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Paruzel, Robert

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Robert Paruzel

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Theory

Culture is a collection of established and accumulated social formations that are capable of spatial expansion, connecting in the process strongly diverse groups of people who support their own language, beliefs, habits, knowledge, traditions, ideas and craving for making the reality of their own ideals of beauty, goodness and truth[1]. The division of the culture into material and immaterial[2] formation is a very conventional one as in the social reality the spirit and matter are always combined with each other. On the one hand – there is no religious belief without rites, i.e. without special gestures, body postures and activities related to material objects[3]. Regrettably, to this date any attempts at developing an explicit definition of culture, which would be satisfying for everyone, have been unsuccessful. As early as in the mid-20th century American sociologists, Clyde Kluckhohn and Alfred L. Kroeber distinguished 164 scholarly inclusions of the notion[4]. Therefore, like in the ancient times, it seems best to present culture by means of descriptive methods, such as: exercise, education, enhancement,

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[1] S. Czarnowski, *Dzieła*, vol. 1: *Studia z historii kultury*, Warszawa 1956, p. 23.
[2] Entry: *Kultura*, in: K. Olechnicki, P. Załęcki, *Słownik socjologiczny*, Toruń 1999, p. 106.
[3] S. Czarnowski, op. cit., p. 17.
[4] R. Bierstedt, *The social order: an introduction to sociology*, New York 1963, p. 129.

maintenance, conservation, nurture of intellectual skills, character, spiritual values or moral principles, following the worship activities[5].

Similar situation is with the issue of the cultural safety of a state, which, unlike typical threats – military, financial, commercial, legal, resource-related, health-related, etc. – is relatively vague in itself. It relates to the issue of identity of large social groups with the culture preferred by the political power centre that dominates in its territory. Cultural consolidation is an important task of state authorities at the time of peace – in the interest of their own legitimization and preventing separatist tendencies. It requires carrying out an effective long-term policy with that regard, often also by means of using violence. History shows us that when great empires were disintegrated, the lines of their breakup were convergent with the cultural and religious borders (the empires: Roman, Mongol, British, Spanish French, Portuguese, Dutch and Belgian overseas colonies). The clearest example of division of great states into smaller ones, with a historically formed national culture occurred in the case of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Soviet Union and Yugoslavia[6].

Human history over the centuries is the evolution from a community living in hordes to individuals acting within the systems of modern states. A human being has almost always been perceived as gregarious. Aristotle defined it as a political animal, Karl Marx saw it as the resultant of the "totality of social relations", Elliot Aronson described man as a "social animal", while Gernot Böhme concluded that the basic determinant of human existence is our natural tendency to live in a community[7]. It is religion that strongly consolidates the state and other political organizations. It is usually present at a transnational level – just like the national culture – creating the community of values, norms and models of conduct. The religious conflicts of the past, as far as they were something more than just the grounds for an interference with the affairs of other countries and their governments, in fact took place not to resolve which confession is superior, but to strengthen own security of state authority and dynastic interests. The uniformness of culture and religion of a specific state determines the gods, patrons, dogmas, ceremonies and forms of worship, while the order constituted by this unity reaches as far as it altars. Anything beyond

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[5]   Entry: *Kultura*, in: J. Korpanty (ed.), *Słownik łacińsko-polski*, Warszawa 2003, p. 423.
[6]   S.P. Huntington, *Zderzenie cywilizacji i nowy kształt ładu światowego*, transl. H. Jankowska, Warszawa 2011, p. 223.
[7]   G. Böhme, *Antropologia filozoficzna: ujęcie pragmatyczne*, transl. P. Domański, Warszawa 1998, p. 118.

and outside thus marked area is profane, barbarian, alien, maybe also hostile?[8] Countries with similar values approach one another with friendliness. Mutual acceptance of similarities connects groups of countries and nations into vast civilizations[9].

As early as in the antiquity a belief was developed that a "civilized person" is an individual that is "cultured", striving for living with others in harmony. A "barbarian" on the other hand, is anyone who lives outside the borders of the Greek and Roman civilization, has their own culture, religion, some value system, own customs and knowledge[10], but is bellicose and particularly hostile towards others[11]. In the etiological meaning[12], civilized people are the responsible citizens of a state. The attitudes they display distinguish them positively in the world[13] and therefore they attribute low value to the qualities presented by the barbarians. The descriptions of barbaric peoples that the civilized citizens of Rome have left us leave no doubt: The Saxons are cruel, the Franks – treacherous, the Gepids – inhuman, the Huns – ignoble, etc.[14] "We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against"[15].

Affiliation and active participation in a specific culture or civilization are equal with adoption of their individual features as one's own. Identity or sameness of behavior and established beliefs induce people to identify with their own meticulously cherished vernacular which gives the feeling of identity to a community[16]. The feeling of dissimilarity from the "barbarians" also stems from tradition and historical memory. If an ethnic myth clearly maps a territory from which the community concerned originates, then its symmetrical complement is the common anticipation of the future[17]. As the meaning of a national

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[8] J.J. Rousseau, *O religii społecznej*, in: idem, *Umowa społeczna*, transl. A. Peretiatkowicz, Kęty 2007, p. 98–106.

[9] S.P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 59.

[10] E. Sapir, *Kultura, język, osobowość*, transl. B. Stanosz, R. Zimand, Warszawa 1978, p. 172.

[11] J. Ortega y Gasset, *Bunt mas i inne pisma socjologiczne*, transl. P. Niklewicz, H. Woźniakowski, Warszawa 1982, p. 54.

[12] Z. Chlewiński, *Etologia*, in: A. Maryniarczyk et al. (eds.), *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, vol. 3: *Me–Pań*, Lublin 2006, p. 252.

[13] E. Sapir, op. cit., p. 175.

[14] J. Le Goff, *Kultura średniowiecznej Europy*, transl. H. Szumańska-Grossowa, Gdańsk – Warszawa 2002, p. 28–29.

[15] S.P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 18.

[16] G. Michałowska, *Zmienność i instytucjonalizacja międzynarodowych stosunków kulturalnych*, Warszawa 1991, p. 280.

[17] L. Kołakowski, *O tożsamości narodowej*, in: K. Michalski (ed.), *Tożsamość w czasach zmiany. Rozmowy w Castel Gandolfo*, Kraków – Warszawa 1995, p. 48.

culture we understand the general collection of spiritual and intellectual values as well as material products of a community concerned[18] – the repository which includes norms and beliefs, historical sources and works of art. Those are recorded, retained and regarded by the nation as their own, decide on the people's separateness, strengthen the feeling of internal bond and identity. The latter one is a resultant of many elements. The national spirit (*Volksgeist*) shapes every state according to unique principles, however the historical experience shows that it is the war that makes the affairs of the state closer to its citizens[19]. Some even claim that a war is an integral part of the world order as given to people by God. It is during the war that the noblest human virtues are formed: courage, selflessness, inclination to sacrifice, sense of duty and fidelity to the ruler or the state, not refraining to go as far as scarifying one's life[20].

The national spirit imbuing the population of the state in which everyone has a bigger or smaller share in exercising power, gives an individual character to the state's virtues and vices. Action expressed in the same words will look different when performed by a Spanish person and by a French citizen. For Hans Morgenthau this is a unique truth that exhibits existence of basic differences between nations. It affects their relative greatness or mediocrity. Everything by what they stand as nations composed from subsequent generations is the result of that spirit's work[21].

The first states were established on the territories constituted of various communities or ethnic groups and "local" nations who naturally, due to their difference were always ready to separate from the centre of domination within the area they found themselves in. Creating a community that is perceived by everybody as a common wealth, which allows the authorities to rule in a steady manner, is significantly more effective and economical in execution than keeping atomized cultural groups obedient with the use of violence. In a situation when a state becomes weaker as a result of natural disasters or wars, any communities that are not connected with it – in their own interest – are inclined to secede or actively cooperate with a foreign state. The attacking state always tends to offer the minorities more advantageous conditions for existence

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[18] J. Pruszyński, *Dziedzictwo kultury Polski: jego straty i ochrona prawna*, vol. 1, Kraków 2001, p. 62.

[19] T. Kroński, *Hegel i jego filozofia dziejów*, in: G.W.F. Hegel, *Wykłady z filozofii dziejów*, vol. 1, transl. J. Grabowski, A. Landman, Warszawa 1958, p. XXVI–XXVII.

[20] A.J. Toynbee, *Wojna i cywilizacja*, transl. T. Dehnel, Warszawa 2002, p. 24.

[21] H.J. Morgenthau, K.W. Thompson, *Polityka między narodami. Walka o potęgę i pokój*, transl. R. Włoch, Warszawa 2010, p. 153.

and development. After victory, just like its predecessors, but in a definitely more effective way, the aggressor will be striving using all available methods to liquidate any foreign culture that somebody else could use against them in the future. It was in the leaders' interest – first in relation to the elites, and then towards other subsequently liberating themselves social groups – to instill in them the standards of identification strengthening the common state affiliation. It must be remembered that each machinery of state and the based on it political, legal and social order are always a necessary and inalienable legitimation of the leaders. In order to protect a monarchy, a tyranny or a democracy from a sudden change of the present public order, its unsettlement or even abolishing, the authority of the state must retain the right of monopoly to use physical violence sanctioned by law[22]. Plato presented it in the following way: if a "lord" happened to be in a desert with his slaves and wealth, in a place with no state, it would only last a short time for him to enjoy those possessions, as well as his own life[23].

Legends and myths uniting the feeling of community can be justifiably called "pre-historic narrations". They develop in societies who do not know historical records or historical continuity. They are the very heart of the culture[24] of the pre- or non-historical societies. Such a consolidating narrative can be the founding myth telling a story of a large family and a common ancestor – a forefather or a first mother, founders or "patrons" of real and imagined communities. The examples are the Babylonian Gilgamesh, Hebrew Abraham, Chinese Fu-hsi, Manu of Hinduism, Minos of Crete, Roman Romulus, English King Arthur and Polish Lech[25]. The consolidating narrative can also concern events that may not necessarily be historical – which is insignificant – what is important is the fact that the legend, the story, oral message, all of them are the driving force for the community, it is the active integrating factor. At the same time it prepares the society to "defend our borders" or produces "warriors"[26]. A very interesting dual split occurs here. The living example of a Polish scout song from

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[22] M. Weber, *Polityka jako zawód i powołanie*, transl. A. Kopacki, P. Dybel, Kraków – Warszawa 1998, p. 56.

[23] B. Szacka, *Wprowadzenie do socjologii*, Warszawa 2003, p. 400.

[24] W.J. Burszta, *Antropologia kultury: tematy, teorie, interpretacje*, Poznań 1998, p. 101–120.

[25] F. Znaniecki, *Nauki o kulturze: narodziny i rozwój*, transl. J. Szacki, Warszawa 1992, p. 31.

[26] The author describes very lively liaisons between the folklore being the "voice of the people" and the "political myth" which was executed by the Serbian nationalists during the last Balkan war; see. I. Čolović, *Polityka symboli: eseje o antropologii politycznej*, transl. M. Petryńska, Kraków 2001, p. 19, 61.

the interwar period, shows us how the national sense of the citizens of a young state was constructed on the ground of references to a vague, mythical tribal community. Through a huge hyperbole a transfer takes place from the tribal world into the world of modern states with all of their discourses or vice versa. In any case one must bear in mind that the modern "tribal" discourse is the establishing foundation of modern national states. We can regard the fictional tribal narrative as an element of the foundation discourse of national states[27], while the "stateless" nations will incline more towards *eternal return*, to their "King in the Mountain". Anyway, we always deal with warriors, knights, arms. Attention should also be drawn to the fact that the basic identity narratives are usually "military" which is not equivalent with aggressive. In national states the authority popularized mass education which by assumption was to develop future "perfect adults". It is not difficult to guess that the curriculum was directly or indirectly developed by the ruling elite so that it reproduced the "correct" model of the world, the scope of knowledge as well as obedience and sense of duty towards the state. From this point of view the modern system of education was a factory of "modern citizens"[28].

As it was mentioned before, the role of the state in the process of developing nations consists in merging fragmented communities and ethnic minorities into a creation granted with a sense of common identity. It can take a form of a positive nationalism that becomes a real and "tangible" concept in the everyday life of a community in question[29], which to some extent protects the state from the chaos of internationalization[30].

Methods of consolidation of a national state

Gradual driving away of the sense of identity: tribal, ethnic, religious and national in case of immigrant minorities and those joining the composition of a wider organism has been an important element of the cultural policy of a state. Starting from the ancient times, the people included into Egypt, Babylon, Tsardom of Russia, the United States and Reich until 1945, at the desire of the rulers fearing

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[27] F. Znaniecki, *Nauki o kulturze*, p. 149.
[28] É. Durkheim, *Zasady metody socjologicznej*, transl. J. Szacki, Warszawa 2000, p. 70.
[29] W.J. Burszta, op. cit., p. 21.
[30] F. Gołembski, *Współpraca kulturalna w procesie budowy europejskiego ładu pokojowego*, Warszawa 1979, p. 43.

secession – especially national uprisings – on principle lost their identity for the benefit of the national cultures that were predominant in those countries. A Germanized or Russified Pole, Czech, Ukrainian or a Byelorussian is a citizen that is very useful for the partitioning countries. He is willing to support the state's security policy at the same time reducing the costs of forcible maintaining of internal order in new provinces. Intensification of the Germanization in the Prussian Partition was directly proportional to the sense of threat with the province's secession. The Reich Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck was afraid that if Poland revives in the territories located to east of Oder, then Prussia will perish. Personally he had a lot of consideration for the Polish people but he made no bones about one thing: if we don't wipe them out, then we ourselves won't be able to exist safely. And so it happened: on 25 February 1947 the Allied Control Council for Germany (*Alliierte Kontrollrat*), with the decision no. 46 dissolved the Prussian state as a political entity. It decided that it was not only the Prussians themselves but also their aggressive "national spirit" to blame for unleashing the two subsequent world wars[31].

A lot had been written about the Aryan race and its calling to rule the world in the millennium-old German Reich. The conclusion of it all is a common knowledge. The policy of the Reich is only worth mentioning at this point, concerning German minorities after 1918 which had led to plebiscites, ceaseless complaints, press campaigns and litigations at the League of Nations. It was obvious for everyone that the policy of Berlin in relation to its minorities serves the destabilization of the states in which they live. All those actions were conducted in the Czechoslovakia Sudetenland, Lithuanian Memel and in the territories of the Second Polish Republic. The problem of German minorities in Europe is regarded one of the most significant reasons for the outbreak of the World War II[32]. The fundamental premise of the Nazi national policy that was consistently implemented in the occupied territories was Adolf Hitler's aspiration that all Germans lived on a single integrated territory. The existing population was to be completely Germanized. The allied forces' decision executed after the war can be called the justice of the fate or its irony. In order to prevent future conflicts with German minorities, a decision was taken to displace all the

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[31] S. Salmonowicz, *Prusy: dzieje państwa i społeczeństwa*, Warszawa 2004, p. 476.

[32] W. Dobrzycki, *Historia stosunków międzynarodowych w czasach nowożytnych 1815–1945*, Warszawa 1996, p. 428, 438, 439, 441.

Germans from the Central, Eastern and Southern Europe into a territory that was significantly smaller than the leader of the Nazi Germany had assumed[33].

A lot had also been written about the cultural policy of Russia. The inferiority prevailing among the Russian power elites, mainly in the view of the material achievements of the Western countries and of the Far East, has been effectively balanced by the very rich spiritual culture of this country, and especially by the myth of the sense of historical mission, as sustained by the elite. This myth has almost always been the enduring element of the strategic culture of Russia. Since the adoption of Christianity, the idea of the Third Rome and New Jerusalem untainted by the western heresies settled well in Moscow[34]. After the October Revolution the myths of Moscow as the Third Rome and Holy Rus have endured, however in an altered form. A view has spread out that it is only the Soviet Russia that implements and retains in the purest form the truth of Marxism that necessarily "must" be spread in the world[35]. The religious values were replaced with dialectical materialism[36]. If the defense of the Orthodox Christianity and the Slavic could no longer be the tool that justified subordinating new territories to Kremlin, then the state that emerged on the ruins of the Russian Empire based its strategic policy on the universal doctrine of communism, which – in its time – could make that expansion quite realistic[37]. The paternalistic model of the authority of state personized by the tsar is still deeply rooted in the Russian culture. The strong submission of the will of the public to the will of an individual had been determined by the collectivistic model of conduct, long before the Revolution. The Russians have always criticized egotism, opposing the western "I" with "us" or "we": the Orthodox Church, nation and local community. After the Revolution the same way defined "us" – as the working class, and later the state – the soviet nation. Elevating the collective "us" has always resulted in totalitarianism[38]. Just like centuries ago, President Vladimir Putin, eager to reconstruct the tsar and soviet empire, intends to geographically turn away all threats from its centre, or Moscow. When swallowing up the neighboring states,

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[33] R. Paruzel, *Problem mniejszości niemieckiej w stosunkach polsko-niemieckich w latach 1945–1999*, praca doktorska, Warszawa 2001, p. 95–141.

[34] W. Peltz, *Suwerenność państwa w praktyce i doktrynie politycznej Rusi Moskiewskiej (XIV–XVI w.)*, Zielona Góra 1994, p. 226.

[35] R. Paradowski, *Eurazjatyckie imperium Rosji: studium idei*, Toruń 2001, p. 263.

[36] M. Bierdiajew, *Rosyjska idea*, transl. J.C.–S.W., Warszawa 1999, p. 14.

[37] M. Czajkowski, *Rosja w Europie*, Kraków 2005, p. 16–23; A.J. Toynbee, *Cywilizacja w czasie próby*, transl. W. Madej, Warszawa 1991, p. 114–126.

[38] A. Czajowski, *Demokratyzacja Rosji w latach 1987–1999*, Wrocław 2001, p. 42.

Russia has always tried to Russify them and make them similar to itself so that they would have always remained on the Russia's side. The deeply embedded in the Russian culture attitude of absolute obedience to its leaders has also remained unchanged in time. The Byzantine standards require to treat the Kremlin rulers in a special way. Since they perform their duties by God's will, then in a way they become more like Him. This is the reason why any foreign ruler, needless to say, a foreign subject must not criticize them because it does not become to do so to the King of the kings[39].

The best example of a modern and very vital legend about themselves is the commonly shared belief of the citizens of the United States of America that they have been chosen by God to lead and educate other nations with regard to justice and law[40]. In the *Manifest destiny* published in press, Americans found out about their mission to bring civilization to the benighted regions of the globe, and even to reign over the wild and ignorant nations for their well-being. The steadfast conviction of the elites and of the American society makes them believe that if their own political system is the best in the world, then it should be spread everywhere – even against the will of the peoples in question. All the nations in the world should necessarily be presented with the gifts of freedom, democracy, education, Christianity, etc. Failure to implement the abovementioned values was justified by the excuse that the non-white peoples are not capable of ruling for themselves and it is this very sense of mission that is the cause for doing it for them. The problem is that to this day armed interventions are carried out under very similar ideas. In the name of the abovementioned values America's armed forces fought against Great Britain, Mexico, Spain, Germany, communist Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan[41]. An exceptionally gladly used reason that weakens the internal cultural integrity of the opponent is the pressure concerning the issue of respecting human rights. Apart from Japan and South Korea, countries outside of the "western civilization" have big problems with that. Practical implementation of those values, especially in Afghanistan and other Muslim countries will probably take many years. The social and political tradition of those countries is completely different. For instance the Confucian ethos to which many Asian countries have adhered for more than two millennia,

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[39] B.A. Uspienski, W.M. Żywow, *Car i Bóg. Semiotyczne aspekty sakralizacji monarchy w Rosji*, transl. H. Paprocki, Warszawa 1992, p. 14–15.

[40] S.P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 100.

[41] Z. Brzeziński, *Strategiczna wizja. Ameryka a kryzys globalnej potęgi*, transl. K. Skonieczny, Kraków 2013, p. 94.

is not always in line with the values of the Western world[42]. Human rights that are not properly respected in China, are sometimes the subject-matter of a dispute and purposeful manipulation on an international scale. It is not the case however with Saudi Arabia who is on friendly terms with the USA. There are many similar examples, which is why the view on double moral standards used by Americans seems justified[43].

This problem was most visible at the time when the United Stated were formed at the beginning. In accordance with the principles constituting the American nation, it significantly increased the territory it occupied, in a very short time. The first settlers who came to Virginia did not land on pristine areas, but on a region inhabited by more than one hundred thousand Indians, and taking their land from them almost always involved violence. As a result of their constant pushing westward and placing in reserves, the native Americans have been physically ruined. Reserves and hunting grounds of the indigenous people were liquidated when the number of the settlers increased so much that there was too little land for the "whites". Then the local politicians would send petitions to Washington with a request to remove native Americans for the "road of civilization"[44]. The conflict between those communities was unavoidable as 90 percent of the English settlers were farmers and the Indian territories constrained their development[45]. Force and exploitation were used towards them[46]. As many as 12 million native Americans lost their lives as a result of ethnic cleansing in the USA and Canada alone. The number is from 68 to 90 million for the whole Western Hemisphere[47]. It has been the biggest genocide in the history of the world to date[48]. The main impact on the extermination of Indians was from the contagious diseases, famine and persecution.

After the expansion on their own continent, it was necessary to present to its democratic public opinion an important reason why the United States should conquer further territories. A bizarre justification for the worldwide

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[42] S.P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 386.

[43] Ibidem, p. 309.

[44] J. Wojtczak, *Sand Creek 1864*, Warszawa 2007, p. 46.

[45] B.W. Sheehan, I. Wawrzyczek (eds.), *Historia Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki*, vol. 2: *1763–1848*, Warszawa 1995, p. 233.

[46] G.B. Tindall, D.E. Shi, *Historia Stanów Zjednoczonych*, transl. A. Bartkowicz, H. Jankowska, J. Ruszkowski, Poznań 2002, p. 79.

[47] R. Horsman, *Race and manifest destiny. The origins of American racial Anglo-Saxonism*, Cambridge 1981, p. 44.

[48] M. Mann, *The dark side of democracy. Explaining ethnic cleansing*, Cambridge 2006, p. 70–110.

leadership of the American White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASP)[49] was the belief, disseminated by the elites of that state about their own racial superiority to all other nations. The major propagators of that idea include: Alfred T. Mahan, Frederick J. Tuner, Theodore Roosevelt and Henry C. Lodge[50]. Modern analysis of those viewpoints leaves no doubt that they were but a mere propaganda tool covering the greed and imperious aspirations[51]. Practical application of this idea occurred after taking over the Philippines from Spain in 1899. At that point Americans started their rule from murdering more than three thousand residents of Manila, who refused to become a colony of the USA. *Chicago Tribune* wrote then that "[t]he entire American population justifies the conduct of its army at Manila because only by a crushing repulse of the Filipinos could our position be made secure. […] We are […] the trustees of civilization and peace throughout the islands". The commander-in-chief of the USA army, General Arthur MacArthur considered national guerrilla warfare as contradictory to wartime customs. He tolerated executing by fire squads and torturing prisoners[52]. Journalists commented it as follows: "There is no question that our men do 'shoot niggers' somewhat in the sporting spirit, but that is because war and their environments have rubbed off the thin veneer of civilization"[53]. During fights on the Samar Island General Jacob H. Smith instructed his troops to kill off the entire island's population capable of carrying guns and ordered: "I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn, the more you kill and burn the better it will please me". Upon his return home, cheering crowds treated him as a national hero. In response to the news of a court-martial threat, his medical officer made a following statement: "It makes me sick to see what has been said about him. If people knew what a thieving, treacherous, worthless bunch of scoundrels those Filipinos are, they would think differently than they do now. You can't treat them the way you do civilized folks"[54].

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[49] H. Kubiak, *Rodowód narodu amerykańskiego*, Kraków 1975, p. 21, 169.

[50] A. Bartnicki, K. Michałek, I. Rusinowa, *Encyklopedia historii Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki Północnej: dzieje polityczne (od Deklaracji Niepodległości do współczesności)*, Warszawa 1992, p. 90, 222.

[51] D.E. Stannard, *American holocaust: the conquest of the New World*, Oxford 1992, p. 134–138, 268.

[52] G. Regan, *Największe błędy militarne w historii wojen*, transl. T. Prochenka, Warszawa 2006, p. 113.

[53] S.C. Miller, *Benevolent assimilation: the American conquest of the Philippines, 1899–1903*, New Haven 1984, p. 107.

[54] Ibidem, p. 118.

There were empires in the world, which right from their rise had always been aware of the fact that they would never be able to impose their culture on other countries. This issue concerned ancient Persia and the British Empire that certainly learnt their lesson from the experience of their predecessor. In the provinces the Persians captured, they retained the existing rulers whose power was constrained by recognizing the superiority of the Persian king and establishing a Persian satrap in their county. In addition, in order to verify the degree of loyalty of all the authorities of the subject province, the royal services placed *incognito* inspectors there (literally *gauska* – the eavesdropping). That allowed to undertake appropriate actions, e.g. send troops to the areas where rebellion was only starting to crystallize[55]. The British colonial policy was very pragmatic. It resulted directly from the limited capacities of that state whose prime objective was the collection of taxes. Different standards were applied to the Irish and Boers. To ensure security in the areas that should remain English forever, mass displacement was applied, not sparing civilians. During the Boer wars women, children and elderly were imprisoned in the first concentration camps in history. Almost a quarter of the prisoners: 27 thousand people died of diseases and starvation[56]. In other places, like in the Persian empire, the existing rulers were allowed to stay (as vice-kings) – under the condition that they recognize the superiority of the British Crown. The Empire was locally represented by a governor. Depending on the location and possibilities, the colonies were divided into royal (with own charters of liberties) and private[57].

Political spectacles strengthening the feeling of community between the rulers and the subjects

In order to strengthen the authority of the state, for centuries the rulers proper for a specific era orchestrated carefully devised political shows[58]. It is enough to mention the Roman triumphs, Baroque courtly celebrations, which were in fact stunning theatrical performances, or today's media spectacles prepared

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[55] G. Górski, S. Salmonowicz, *Historia ustrojów państw*, Warszawa 2001, p. 28–29.
[56] A.J. Kamiński, *Koszmar niewolnictwa. Obozy koncentracyjne od 1896 do dziś: analiza*, Warszawa 1990, p. 28–31.
[57] G. Górski, S. Salmonowicz, op. cit., p. 410–412.
[58] A. Rycman, *Rytuał jako sposób budowania rzeczywistości politycznej*, in: J. Wódz (ed.), *Między socjologią polityki a antropologią polityki*, Katowice 2009, p. 69–82.

to the commission of the authorities by the biggest PR agencies[59]. Ceremonies, formalities, the entire *decorum* of the modern-era authorities – all those largely stem from religious ceremonial: both there and here symbols blend the image of the world into unity, even just for a moment, bringing into existence the order anticipated in it[60]. In both cases the obligatory standards include loftiness, severity, sublimity and the distance necessary to emphasize the power of the authority: shortly a form that evokes humility in those watching the spectacle. The most characteristic symbols that enhanced authority in the past were crowns (papal, emperor's, royal and prince's). They used to be the synonyms of sacrality and superiority of the ruler who should become the object of cult for his subjects. The scepter in his hands symbolized power over the army. When he sat on the throne, he was physically taller than all the people standing or kneeling before him. An eagle in the national emblem is to this day the most popular political symbol. As early as ancient Rome, the symbol of an eagle or Aquila was carried in front of every legion. It symbolizes great strength, bravery, exquisiteness, but also relentless cruelty resulting from its animal nature[61]. A sword in the hands of a ruler linked earth with the sky. All the spectacles were accompanied by apotheosis, or the feeling of the highest degree of glory that can be gained by a mortal receiving homage when exercising authority over individuals like him[62].

From the anthropologic point of view, any political spectacles[63] fulfill three essential functions. The first one is integrative in nature. According to Émile Durkheim, the rules of the ritual and allocated roles enhance social bounds. They consolidate the existing order, generate mass acceptance of political games. Participation of the head of state in religious and state services always has a character of a perfectly arranged ceremony – the purpose of the *decorum* of the authority is to communicate existence of some kind of *sacrum* unavailable to an every mortal. Each element of the show of authority has a specific symbolic meaning, generates the impression of continuity and power: is a peculiar liturgy in a secular rite. State shows performed within a strictly determined political space are only comprehensible through their context, never – as it seems – in

[59] K. Dojwa, M. Bodziany, *Public relations instytucji bezpieczeństwa*, Wrocław 2013, p. 17–24.

[60] A. Kuper, *Kultura. Model antropologiczny*, transl. I. Kołbon, Kraków 2005, p. 87.

[61] E. Razin, *Historia sztuki wojennej*, vol. 1: *Sztuka wojenna okresu niewolniczego*, transl. I. Bukowski, Warszawa 1958, p. 328.

[62] P. Rapelli, *Symbole władzy i wielkie dynastie*, transl. A. Wieczorek-Niebielska, Warszawa 2008, p. 22, 28, 34, 40, 44, 48, 52, 60, 64, 68.

[63] A. Rycman, op. cit., p. 76.

a direct reception. They certainly give their participant a feeling of bond[64]. Let us repeat: political rituals are ceremonies sanctifying an imagined community, as Benedict Anderson called a nation. Honoring the flag and the national coat of arms, assigning emblems to the key events in the national history, worship of national heroes, celebrating important historical anniversaries – all that constitutes a specific political religion[65]. The second function of the political shows is the legitimization of authority. National ceremonies manifesting excellent condition of the contemporary monarchs resemble to great extent the ceremonies held on the occasion of for example Joseph Stalin's or Kim Il Sung's birthday. Personality cult is not only associated with totalitarianism. It equally also relates to the contemporary "political and cultural celebrities". By assumption it should lead to the conviction of the extraordinariness of the authority or the actors whose image is "not from this world". One could say that as long as in the past they had been identified as the "anointed ones", today they are one of the ways to keep the masses in a devout awe[66]. The third function is distinctive in nature. It is to remind us of the "natural" asymmetry between the ruling and the ruled, showing this asymmetry as inevitable and undisputable (being something granted, by the succession rights, etc.). It clearly tells apart the dominant from the dominated. Each and every of the actors in the spectacle has an assigned function and position. The distinctive function prejudges the position of an individual in the rigid social hierarchy. In this case we can talk about "predetermined" authority.

There exists an important, if not the more important instrument for the reproduction of the existing order – namely internalization of authority. It stands for the process of "absorbing" authority by the dominated unit, which in a way starts to become a "porter of power" and executes a self-censorship, refrains from protests, contestation, rebellion: accepting the existing order. Let us distinguish three sources of internalization. The first one is the belief that "it has always been this way" and that the existing condition is sanctioned with tradition with which the dominated individual strongly identifies themselves. The second one is the belief in extraordinary features of the "good" leader, which occurs when an individual counts on better life secured by the leader and that they will safely lead them into the future. This belief makes it possible for people

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[64] É. Durkheim, *Elementarne formy życia religijnego: system totemiczny*, transl. A. Zadrożyńska, Warszawa 1990, p. 41.

[65] A. Rycman, op. cit., p. 73.

[66] F. Znaniecki, *Nauki o kulturze*, p. 40.

to see outstanding features in an even uncharismatic leader. The third source is related to the legal and rational argumentation. The truth is that a ruled person persuades themselves that any objection, violation of the social rules in force is harmful for the entire community and can cause more harm than good[67].

Contemporary threats to the cultural safety of countries

With few exceptions, most countries have always been open to external influence, which significantly contributes to their cultural development. The possibility to use the experience of other nations is dynamic in nature and is associated with slow evolution, adding on consistent elements, incorporation of ideas that are possible to be integrated into own system of values[68]. Today the biggest threat for the certainty of subsisting of a specific society, i.e. retaining its identity and religion, is the global mass culture, perceived as a foreign and destructive element[69]. In *Nineteen eighty-four* (1949), George Orwell presented his vision of how a mass transmission of information can become a perfect tool to influence a society in order to incapacitate and build a totalitarian system. Walter Benjamin endeavored to see a positive role of mass culture which could carry progressive political practices, however in reality the owners of the mass media used celebrities to strengthen the repressiveness of the political regimes. As long as the film capital is the driving force of the works of art, this will lead to changing the art of film into a commodity, and the consolidated worship of "stars" will not bring anything new into the art, instead just multiplying common stereotypes about it[70].

Mass culture is a secondary product of the industrial revolution, industrialization and urbanization. The process of creation of its work is called commercial production, directed to suit the demand of the general public. Antonina Kłoskowska maintains that the mass culture, currently called popular or pop culture, undoubtedly constitutes some kind of humanism, as it deals with discussing human issues, spreading common ethical values and models

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[67] M. Weber, op. cit., p. 78.
[68] G. Michałowska, *Bezpieczeństwo kulturowe w warunkach globalizacji procesów społecznych*, in: D.B. Bobrow, E. Haliżak, R. Zięba (eds.), *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe i międzynarodowe u schyłku XX wieku*, Warszawa 1997, p. 131.
[69] A. Włodkowska, *Bezpieczeństwo kulturowe*, w: K.A. Wojtaszczyk, A. Materska-Sosnowska (eds.), *Bezpieczeństwo państwa: wybrane problemy*, Warszawa 2009, p. 149.
[70] W. Benjamin, *Twórca jako wytwórca*, transl. H. Orłowski, J. Sikorski, Poznań 1975, p. 82.

of behavior, works of high culture boosting social integration of the audience dispersed in space. Thanks to its simplicity it does not require any effort form the recipient and allows to relieve stress. From the heights of intellectual criticism such a type of humanism seems to be a parody as well as disfiguration and distortion of a deep idea. Mass culture is currently criticized for the fact that it restrains the direct contact of the creator with the recipient[71]. To make the reception easier, written word is departed from for the benefit of images and spoken word[72]. Commenting the current events, it suppresses an accurate public debate, transforming it into a staged show, its content is lowly, its form is dull, its interests are trivial, it is brutal, intrusive, expansive, disturbs people's lives[73].

In a situation when a nation is dazzled by a never stopping stream of entertainment and the discussion about its public interests starts to resemble a vaudeville, or a farce with music, it is in a serious jeopardy, as its culture and tradition start to perish[74]. As a result of opening to foreign influence, the cultural threats are not homogeneous in nature – especially in the spiritual and symbolic field[75]. When writing about the cultural safety of a nation, Jan Czaja points out that an uncontrolled inflow of mass culture leads to affirmation of the culture of death, mass migration, crisis of values, disintegration of traditional social structures[76]. The best fuel for this culture is the same matter that gives impetus to a neighbor gossip and is suitable for tabloid journalism. UNESCO spoke in 1965 on behalf of the international community, defending the diversity of cultures, adopting a convention which explicitly states that "[c]ulture constitutes a fundamental dimension of the development process and helps to strengthen the independence, sovereignty and identity of nations". It further says: "Every culture represents a unique and irreplaceable body of values since each people's traditions and forms of expression are its most effective means of demonstrating its presence in the world"[77]. The organization resolved that the protection of the diversity of cultures is one of the most important features of contemporary

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[71] P.T. Nowakowski, *Fast food dla mózgu, czyli telewizja i okolice*, Tychy 2002, p. 30.

[72] Idem, *Środowisko słowa a środowisko obrazu w mediach. Aspekt pedagogiczny*, in: P. Drzyzga (ed.), *Nowe media a tradycyjne środki przekazu*, Tychy 2007, p. 30–31.

[73] A. Kłoskowska, *Kultura masowa: krytyka i obrona*, Warszawa 2005, p. 280–309.

[74] N. Postman, *Zabawić się na śmierć: dyskurs publiczny w epoce show-businessu*, transl. L. Niedzielski, Warszawa 2002, p. 220.

[75] J. Czaja, *Ochrona kultury narodowej*, in: R. Jakubczak, J. Flis (eds.), *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe Polski w XXI wieku: wyzwania i strategie*, Warszawa 2006, p. 410.

[76] Idem, *Kulturowe czynniki bezpieczeństwa*, Kraków 2008, p. 30.

[77] *The Mexico City declaration on cultural policies*, [Paris] 1983, no. 1.

civilization and thus it adopted another document on 20 October 2005 in Paris, i.e. *The convention for the safeguarding of the intangible cultural heritage*. The objective of that agreement is to develop interaction between cultures that serves building bridges between nations, to emphasize the liaisons between cultures and the development of all countries in the spirit of solidarity and partner- ship, confirmation of the sovereign right of the countries to apply, adopt and implement policies and means which they consider suitable for protection and promotion of the diversity of the forms of cultural expression in their territory. This Convention has been incorporated into the Polish legislation[78].

It is difficult to argue with the principle that the global society is slowly becoming a reality[79]. Because of that fact, will we witness gradual decline of national cultures and maybe of the nation states such as we have known so far? If from the time of establishment of first states we were ready for sacrifice in order to retain their cultural identity and political continuity, then will we in future deal mainly with economic issues and the real "end of history" will occur?[80] Are we then on the verge of a new form of civilization which will not only save the most precious from the past structures but will also reach the level exceeding the most daring dreams of the utopians?[81]

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Abstrakt

Sposoby kształtowania bezpieczeństwa kulturowego państw narodowych

Każda władza państwowa prowadzi politykę kulturalną w interesie własnego bezpieczeństwa. Jej celem jest konsolidacja społeczeństwa wokół indywidualnych wartości duchowych. Należą do nich normy i wierzenia, przekazy historyczne i wytwory artystyczne. Są one celowo utrwalane i modelowane, aby zostały uznane przez naród za własne. Z założenia mają one stanowić o jego odrębności, poczuciu więzi wewnętrznej i tożsamości. Chodzi o stworzenie silnego przekonania, że „my" jesteśmy inni, nierzadko lepsi od obcego poczucia „oni". Wszelkie ceremoniały służą internalizacji władzy, czyli wchłaniania jej przez jednostkę zdominowaną, która zaczyna być jej tragarzem. Samoczynnie dokonuje autocenzury, powstrzymuje się od protestów, kontestacji, buntu, akceptując zastany porządek. W dalszej części autor artykułu opisuje problem „skrzywdzonych Niemiec", które tylko siłą są w stanie przywrócić należne im miejsce w świecie. Odnosi się także do rosyjskich kompleksów narodowych, poczucia misji dziejowej w czasach prawosławia i marksizmu. W przypadku USA opisywany jest mit narodu wybranego przez Boga i jego szczególna misja w świecie. Największym zagrożeniem dla tradycyjnego państwa narodowego jest kultura masowa, która stopniowo zaciera indywidualne różnice między ludźmi na całym świecie, dążąc do jego ujednolicenia.

Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo kulturowe, państwo narodowe, wartości duchowe, odrębność, tożsamość, kultura masowa

Abstract
Methods of forming cultural safety of nation states

Each state authority carries out a cultural policy in the interest of their own security. Its objective is to consolidate the society around individual spiritual values. They include norms and beliefs, historical accounts and works of art. They are intentionally retained and modeled, so that the nation regards them their own. By assumption they are to decide about the nation's identity, about the feeling of internal bond and identity. The purpose is to create a strong feeling that "we" are different, very often better than the strange and foreign feeling of "them". Any formalities serve internalization of authority, or absorbing it by the dominated individual who starts to be its porter. They execute a self-censorship, refrain from protests, contestation, rebellion, accept the existing order. Further in the article the author describes the problem of the "wronged Germany", who can only forcefully recover their due position in the world. He also relates to the Russian national complexes, the sense of historic mission in the times of Orthodox church and Marxism. In the case of the USA a description is given of a nation chosen by God and the Americans' special mission in the world. The biggest threat for a traditional national state is the mass culture which gradually blurs the individual differences between people around the world, aiming at its uniformity.

Key words: cultural security, national state, spiritual values, difference, identity, mass culture