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The Other “Post-1968”: A Socio-Historical Analysis of the Resurgence of the Conservatives in Japan’s Long 1960s

Eiji Oguma

Abstract

Economic growth in the 1960s prompted a massive internal migration from provincial to metropolitan areas in Japan. This migration and urbanisation led to the rise of social movements and a decline in the percentage of votes for the ruling conservative LDP party. In response, the government introduced an industrial dispersal policy, shifting factories from metropolitan to provincial areas. Additionally, in 1971, the government started the “Model Community Project”, which strengthened local resident organisations that cooperated with local administrations and the conservative party. This reorganisation of the citizenry became the social background for the containment of social movements and the conservative resurgence of politics. This combination of industry dispersion and reorganisation of the citizenry, resulting in the conservative resurgence, characterised “the long 1960s” in Japan.


Keywords: Japan, LDP, Long 1960s, 1968, internal migration, industry dispersion, neighbourhood associations (NHA)

In the late 1960s, the conservative regime in Japan was confronted with a crisis. Economic growth in the 1960s had led to massive internal migration, rapid urbanisation, environmental issues, the rise of social movements and a decline in the percentage of votes for the ruling conservative party.

The ruling party was the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party), which had been formed in 1955 by the merging of two conservative parties. As shown in Figure 1, the absolute percentage of votes (the portion of votes as a percentage of the total number of eligible voters, including abstentions) for conservative parties (centred on the LDP) in general elections declined linearly until 1969, while that of non-conservative parties (called “progressives”, *kakushin*, and centred on the JSP, the Japan Socialist Party) continued to grow.

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Figure 1: Absolute percentage of votes* in general elections (in per cent, 1952–1990)



The classification of parties as “Conservatives” and “Progressives” follows Ishikawa (1995). *The concept of the absolute percentage of votes, which is distinguished from the relative percentage of votes (the portion of votes garnered by a party as a percentage of actual votes cast), has been popular in Japanese media and political science.

Source: Compiled by author, based on the data from the House of Representatives’ general election results, published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications

As can also be seen in Figure 1, the trend stopped in the 1970s, from which time the LDP has continued as the ruling party. Only twice, in 1993 and 2009, has the LDP lost a general election since its foundation in 1955. That said, the decline of conservatives in the 1960s was serious.

The troubles of the LDP in the late 1960s were predicted in an article written in 1963 by Hirohide Ishida, the then Minister of Labour in the LDP administration. In this article, Ishida predicted that his party would lose power in 1968. Due to the rapid economic growth and industrialisation from the late 1950s onwards, the percentage of employed workers in Japan’s overall workforce had increased from 36 per cent in 1948 to 53.7 per cent in 1960, while the number of self-employed farmers and merchants had radically decreased – the reason, according to Ishida, for the LDP’s continuing decline in the absolute percentage of votes. The LDP was supported by relatively lower educated farmers and merchants, whose total number had been declining since 1952. On the other hand, the rate of employed workers – about 40 per cent of them were union members supporting the JSP – had been increasing. Ishida thus predicted that

the LDP would be defeated by the JSP in 1968 if the number of young, well-educated employed workers in urban areas increased at the same pace (Ishida 1963: 92–94).

Ishida was also concerned with the massive internal migration in the 1960s and saw this as another reason for the decline in LDP votes. Between 1955 and 1965, about 4 million people moved out of the agricultural sector and into the industrial sector in large cities on the Pacific coast. In 1962, the population of Tokyo exceeded 10 million and by 1965, 45 per cent of Japan’s population lived in the three major metropolitan areas of Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya. Ishida’s concern became reality in the late 1960s: in the industrial areas along the Pacific coast, including the three major metropolitan areas, the relative percentage of votes for the LDP and for opposition parties shifted from 54.6 per cent (LDP) and 44.3 per cent (opposition) respectively in 1960, to 41.2 per cent (LDP) and 52.6 per cent (opposition) respectively in 1967 (Ichimura 1968: 135).

The political behaviour of the younger generation and women voters contributed considerably to this shift. For example, in the Tokyo gubernatorial election of April 1967, the LDP candidate was defeated by the candidate supported by the JSP. Kakuei Tanaka, who was the Secretary General of the LDP (and later Prime Minister in 1972), declared that the cause of this defeat was urbanisation and modernisation, causing the decline of conservative older male rule – as according to the statistics the LDP candidates received 12 per cent fewer votes than the opposition candidate among voters in their twenties, 8 per cent fewer among female voters and 6 per cent fewer among college graduates (Tanaka 1967: 285). This political defeat was followed by the rise of the student movement and the anti-Vietnam War movement. On 21 October 1967, a demonstration protesting against the Vietnam War, organised by labour unions, mobilised 60,000 people in Tokyo and even 250,000 nationwide. Two years later, Beheiren, a “New Left” activist group strongly criticising Japan’s involvement in the Vietnam War, organised a demonstration of 70,000 people on 15 June 1969 in Tokyo (Havens 1987, Avenell 2010). The size of Japan’s student/anti-Vietnam War movement at that time compared favourably with that in West Germany for instance, where the largest demonstration assembled 60,000 people in Bonn on 12 May 1968 (Klimke 2008).¹

The rise of the student/Vietnam War protest movement can also be linked to the massive internal migration when looking at the statistics. According to the national census of 1965, 47 per cent of Tokyo’s population was aged between 15 and 34. Since most of the migrants from the rural areas were young male labourers and students, males exceeded females in the Tokyo metropolitan

1 Some researchers are sceptical of the numbers claimed for the Japanese protests at that time because the organisers tended to inflate the numbers of the participants. As for the demonstration on 15 June 1969 in Tokyo, the organisers claimed 70,000 participants, whereas the police counted only 30,000. However, such variations in participant numbers were not specific to Japan. Martin Klimke, the co-editor of *1968 in Europe* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) for example, wrote that 60,000 joined the demonstration at 12 May 1968 in Bonn, whereas the UK newspaper *The Times* reported 40,000 protesters (Hotham 1968).

area by 6 per cent. Another survey of 1965, by the Ministry of Labour, on the situation of workers in Tokyo reported that 36.5 per cent of the survey respondents lived in a space of less than 5 square meters per capita (Oguma 2009a: 37). Many of these young workers were thus dissatisfied with their life situation in Tokyo and often joined street protests as “unaffiliated onlookers” (*Yaji-Uma*), sometimes initiating violence, such as throwing stones at the police. Such “unaffiliated” participants often exceeded the number of students (Oguma 2009a: 537–549). On 21 October 1968, an anti-Vietnam War protest organised by New Left student groups in Shinjuku, in central Tokyo, developed into a massive riot due to the unexpected influx of thousands of young workers (Oguma 2009b: 82–93). Although only a few politicians and intellectuals believed that the student/anti-Vietnam War movement itself directly influenced the outcome of the elections at that time, the growing importance of the movement and the changing trend of election outcomes went hand in hand, reflecting the ongoing massive internal migration within Japan’s society.

However, as mentioned above, the downward trend of votes for conservatives stopped in the 1970s and the LDP continued to be the ruling party thereafter. After 1968, unlike in Western countries, Japanese politics and society remained conservative even though Japan’s social movements had not necessarily been weak. This article sets out to analyse why the social changes stemming from the rapid economic growth of the 1960/70s subsided and the conservative political order re-stabilised in the 1970s.

There are several earlier studies by political scientists examining why the LDP recovered in Japan in the 1960s and 1970s. Many Japanese intellectuals claimed that the reason was that the LDP had promoted economic growth. After the big protest movement against the US-Japan security treaty in 1960, the LDP shifted its priority from a conservative anti-communism ideology to economic policies (Kapur 2018). Some political scientists emphasised the compensation policy and the clientelism of the LDP in the form of distributed subsidies, public works and pension increases to attract local self-employed farmers, merchants and older voters (Calder 1988). Other researchers focused on the paternalism of Japanese corporations (*kigyō shugi*), which provided long-term employment and seniority-based wages, contained militant labour movements and created a conservative cooperative culture (Watanabe 2004). There is also a perspective that the leftist movement lost its cohesion due to the end of the Vietnam War and the reversion of Okinawa (Dower: 1993).

Still, these theories do not sufficiently explain the trajectory. Even after the LDP shifted its priority to economic policies after 1960, its absolute percentage of votes continued to decline until 1969. The LDP did win in the elections of the 1960s, but this was due less to an increase in its voter base than to its strategy of limiting the number of candidates (Kōno 2001: 33–34). It is true that the

compensation policy of the LDP attracted farmers and self-employed merchants, but in the latter half of the 1970s, the support of the LDP as shown in opinion polls increased even among young labourers and clerical workers. Corporate integration through long-term employment and seniority-based wages, the containment of activity of militant labour unions and the end of the Vietnam War may explain the decline of the JSP and the leftist movement in the 1970s, but it does not directly explain the increase in support for the LDP. Moreover, no correlation has been found between the increase or decrease of income among labourers and clerical workers and their political party support in 1970s Japan (Miyake 1985: 19). Another theory states that the Japanese economic growth of the 1970s, which exceeded that of Western industrial countries, explains the increase in support for the LDP, but this theory also falters when we consider the decline in the LDP’s absolute percentage of votes in the 1960s, a period in which Japan’s economic growth was even higher than in the following decade.

On this issue, the journalist Masumi Ishikawa proposed his own theory: that the conservative resurgence of Japanese politics in the 1970s might be explained by the decrease in internal migration from rural to urban regions (Ishikawa 1978: 73–81; 1995: 206–210). According to Ishikawa, the LDP was actually an aggregation of local influential politicians from various regions who organised voters through their own regional networks. This being the nature of this type of conservative party, it became difficult for the LDP to keep voters on track as migration to urban areas increased. Those who migrated to the big cities would most probably either abstain from voting or join a labour union, which rendered them JSP supporters rather than voters for conservative parties.² But as we see in Figure 2 below, the outflow of population from provincial areas to the three major metropolitan areas decreased sharply in the 1970s, halting the further shrinkage of the LDP voter base. Through his theory, Ishikawa explained both the decline in the LDP’s absolute percentage of votes and the increase in abstentions in the 1960s, as well as the subsequent stabilisation of both in the 1970s, as we saw in Figure 1. Ishikawa claimed that the LDP’s decline in votes in the 1960s was too linear to attribute to individual political events, and that it could only be explained by the ongoing social structural change.

There has been criticism of Ishikawa’s theory. A first objection was that the theory contradicts the fact that the rate of supporters of the LDP in opinion polls slightly increased in the late 1950s to early 1960s (Kōno 2011: 32). The second objection was that the theory did not explain the increase in the rate of supporters of the LDP among labourers and clerical workers in the late 1970s. Although Ishikawa insisted that even labourers and clerical workers had been organised in regional networks of the LDP politicians inasmuch as they stayed in the provinces, he did not explain clearly how that became possible (Ishikawa

2 Ishikawa (1995) also mentioned the possibility of urban migrants joining the Sōka Gakkai, a Buddhist group that established the political party KOMIETO in 1964, and the JCP (Japan Communist Party).

1995: 210). The first objection can be explained by the fact the LDP needed a certain period after its founding to be recognised as a reliable party.³ The second objection to Ishikawa's thoughts – the reason for the increase in the rate of supporters of the LDP among labourers and clerical workers in the late 1970s – requires more investigation.

In this article, I will corroborate Ishikawa's theory by describing the change in the social policy background of the 1970s with a focus on two important developments: the dispersion of industries from large cities to provincial areas, and the restructuring of community policy, mainly by strengthening so-called Neighbourhood Associations (NHA), by the Japanese government and the LDP administration. Both developments have been individually studied in economic analysis and local community research in Japan, but to my knowledge there is no work that comprehensively describes how the changing social conditions contributed to the resurgence of conservative politics. Political scientists who accepted Ishikawa's theory and explained the Japanese conservative resurgence in the 1970s on the basis of demographic change did not investigate the social policy context (Tomita et al. 1986). Even James W. White, who surveyed and analysed the correlation between migration and social/political stability in Tokyo during the 1970s, did not mention the industrial dispersal policy and the community policy (White 1982). This article is thus not an analysis of voting behaviour from the perspective of political science, but instead applies a sociological perspective to the history of those years.

From the cities to the countryside: Dispersing industry


In Japan, as in other nations, the biggest factor determining internal migration was and is the regional disparity of income (Ōe 1995).⁴ A report by the Agency of National Land of the Japanese government in 2000 analysed official statis-

3 Before the founding of the LDP in 1955 by the merger of conservative parties, the total rate of supporters of these conservative parties had been much higher than that of the LDP in the late 1950s to early 1960s. In opinion polls by *Asahi Shimbun*, for instance, the total rate of support of conservative parties reached 59% in June 1953, while that of the LDP was 43% in June 1956, some 7 months after its founding. The LDP, which was founded by the merger of the conservative parties, included politicians of diverse ideologies, such as liberalists, rightists and opportunists. In an opinion poll by *Asahi Shimbun* in November 1955, only 18% of respondents felt that the LDP would do well without causing splits or internal conflict. In later polls, the rate of support for the LDP increased gradually as the new party became stable, while the response "I do not answer (which party I am supporting)", chosen by 17% of respondents (24% of farmers and fishermen, 39% of those over age 60) in June 1956, decreased to 5% (9% of farmers and fishermen, 11% of those over 60) by March 1967, also in opinion polls by *Asahi Shimbun* (*Asahi Shimbun* 1976: 9–125). Actually, in the late 1950s to early 1960s, the LDP's absolute percentage of votes tended to exceed its rate of supporters in all of the opinion polls. These facts suggest that there was a considerable number of provincial conservative people who were reluctant to show their support for the LDP in opinion polls after its founding while remaining loyal voters for the local politicians who eventually joined the LDP.

4 Ōe (1995) analysed the governmental statistics of internal migration from 1950 to 1990 in Japan and concluded that economic factors explained 45–100% of its fluctuation. The second biggest factor was the difference in the numbers of each generation cohort.

tical data and presented a correlation between regional income gaps and net inflow to the three major metropolitan areas from provincial areas⁵ (ANL 2000: 11). Figure 2 uses the same official data as the report and shows the correlation. The average annual growth rate in the gross domestic product from 1965 to 1970 of the three major metropolitan areas was 12.5 per cent, whereas that of other provincial areas was 10.4 per cent. These relative positions of these two areas were reversed in the years from 1970 to 1973, however, to 8.0 and 9.2, respectively (ANL 2000: 85).

Figure 2: Net migration to the three major metropolitan areas and regional income gap ratio in the years 1955–1997



The unit of net migration is 1,000 (left axis). Regional income gap ratio is the division of average income per capita of the best 5 prefectures by that of the worst 5 prefectures (right axis).

Source: Compiled by author, based on Statistics Bureau 2012 (for net migration) and NLBP 2006 (for regional income gap ratio)

One of the reasons for this change was the dispersion of industry, which was actually a policy of the government. In 1959, the Factory Location Investigation Law (Kōjō Ricchi Chōsa Hō, No.24/1959)⁶ and the Factory and Others Restriction Law (Kōjō tō Seigen Hō, No.17/1959) were enacted to restrict the construction of large factories and the establishment of colleges and new uni-

⁵ The Japanese government divides the three major metropolitan areas into 11 prefectures, including Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka and their respective suburbs. The provincial areas constitute the remaining 36 prefectures.

⁶ Official names of Japanese laws are generally very complex and long. Abbreviations are used in the media, but the abbreviations are often inconsistent. Each Japanese law is assigned an official number for the year of enactment, and this is the most reliable way to reference them.

versity faculties in Tokyo. At that time, environmental pollution was becoming an issue, but the major purpose of legislation was national security. The government explained the purpose of these laws in the House of Representatives on 16 October 1958 in the following terms: “(these laws are meant to prevent) the capital from the possibility of confusion and dysfunction (caused by disaster and others).”

As early as the 1920s, the Army had advocated for the dispersion of government agencies and industries that were concentrated in Tokyo after the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923 (Imamura 1970: 131–133). The government made an industrial dispersion plan in 1936 and an Outline of National Land Plan (*Kokudo Keikaku Settei Yōkō*) in 1940, which was modelled after Nazi Germany’s national land planning (Ito 1965: 61, Honma 1995: 9–10). After the defeat of Japan in WWII, further attempts were made in 1946 in the Outline of National Planning for Reconstruction (*Fukkō Kokudo Keikaku Yōkō*) and in 1950 in the Comprehensive National Land Development Act (*Kokudo Sōgō Kaihatsu Hō*, No.205/1950). In 1962, the government declared the need for a “balanced development of national land” in the National Comprehensive Development Plan and designated 15 cities in provincial areas as “new industrial cities” (Honma 1995: 17–47, Mikuriya 1996: 226–237).

After that the number of factories with more than 30 employees in the 23 wards (administrative districts) of the centre of Tokyo peaked. According to a survey conducted in 1963, 1,140 out of 7,290 factories in the 23 wards already had plans for relocation, and about 3,200 were considering relocation. 41 per cent indicated that the reason for relocation was restrictions by the government, while 30 per cent cited pollution and other environmental issues (Yanagisawa 2010: 119–120). By the latter half of the 1960s, public opinion criticising the depopulation of provincial areas and the deterioration of the environment in urban areas increased. In 1964, a similar restriction law to Tokyo’s was enacted for the Osaka area, the second largest city in Japan. The New National Comprehensive Development Plan of 1969, which was introduced under the direction of Kakuei Tanaka, declared to allocate 130–170 trillion JPY (361–472 billion USD at that time) of government investment for the redevelopment of new industrial areas and the construction of highways and railroads in provincial areas throughout the country by 1985 (Honma 1995: 56). Furthermore, in 1972, the Factory Relocation Promotion Act (*Kōjō Saihaichi Sokushin Hō*, No.73/1972) was enacted.

The dispersion of the manufacturing industry did not proceed solely because of these policies. As mentioned above, the Factory and Others Restriction Law in 1959 prohibited the establishment not only of large factories, but also new colleges and faculties of universities in the centre of Tokyo. However, in contrast to factories, colleges and universities were relocated to the suburbs of Tokyo rather than to provincial areas. Consequently, this did not reduce the disparity

in educational opportunities between big cities and provincial areas (Shirakawa 2007). The 1962 National Comprehensive Development Plan designated 15 cities as “new industrial cities”, but the majority of them failed to attract big firms; only 2 out of 15 exceeded 50 per cent of the planned industrial production indicators (Honma 1995: 100). Probably a major pull factor for the industrial dispersion to rural areas was the lure of cheap wages for female workers in provincial areas, as shown below.

Many factories that moved to provincial areas in the 1960s and 1970s were labour-intensive subcontracting companies that supplied parts to the metropolitan industrialised areas. According to a 1984 survey by the Institute for Economic Research of Chūō University (IERC) on Aoki village in Nagano prefecture, there were 29 subcontracting manufacturing companies in Aoki. The breakdown was 13 for automobile parts, 8 for electric appliances, 4 for general equipment, 2 for communications equipment and 2 others. Among the 29 companies, the largest had 70 employees, 16 had 5 to 50, 12 had fewer than 5 and many workers in those with less than 5 were family members. 69.5 per cent of the employed workers of all companies were females and most of them were women aged 35 and above from farming households (IERC 1985). The IERC also uncovered the wage gap of Hitachi and its subcontracting companies in 1975. According to the research, the wage per “unit price” of the Hitachi factory was estimated at 45 JPY or more, but the primary subcontractor received an estimated 18–20 JPY, the secondary subcontractor got 10 JPY, the third subcontractor got 7 JPY and the in-house domestic workers received 3 JPY (IERC 1976: 8–19). This huge wage gap was the defining characteristic of Japanese manufacturers, coupled with the fact that unions did not organise workers of subcontractors.

The governmental labour census reported that women accounted for 43.0 per cent of labourers in production processes in the manufacturing industry in Japan in 1989 (METI 2010: 36). The employment of female manufacturing labourers was especially significant in the north-eastern regions of Japan. According to the national census, the share of women employed in the manufacturing sector in Yamagata Prefecture (in the northeast of the main island Honshū) was 7.7 per cent in 1955, then increased to 18.7 per cent in 1970 and to 30.4 per cent in 1985, while that of male employees increased more slowly, from 10.1 to 14.9 and 19.7 per cent, respectively (Maeda 2014). On the other hand, in Tokyo, although the number of manufacturing workers had decreased, the management offices and research laboratories that required high technology remained. As a result, the average wage gap in the manufacturing industry between the north-eastern regions and the Tokyo metropolitan area became more significant in the late 1960s to early 1970s (Andō 1986: 28–29).

The dispersion of industries rendered Japanese manufacturers more efficient. In the late 1980s, US-American car maker General Motors (GM) produced about

5 million cars annually with around 800,000 employees, while Toyota produced about 4 million cars per year with around 70,000 employees. The background was that GM produced about 70 per cent of its parts in its own factories while Toyota procured about 70–80 per cent of its parts from about 270 subcontractors (Kobayashi et al. 1995: 213–214). In 1981, the percentage of Japanese manufacturing SMEs that had become subcontractors was 85 per cent in the electrical machinery sector, 88 per cent in the transportation equipment sector and 81 per cent in the precision machinery sector (Nomura 1994: 43).

The second effect of the dispersion of industries was a combination of a low unemployment rate and the flexibilisation of the economy. According to Japanese statistics, the unemployment rate never exceeded 3 per cent in the 1970s and 1980s. However, according to a survey conducted in the Ryōban area of Iwate Prefecture (in the northeast of Honshū) in 1981, 63.9 per cent of the female respondents experienced unemployment due to the oil crisis in 1978. But most of these female workers were not counted as unemployed workers by Japanese official statistics because they stayed at home as housewives after they lost their jobs, which explains the low unemployment rate of those years (Andō 1986: 107–109).

In spite of the relatively low wages, the third effect of the dispersion of industry was the increase in household income in provincial areas. Self-employed farmer households welcomed the fact that females in their households earned extra income in the vicinity rather than having to migrate to urban areas for factory work. Consequently, the rate of economic growth in the regions rose and the average rural-urban income gap decreased as unpaid female family members in farming households became factory workers, even for relatively low wages (Andō 1986: 108).

The dispersion of the manufacturing industry was accelerated by the development of public transportation networks in the 1960s and 1970s. Under the New National Comprehensive Development Plan of 1969, the government invested in the construction of highways and railroads in provincial areas throughout the country. Expenses for infrastructure in the national general account budget increased 2.2 times from 1970 to 1975, and 4.8 times in 1980. Although the policy led to corruption and clientelism among LDP politicians, it provided provincial subcontracting factories with a logistics system to connect with big corporations. This also resulted in the rise of land prices in provincial areas, the increase in construction jobs for male farmers and the decrease in the income gap between provincial areas and large cities. The economic growth in the provincial areas was accompanied by a rise in the service sector, such as retailers and realtors. Thus the National Comprehensive Development Plan subsequently resulted in the growth of the provincial economy, even though it failed in achieving the creation of “new industrial cities” (Andō 1985: 59–90).

In 1964, more than 50 per cent of a farmer’s average household income was non-agricultural income, and the average farming household income (per house-

hold member) exceeded that of employee households in 1972 (Watanabe 2004: 65, 106). Self-employed farmers stopped moving to urban areas and household members would go to work in the manufacturing and construction industries in their neighbourhoods while continuing to work on the farm.

This situation not only mitigated migration from provincial areas but also reduced social disorder in big cities. In 1975, as Figure 2 shows, the regional income gap ratio reached its minimum and net migration to the three major metropolitan areas actually fell to zero. The governmental data (Statistics Bureau 2012) shows that the decrease in net migration to the three major metropolitan areas was caused not only by the decrease in migration from provincial areas (1,430,526 in 1965 to 1,285,383 in 1974), but also by the increase in migration to provincial areas (944,461 in 1965 to 1,233,597 in 1974). This suggests that the increase in jobs in provincial areas made it easy for migrants who had failed in adapting to city life to relocate to their former hometowns. Indeed, Japanese demographers have pointed out that a considerable proportion of people who moved to big cities returned to their hometowns after 6 to 7 years, and that this was mainly due to their financial circumstances (Ōe 1995, Shimizu 2010). James White, who surveyed three areas of Tokyo in 1972 and 1977, found that despite the large numbers of rural-to-urban migrants in the 1960s, those areas of the capital were socially and politically more stable than he expected. Only 11 per cent of his sample had lived less than 5 years in the surveyed areas as adults, 50 per cent had lived more than 10 years there and the mean of the sample was 12 years (White 1982: 255). These statistics suggested that the only people who stayed in the area were those who could secure their positions in Tokyo, and those who might cause social disorder, as in the 1968 Shinjuku Riot, would soon return to their hometowns.

Thus, the dispersion of industry had political effects in two respects. First, it stopped the massive migration that was causing social disorder in urban areas and a decline in LDP votes. Second, it increased manufacturing and clerical jobs in rural areas, allowing people to stay in rural areas. The latter effect would be reflected in the increase in LDP supporters among labourers and clerical workers who remained in the regional network of LDP politicians.

Community policy

Another policy introduced to stop the social disorder associated with rapid urbanisation and that eventually contributed to the resurgence of the LDP was the community policy in the 1970s. Community policy (*Komyuniti Seisaku*) is a general term for a series of policies in which many ministries and agencies were involved, centring on the Model Community (*Moderu Komyuniti*) Project started by the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1971. As I describe below, it was one

of the countermeasures of the Japanese government against the crisis in the late 1960s, aiming to mitigate social disorder by reorganising society.

The annual report White Paper on Crime (*Hanzai Hakusyo*) of 1969 by the Metropolitan Police Department stated that the measures against internal migration and urbanisation were as follows: “The measures against crime and delinquency and their prevention are not effective unless the residents of the local neighbourhoods and police agencies organically unite and act with common interest. In this sense, the organisation of local society is needed” (MPD 1969). The 1973 Policing White Paper (*Keisatsu Hakusyo*) by the National Police Agency attributed the intensification of student movements and the emergence of extreme leftist groups to “the decrease in solidarity among local communities through the process of urbanisation” (NPA 1973). The government’s answer to this problem was to utilise the Neighbourhood Associations (NHAs), *Jichikai* or *Chōnaikai* in Japanese.

Japanese police established NHA-based Crime Prevention Associations (*Bōhan Kyōkai*) as a security measure in the context of the rapid increase in internal migration. According to Walter Ames, who investigated the police and the local community in Kurashiki City, Okayama Prefecture in 1974, there were 233 Crime Prevention Associations in Kurashiki City at the time, and they were organised by the Crime Prevention Federation headed by the mayor. The NHAs and the Crime Prevention Associations were made up of virtually the same members, with the members of the former providing the police with an extensive informant network. The police designated one out of every 50 households as a crime prevention checkpoint, and the designated household was meant to report information on suspicious people in the neighbourhood to the police. The system was unified nationally by the police in 1969 (Ames 1981: 41–43).

This citizenry cooperation made the police more efficient in maintaining security. From 1963 to 1975, the number of police officers in Japan increased from 137,710 to approximately 197,000. However, according to data from the Policing White Papers of 1974 and 1976, the number of police officers per capita in Japan in 1972 was only 52 per cent of the number in France, 68 per cent of that of the United States and 71 per cent of West Germany’s. Still, the Japanese arrest rate was the highest. Ames asked the head of the criminal investigation division of the Okayama Prefectural Police Headquarters about the reason for this and was told that it was because the Japanese were still somewhat “feudal” (Ames 1981: 225, 228). What this meant was that the Japanese had been obedient to authority since the feudal era and were willing to cooperate with the police.

However, the NHAs were not the legacy of a feudal era, but an organisation empowered by the support of the government. Officially the NHA was a voluntary self-governing association of the local community, but in a nationwide survey of chairmen of the NHAs in 1968 by the Cabinet Office, only 53.4 per cent of

chairmen in provincial areas and 58.4 per cent in urban areas answered that the NHA was “voluntarily organised” (Cabinet Office 1968).

Although voluntary associations existed in Japanese local communities even before the modernisation of the 19th century, the origin of NHAs was the establishment of the 1889 modern municipal system, in which the government created new municipalities by merging groups of about ten old villages. The old village chiefs performed administrative assistance as honorary posts, and the territories and inhabitants of these old chiefs subsequently developed into the NHAs (Torigoe 1994, Pekkanen 2006, Hidaka 2018). In the 1920s and later, local governments in urban areas where internal migrant populations and Korean immigrants were increasing urged inhabitants to organise NHAs in areas where there had been no neighbourhood associations. In the 1930s, the city office of Tokyo set standards for NHAs to unify their rules, sizes and names. In Setagaya ward in Tokyo, where the population was rapidly increasing, the number of NHAs increased from 10 in 1922 to 31 in 1933 and 76 in 1947 (Setagaya Ward Office 2015: 70–71). The 1940 Ordinance of the central government officially legalised the NHA as a subordinate organisation of the administration and ordered the creation of NHAs to cover all Japanese people in all regions (Hidaka 2018: 193). In 1941, there were 199,700 NHAs in Japan, which were utilised for food distribution and other controls during wartime. The number of NHAs reached 210,120 in 1946 (Tsujinaka et al. 2009: 44, 2014: 19). After the defeat of Japan, in 1947, the SCAP (Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers) ordered the disbandment of the NHAs but local NHAs changed their names and survived as private organisations, then were officially revived at the end of the occupation (Takagi 2005, Kohama 1994: 30).

As well as in the 1920s, during the high economic growth period of the late 1950s and 1960s, the creation of NHAs became a countermeasure to maintain urban social order, which was threatened by the massive internal migration. The number of NHAs increased in line with the population growth in Tokyo. In Setagaya Ward, the number of NHAs was 76 in 1947, but had increased to 173 by 1965 (Setagaya Ward Office 2015: 70). According to the 1960 survey of NHA chairmen conducted in Meguro ward in Tokyo, most chairmen held multiple posts as chairmen of many regional organisations, not only of Crime Prevention Associations, but also fire prevention brigades, sanitary associations and social welfare councils (Hirohara 2011: 425). This kind of multiple-post holding was common nationwide (Ames 1981:41, Kurasawa 1990:19, Hidaka 2018: 139–163).

In 1968 and later, Japanese police mobilised the NHAs in an attempt to crack down on the student movement. The Metropolitan Police Department requested NHAs to form vigilante groups (Asahi Journal 1969: 7). The exaggerated image of the 1968 Shinjuku riot was utilised in this “cooperation protecting the city centre from mobs” (Oguma 2009b: 155). On 16 November 1969, when

a protest against Prime Minister Eisaku Satō's visit to the United States was held around Kamata railroad station, the nearest station to Haneda Airport, fifty NHAs organised vigilante squads. The activity of the vigilantes was reported as follows in the Tokyo Metropolitan Defence Association Bulletin issued on 25 November 1969:⁷

There were town baseball team members who were wearing armbands of NHAs and "armed" with helmets, bats, masks and protectors. Some fencers held traditional Japanese wooden swords. "We won't let anyone who is suspicious enter our town." Some members were keeping watch from the rooftops of watchtowers and guard stations in the streets, using transceivers to contact the NHA office. [...] In a restaurant area about 100 metres north of Kamata station, fishmongers with boots and wooden swords were vigilant. Then, several radical leftist students wearing white helmets ran into the town and threw Molotov cocktails. Shouting "You bastards!", youth vigilantes with wooden swords assaulted them. Students with white helmets were beaten and held their heads. Several dozen other leftist students who ran into the street were contained by the vigilantes and arrested by the riot police. The vigilantes also confined another dozen leftist students in a narrow street and called riot police to arrest them. [...] Members of the vigilantes were hurling violent words at the radicals and said, "We are protecting our town and businesses!" (Anon 1969: 3)

Although such violent activity of the NHAs was exceptional, cooperation between NHAs and police was seen in Shinjuku and other downtown areas in 1969 (Oguma 2009b: 153, 162). Regional information networks of the Crime Prevention Association were also effective in the suppression of radical leftist groups. The most prominent case was the 1971 "Operation Apartment Roller" (*Apaat Rōrā Sakusen*) against the Red Army Faction (*Sekigun Ha*), which was the predecessor of the Japanese Red Army. The 1973 Police White Paper stated that:

Operation Apartment Roller consists of investigating by visiting apartments, rented houses and other places where leftist activists are expected to be hiding. With the cooperation of local residents, it is like a steamroller that discovers their hiding places, arrests the wanted suspects and grasps the suspicious activities at their early stages. (NPA 1973: Chapter 7)

During the operation, over 250,000 rented houses, hotels and other places were investigated (Oguma 2009b: 577–578).

The LDP utilised the NHAs for election campaigns. As a political scientist who researched the LDP campaign in Katsushika ward in Tokyo in the 1996 general election said, "It's no secret that the NHAs have long been the LDP's political machine" (Pak 2000: 132). Although some NHAs came into conflict with the government due to social issues such as pollution, most of their chairmen had a conservative political orientation. According to a 1960 survey in

7 The association Tōkyō To Bōei Kyōkai was founded in 1966 as a voluntary citizen group cooperating with the Self-Defence Forces. The first chairman was Takeshi Sakurada, who was the chairman of the Nikkeiren (Japan Business Federation). The opening article of this issue of the bulletin was a contribution by Shigeru Hori, who was the Chief Cabinet Secretary and Deputy Prime Minister.

Meguro Ward in Tokyo, the chairmen were mostly landowners, town factory owners, company officers, temple monks and other men aged 60 and over who had lived in the area of their NHAs for more than 30 years, and almost all were supporters of the LDP (Hirohara 2011: 425).

In Japan, election campaigns were strictly restricted. This originated from the purpose of limiting the campaigns of proletarian parties when universal suffrage for men was introduced in 1925, and of trying to favour the candidates of conservative local leaders who already had access to local voters. In the campaign in 1967, the LDP candidates accessed voters through various local groups such as NHAs, agricultural organisations, merchant associations, school alumni associations and hobby clubs, through non-political cultural events, personal visiting and others (Curtis 1971). The method of the LDP’s campaign, called a “noncampaign” by Gerald Curtis, was almost identical to that of the 1996 general election in Katsushika ward (Pak 2000: 131–133). Even researchers who value NHAs as a kind of social capital admit that “to assembly members, the NHA is not just part of their political machine but also provides the opportunity to come into contact with many voters” (Tsujinaka et al. 2009: 179, 2014: 163).

Not surprisingly, intellectuals who supported the JSP were critical of the NHAs. When the LDP won in the general election of 1960 despite the massive protests against the US-Japan Security Treaty in that year, the intellectuals who supported the protest movement, including Matsushita Keiichi, one of the leading political scientists and an advisor to the JSP, published a research report revealing that most of the conservative assembly members in Sugunami ward were leaders of NHAs (Tosei Chōsakai 1960: 83–89).⁸ In contrast, although the Tokyo NHA Federation (*Tōkyō-to Chōkai Rengōkai*) invited the LDP candidate (Hirohara 2011: 404) in March 1967, one month before the Tokyo gubernatorial election, the LDP candidate was defeated in the election – even though Kakuei Tanaka, the secretary general of the LDP who blamed the defeat on urbanisation, praised the contribution of the NHAs to the election (Tanaka 1967: 285–288). As Tanaka pointed out, the traditional LDP networks were becoming unable to cope with rapid migration and urbanisation.

After that, the government began to show increased interest in the NHAs. In 1968, the first nationwide survey of chairmen of the NHAs, mentioned previously, was conducted by the Cabinet Office. In 1969, the Community Issue Committee (*Komyuniti Kenkyūkai*) of the Economic Planning Agency published the report *Recovering Humanity in Community Life* (Community Issue Committee 1969). This report claimed that there was a need for a new type of resident organisation to cooperate with the local administration, taking into account the limitations of old NHAs, such as their closed nature to new migrants. How-

8 As for Matsushita, see Avenell (2010).

ever, in 1971, the year of Operation Apartment Roller, the Ministry of Home Affairs insisted that it was unrealistic to ignore the existing NHAs, and began the Model Community Project by designating 87 regions where NHAs were active as test cases (Hirohara 2011: 242–257).

The Ministry of Home Affairs (*Jichi-syō*) was a small successor to the mighty pre-war Ministry of Home Affairs (*Naimu-syō*). The pre-war Ministry of Home Affairs was divided into the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Construction, the Ministry of Labour and others by the SCAP in 1947. What remained was a small agency that oversaw local governments, but after it was “promoted” to the ministry in 1960, its official English translation was the Ministry of Home Affairs because the revival of the pre-war Ministry was the wish of the agency (Jin 1990). In the 1970s, the Ministry of Home Affairs was irritated with the governors and mayors who were elected with the support of the JSP, because they tried to expand their autonomy and sometimes did not follow the administrative guidance of the ministry. Many of these “Progressive Local Governments (*Kakushin Jichitai*)” were large cities such as Tokyo and thus governed 41 per cent of Japan’s population in 1974 (Okada 2016). The Ministry of Home Affairs took countermeasures – which they called “Operation TOKYO (*T.O.K.Y.O. Sakusen*)” – such as leaking fiscal data to the media that emphasised the inefficiency of Progressive Local Governments. The operation began in 1974 under the Kakuei Tanaka administration, and its name was an acronym for Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Yokohama and Okinawa, which were major Progressive Local Governments (Hibino 1987: 76–96).

In the Model Community Project promoted by the Ministry of Home Affairs, local governments divided the designated areas into small districts, each led by one NHA. They built “community centres” with subsidies in each designated area and organised local residents through those centres. According to the survey of the Ministry of Home Affairs, only 619 (19 per cent) out of 3278 municipal governments implemented some sort of community policy before 1970. After the Model Community Project by the Ministry Home Affairs was launched in 1971, the number and the rate increased to 1900 (58 per cent) in December 1977, 2550 (78 per cent) in April 1983 and 2884 (88 per cent) in April 1990 (Hirohara 2011: 257).

Along with the promotion of the community policy, the number of NHAs also increased. According to a 2008 nationwide survey conducted by the research group headed by Yutaka Tsujinaka, the graph of the period of establishment of NHAs had twin peaks in 1946–1955 and 1971–1975. The former peak might have included the reorganisation after the end of the SCAP’s order to disband the NHAs, but the latter shows the effect of the community policy in the 1970s. The number of NHAs was 210,120 in 1946, 274,738 in 1980, and 298,488 in 1992. From 1946 to 1996, the number of NHAs increased by 2.88 times in

Tokyo and 2.75 times in Osaka (Tsujinaka et al. 2009: 44–63; 2014: 19–38). In 1984 the Ministry of Home Affairs reported that only 7 of 3278 municipalities lacked an NHA (Kurasawa / Akimoto 1990: 2).

In the community policy of local governments, sports activities for males and cooking classes for women were promoted (Hirohara 2011: 259). There were local sports clubs that helped oppress the student movement, as in the case of the baseball team members and fencers in the Kamata station area in 1969. In some universities, such as Nihon University, clubs for martial sports such as judo and karate were utilised to oppress student movements in 1968 (Oguma 2009a: 558–559, 641–642, 661). Although such blatant manipulation of sports clubs was exceptional, sports activities were praised in conservative discourses as a measure to prevent “moral degeneracy” and “juvenile delinquency” (Nakazawa 2014: 131–134). In 1972, the Association of Corporate Executives (*Keizai Dōyūkai*) published the report *Problems of Social Tensions in the 1970s and Tentative Measures to Counter Them* (Keizai Dōyūkai 1972). The report highlighted the rise of student movements and citizens’ movements as a problem and proposed the reconstruction of local communities and local sports activities as countermeasures. In 1973, the Economic Planning Agency of the government published a *Basic Plan for Economy and Society* (*Keizai Shakai Kihon Keikaku*), a report that characterised sports activities as a measure to revive the sense of solidarity that had allegedly been lost during economic growth. Later, the government promoted Comprehensive Community Sports Clubs (*Sōgōgata Chiiki Supōtsu Kurabu*), claiming to be inspired by local sports clubs in Germany (Matsuhashi 2014: 106).

According to a survey of the Ministry of Home Affairs, 67 per cent of the 3278 municipal governments responded that sports/recreation activities were the “most active community activities” in 1978; the figure increased to 77 per cent in 1983 (Hirohara 2011: 259). From 1955 to 1996, the participation rate of schoolboys in school sports clubs increased from 27.2 per cent to 73.9 per cent in junior high schools and from 23.4 per cent to 56.3 per cent in high schools (Nakazawa 2014: 96–98). In 1990, sociologist Susumu Kurasawa pointed out that all NHAs throughout Japan were conducting virtually the same activities, such as sports and crime prevention, even though the NHAs were officially voluntary associations (Kurasawa / Akimoto 1990: 4).

There are various theories about the membership rate of the NHAs. The modern NHA has been institutionalised together with zoning by municipal governments and it has become customary for all the households in a given area to voluntarily/automatically join. As a result, many municipalities still claim a membership rate in NHAs of over 90 per cent.⁹ However, a Japanese semi-

⁹ In the nationwide survey of NHAs in 2008, the average participation rate of households inside of its boundaries was 81.0 per cent (Hidaka 2018: 119).

official organisation, the Association for the Promotion of Fair Elections (APFE, *Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyōkai*), has conducted surveys asking voters which organisation they have been affiliated with in every national election since 1972. From this survey, it is possible to interpret voters' self-recognition with the organisations they are affiliated with, and this can be regarded as a much more realistic reflection of voters' participation rates. As Figure 3 shows, the participation rate in NHAs increased in the 1970s and peaked in 1986.¹⁰ Participation in "Society Clubs and Hobby Clubs", such as local sports clubs and cooking classes, exceeded that in primary industry organisations in 1976 and in labour unions in 1983.¹¹ The answer "not affiliated" declined in the 1970s and reached its lowest point in 1983. In other words, the 1970s and 1980s in Japan were the period of the reconstruction of the social order by reorganising the people/voters who had left rural organisational networks and moved to metropolitan areas in the 1960s.


According to a study based on interviews with 9 parliamentarians and 91 local assemblymen in a region of western Japan from 1974 to 1980, political leadership of NHAs tended to be held by people with the same conservative attributes as those during the 1960s unless a constituency consisted of over 70 per cent migrants, because of the lack of cohesion of migrants (Wakata 1981: 161–165). In a survey conducted by the above-mentioned APFE (Association for the Promotion of Fair Elections) after the national unified local elections of April 1983, 19.2 per cent of voters in the 23 wards of Tokyo stated that the NHAs with which they were affiliated had recommended candidates. This figure was 39.4 per cent in cities with 50,000 to 100,000 residents and 42.9 per cent in towns and villages with less than 50,000 residents (APFE: 1983). In 1985, political scientist Ichiro Miyake pointed out that the impact of NHAs' actions in election campaigning was significant due to their organisational size, even if only some of them were committed to political campaigns (Miyake 1985: 21). Although there is no data on what percentage of NHAs campaigned in the 1970s and 1980s, according to the 2008 nationwide survey conducted by Tsujinaka and others, 14.3 per cent of NHAs responded that they would "always" carry out election campaigns, 21.2 per cent answered "sometimes", 15.3 per cent answered "previously" and 2.5 per cent answered "recently begun" – in other words 53.3 per cent in total (Tsujinaka et al. 2009: 179–180; 2014: 164–165). It is unclear whether the "election campaigns" of these answers included "non-campaign" activities such as inviting politicians to gatherings of the NHAs.

10 Tsujinaka et al. also made a graph from the same APFE data (Tsujinaka / Pekkanen / Yamamoto 2009: 26) but it was deleted in the English translated version in 2014.

11 The percentage might have differed in urban areas where hobby/sports clubs were more active than in provincial areas. According to a survey in three areas in Tokyo in 1972, the membership rate in NHAs (and in fire and crime prevention associations) was 34 per cent and in recreation/sports clubs 23 per cent, whereas labour unions had 10 per cent, religious organisations 5 per cent, consumer groups/citizen movements 1 per cent and none 25 per cent (White 1982: 153).

It is also unclear how much political impact the community policy had, but the number of Progressive Local Governments had declined by the 1980s. In 1978, candidates supported by the LDP were elected in gubernatorial and mayoral elections of Kyoto, Yokohama and Okinawa, which were also the targets of Operation TOKYO of the Ministry of Home Affairs, and in 1979 the gubernatorial elections in Tokyo and Osaka were won by ex-bureaucrats of the Ministry of Home Affairs, who were supported by the LDP. These victories symbolised the conservative resurgence.

Figure 3: Participation rate in NHAs and other organisations (in per cent, 1972–2017)



Source: Compiled by author, based on the data from the surveys on general elections by the APFE (Association for the Promotion of Fair Elections)

Conclusion

In Europe and the United States, it is said that “1968” was a turning point in politics, culture and society. A book titled *1968 in Europe*, published in 2008, claimed that “nobody today seriously doubts that European societies were fundamentally transformed as a result of the events of ‘1968’” (Klimke / Scharloth 2008: 7).

However, in Japan, the social movement of 1968 has been regarded as a temporary historical episode. This was not because Japan’s movement in the late 1960s was necessarily small. The Japanese student revolt of 1968 shared a common social context with those of Europe and the United States, such as the spread of TV media and protests against the Cold War order (Oguma 2018a). Moreover, the Japanese movement was a reaction to the social change caused by economic growth, such as internal migration, urbanisation and the rapid increase in college enrolment rates (Oguma 2015). In other words, the Japanese student revolt was one of the reflections of the social change that the LDP feared. However, what happened in Japan after 1968 was a reorganisation of social structures and a conservative resurgence. This reorganisation was achieved through the dispersion of industry away from metropolitan areas and the implementation of community policies, and resulted in the reconstruction of the LDP network in both of rural and urban areas. This Japanese “long 1960s” led to the difference in the historical legacy of “1968” between Japan and the West.

The conservative resurgence shaped the stereotype of Japan in the 1970s and later. In 1979, Ezra Vogel’s *Japan as Number One* portrayed Japan as a country that had avoided the harmful effects of modernisation and urbanisation. In the Japan that Vogel portrayed, modern technology and traditional values coexisted. Public investment had created stunning highways and modern factories. Japan boasted high productivity, low crime and unemployment rates, well-ordered schools and the maintenance of community norms (Vogel 1979). But such a Japan was not the result of tradition, but a temporary phenomenon that emerged from the political and economic conditions of the “long 1960s”.

It is unclear whether the industry dispersal policy and the community policy were intentionally planned as a unified policy package, although there are some politicians such as Kakuei Tanaka who were involved in both processes. Industry dispersion in the 1960s and 1970s was not only the consequence of government policies, but also a result of the aggregation of clientelism of individual LDP politicians and the preference of the manufacturing industry for low wages. Having said that, all conservatives, such as LDP politicians and chairmen of NHAs, shared the same fear of migration and urbanisation that could weaken their status. This fear became the common motivation which drove all of these policies even if they did not have a unified big picture.

Once migration to cities had ceased and the people were reorganised into local networks, it became easier for the LDP to access voters. The rate of sup-

port for the LDP in the late 1970s increased not only among farmers and fishermen and in provincial areas, but also among clerical workers and labourers and in urban areas. Masumi Ishikawa, who observed local politics as a journalist, pointed out that even if farmers became manufacturing labourers or clerical workers, they did not leave the LDP network if they stayed in the same area (Ishikawa 1995: 210). Although Ishikawa did not explain clearly why migration ceased, how farmers could become labourers and clerical workers without migration and why they were reorganised by the local network of the LDP, the present article corroborates how this became possible, considering the social policy context. The fact that NHAs and other local organisations in the 1970s and 1980s developed significantly in urban areas can explain the increase in the rate of support for the LDP also in urban areas.

That said, this article does not contradict previous theories. It has been posited that the conservative resurgence was due to the LDP’s compensation policy or policy changes such as the enhancement of social welfare and pollution regulations. Another theory claims that the introduction of the LDP general leadership election in 1977 in which rank-and-file party members could vote attracted the urban middle class and labourers (Nakakita 2013). However, the dispersion of industry and the Model Community Project, accompanied by many public works and subsidies, were themselves compensation policies. The fact that the LDP gained greater access to a large number of residents through the increased number of NHAs might have facilitated the adoption of new policies and the introduction of the general leadership election in that more voices were heard from the grassroots.

This article also explains the background of voting behaviour in Japan as revealed by previous studies. Ikuo Kabashima analysed the data of the 1986 general election and found that the voting rate was higher among lower educated voters than more educated ones, unlike in other developed countries. According to Kabashima, the lower the educational background, the older the age and the less urbanised the area in which voters lived, the more likely they were to turn out to vote (Kabashima 1988). Shirō Sakaiya analysed the data of the survey by the APFE and concluded that this type of voting behaviour was not found from the 1950s to the mid-1960s, and it only became apparent after the 1967 general election (Sakaiya 2013). The demographics described by Kabashima overlap with those of the core members of NHAs, and Sakaiya’s finding is consistent with the description of socio-political change in this article.¹²

The phenomena described in this article are not necessarily specific to Japan. Many “sweat shop” factories utilising cheap female/immigrant labour flourished

12 After the 1990s, as shown in Figure 3, participation in NHAs declined sharply to around 25 per cent by 2012, and the LDP was heavily defeated by the Democratic Party in the 2009 general election. However, following the failures of the Democratic Party at the time of the Fukushima nuclear accident of 2011, the LDP gained power again with its victory in the 2012 general election. The absolute percentage of votes for the LDP and its coalition partner KOMEITO has hovered consistently around 27 per cent since 2012, but the total absolute percentage of votes for opposition parties has stagnated at around 20 per cent, while the abstention rate has been around 50 per cent (Oguma 2018b).

in suburban areas in the United States as the hollowing out of the manufacturing industry from the city centres unfolded in the 1970s and 1980s (Sassen 1988), although these did not necessarily lead to community organisation or conservative voting. In the 1960s and 1970s, conservative administrations in Asia urged citizens to form local resident organisations, such as Bansanghoe in South Korea, Barangay in the Philippines and RT/RW in Indonesia. The social changes that took place in Japan's "long 1960s" should be noted not only as a turning point in modern Japan, but also as a pattern that can be found in other parts of the world.

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