Aquino Cabinet declared that they were “solidly behind” Aquino’s decision to endorse the presidential bid of Roxas, several LP members reportedly dumped Roxas’ presidential campaign in favour of the more popular Senator Grace Poe – the adopted daughter of defeated presidential candidate Fernando Poe Jr. (Aquino and Calonzo, 2015).

During the 2010 elections, Binay ran and won as vice president under the banner of the moribund PDP-Laban. In 2012, Binay’s party established an electoral alliance with *Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino* (PMP) – the party of former president Joseph Estrada – in preparation for the 2013 elections, thus forming the United Nationalist Alliance (UNA). In 2014, after being a party stalwart since its inception in 1983, Binay left the PDP-Laban. Following Binay’s decision, PDP-Laban, led by Senator Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel III- son of PDP-Laban founder Aquilino “Nene” Pimentel Jr.- also decided to leave the UNA coalition. In 2015, Binay resigned from Aquino’s Cabinet, launched the UNA as a single political party, and became its official candidate in the 2016 presidential elections (Iglesias, 2015).

Far from being a party of formidable force during the Arroyo administration, Lakas-Kampi-CMD split into three separate factions following Aquino’s rise to the presidency- the first of which, purportedly supported by Ramos, was headed by Albay First District Representative Edcel Lagman, who was elected as party chair in 2011 with Senator Ramon Revilla Jr. assuming the position of party president (Cruz, 2016). Camarines Sur First District Representative Rolando Andaya Jr., one of the three elected vice-chairs of the party, led a separate faction allied with House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte Jr. Lastly, House Deputy Speaker Pablo Garcia led the third faction composed of Kampi originals who opted to distance themselves from the Lakas originals. In the same year, Garcia’s faction bolted from the party to establish the National Unity Party (NUP). The NUP went on to become part of the LP-led coalition in the House of Representatives during the Aquino administration.

PDP-Laban, the party which Binay left in 2014, went on to become the country's ruling political party following the 2016 presidential elections. After playing coy for several months on whether he would seek the presidency or not, Davao city mayor and PDP-Laban's standard-bearer Rodrigo Duterte won the five-way race with 39.01% of the total popular votes. Less than three weeks following the elections, the PDP-Laban's multi-party alliance Coalition for Change successfully "gathered as many as 260 allies or 90% of the estimated 290 members in the next Congress" (Cabacungan, 2016).

The LP suffered the same fate experienced by the Lakas Kampi CMD in 2010. From being the dominant political force during the term of Aquino's membership dwindled following the decision of political turncoats to jump ship towards the ruling PDP-Laban. Nevertheless, the decimated LP decided to join PDP-Laban's supermajority in Congress. Aside from LP, the other major parties also forged alliances with the ruling PDP-Laban. The Lakas-CMD and NUP, parties that both identify with former president Arroyo, reunited and decided to ally with and support the legislative agenda of Duterte's party in the House of Representatives (Cahinhinan, 2016). The NP, the party of his defeated running mate Alan Peter Cayetano, also made a pact with the PDP-Laban (Macas, 2016). Likewise, the PDP-Laban also signed a formal agreement to ally with Eduardo Cojuangco Jr.'s Nationalist People's Coalition, the country's second-largest party, which supported Poe's candidacy back in the 2016 elections. In 2017, the LP's alliance with the PDP-Laban came to an abrupt end. The LP has also been active in voicing their opposition against the Duterte administration, specifically regarding issues on the extrajudicial killings, the burial of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos in the *Libingan ng mga Bayani* (National Heroes' Cemetery), and the reimposition of the death penalty.

The 2019 mid-term elections signified a major realignment of political forces. As in the past, the majority of those elected at the local level immediately switched to the party of the winning president. Hence, from a party of handful elected officials, Duterte's PDP-Laban has swelled into a "supermajority" party. Despite the lack of reliable party support and political machinery, the former mayor of Davao City in Mindanao rode a wave of angry votes to capture the presidency in 2016. However, unlike previous Philippine presidents, he did not personally endeavour to consolidate his political support under a dominant party. Nonetheless, the party suffered a setback as most of its members had aligned with the *Hugpong ng Pagbabago* (HNP), the regional party established by Davao City Mayor Sara Duterte-Carpio. The president's daughter did not deliberately register HNP as a national political party, but instead started forming alliances with several provincial and regional-based political parties (usually controlled by political dynasties) around the country. The HNP has become a rival centre of political gravity within the Duterte administration, with Mayor Duterte-Carpio openly orchestrating the ouster of PDP-Laban stalwart Pantaleon Alvarez from the house speakership and supporting former president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. HNP also fielded a senatorial slate for the mid-term election with the PDP-Laban, but dropped its party president Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III during the last minutes of the campaign (Teehankee and Kasuya, 2019).

Meanwhile, the former dominant LP has been decimated, with most of its members jumping to the administration parties. It was barely able to form a senatorial slate and suffered a crippling defeat with none of its candidates making it to the Senate. The LP's two pillars Manuel "Mar" Roxas II and Paolo Benigno "Bam" Aquino IV lost in their senatorial bids. In the House, the PDP-Laban dominated the district seats, winning a total of 86. This is a far cry from the two seats it initially held immediately after the 2016 elections. Ironically, the regional party HNP flexed its political clout at the national level with nine of its nominees winning senate seats. Nevertheless, it failed to impress at the local level with critical losses at elections in the Davao region, including the victory of Sara's avowed political enemy – Pantaleon Alvarez – over HNP stalwarts Anthony del Rosario and Antonio Floreindo, Jr. The national party PDP-Laban, on the other hand, performed quite well in the gubernatorial races winning forty-one of the eighty-one provinces (51%). The HNP won in only two provinces (Teehankee and Kasuya, 2019).

Conclusion

Factionalism has been an integral part of Philippine party politics. However, it has significantly been understudied in the academic literature. The factional nature of Philippine party politics has endured through time – from bifactionalism of the post-war two-party system to the multi-factionalism of the post-authoritarian multi-party system. All the major political parties that have dominated politics at different historical epochs have experienced intense factional splits. The increase in the number of intra-party factions in every period of Philippine political history generally accounts for the low level of party institutionalisation.

This article has delineated the dynamics of intra-party factional politics at critical historical junctures in the country by highlighting the causes, characteristics, and consequences of intra-party factionalism. The NP, which dominated politics during American colonial rule, twice experienced factional splits, in 1922 and 1933. The two factions opted to reunite, instead of merging with other parties or permanently forming a new party in pursuit of Philippine independence. The structure of colonial politics provided centripetal incentives for the two factions to continue cooperation and restore party unity. The LP emerged from a faction that split from the NP in 1946. Both the NP and LP experienced intense factional splits during the twenty-five years it alternated in power under a two-party system during the post-war period. The first-past-the-post election for the House and popular election of a powerful president served as significant legal reinforcements for the maintenance of the two-party system. Internal weakness, coupled with the absence of ideological differentiation, contributed mostly to intra-party factionalism. Political competition was fought more exclusively based on factional and personal issues that emerged in the pursuit of favourable access to the state machinery and patronage.

The Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) was cobbled together by the dictator Ferdinand Marcos from the shattered factional remains of the NP and LP to legitimise and consolidate his authoritarian powers. The restoration of democracy after the ouster of the

Marcos dictatorship saw the intensification of factionalism in the post-authoritarian party system. In the post-authoritarian period, each of the parties (or coalition of parties) that dominated the successive presidential administrations were riven with self-seeking factional divisions and operated mainly as channels for the distribution of patronage.

Philippine political parties “continue to be candidate-centred coalitions of provincial bosses, political machines, and local clans, anchored on clientelistic, parochial, and personal inducements rather than on issues, ideologies, and party platforms” (Teehankee, 2012: 188). The highly factionalized nature of Philippine party politics is both a cause and an effect of the under-institutionalisation of the political parties. A multitude of political parties has come and gone since the first Filipino political party was established in 1900. Yet party institutionalisation in the country remains weak and underdeveloped.

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Notes

1. The study of patron–client relations emerged from anthropology and sociology in the late fifties and early sixties. Studies that utilised the patron–client framework “ranged from semi-institutionalised personal dyadic or triadic relations in small communities or in more organised settings like various bureaucratic agencies to relatively loose, less rigidly prescribed social relations, often organised in complex networks and connected by brokers, as well as to loose cliques and factions in political machines” (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1980: 43).
2. Kasuya (2009), however, argued that empirical data are not consistent with the faction-based theory when applied to the Congressional-district level. Her analysis found that the number of serious candidates did not change between pre-election and post-election, which suggests that the local factional rivalry had not changed from bipolar to multi-polar rivalry. She attributed the increase in the number of political parties to the corresponding rise of viable presidential candidates or what she termed as the “presidential bandwagon” framework.
3. Osmeña was a rising provincial governor who entered politics as a Spanish loyalist during the Revolution and later published a moderate nationalist newspaper in Cebu, while Quezon was another brilliant provincial governor, whose shrewd grasp of colonial politics facilitated his rapid rise to national prominence from a local base of Tayabas (now Quezon) (Paredes, 1989).
4. Sartori (2005) defined predominant party-systems as “those systems in which the same party wins, over time, the absolute majority”.
5. For example, a group of reformers associated with President Ramon Magsaysay (who tragically died in a plane crash in 1957) twice attempted to challenge the dominance of the NP and LP: first, with the organisation of the Progressive Party of the Philippines in 1957, and

- later in 1965 with the Party for Philippine Progress. These parties would later influence the formation of the National Union of Christian Democrats (NUCD) in 1984. The NUCD would successfully elect former General Fidel V. Ramos as president in 1992 (Tagle, 1984).
6. According to Section 7, Article IX of the constitution, “a free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people”.
 7. The appointment of Pimentel as Local Governments Minister after the February uprising strengthened the PDP-Laban’s political clout. Pimentel appointed members of his party as Officers-in-Charge (OICs) of choice cities, municipalities, and provinces in an attempt to dismantle the Marcos machinery. The undue advantage given to the PDP-Laban drew the ire Laurel’s UNIDO. Having given up his presidential bid in 1986 and provided his party’s machinery to Aquino, the Vice President expected his greater share in the political spoils. Instead, he found his party further weakened under the Aquino administration (Kimura, 1992).
 8. Aside from the Mitra and Cojuangco factions, two others were identified: the faction of the President’s uncle and Mitra’s perennial rival for the speakership, Rizal Representative Francisco Sumulong, and that of Local Government Secretary Luis Santos. The intense factionalism was further aggravated when Sumulong, together with Representative Jose de Venecia, led a failed attempt at toppling Speaker Mitra (Teehankee, 1995).
 9. These included three coup attempts against her government in 2003, 2006, and 2007. The last two attempts came on the heels of alleged electoral fraud committed by Arroyo in the 2004 presidential election, as exposed by an alleged tape recording of the president ordering an election official to manipulate the election results (Teehankee, 2006).
 10. Under the 1987 Constitution, Arroyo was eligible to stand for her six-year term since she was only completing the remaining term of ousted president Joseph Estrada.

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