

A New Responsible Power China? China's Public Diplomacy for Global Public Goods

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
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The background of the cover is a photograph of several terracotta warrior statues from the Qin Dynasty. The statues are arranged in rows, wearing detailed armor and various types of helmets. The lighting is somewhat dim, highlighting the texture of the clay and the individual features of the warriors.

ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy

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Ines Sieckmann and Odila Triebel (eds.): Introduction

“Experiments have [...] shown that when a group of individuals are given unrestricted access to harvest from a common-pool resource, they substantially overuse it. [...] but changing only one variable, namely, the capacity to communicate with one another, individuals can come to agreements and keep them to harvest very close to an optimal level.” Elinor Ostrom, pioneer researcher on Global Public Goods

It is understood that only through global cooperation can we effectively combat global challenges such as climate change and security. Emerging economies, like China, play a crucial role in this endeavour. While we outspokenly share a common interest in countering shared threats or at least mitigating negative effects of global challenges, many obstacles to cooperation between China and Europe remain. Not only do different levels of development infringe on ambitious and binding shared climate targets, but different mindsets and intercultural misunderstandings also impact on the level of cooperation. With its economic growth, and along with a change in self-perception, China was expected to take on more responsibility in global governance. This anthology takes a closer look into how China redefines its role in the governance of different Global Public Goods (GPGs) and elaborates on possible joint global goals and the impact of differences in cultural perceptions, especially between China and the EU.

GPGs are challenged whenever the consumption of shared resources is not balanced with the needs of the wider community. The individual use cannot be adequately priced and markets typically fail in providing these goods. No single nation, however powerful, can produce these goods on its own. Therefore, policy interventions have to promote collective action, starting with agreements between actors involved to provide specific public goods. GPGs transcend national borders; they emerge from a multi-level process, requiring policy action at national, regional and global levels. Challenges regarding GPGs depend on effective international cooperation and coordination and thus comprise policy interdependence among countries. (Kaul 2013)

The growing challenge of providing GPGs, however, occurs at a time when international patterns of decision making are in flux due to the rise of emerging economic and political powers like Brazil, India, China and South Africa, while the USA are redefining their role as an international actor. As for a long time, emerging powers justifiably felt left out in many norm-making processes (UN Security Council, the Bretton Woods institutions, the G7 and the G20) the inclusion of emerging powers in the provision of GPGs is inevitable. This is not only due to their rising capacities and power but also for reasons of

fairness (Jürgensen 2014). When the existing system does not effectively include these demands, coalitions outside the established system can arise.

In order to design cooperation that gains the trust and legitimacy of all the parties engaged the differences in perceptions of the actors involved need to be taken into account. This requires a profound learning process on all sides about the Self and the Other. The purpose of this volume is to provide reflection on differences in perspectives and concepts in EU-China relations in order to contribute to better informed and therefore more sustainable external action.

Many authors in this anthology point towards changes in China's mindset and its taking over of new responsibilities in global governance. In a public panel discussion at the IV. Public Diplomacy Forum¹, 7-8th October 2015 in Berlin, Yiwei Wang, an expert on China's international relations, points out important changes in China's mindset about climate change during the last years: Starting from the initial belief that Western climate discourse was mainly aimed at slowing down China's rise, China increasingly came to trust in the importance of mitigating climate change, but insisted on doing this unilaterally; only recently, it has taken on a more cooperative approach in the international system. "China has now adopted the dream of clean air and water, something you already take for granted in Germany".

This volume discusses public goods such as security and infrastructure. Thus, the following publication covers timely relevant topics due to new debates on multilateralism in the global arena. Engagement for GPGs can aim for international reputation and respect. This strategy relies on the premise that taking responsibility for common interests serves peaceful cohabitation better than pursuing primarily unilateral interests. As a governance model this needs new invigoration.

International cooperation in support of GPG provision is for sure also driven by "enlightened self-interest" (Gavas 2013). However, a modernisation dilemma leads to contested priorities. Cultural relations can help to provide culture as a GPG and at the same time serve to create foundations of understanding for international cooperation for other

¹ The Forum was a cooperation between Clingendael (Netherlands Institute of Foreign Relations), the Charhar Institute and ifa funded by the Robert Bosch Stiftung. More information about the Forum are available online: <https://publicdiplomacyforum.ifa.de>

GPGs. Trust is needed so that geostrategic competition is not a stronger interest than the common good.

Yiwei Wang states along the same line: “By building Chinese soft power and changing China’s rise from a hard rise to a soft rise (rising in norms, not just markets; rising in values, not just goods), public diplomacy can be the lubricant for China’s rise.” But how is China’s new global role perceived? How does it engage in global governance of important GPGs?

China, due to its sheer size, is an indispensable partner in the solution of global problems and is hence also expected to increase its engagement in global politics. This can also be confirmed for the different GPGs analysed in this volume. But this increasing involvement is not without complication. Some see China as an incumbent power challenging status-quo powers, hence impacting on the existing global order. With its “new assertiveness” noted by many, China stresses an interest in bringing in its own definitions and wielding influence on existing rules of the game. Therefore, it is important to understand China’s point of view, its concepts and strategies in different policy areas, especially with view to GPGs – because governing GPGs requires shared reference points and joint strategies.

This volume offers short analyses of China’s role in international relations with regard to various GPGs. Taking these different observations into account, what do we learn about China’s emerging role as an international political player? The Chinese government cares about its international image as a responsible power, but this image hinges on questions of credibility and accountability.

In a famous article reprinted in this volume, Shambaugh describes how, in recent years, Beijing has been launching “a major public relations offensive” to improve perceptions of China throughout the world, but he questions the scope and credibility of such a propagandistic top-down approach in increasing soft power, which - following Nye - emanates mainly from society. In a similar vein, Kim questions the credibility of this “charm offensive.” Drawing on the example of the GPGs associated with the Belt and Road Initiative, such as infrastructure and connectivity, he points out that China, as a rising power, faces a dilemma as these GPGs “may be perceived by others as private goods to enhance China’s geostrategic national interests even at the expense of others’ interests.” Similarly, Ding sees China’s attempts at shaping an image as a “responsible great power” challenged by its growing assertiveness, i. e. in handling territorial disputes

with its neighbours as well as by its internal lack of political plurality, accountability and rule of law. For Ding, the latter aspects result in doubts about an authoritarian China's willingness to adhere to international norms.

The authors find an increase of engagement by China in the global governance of GPGs, but point towards differences in definitions, concepts, sets of actors and expectations of government frameworks between China and Western approaches. Breslin describes how, through crises such as SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) and the bird flu, Chinese perceptions of security shifted towards concepts of non-traditional security and increased the overall importance of international cooperation for China, while he points towards the need of finding common grounds in key reference points for a joint security agenda.

Sieckmann views intercultural understanding as an important basis for transnational cooperation and the co-creation of ideas between China and the EU, but European actors need to be aware of sharp differences in concepts of culture – with a top-down approach, Chinese state censorship and the accentuation of unity on the one side and bottom-up actors stressing Europe's diversity and freedom of expression on the other.

With its growing assertiveness, China is increasingly engaging in international fora and even aiming at reshaping global governance frameworks to defend its interests. Arsène describes how China – as a rising cyber power – recently increased its engagement in global internet governance – a field of global governance that, to date, is shaped by a myriad of actors through rough consensus. While stressing non-interference in domestic cyber policy, on the global stage, China is pushing for an interstate mechanism to increase its influence in regulating the internet – seeing the internet through the lens of the ruling party rather than in terms of a global public good.

The EU is still seen as an important partner in China. Chaban et al. look into the perception of the EU in China, finding that although the two perceived “crises” – of debt and of refugees - have had an impact on the EU's image abroad, in China it is still viewed as a modern and developed economy and the third most important partner after the US and Russia.

Despite differences pointed out between China and Western democracies in terms of political concepts, policy approaches and types of actors, GPGs can serve as important starting points to find common reference points for further cooperation. China's Belt and

Road Initiative and the Sustainable Development Goals could serve as examples of taking up international responsibility for GPGs. Wang presents a view of the Belt and Road Initiative as a project to share insights from China's own development reform with countries along the 21st century Silk Road, promoting peace, security and prosperity and thereby bridging the gap in public goods' demand and delivery.

As gender inequalities are resurging under China's current economic development path and women are disproportionately hit by the economic cool down in China, Perry proposes gender equality to be included as an integral component in political and developmental initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative.

GPGs have in common that they necessitate international and often transnational coordination and cooperation and China is increasing its engagement. This also insinuates the necessity of a common ground in terms of defining the public interest with view to each GPG and in terms of setting up each GPG's intergovernmental and/or transnational governance – and which actors to involve. Differences, both in concept definitions and political set-up, impact on fruitful cooperation between China and the EU and have to be taken into consideration when targeting each policy issue in order to find agreements. As the complex governance of GPGs often also involves a multitude of non-state actors, this creates additional complexity when dealing with more state-centric structures of an authoritarian state.

To attain fruitful cooperation, common reference points and levels of trust have to be reached, as well as an understanding for the remaining differences on both sides.

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Natalia Chaban, Olga Gulyaeva and Suetyi Lai: Images and Perceptions as a Resource in Public Diplomacy: Images of the EU in China

Public Diplomacy in a Globalising World

The days are long gone when diplomacy was synonymous with elitist, secretive negotiations, conducted exclusively by state actors. On the one side, the reality of a rapidly globalising world brings a range of non-state actors who are not shy about becoming active producers of diplomacy outcomes (a process of “multi-stakeholder diplomacy”, as observed and classified by Hocking 2006). Among these new producers of diplomatic outputs are non-governmental organisations, corporate actors, powerful and influential individuals, and multilateral (e. g. UN, NATO, Commonwealth) and supranational (e. g. the European Union (EU)) entities. They are all competing for global attention with each other and with “traditional” state actors. Unsurprisingly, a more crowded line-up of diplomacy producers pushes many state actors around the world to “pay more attention to the politics of credibility” in a world where they have to “share a stage newly empowered with non-governmental actors and individuals” (Nye 2002: 76). This includes the public diplomacy of China – an emerging power that is credited with a new global role in the multipolar architecture of the world. The focus of this chapter is on China-EU interactions and the role of perceptions and mediated communication in shaping public diplomacy strategies.

Images and perceptions of important international counterparts – observed among members of the public and surfacing in the discourses that shape public opinion – become key indicators for informed public diplomacy strategies. In the case of interactions, a survey of EU images and perceptions in Chinese discourse and among the general public will give the EU (as a producer of public diplomacy outreach towards China) an opportunity to listen to the themes about and evaluations of the EU that matter to Chinese society. Such attentive listening will help to fine-tune the EU’s public diplomacy messages and actions. This link between EU perceptions and its public diplomacy practice has been extensively elaborated in the relevant literature (Chaban/Holland 2015; Chaban/Beltyukova 2014; Chaban 2013/14).

Theoretical Framing

This analysis of perceptions of the Self and the Other has a theoretical basis. Our argument is grounded in the model of the “semiotic square” (Greimas 1983). The semiotic square is postulated by Greimas to be the elementary structure of meaning. The model applied to study the meaning of Self-Other interactions (Chaban 1995) comes with the following four-member paradigm in our study of perceptions in EU-China interactions:

1) what the Self thinks about the Other (China's images of the EU); 2) what the Other thinks about the Self (the EU's images of China); 3) what the Self thinks about the Self in relation to the Other (China's self-images when it sees itself dealing with the EU); and 4) what the Other thinks about the Other in relation to the Self (the EU's self-images when it imagines itself in relation to China). This paradigm suggests that an informed inquiry into Self-Other interactions and imaginations – critical for successful public diplomacy – is a complex and multifaceted exercise.

Here we propose a focus on the first dimension, linking it to another theoretical model, Othering, which is also used in the perception studies (Chaban/Holland 2014). According to this theoretical model, consideration of what the Self thinks about the Other tells us less about the Other than about the Self, who chooses to perceive facets and features that are the most meaningful for the Self; or, to quote French writer Anaïs Nin, “We do not see things how they are, we see things how we are” (Nin 1961). Chaban and Holland (2014) argue that such a perspective serves as an “invaluable resource” that contributes to more informed external action, which “stresses mastery of the skills of ‘listening to’ and ‘talking with’ the world”.

Case Study

We undertook a systematic analysis of EU images and perceptions in public opinion and in opinion-shaping discourses in the influential Chinese press (observations in 2011/12 and 2015). While the 2011/12 period was marked by the peak of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, 2015 was seen as a year when the EU started to slowly emerge from this crisis. Yet 2015 featured a nascent migration crisis that was not observed in 2011, in addition to the impacts of the on-going Ukraine crisis. In China, 2015 saw an economic slowdown that became the “new normal” first mentioned by President Xi in 2014, which meant a farewell to the high-speed growth rate. The year also saw a continuing emphasis and a strong message on China's foreign policy vision, the Belt and Road Initiative first proposed in 2013. This initiative maps China's interaction with the world in terms of a renewed Silk Road (from Asia through the Middle East and Africa to Europe) and creates a new concept of a Maritime Silk Road (with new partnerships in Southeast Asia, Oceania and North and East Africa). What do changing images and perceptions of the EU tell us about China's self-perceptions – when seen through the images of the Other (the EU)? Have references to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and the European migration crisis as key events resulted in Chinese views of the EU that confirm the phenomenon of China's “new assertiveness”? Have changing images contributed to the Chinese impression of Europe in decline?

The cognitive structures of images and perceptions are known for their resistance to change. If the change in images happens in a short period of time, it is usually due to critical events of a major magnitude (see Braudel's paradigm of temporary changes in images discussed by Didelon-Loiseau and Grasland 2014). The EU's financial and refugee crises are seen by some observers as one of these critical junctures that triggers negative shifts in EU global perceptions and self-images of confidence and assertiveness, especially among emerging powers. China's dissent towards the EU's reaction to the Syria crisis and EU pressures on the appreciation of the renminbi may further add to this sentiment. Thus, our first hypothesis is that Chinese public opinion and media frames will register a visible deterioration in the EU's image over time.

However, we also hypothesise that images of the EU will not change significantly. This could be due to the images' universal characteristic to resist change. But it could also be due to the peculiarities of the reflections by the Self. The Self still chooses to reflect on the facets of the Other that matter most to the Self. In this light, a possible lack of change to the negative in EU images may suggest that for China the EU's "crises" are not seen as that "critical" or "identity-changing". It may also mean that certain features of EU international identity remain stable in the imagination of the Chinese public and public opinion-shaping discourses. However, stability in the image, especially in media discourses, may be linked to the nature of government-media relations in China (characterised by extensive government control over the media) and the government's particular vision of relations with the EU. The Chinese government's policy is to maintain good relations with the EU, as China has substantial trade with and investment into the EU, and one quarter of China's foreign reserves are kept in euros. When reporting on the EU, the media may pick up on clues from the government on how to present the EU in order to legitimise the EU in the eyes of the citizens as a "good friend" and a "profitable partner" for China.

We test our two hypotheses using empirical evidence from two large-scale comparative projects – "After Lisbon: Images of the EU in the Asia Pacific" (Australia, India, Japan, Mainland China, Malaysia, New Zealand, Russia, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand)(2011-12) and "EU Perceptions in ten Strategic Partners of the EU: Analysis of the Perception of the EU and EU's Politics Abroad" (Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and the USA) (2015).² In this chapter we will

² For more information, see international research project "EU Global Perceptions".

examine some key findings from the public opinion surveys³ (2012 vs. 2015), as well as media analysis with a special focus on the influential *People's Daily* (2011 vs. 2015). The choice of *People's Daily* for this analysis is not random. As “the biggest newspaper in China,”⁴ owned and run by the Chinese Communist Party, it is known to signal China’s official positions to the Chinese and international audiences, and inform and set agendas for regional and local media outlets within China. It boasts high circulation: according to the 2013 statistical indicators, the daily circulation of the *People's Daily* was three million copies and its official website reached a daily visit rate of 400 million readers.

FINDINGS

Media: 2011 vs. 2015

Volume and Intensity

Both of the periods of observation included reports on top-level interactions between the EU and China. Although the intensity of interactions between the EU and China at the highest level seemed to remain undiminished or even increase over the years, interest in the EU on the part of the influential, government-run *People's Daily* seemed to visibly decrease.⁵ In 2015, other events seemed to overshadow EU-focused news and attract newsmakers’ attention. These included China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative, and China’s “new normal”, along with the election in the UK and a military parade in Moscow. A decrease in the volume of coverage between 2011 and 2015 is of potential concern to Chinese and EU public diplomacy practitioners. Specifically, less volume of coverage in a major opinion-forming agenda-shaping newspaper means less space to report on links and collaborations between the two partners. This may potentially translate into the idea that “if it isn’t reported, it can’t be important.”

³ The surveys for the two projects were administered by TNS London in 2012 and 2015. The 2012 survey was conducted in March and collected 1,009 responses (the margin of error is $\pm 3.1\%$ with a confidence level of 95%). The 2015 survey was conducted in August with 1,410 respondents (the margin of error is $\pm 2.6\%$ with a confidence level of 95%).

⁴ According to the *People's Daily* official website, <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/50142/104580/>, accessed on 4 March 2015.

⁵ Between January and June 2011, a six-month observation period of the *People's Daily* resulted in 82.8 articles per month on average, and a three-month monitoring period between April and June 2015 registered 46 news articles per month on average.

In 2011, the EU featured only occasionally in news stories as the major actor, and in over half of all coverage the EU was cast as a minor actor, with the EU typically limited to just one or two sentence in a news article (Figure 1). Such patterns of visibility present a challenge to public diplomacy conceptions and delivery. Dominant minor centrality suggests a limited opportunity to present the EU – as an existing or potential counterpart for China and its various publics – in a detailed, nuanced way. In 2015, we observed only a slight increase in the EU’s centrality in news reporting.




Figure 1: Degree of centrality of EU news, 2011 and 2015 compared

Sources of EU News

Our next question was to identify the sources of EU news. The heavy reliance on local sources was found in both years of analysis – 81.4% of EU news in 2011 and 96.4% in 2015. Some of these local authors were based in China, while more than half were staff journalists posted overseas. Foreign sources (foreign correspondents and international news wires) were extremely rare. News agencies, either local or foreign, were seldom a sole source of news. If a news agency was used, typically it was Xinhua, China’s state news agency.

This particular profile of sources suggests there is serious potential for the practice of public diplomacy. Local journalists could be engaged in various programmes of exchanges, cooperation and collaboration with their European counterparts as part of public diplomacy campaigns that originate in both the EU and China. Initial approaches could be made to those who are the most frequent reporters of EU/Europe-themed news. Not only are they the ones who will be interested in covering EU affairs in general, but they are also potentially more open to reporting on EU-China interactions in various fields.

Themes and Evaluations

In both years, the *People's Daily* prioritised reporting on economic and political issues relating to the EU, with the economic frame slightly more visible. The third most visible frame in 2011 and 2015 was EU social and cultural affairs. In both years, EU news about energy, development and the environment was peripheral (Figure 2).

In the 2015 sample, the economic reporting focused on the Greek debt problems and the slow growth and potential recovery of the Eurozone economy. Turning to politics, the newspaper was more interested in the EU's external political actions in general and the China-EU partnership in particular. In the coverage of social and cultural affairs, in 2011 the news focused on cultural events, and specifically on youth exchanges (2011 was a year of EU-China Youth Dialogue). In contrast to 2011, the socio-cultural issue most frequently covered in 2015 was the EU's refugee crisis. Another visible news theme in 2015 was health care, especially more advanced food safety standards in the EU compared with those in China. In total, the *People's Daily* seems to frame the EU as a somewhat challenged international actor, yet still a worthy counterpart to China in a number of spheres.




Figure 2: Thematic frames of EU news, 2011 and 2015 compared

In both years, neutrality dominated the *People's Daily* reportage of the EU (Figure 3). If we set aside neutral evaluations, in 2011, EU political actions were evaluated more frequently from a positive (18.4%) rather than negative (3.1%) point of view. In 2015, EU political actions were even more positively evaluated (35.4%), especially those referring to the China-EU annual summit and celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the bilateral relationship. In 2011, EU economic actions received more negative evaluations (20.4%) than

positive ones (13.1%). This was due to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Such an evaluation pattern was also observed in 2015 – the EU’s economic actions were presented predominantly with a negative tone (29.5%), particularly in the news on the prolonged Eurozone debt crisis and the EU’s slow economic recovery. In 2011, EU social actions were evaluated positively in 23.1% and negatively in 15.4% of the news. In 2015, social actions were mostly negatively evaluated (31%) due to the news stories on the EU’s handling of the refugee crisis.

The evaluation patterns discussed here present different meanings for public diplomacy. A dominant neutrality of EU images rendered by this important newspaper could be conducive for public diplomacy. This is further supported by political framings of the EU that have remained more positive than negative over the years. Yet a lingering and growing negativity in economic frames and a peaking negativity in socio-cultural frames are of concern, as the business and socio-cultural spheres are among the primary targets of public diplomacy campaigns. The political realm is usually seen as belonging to the sphere of traditional diplomacy.




Figure 3: Evaluation of the EU, 2011 and 2015 compared

“Local Hooks”

Reporting international actors with “local hooks” is a framing technique that Ginsberg (2002: 53) called “localising”, or “giving people explicit reasons why they should care about a place by pegging the story directly to the local economy, local business, local culture, local immigrants.”

While EU news with local, Chinese “hooks” has decreased over time (37.1% in 2011 vs. 30.7% in 2015), in terms of thematic priorities, this EU news has remained stable over time. It tends to prioritise themes relating to politics and the economy, with social themes following. When considering evaluations in EU representations, neutrality and negativity grew in the news where the Union was reported either in an exclusive European or global context. In EU news with a “local hook”, it was neutrality and positivity that grew over time. Positive assessments disseminated by an important national paper may affect the subsequent construction of the social and political reality of the EU as an international actor for domestic audiences.

Public Opinion

In 2012, the general public considered the EU to be a very important actor in relation to China, both now and in the future. In both questions, the Chinese public rated the EU as their third most important partner. Yet, the EU’s importance was placed by respondents below the importance of the USA and Russia, both now and in the future. In terms of general feeling, more than half of the survey respondents in China reported positive attitudes towards the EU (51.6%) vs. 13.3% who saw the EU in a negative light.⁶ The EU was most commonly described as modern, efficient and arrogant. The EU was described the least as fair, hypocritical and likeable (Figure 4).




Figure 4: Words chosen by Chinese respondents to describe the EU (2012)

In the 2015 survey, the EU’s leadership in world affairs was seen by the general public as desirable. Only 5.6% of interviewees responded negatively. Yet most respondents saw the USA and China, not the EU, as the major players in world affairs in the future. Similar to the findings of 2012, most of the survey respondents in China reported positive attitudes towards the EU. The 2015 survey showed that these positive attitudes increased

⁶ 35% of respondents reported neither positive nor negative attitudes towards the EU.

from 51.6% in 2012 to 55.7% in 2015. Meanwhile, negative attitudes decreased to 5.3% in 2015. Compared to other international organisations, the EU was evaluated positively, behind only the UN and the WTO. With regard to the China-EU relationship, 57% of respondents saw it as either “very good” or “rather good”. In comparison, only 29.5% of respondents viewed the China-US relationship in a positive light.

The EU was most commonly described as multicultural,⁷ modern and strong; and least often described as hypocritical, aggressive or arrogant (Figure 5). These descriptors are in line with the generally positive view of the EU and the positive assessment of China’s relationship with the EU. The percentage of the Chinese public calling the EU “modern” has decreased significantly though.




Figure 5: Words chosen by Chinese respondents to describe the EU (2015)

Concluding remarks

In terms of Public Diplomacy (PD), we argue that the EU has invested a lot into its relation with China while the Chinese government also has been treating the EU as a close partner. However, internal crises of the EU inevitably damaged the image of the EU in China. PD cannot do much if the domestic reality is challenging.

⁷ Importantly, “multicultural” in the context of the EU migration crisis in 2015 could evoke both positive and negative associations.

In addition, PD of the EU to China has focused a lot on cooperation in social-cultural, sustainable development and human right protections. Yet, the most visible partnerships which were recognised by the *People's Daily* and general public remain the ones in economy and politics. This, on one hand, reflected that Chinese public views external relations in a rather conventional way (i. e. focus on high politics). On the other hand, it also showed that the EU's PD experiences difficulties in projecting and communicating its image in China.

Our research demonstrates that a systematic analysis of powerful opinion-making news media combined with public opinion analysis may present a valuable resource for the practice of public diplomacy. In our case, we argue that this is a resource for both the EU's (and potentially China's) public diplomacy towards each other.

Insight into the EU's framing in one powerful agenda-setting newspaper of national significance in China revealed that EU images are painted more negatively in some thematic fields (economy and social affairs) and EU news has decreased in volume. Also, EU news with "local hooks" seems to have become less visible over time. Lesser visibility in general and lesser visibility of EU news with a "local hook" in particular may result in lesser salience attached to the EU by the readers. More negativity in representing the EU as an economic and social affairs actor may have a multiplying, negative effect on a Chinese society that values entrepreneurial and social aspects. It seems that our first hypothesis – that Chinese media frames will register a visible deterioration of the EU's images over time – is supported.

However, our systematic nuanced analysis of the images and frames indicates that there are several counterbalances to the concerns formulated above. On the one hand, even though the overall volume of EU news was seen to be declining, the centrality in EU representations was observed to be growing. In other words, while there may be fewer articles about the EU, more of them are reporting the EU as a major central actor in the story. This contributes to a more elaborate profile of the EU in China. On the other hand, while negativity might be growing in some thematic areas, when assessed through the filter of the focus of domesticity, EU news with a local Chinese "hook" are increasingly featuring positive evaluations. These observations fine-tune our answer to the first hypothesis. We argue that this media portrayal correlates with the public opinion. Public feeling towards the EU was more positive in 2015 than in 2012. Importantly, the high profile assigned to the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the establishment of EU-

China relations in 2015 by government and leading newspapers influenced Chinese public views that the EU is a close partner.

Our second hypothesis is therefore also partially supported – certain features of EU identity remain stable in the imagination of the Chinese public and public opinion-shaping discourses, and the crises in Europe do not seem to have irrevocably damaged the EU's image – the Chinese see the EU as one of the most important global poles and one of China's key partner (importantly, one of many, not the only one). This stability of EU images may serve as a basis for long-term public diplomacy strategies and actions between China and the EU. Future studies of the image of the EU – in key media (including social media, such as Weibo (China's version of Twitter) and Wechat (China's version of a combination of facebook and WhatsApp) and among the general public – will remain a critical contributor to fine-tuning public diplomacy practices in both the EU and China.

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Shaun Breslin: Non Traditional Security for Who/What? Between the International, the National and the Human

Security issues occupy a relatively minor role in Europe's relations with China compared to finance and trade. This is partly because Europe is not a significant security actor in East Asia – something that makes Europe's relationship with China very different from that of the United States. Indeed, the lack of bilateral security tensions creates a rather more conducive environment in which Europe can engage China compared to the lack of (security) trust that often shapes Sino-US relations. But this does not render the security arena totally unimportant. For example, Chinese acquiescence or opposition is crucial in either facilitating or blocking European security agendas at the United Nations. Moreover, if we move away from security defined as war (or threats of war) and other forms of military conflict conducted by nation states, then we can identify areas where China and Europe might collaborate to provide Global Public Goods. In thinking of ways in which this potential can be transformed into actual progress, it is important to interrogate what we mean when we talk of security.

This partly entails focusing on what is called “Non Traditional Security” (NTS); a term that covers a wide range of non-military sources of insecurity such as financial insecurity, environmental challenges, how best to ensure supplies of materials and food, the spread of infectious diseases and so on. It also includes violence and threats of violence that are not directed by states; most obviously, international terrorism. It also partly entails thinking about what or who should be secured and the main focus of security policy; if the aim is to maintain a stable international order, then the policies required will be very different from trying to ensure that individual human beings across the planet are free from fear and free from want. This then generates the secondary question of whether there is a shared understanding of the targets and means of a security agenda that might provide the basis for such cooperation.

The “Traditional” Cold War Peace and Security Agenda

The starting point is to think about three different levels of security that revolve around the question of what should be secured: international security, national security and human security. For the best part of half a century, the security agenda was dominated by the search for international security defined as preventing a third world war. To be sure, the attempt to guarantee the national security of key actors like the Soviet Union and the United States were crucial underpinnings of this agenda, but the overriding concern was to avoid war on a global scale that might have existential consequences for mankind. And

on reflection, we can say that the bipolar Cold War system did what it was intended to do – it kept “the peace”, with the peace here defined as preventing war in Europe and/or on a global scale. But keeping the peace in this definition did not equate to maintaining the security of everybody and keeping the peace everywhere.

In order to ensure this combination of international security and the national security of the superpowers, political processes and actions were condoned, accepted and promoted by the Great Powers that led to the abrogation of the national security of a number of states. This included abrogating the sovereignty of states that either threatened to move into the Communist camp (most notably but not only in Asia), or out of it (in Eastern Europe), prolonged “civil” wars in Asia that had strong inter-state dimensions, and perhaps even bloody wars of independence and liberation that sometimes broke down along Cold War lines. It also included the toleration of a balance of power and legitimate spheres of influence that resulted in many millions living in fear under oppressive regimes.

In short, international security provided national security for the major powers, and through this also dealt with the major trans-national existential threat to the individuals of those nations – the threat of death as a result of nuclear war. But this was partly built on the lack of national security for many countries. In addition to facing the prospect of inter-state war and involvement in a third world war, the national security of most states was at threat either from intervention by external forces, involvement in localised wars, or through internal challenges of civil war/wars of liberation. At an individual level, poverty, disease, migration, terrorism and state violence were all at least as clear and present dangers to existence as nuclear war for most of the world’s population. Their Human Security (HS) – a concept we will return to shortly – was sacrificed to help maintain international security, and the national security of the world’s major powers.

Non-Traditional Security (NTS): New Issues in Security

With the end of the Cold War, the security agenda shifted and a new, “non-traditional” array of security issues increasingly attracted attention. This is partly because those with the most power to shape the nature of international security debates (and thus the focus of the security governance architectures), rethought what were the biggest existential challenges to the international system as a whole. More important, they also rethought the nature of the most significant national security challenges that they faced as well. In the West, the prospect of states becoming embroiled in inter-state wars has become much reduced – though events in Ukraine suggest not entirely eliminated. The chances of a

nuclear third world war were also much reduced; “rogue states” might at some point manage to fire off a weapon or two, but the prospect of a truly global nuclear conflict seemed very remote. But in thinking what was most likely to threaten the security of most Western states and their people, the focus turned towards supposedly “new” NTS challenges – though in truth these “new” security concerns had been a matter of life and death across the globe for many years: Combatting infectious diseases, terrorism and climate change, and ensuring cheap and adequate supplies of key commodities and resources now came to the fore in many national security agendas, and through these, into the international security arena.

Human Security (HS): A Shift Towards the Human as Point of Reference

The end of the Cold War also created a space for the focus to move away from the needs of the most advanced and powerful states to the rest of the world as well; it wasn't just about the security of “us”, but also increasingly about the security of “them” in the developing world. There are a number of conflicting explanations for why this came about. For some, the end of the Cold War meant that we no longer needed to support authoritarian regimes just because they were on “our” side. For others, more important was the recognition that the origins of potential sources of national insecurity in the West (terrorism, disease and so on) often lay in poverty and instability in other parts of the world. Or maybe it was a result of real compassion and humanity. But whatever the cause, the 1994 UN Human Development Report highlighted a new security agenda putting humans and HS at its core, rather than the previous focus on states, national security, and the international order. This partly focused on the immediate existential challenges that individuals face on a daily basis – poverty, ill health, violence and so on – and the provision of existential basic needs for people to survive. But it also went further by not just emphasising the threats to life itself, but also the quality of life that individuals should live; a life free from oppression with the ability to freely make positive life choices and attain their personal goals.

Though NTS and HS are often conflated together, they should not be. The specific issue areas that are identified as central to the HS agenda are all ones that fall under the broad heading of NTS. But the key difference is the reference point. In HS, it is very clearly and specifically the individual that should be secure. In the broader NTS discourse, it can be the individual but it can also be the state or indeed the international system as a whole. Or put another way, NTS is all about thinking differently about what constitutes a security challenge, whereas HS is about thinking differently about what/who exactly it is that should be secured.

No Common Global NTS Agenda

Differences remain over which Non Traditional issue should be prioritised. For example, mosquitoes are the single biggest transmitter of disease, but water is the root cause of millions of deaths either through providing a breeding ground for mosquitoes or as the source of diarrhoea – something that despite being easily treatable with the right drugs is the second biggest cause of death of infants in the world (after pneumonia). Yet the diseases that have at times become the focus of international security debates (and some action) have been infectious diseases like AIDS, SARS and various forms of animal flus (avian, swine etc.) that have been identified as potential threats to people in developed Western states. There are also often very big differences of opinion over how best to deal with different challenges – an issue we will return to shortly. And some embraced this new security agenda quicker than others. Canada and Japan in particular took the lead in promoting the HS concept and embedding it in United Nations discourses. Nevertheless, the overall logic of the NTS agenda has become widely accepted.

Seeking Common Ground for China and Europe

Does this shift in thinking from traditional security agendas towards NTS and HS provide a basis for the collective provision of global public goods from China and Europe? The answer is a cautious and qualified yes. In China, a series of crises (including SARS, the 2004 tsunami and the bird flu outbreak) resulted in a rethink of what constitutes the nature of security, and what constitute the major security challenges for China. Furthermore, the nature of these and other challenges has resulted in a renewed focus on the importance of international cooperation and collaboration, including in multilateral organisations, to provide security. And in recent years, China has emerged as an important provider of aid and development for other developing states, and has become a provider and facilitator of HS for others in the process. In particular, Chinese loans have funded the construction (often by Chinese companies) of infrastructure projects across the developing world. China has also increased its spending on overseas agricultural projects and on health and education programmes (particularly in Africa) And here, we see great potential for collaboration with Europe, as there is already considerable interest and demand from European actors to partner with Chinese counterparts to provide development assistance in third countries. For example, to work with China in the provision of medical facilities in the world's least developed economies. Even though this overseas aid and development-related investment isn't framed in China in terms of NTS, the fact that it chimes with European understandings of the need to combat NTS challenges can provide the basis for a Sino-European joint effort in providing global NTS security goods.

Differences Between Chinese and European Conceptions of NTS and HS

But while there might be potential for a convergence of interests and agendas, considerable differences between the two sides remain. Division on how best to deal with NTS challenges remains an important one with clear divisions over the extent to which other countries should interfere in the domestic politics of other sovereign states – a notion that China (among others) strongly rejects. This applies, for example, to divisions over the correctness (and indeed, efficacy) of military intervention to free individuals from the human insecurity that comes from the tyranny of authoritarian dictators. It also applies to divisions over the best way of promoting economic development, the correctness (and efficacy) of imposing solutions and models on others, and the linking of political conditionalities to economic relations and aid. This means that security concepts which favour the human as a point of reference above the state, and think that protecting the individual is more important than preserving state sovereignty, collide with Chinese approaches.

So can a conception of security that puts the individual human being at its centre – and importantly, all individual human beings no matter which state they live in – provide the basis for collaboration between China and Europe? Or does it instead pull them in different directions? There are two main reasons for leaning towards the latter more pessimistic position.

First, the HS agenda is typically simplified to the goal of providing freedom from fear and freedom from want. As I have argued elsewhere in a paper that analyses Chinese language discussions of the nature of HS, whilst most Chinese analysts accept that these two freedoms represent the basic aspiration of all people, they argue that each country should develop their own HS agendas. These should be based on the own specific circumstances of each country, and nobody should try and impose an external political definition of HS, or agenda to achieve it, on any other country. In practice, this means an emphasis on freedom from want, and the provision of socio-economic security in China that does not sit easily with European positions. It also means that the security that each individual human being should have is not innate and universal, but rather specific to the state that each individual lives in.

Second, and more fundamentally, we have already argued that NTS and HS should not simply be used interchangeably to refer to a range of new security challenges. NTS identifies the new challenges that we are facing, while HS clearly establishes a new reference point for considering what it is (or who it is) that needs to be secured. And although Chinese analysts do use the language of HS at times, when they do they – in contrast to

Western conceptions – tend to have the state, rather than the individual, as the reference point. Indeed, it is notable that the most commonly used Chinese term for Human Security – *renlei anquan* 人类安全 – refers to the security of humankind, rather than the security of individual human beings.

Conclusion

It would be wrong to suggest that all European security agendas focus on the individual human, and that all Chinese ones focus on the state as the sole actor and referent point. Nor is all that Europe does beyond its borders based just on promoting HS for others, while China is simply interested in defending its own national core interests. Indeed, much of what is done in Europe to promote HS elsewhere is justified by explaining how it will contribute to national and human security for Europe and Europeans, rather than being simply acts of benevolence and philanthropy. As just one example, while there really is huge concern in Europe with the security of migrants fleeing war and chaos in the Middle East, the migrant crisis has also been generating debates over how best to secure Europe's borders, and to ensure that increased migration does not cause domestic discontent in individual European countries. Nevertheless, there does seem to be something of a gap when it comes to who or what the security reference point is or should be; the planet/mankind, nations/states or individual human beings? And the answer to these questions has massive implications for how best (if at all) we can collectively construct a new security agenda and institutions that not only prevent insecurity, but which are also widely perceived to be legitimate. In particular, it seems difficult to find a legitimate and broadly accepted platform where ensuring the securing of individual human beings can or should be put above other security concerns. If common ground is to be found, the opportunity seems to lie in common positions on NTS that start from a focus on (sovereign) states as the key referent point, rather than a more ambitious and contested HS agenda.

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Taehwan Kim: Global Public Good or Hard Power in a Velvet Glove? China's Public Diplomacy in the Asian Geopolitical Landscape

The Dual Face of China's Rise

Much has been talked and written about China's rise. With its impressive and even historically unprecedented economic rise over the past three decades, Beijing has been attracting the world's attention as an economy that is wielding a great impact on the world. China is now most definitely manifesting its global presence. Beijing's expanding economic power has allowed it to extend its reach virtually everywhere – from mineral mines in Africa, to currency markets in the West, to oilfields in the Middle East, to agribusiness in Latin America, to the factories of East Asia. However, this economic rise, so impressive so far, is breeding fresh concerns worldwide as its growth now slows down, equity markets tumble and currency wobbles. Along with its economic rise, China's military rise has also begun to ignite heated debates in both academic and policy communities, giving rise to concerns on the part of the West and its neighbours.

Much less known, however, is its soft power rise, overshadowed by the hard side of the story. China has been launching its "charm offensive" (Kurlantzick 2008) at least since the 2000s. China's public diplomacy is inextricably intertwined with its hard rise as it arouses much concern on the part of the West and its neighbouring countries. The emphasis on soft power is intended to ease the concern, with Beijing's intention most clearly reflected in a series of official discourses (Lay/Lu 2012), in such an emphatic lexicon as "multipolarity", "multilateralism", "democratisation of international relations", "peaceful rise", "peaceful development", "harmonious world" and most recently in the Xi Jinping era, "a new type of major power relations" and "China Dream". Beijing's foreign policy discourse has been disseminated worldwide, first of all through the Chinese media's "going out" strategy to improve its image.

Beijing's "Charm Offensive"

After the Beijing Olympics in 2008, China made a major commitment to creating its own media empire to compete with the established international media, launching a new English newspaper, the Global Times, and adding Arabic language programmes to China Central Television (CCTV) in 2009. Also in the same year, around 8.8 billion USD was pumped into the big four media outlets (CCTV, China Radio International, China Daily, and Xinhua News Agency) to support their global expansion (Shambaugh 2013: 227). Since launching its first 24-hour English channel CCTV International in 2000, CCTV now

broadcasts in six languages around the world. China Radio International, formerly Radio Beijing, broadcasts 392 hours of programming per day in 38 languages and maintains 27 overseas bureaus. Versatile media outreach is an especially pronounced aspect of China's public diplomacy in the United States. By 2013, CCTV was operating in English around the clock from a large broadcast facility in Washington, D.C. through its CNC World Internet channel, and also providing cell phone video and streaming video of its broadcasts (Calder 2014).

Another field of China's charm offensive is its cultural diplomacy to disseminate Confucian civilisation and values across the globe. Taking advantage of its unique culture and utilising a platform for cultural exchange, China has actively promoted cultural exchange programmes, festivals, movies, music, religious forums, sports, and tourism, as well as people-to-people and cultural exchanges, including educational cooperation, with the outside world since the 2000s. Most outstanding is the Confucius Institute project administered by the Hanban, or the Office of the Chinese Language Council International, with three main objectives – to teach Chinese, promote cultural exchange, and facilitate cultural activities. By the end of 2013, the Confucius Institute had a network of 1,086 affiliates – 440 institutes and 646 classrooms – in 120 countries (Zaharna/Hubbert/Hartig 2014).⁸

Knowledge diplomacy – utilising a country's knowledge assets, including its historical experience, institutions and values repacked in knowledge forms for dissemination with a view to engaging foreign publics – is yet another realm of China's public diplomacy. China's developmental experience, or so-called "Beijing Consensus," is considered by many developing countries as an alternative political and economic model to the Washington Consensus. Although China does not seem to promote its development experience to the height of a consensus, the fact that the Chinese economy is one of the most powerful and will probably very soon be the biggest economy in the world attracts more people to its developmental experience, if not model.

Beijing appears to have strong enthusiasm for a new political and economic order in Asia as reiterated in its official parlance – "being the responsible great nation", "building friendship and partnership with neighbouring countries", "good-neighbourliness", "stabilised neighbour", "rich neighbour", and "new Asia security concept". As part of so-called "host diplomacy", Beijing is utilising multilateral forums as intellectual venues to push these ideas. The Boao Forum for Asia (BFA), inaugurated in 2001 as a high-end platform

⁸ <http://english.hanban.org>.

for dialogues among leaders of governments, industrial, business, and academic circles in Asia, is a typical example of China's host diplomacy for regional cooperation. The Network of East Asian Think Tanks (NEAT), officially recognised at the ASEAN+3 summit meeting, is another example of ushering in regional institutional design. In this vein, more recently, the One Belt, One Road initiative is projected as a global and regional public good since Beijing claims it could provide infrastructural connectivity for developing countries along the road and belt, along with potential opportunities for common prosperity (Yinbin 2015).⁹

Amidst its dual rise, although it wants to see its soft power parallel to its hard power, Beijing still feels a certain deficiency of soft power (Shambaugh 2013). "While China's economic prowess impresses much of the world, its authoritarian political system and mercantilist business practices tarnish its reputation." (Shambaugh 2015: 99) But the real problem appears to be not a deficiency between hard and soft power, but rather the instrumentality of the latter for the former, which fundamentally derives from the dual, split identity of China – an aspiring great power and a low-profile developing country that seeks to avoid conflict with the United States and its allies. The instrumentality, or the subservience of soft power to hard power, may transform its charm offensive simply into another type of "hard power in a velvet glove." (Van Herpen 2015) This is particularly so in Asia, where China is at the centre of "the return of geopolitics" (Mead 2014), challenging the existing international order established for the past seven decades by the United States' initiatives in the region. Regardless of its intention, Beijing's external behaviour evokes some dubious apprehensions even about its charm offensive in today's geopolitical context. This is the case in at least three aspects.

History, Geopolitics and China's Growing Assertiveness

History shows that a nation's economic rise eventually leads to military rise, particularly in the context of geo-strategic competition and contentions between great powers. A study carried out by the Harvard Belfer Centre confirms the power transition theory, finding that in twelve out of sixteen cases over the past 500 years, in which there was a rapid shift in the relative power of a rising nation that threatened to displace a dominant state, the result was war.¹⁰ In each case of power shift, a nation's economic rise invariably preceded

⁹ Also available at http://charhar.china.org.cn/node_7230299.htm.

¹⁰ Graham Allison (2015): *The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?*, *The Atlantic* (September 24). See also http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/25760/thucydides_trap_project.html.

its military rise and challenge to a dominant power. In Asia in particular, Japan's rapid economic rise since the Meiji restoration led to war with China in 1894-1895 and with Russia in 1904-1905 and eventually, the Pacific War.

Traditional functionalists would argue to the contrary that economic interdependence would pave the way to political and security cooperation. This may not necessarily be the case, however. The growing economic interdependence between Washington and Beijing has not prevented the strategic rivalry between the two great powers. In the case of Japan, economic inter-connectedness did not prevent the deterioration of Tokyo-Beijing relations over the past decade (Smith 2015). Although China was its largest trading partner, Vietnam did not hesitate to reveal its animosity against China in the anti-China riots amidst the conflict over the South China Sea and, eventually, align itself with its old arch-enemy, the United States. Historical and contemporary events forcefully tell us that security prevails over economy. This is more so when classical geopolitics is back on the scene.

This century, the spectre of the old geopolitics is wriggling out of Pandora's Box. The Middle East is ablaze from Iraq to Libya, Yemen and Syria, each becoming the breeding ground for violent extremism and terrorism as symbolised by the so-called Islamic State. In Eastern Europe, tension between Russia on the one hand and the United States and its European allies on the other with regard to Ukraine and the Missile Defence system remains unabated, leaving many to wonder whether a new Cold War has returned. In Asia, a rising China faced the United States' "rebalancing" towards the region under the Obama administration, and now would encounter the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" of the Trump administration. Japan's recent march towards a "normal state" that "can wage a war" makes the geopolitical game in this part of the world even more complicated. Territorial disputes and freedom of navigation in the East and South China Seas are increasingly taking on a dimension of strategic rivalry between the countries in the region. More seriously, North Korea's continued nuclear tests and provocations are perceived as a common security threat causing instability in the region. The spectre of the old-style geopolitics of the late 19th and early 20th centuries seems to be re-emerging.

The geopolitical landscape indeed breeds a conventional security dilemma, in which miscalculations and uncertainty about intentions could easily escalate into dismal conflicts. In Northeast Asia, the historical question that has long stained and strained relationships between the nations of the region remains unabated. The agony of the collective national memories of modern Northeast Asian history since the 19th century has been

continually reproduced and rekindled in each of the countries of the region in the form of retrospective and reactive nationalism, adding fuel to the geopolitical flames.

China's growingly assertive behaviour is unmistakably discernible in its Asia policy, at least since the 2008 financial crisis and the Beijing Olympics. Particularly notable are its moves in the East and South China Seas, territorial claims that Beijing lists among its "core interests." In 2013 China unilaterally declared a China Air Defence Identification Zone (CADIZ), which contains the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and South Korean airspace north of Yiedo and west of Jeju Island. In the South China Sea, China has been building frenetically, turning rocks and reefs into islands. Not only China, but also countries such as Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines have built artificial islands and laid territorial claims, but China is considered particularly threatening simply because it is a rising great power. Seen through the recent changes in its naval strategy and doctrine as well as its naval build-up, Beijing unmistakably appears to be steadily expanding its presence until its dominance of the sea becomes an incontestable fact, challenging 70 years of American naval supremacy in the Western Pacific.¹¹ In a report published in 2016, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a renowned Washington-based think tank, projected that by 2030, on current trends, "the South China sea will be virtually a Chinese lake, as the Caribbean or Gulf of Mexico is for the United States today." (CSIS 2016)

Another case in point is Beijing's equivocal attitudes toward Pyongyang, and its nuclear and missile provocations in particular. China makes clear that it sees the collapse of North Korea's brutal regime as a greater threat than its nuclear weapons programme. Beijing still weighs up the value of North Korea between being a strategic asset that acts as a buffer state in the increasing strategic rivalry with the United States and a liability in international society that tarnishes Beijing's reputation as a responsible great power. In a meeting between John Kerry and the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi in January 2015, for instance, Wang resisted suggestions that Chinese leaders could do much more to punish North Korea for its latest test of a nuclear bomb, citing among other things the harm that imposing sanctions might cause to Chinese companies. Although Beijing eventually joined the UN Security Council Resolution 2270, the multilateral sanction against Pyongyang's nuclear provocation in 2015, it still remains to be seen whether Beijing will once again turn into a black knight for the Pyongyang regime.

¹¹ See, for example, Robert Haddick, *Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014) and Eric Heginbotham, *The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power 1996-2017* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2015).

Great power discount in winning the hearts and minds of foreign publics

China's efforts at public diplomacy in several directions could be futile. Claims already abound that China is walking down the same path towards empire in different parts of the world as did the former Western powers a century ago. A notable difference is that the nature of geopolitical competition is now evolving from war over territory to a 'tug-of-war' over infrastructures and connectivity across the globe. An important way this competitive connectivity is taking place is through infrastructure alliances. Beijing claims that its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has elevated infrastructure to the status of a global good on a par with America's provision of security (Khanna 2016).

Even its charm offensive with a benign intention could arouse suspicion and fear of domination on the part of smaller nations. This is not so much because of Beijing's malign hegemonic intention as a great power discount: regardless of its intention, the international society will be suspicious that Beijing will eventually unveil its hegemonic clout. Beijing's behaviour in the security realm only confirms this suspicion. Global public goods may be perceived by others as private goods to enhance China's geostrategic national interests even at the expense of others' interests. This is the reason why China's argument on global public goods in particular, and public diplomacy in general, is struggling to gain traction. So much more is needed if China is to convince the rest of the world, and its Asian neighbours in particular.

China appears to have a dual identity as a great power and a developing country. In the struggle to strike a balance between the two, China is still juggling its low profile policy with its emerging role of a global power. Its charm offensive is part of its strategy of managing its rise on the world stage. In this endeavour, Beijing's public diplomacy could be a crucial linchpin for integrating this dual identity. Or, it could be another type of hard power in a velvet glove that veils its aspirations to be a great power. The more assertive Beijing's external behaviour on the geopolitical horizon, the more of a great power discount it will face in winning the hearts and minds of foreign publics. The burden falls on China's shoulders to narrow the gap between hard and soft power by lessening the instrumentality of soft power for its hard power rise.

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Sheng Ding: Promoting Chinese Culture in China's Public Diplomacy

"Culture has become a more and more important source of national cohesion and creativity and a factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national strength.... Chinese culture has been an unfailing driving force for the Chinese nation to keep its unity and make progress from generation to generation... We will further publicise the fine traditions of Chinese culture and use modern means of science and technology to exploit the rich resources of our national culture... We will also strengthen international cultural exchanges to draw on the fine achievements of foreign cultures and enhance the influence of Chinese culture worldwide."¹²

Traditional analyses foretell that the coming of a new great power portends a threat to the international system, and its rise often leads to war, mainly because it often uses coercive power to change the international order to suit its expanding national interests. As a rising power, the authoritarian China's foreign policy orientations are always under the scrutiny of the other great powers as well as its Asian neighbours. While it has become an increasingly socialised state that is willing to embrace and shape the norms in regional and global affairs, China's cautious and sometimes disingenuous participations in global governance on some politically sensitive issues have not boded well for the country's desired national image as "a responsible great power". For example, Beijing has often shown its aloofness towards human rights problems in other countries, provided political support for repressive regimes, and made inadequate responses to some international crises such as the Darfur genocide and the North Korean nuclear crisis. Against this backdrop, the rising China has hardly been considered a "responsible stakeholder" in the fast-growing global governance of the post-Cold War era. The unpredictability and challenge imposed by China to global governance are mainly due to the country's failure to accept its leadership roles proportionate to its growing national power and increasing international status.

Furthermore, in the post-Cold War world, economic globalisation, democratisation, and the spread of information and communication technologies (ICTs) have greatly deepened global interdependence, universalised certain values like democracy and human rights, and expanded the flow of information and talent. Many call this period the global

¹² In his report delivered at the 17th Chinese Communist Party National Congress, the former Chinese President Hu Jintao called for promoting the Chinese culture in China's public diplomacy. See his report "Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society", 15 October 2007. <http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm>.

information age, in which public diplomacy has become an increasingly important policy approach in world affairs. According to Peter Van Ham, globalisation and the media revolution have made each state highly attentive to its image, reputation and attitudes that are considered part of a state's brand (van Ham 2001). Indeed, almost all state governments have actively developed their public diplomacy resources and implemented new policy initiatives in order to deal with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of their foreign policies.¹³ Many China observers, including Joshua Cooper Ramo, believe that China's most important strategic issues and policy challenges as diverse as sustaining economic growth and the threat of Taiwanese independence have at their root a shared connection to its national image. In this milieu, public diplomacy is vital to China's national image management and has become one of the strategic priorities of Beijing's policymakers (Cooper Ramo 2007). Since the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, Beijing has made great efforts to pursue the cultivation of its desired national image in other countries and promote the interaction of private groups and interests in China with those of other countries.

Beijing as a showcase for endeavouring to conduct its public diplomacy in the global information age has generated a dilemma. On the one hand, conventional wisdom predicts that globalisation and the information revolution pose potent threats to the authoritarian rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), especially its capabilities in terms of information control. On the other hand, many people believe that Beijing will be able to wield its soft power and strengthen its international broadcasting capacity through such effective public diplomacy approaches as broadening its foreign cultural exchange and utilising ICT in its external publicity campaigns. For example, the Chinese government has hired top brand consultants and policy strategists, and adopted various new policy initiatives in order to improve its international image, and advance its policy agenda worldwide. Among many new policy initiatives and approaches, the Chinese government has particularly stepped up its continuous campaigns to promote Chinese culture to foreign publics.

¹³ Edmund A. Gullion, one of the earliest scholars in the study of public diplomacy, coined and defined the term public diplomacy in 1965. See <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/murrow/diplomacy>.

China's Cultural Diplomacy Strategy

In his report delivered at the 17th CCP National Congress, the former Chinese President Hu Jintao claimed that Chinese culture not only influences various aspects of people's lives and plays a vital part in the country's economic and social development, but also has direct impacts on China's foreign relations and helps achieve important foreign policy goals. Seeking to build the desired national image and inspire positive international public opinion, the Chinese government has patiently and skilfully implemented its cultural diplomacy. China's cultural diplomacy strategy was defined by its former Minister of Culture Sun Jiazheng as follows: "a new mechanism for China's outward culture exchange has come into being, with the Chinese government playing a major role, social organisations playing supplementary roles".¹⁴ Under this new mechanism, the Chinese government has implemented many cultural initiatives such as sponsoring student exchange programmes between China and other countries, encouraging inbound and outbound tourism, organising grand cultural events in other countries, and so on. In a national meeting on external publicity held in January 2011, Wang Chen, the former czar of China's public diplomacy (who served as Director of the Information Office of the State Council and the International Communication Office of the CCP Central Committee) vowed to enhance the nation's cultural soft power, build a friendly international environment of public opinion, and promote China's favoured image.¹⁵

As China continues its rapid economic development and expands its share of world trade, the value of the Chinese language has been on the rise. More than 2,300 universities in some 100 countries are offering Chinese courses as part of their curriculums. In South Korea, Japan, France, as well as other countries, Chinese has become the fastest-growing foreign language in high schools. The global popularity of Chinese has not gone unnoticed by Beijing. Recognising the importance of its culture and language in enhancing the country's public diplomacy, the Chinese government has introduced a series of aggressive measures to promote the study of and research into Chinese language and culture around the world. Beijing has sought to tether its public diplomacy campaigns to the global popularity of Chinese language and culture. The National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language, Hanban, was established in 1987 to coordinate China's efforts to promote Chinese language and culture around the world. Hanban's two most important

¹⁴ See "Chinese Minister of Culture on 'Chinese Culture Year in France'", Xinhua News Agency, 21 February 2004. Available at <http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/88063.htm>.

¹⁵ See "National Working Conference on External Publicity Has Deployed External Publicity Work this Year", Xinhua News Agency, 5 January 2010. Available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2010-01/05/content_1503803.htm.

programmes are the Confucius Institutes (CIs) and Confucius Classrooms (CCs). Beijing aims to make significant headway in entering foreign education institutions, with the CIs targeting foreign universities and colleges and the CCs targeting secondary and even primary schools. As of the end of 2015, there were about 500 CIs and 1,000 CCs around the world. According to the data posted on Hanban's official website, the two largest concentration regions of CIs and CCs are Europe (159 CIs and 257 CCs) and the Americas (157 CIs and 544 CCs).¹⁶ The mission of these institutions is to strengthen understanding, opportunities and bonds between individuals, enterprises, communities and institutions in host countries and China.¹⁷ To a great extent, the spread of CIs and CCs have forged strategic alliances with businesses, industries, governments, and other institutions with an interest in closer and more productive ties with China. They have unabashedly served as a global-local keystone for China's cultural diplomacy.

The Role of the Diaspora

Along with these CIs and CCs, the 51-million-strong Chinese diaspora also serves as a vital platform for promoting Chinese culture in China's public diplomacy. Throughout its 5,000-year history, China's national identity has always been so strong and unique that the Chinese people named its own country the "Middle Kingdom", which references the centrality of China to the world system. Since many Chinese diasporas possess a sojourner mentality and lack a sense of permanence in their adopted countries, they cherish their various connections with China, as well as being recognised by their cultural motherland. As Wei-ming Tu pointed out, "the ubiquitous presence of the Chinese state—its awe-inspiring physical size, its long history, and the numerical weight of its population—continues to loom large in the psychocultural constructs of diaspora Chinese." (Wei-ming Tu 1994: 18) In the global information age, Chinese cultural and ethnic identities seem to be growing stronger as certain attributes of the Westphalian state system fall away revealing a post-modern world of global-local identities. More importantly, as China strengthens its international status through foreign economic cooperation, transnational cultural exchanges, and productive and inventive diplomacy, it is reasonable to expect more overseas Chinese to re-embrace their cultural identities and seek to build even tighter bonds with their cultural motherland. Against this backdrop, it has become a highly effective approach for Beijing to engage and mobilise the 51-million Chinese diaspora in its cultural diplomacy.

¹⁶ The data about the distribution of CIs and CCs are collected from Hanban's official website. Available from http://www.hanban.org/confuciusinstitutes/node_10961.htm [Accessed 10 January 2016].

¹⁷ See the mission statement posted on the website of Western Australia University's Confucius Institute located at <http://www.confuciusinstitute.uwa.edu.au/about/mission/>.

The overseas Chinese who live in the culturally distanced regions particularly feel the pull of China's cultural diplomacy when they speak the Chinese language, identify themselves as ethnic Chinese, learn popular Chinese culture, and pass on Chinese traditions to their descendants. China's efforts to strengthen its international education have paid off in public diplomacy with overseas Chinese. For example, the number of foreign students who studied in China rose to 328,000 in 2012, compared to 290,000 in 2011. Among these foreign students, many are ethnic Chinese students, that is to say the offspring of Chinese nationals who emigrated abroad. This new generation of Chinese descendants aims to learn more about Chinese culture and language to improve their career prospects and maintain their transnational cultural identities. In addition, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office and its subordinates at all levels of government have collaborated with various overseas Chinese communal organisations to organise Chinese Origin Root Search Trips for younger overseas Chinese. The Guangdong and Fujian provinces as well as some metropolitan cities like Beijing and Shanghai are popular destinations for those root-searching trips. As an important platform of China's cultural diplomacy in the global information age, the Chinese diaspora has helped Beijing to promote the Chinese culture in its public diplomacy and improve China's national image around the world.

China has a Long Journey Ahead

China's more than four decades-long process of reform and opening-up has transformed the country from a reclusive hermit in the Western-dominated international system to the keystone of Asia-Pacific's globalisation processes. With China rising, it behoves a Chinese government enjoying considerable international influence to embrace international norms and participate in global governance. The Chinese government has always claimed that China will become a "peaceful and responsible great power" as the nation rises. Some China observers believe that Beijing has demonstrated increasing willingness to contribute to the international public good, including economic stability and growth, non-proliferation, and regional security. However, many doubt that an increasingly powerful, nationalistic, and authoritarian China will adhere to international norms and fully participate in global governance.

Although the Chinese government has made some progress in projecting a "new" China to foreign publics since the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, China's public diplomacy in the global information age still faces some hurdles arising from its lack of political credibility and poor human rights record. In particular, China's new cultural diplomacy campaigns are unlikely to build its favoured national image. Without adequate political plurality, government accountability and the rule of law, things that are only established

by democratic political reform, China's new cultural diplomacy campaigns will only become rhetorical propaganda that will often be misconstrued by other countries and risk engendering conflict. For example, the international media coverage on China's foreign policy behaviours and its human rights issues have become increasingly intense in recent years. China's cultural diplomacy campaigns have been overshadowed by its continuous military build-up and growing assertiveness in handling territorial disputes with its Asian neighbours. From alleged Beijing-sponsored cyber attacks on Western corporations to blackmailing other governments to prevent them attending the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize Ceremony to the infamous Great Firewall of China, Beijing's sensitivity to and recalcitrance about its human rights records has raised further doubts about the effectiveness of China's cultural diplomacy. In North America and Europe, a few education institutions such as the University of Chicago, Penn State University, and Stockholm University have already ended their relationships with the Confucius Institute over their concerns about academic freedom, etc. In this milieu, the Chinese government will have a long journey ahead if it is to succeed in conducting its public diplomacy and promote Chinese culture around the world.

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Susan Perry: Gender as a Global Public Good in China

When we think of global public goods, we think of air, water, climate or outer space, but we rarely include gender equality on the list. Nonetheless, our ability to guarantee a viable future for our environment pivots on the empowerment of women to act as full partners in the protection and sustainability of our global surroundings.¹⁸ Global Public Goods (GPG) are resources that can be consumed by one individual (or country) without diminishing availability of the good to another, and are nonexclusionary in that no individual (or country) can be barred from GPG benefits (International Task Force on Global Public Goods 2006). Initial discussion of GPGs skimmed over the issue of gender equality, before full consideration of the collective, transboundary impact of women on GPGs was acknowledged in research and academic circles (Blackden 2009). Today, most international institutions apply a gender equality perspective to the discussion of all global public goods, rather than include gender equality as a stand-alone item on their definitive list of GPGs. This is remarkably convenient for both gender equality advocates and their opponents, as this policy not only highlights the seminal importance of women as full partners in the protection and sustainability of GPGs, but also diffuses the allocation of resources in such a way as to make gender an add-on, rather than a core objective of international and national policy-making.

China, with its historic commitment to gender equality since 1949, its acknowledged role as a global polluter, and its more than 750 million female citizens represents a key player in any discussion of gender equality and GPGs. The current Chinese government fully supports gender equality on paper and has made several symbolic gestures, such as the donation of 10 million US Dollars to UN Women in 2015, but it is not clear whether the government considers gender equality as a full-fledged GPG, or an add-on policy choice with interesting potential. This paper will explore (1) the historic foundations for gender equality in contemporary China, (2) the slow pace of equality implementation in the political and economic spheres, (3) current challenges in signalling China's commitment to gender equality, and (4) recommendations to European and Chinese actors hoping to advance China's commitment to gender equality within the international human rights treaty framework.

¹⁸ While the final text of the Paris Agreement for the COP21 mentions "gender" only five times, UNEP.

Historic Foundations

With the modernisation of Chinese society and the 1949 Communist Liberation, women moved out of the home and into farming and factory production, and into the professional spheres traditionally reserved for men. Yet, like their female counterparts the world over, Chinese women have continued to face subtle and overt forms of discrimination (Stacey 1983; Wolf 1985; Honig and Hershatter 1988; Chan et al. 1998). Today, governmental and quasi-non-governmental associations encourage rural and urban women alike to defend themselves, promote their interests and, above all, define a new space for themselves within the parameters of a single party state. Contrary to official statements claiming the importance of bettering the status of women and reducing gender inequalities, however, the improvement of women's lives by governments and development agencies remains an underfunded endeavour. The State Council, China's executive body, coordinates gender policy through the National Working Committee on Children and Women, rather than through a designated ministry of women's affairs. The grouping of children and women together suggests that women are to be treated as minors, rather than fully fledged adults, an echo of traditional cultural paradigms. Moreover, the Party-State has always been ambivalent about the potential of Chinese women to organise and challenge government policy (Perry 2000).

The Chinese government published a White Paper in September 2015 on gender equality and women's development that focuses on the steady statistical progress made by women in health, education, political representation, legal protection and environmental sustainability in China. Empirically, there is no question that China has made remarkable strides over the past 65 years in overcoming embedded discrimination against women in all spheres of public and private life. Because the White Paper includes no negative statistical information, however, it can be assumed that the publication was written in response to a growing chorus of criticism levelled at the government by Chinese citizens, via social media, following the arrest of five prominent feminists in April 2015. The White Paper does recognise that:

“China is highly aware that, as a developing country with the world's largest population, and restricted by its limited level of economic and social development, it will continue to be confronted with new situations and problems in its efforts to promote women's development. There is still a long way to go to achieve gender equality in China, and arduous tasks remain to be tackled.” (White Paper 2015: 13)

Most recent scholarship on gender equality in China points to a decline in the position of women in Chinese society during what is called the post-socialist era (1992-2015). This pattern may be traced to China's post-socialist economy and to a long-existing cultural tradition that places a premium on harmony and group solidarity (Wang 2007).

Post-socialist Implementation of Gender Inequality

Implementation of gender equality became less of a government priority under market socialism. Despite China's Revised Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests (2005), which provides an expansive framework for gender equality, a study of on-budget capital expenditure in China shows that the social sectors received only a small proportion of the wealth generated under the new economy, less than 10 per cent (Mei and Wang 2006, 32). As inequalities of all sorts resurged under the "state capitalist economy" (Lardy 2013), the All-China Women's Federation found itself in the unprecedented position of challenging its boss, the Chinese Communist Party, to make good on its commitment to gender equality. The Federation, one of China's traditional "mass organisations" designed to serve as a conduit for Party-State directives aimed at the grassroots level, has been remarkably successful in making women's voices heard at the upper echelons of power. Still viewed as more apolitical than the All-China Federation of Trade Unions or the Communist Youth League of China, the All-China Women's Federation has been especially vigilant in promoting legal recourse for female members that face gender discrimination. The fourth (and last) World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995 galvanised the sleepy women's federation into what activists have referred to as a two-headed dragon, fiercely supporting unpopular Party-State policies such as the former One-Child campaign,¹⁹ while challenging the Party-State on violence against women (which impacts one fourth of the Federation's members)²⁰ or rampant discrimination in employment (Perry 2000; Otis 2011; Kuhn and Shen 2012; Angeloff and Lieber 2012).

Discourse and Practice Under the Xi Jinping Administration

The debate on gender equality has heated up since 2008, when the global recession triggered rising unemployment in China that has disproportionately impacted women (Golub 2016). The Women's Media Monitoring Network provided evidence of active admissions discrimination at sixty-six universities across China, with a lower required score for men

¹⁹ The Chinese government announced in 2013 that it would consider relaxing its decades-old One-Child policy in order to reverse demographic trends, and the first provincial and municipal announcements began in 2014. The official legislative adjustment for the entire country came into force on January 1, 2016. See: http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/2015-12/21/content_22764063.htm.

²⁰ China's first Anti-Domestic Violence Law was scheduled to come into effect in March 2016.

than for women at 13 Chinese universities (WMMN 2014). Once these women graduated from university, a 2011 survey by the All China Women's Federation indicated that nearly 92 per cent of female college graduates had experienced gender discrimination when seeking work (ACWF 2011). In 2014, a private tutoring firm settled with a Beijing female graduate who sued the company for gender discrimination in hiring practices, a first for China. For those who never make it past high school, a 2013 study of 134 Guangdong female factory workers demonstrated that 70 per cent experienced regular sexual harassment on the job, and for 15 per cent the harassment was so serious that they had no option but to quit (Sunflower Women Workers Centre 2013). And in the higher political and economic echelons, less than 25 per cent of Chinese Communist Party members were female (Gender Study Network 2015) and less than 6 per cent of general managers of companies publicly traded on China's A-share stock markets – 115 individuals altogether – were women in 2015 (China Accounting 2015). The one area where women appear to be making equal strides with men is in cyberspace, where female entrepreneurs account for 55 per cent of entrepreneurs (White Paper 2015: 4) and "sheeconomy" incubators for women e-entrepreneurs receive a good deal of media attention (Women of China 2015).

These figures point to a persistent gap overall between discourse and practice in the PRC. As in most countries, the gender gap is due to chronic underfunding of women's rights protection and enduring under-representation in political and economic leadership circles. While cyberspace offers a new domain in which women appear able to compete with men on an equal footing, e-entrepreneurship is to a great extent virtual until the first public stock offering; once a company is listed on a stock exchange, corporate leadership becomes predominantly masculine worldwide.

Potential for Gender as a GPG in China

One of the PRC's first acts as an international player in 1980 was to sign and ratify the newly promulgated UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Like most societies, however, China continues to struggle with culturally embedded gender discrimination, despite a remarkable array of legislative tools and campaigns designed to protect women's rights. China recently launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an exceptional opportunity for the government to integrate a vibrant gender component in all project planning and funding, and to become a world leader in promoting gender as a GPG. According to Chinese scholars, the BRI includes enhanced policy coordination across the Asian continent, financial integration, trade liberalisation, and people-to-people connectivity, but does not yet have an integrated gender component (Wang and Yao 2015). The current paradigm that treats gender as a GPG add-

on defeats the non-derogable anti-discrimination doctrine that is at the core of international law and China's obligations under the CEDAW (CEDAW, article 2).

China must espouse gender as an integral component of policymaking, rather than an afterthought. Given the ambitious geographic reach of the Belt and Road project, the integration of gender as a policy pivot would firmly place women's potential at the heart, rather than the periphery of the BRI. In this way, China would take the lead in promoting gender as a fully operational GPG, rather than as a policy postscript.

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Ines Sieckmann: Building Sino-European Cultural Relations: Background and Challenges

With regard to pressing global social and environmental challenges, it becomes inevitable for both China and Europe as important global players to seek common ground and ways for effective sustainable co-operation. But relations between Europe and China are complex and remain open to setbacks, tensions and misunderstandings. Gottwald et al. (2010: 29) stress that Europe and China were "...operating from mutually exclusive expectations" based on substantial systemic and definitional differences. There is no alternative to dialogue in order to find common ground. Even in a seemingly softer policy field such as cultural relations, the difficulty remains of weighing up each other's tolerance threshold, negotiating reasonable limits and reacting to each other's crossing a line. This chapter looks into challenges and framework conditions of cultural relations between Europe and China.

Culture as a Global Public Good (GPG)

"(P)eople's well-being does not depend only on the provision of public goods by national governments, but increasingly depends on the provision of global public goods that only international cooperation can secure. [...]securing their provision is central for promoting the well-being of individuals in today's globalized world."
(Deneulin/Townsend 2006: 3)

Cultural relations can serve the provision of culture as a GPG, and can at the same time help create foundations of understanding that facilitate international co-operation for other GPGs by fostering respect for diversity and a knowledge of cultural differences and similarities.

Culture as a GPG can refer to characteristics or goods of specific cultures and their intrinsic value for all humankind (as in world cultural heritage). It underscores the value of culture and cultural diversity and includes aspects of culture such as specific values that are increasingly globally shared. In a seminal publication of Kaul et al. on Global Public Goods, Serageldin (1999) points out that

"(a)s an essential part of humanity, culture is an end in itself. One of the least understood but most essential aspects of cultural identity is its contribution to a society's ability to promote self-esteem and empowerment for everyone..." (Serageldin 1999: 240)

But as the protection of (often traditional) culture can collide with other GPGs such as gender equality and other human rights, he holds that "...a balance should be struck between the defence of particular traditions and other global public goods" and stresses an approach to culture that "(...) encourages diversity, creates a space of freedom in each society for the minority expression and the contrarian view and promotes inclusion and social cohesion." (Serageldin 1999: 240f.)

Often, authoritarian regimes such as the Chinese value social cohesion and "harmony" more than diversity; freedom of critical or contrarian views is regarded as a threat to legitimacy. In this respect, different outlooks between Europe and China collide and complicate cultural relations.

Finding an Equal Footing

Obviously, the rise of China as an emerging giant poses important questions of status in the changing international system. In reaction to this shift, President Xi Jinping propagates the concept of the "Chinese Dream" of the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation", a dream of reacquiring previous grandeur after over a "century of humiliation" by colonial powers (i. e. Wang 2013). China's aiming for new grandeur is being eyed by many with an uneasy feeling. And in the eyes of some Chinese observers the US and Europe begrudge China its rise. In China, Europeans are often perceived as arrogant (see Chaban in this volume) and "Old Europe" as in decline. Still, China started seeking a stronger relationship with the EU motivated by the hope to contain US unilateralism and dominance. "China's view is that Europe offers a 'bridge' for China to enter a world system, dominated by the US, on its own terms." (Clegg 2009:132) Europeans are not only seen as far less concerned with the threat of China's hard power compared to the US but – as a "Civilian Power" – "(l)acking the hegemonic reach and ambition of the US, the EU is regarded as more prepared to treat China as an equal." (Clegg 2009: 132). And for China, this – treating China as an equal partner – is key in the relationship with Europe, including China's former colonial powers.

In general, EU-China relations are deepening, but frictions persist. Europe and China seem to be "...operating from mutually exclusive expectations". The EU is projecting itself as a "Normative Power" or norm exporter, emphasising – though to varying degrees – a value-based foreign policy. Its liberal norms represent an important building block of shared identity. In China's view, on the contrary, multilateralism should be based on "...equality and respect for sovereignty and on common interests rather than shared values and ideologies." (Clegg 2009: 125) It should hence be non-interventionist or non-

interfering.²¹ Normative differences and the search for a dialogue on an equal footing also pervade cultural relations between Europe and China.

Approaches to Culture in the EU and China

Culture is often perceived as a soft issue in international relations and research focuses much more on “harder” issues in Sino-European relations (Staines 2012).²² Also, cultural relations are not considered a priority in EU-China relations, and are mainly realised on bilateral terms (Ferrero-Waldner on behalf of the EU Commission 02.02.2006).

Cultural relations are often understood as a powerful means for bridge-building between countries or regions. Still, culture, as an identity issue, can become a politically sensitive apple of discord. As pointed out by Batora (2011), culture can play an ambiguous role in politics: It can be used for boundary building and “othering” (Neumann 2011) – i. e. delineating an out-group in order to strengthen the we-ness of the in-group – as well as for boundary transcendence and integration. This can be used domestically to legitimate one’s rule. Those aspects of politicisation shape and complicate cultural relations between Europe and China.

“Socialist Cultural Superpower” and a “Superior European High Culture”

With view to culture, both China and the EU proudly look back on thousands of years of cultural heritage. China, the “Middle Kingdom”, thought of itself for a long time as the centre of the world – just like Europe. Nowadays, sentiments of inferiority from a “century of humiliations” and a recent history as a poor developing country still exist, but a “new assertiveness” of China has recently been noted. Shambaugh (2013: 208, see also Shambaugh in this volume) notes, the Chinese government recently even called for establishing a “socialist cultural superpower”.²³

Europe is said to often come along with a traditional ethnocentric “superiority complex” (Ringmar 2011), behaving like an exclusive club (Batora/Mokre 2009) and assuming

²¹ At the same time, China itself has been known for ideological foreign policy, posing as ideologically or morally superior (i. e. with regards to Taiwan, the USSR etc.) (Chan 2009).

²² For a bibliography of publications about EU-China cultural relations, see: “Judith Staines (2012): Mapping Existing Studies on EU-China Cultural Relations”. Online source URL: <http://www.eenc.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/JStaines-Mapping-Existing-Studies-on-EU-China-Cultural-Relations.pdf> (accessed on February 2nd 2016)

²³ Shambaugh is citing a final plenary communiqué of the Seventeenth Central Committee of the CCP of a plenary session on culture in October 2011.

European culture to be “high culture” in contrast to other countries producing rather “low culture” (Bátora 2011)²⁴ – similar to Imperial China. China has opened itself much more to European cultural influences and concepts than vice versa. Still, long centuries of exchange of thoughts between both regions prove that they have many transnational roots. But while there really is an enormous treasure of cultural heritage, history and potential on both sides, notions of superiority and inferiority complicate cultural relations.

To give an example from Germany, recently, intensive “museum diplomacy” between several leading museums from different German states led to great pioneering exhibition exchanges. A joint exhibition by the Palace Museum and the museum *Staatliche Kunstsammlungen* in Dresden, Germany, displayed treasures of the Chinese and the Saxon-Polish courts side by side in Germany for the first time. But once the exhibition opened in Beijing, the German exhibits were presented solely. Chinese officials seemed to feel uncomfortable about this concept of having Chinese art displayed side by side and in direct comparison with European art of the same epoch.²⁵

Unity and Diversity

Both China and Europe are vast and diverse entities, so that the projection of a “Chinese” or “European” culture needs be an essentialism. And in both regions culture and its representation in foreign relations bears political fuel for conflict regarding the dimensions of domestic politics of unity and diversity, but with diametrically opposed approaches.

Liu (2009: 197) contrasts these two tendencies. While in Europe, foreign cultural relations have to protect and underline the diversity of European languages and cultures²⁶, to especially protect minority cultures and to refrain from a “cultural unification” both internally as well as in external representations, in China, domestic cultural politics display folkloristic diversity but emphasise harmony, unity and even homogenisation. For example, the Communist Party of China subsumes almost 92 per cent of China’s population

²⁴ Bromark and Herbjørnsrud (2005) even claim that “(...) we have developed a self-glorifying image of Europe which is possibly the most Eurocentric ever, and forgotten our transnational heritage.” (Cited in Naess 2009: 41).

²⁵ The exhibition (on the German side) was called “Golden Dragon, White Eagle - Art in the Service of Power at the Imperial Court of China and at the Saxon-Polish Court (1644-1795)”. For more information on this exhibition see, for example: <http://www.asianartnewspaper.com/article/golden-dragon-white-eagle> (accessed February 2nd 2016).

²⁶ “Following Article 151(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, the ‘...Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.’” (quoted in Liu 2009: 196).

under the “Han nationality”, thereby socially constructing the largest single ethnic group in the world.²⁷ This reflects an approach of politicising culture in an attempt at identity formation during the stage of state-building which European governments have also used over a long period of time (Liu 2009). In Europe, this process of national identity formation was accompanied by conflicting nationalisms and centuries of wars. It propelled images of racial superiority, for example in Hitler’s Nazi Germany, with rigid censorship and propaganda machines distorting and instrumentalising aspects of arts and culture. The collective memory of dreadful atrocities in Europe is key to today’s liberal values in the EU including freedom of expression and freedom of the arts.

Freedom of Expression versus Censorship

Hence, in Europe, artists are often expected to play an important role in publicly inspiring critical reflections about society, constituting a “critical vanguard” (Zhu 2012). This differs greatly from the traditional or socialist roles granted to artists in China. Still, with a new emphasis on innovation in China, as well as the continuous process of modernisation and opening up, diversification is under way.

Against that backdrop, co-operating with a political system that clearly operates with censorship and repression of both artists and freedom of expression raises many questions for European cultural actors. European actors remain divided over the question of whether (and to what degree) to allow for censorship by the Chinese government and to pursue non-confrontational cultural co-operation with China or to push the boundaries of co-operation to create spaces for challenging and more confrontational ideas. This is a central conflict in cultural relations between China and Europe and assessments of situations differ greatly on both sides. While some red lines are clear, i. e. Taiwan, Tibet and Tiananmen, for Europeans it is often hard to understand which aspects could raise disagreement and trigger censorship. For example, an initially successful joint exhibition project of the twin cities Hamburg and Shanghai about Jews migrating from Hamburg to Shanghai to find refuge in China from Nazi persecution in Germany – a topic that, in the German partners’ eyes, shows China in a positive light and should hence be non-confrontational – in the end failed to overcome disagreements over the production of a

²⁷ On the basis of Stalinist criteria for nationalities from 1913, the Communist Party officially recognised only 56 nationalities in China out of around 400 groups applying for minority status (Olson 1998: 127f.) - although “(m)ost ethnologists would agree that these minorities are divided into hundreds of ethnic groups. The central government, however, has refused to acknowledge such diversity.” (Olson 1998: ix) Furthermore, “(...) the government insists on maintaining the fiction that there is only one Chinese language, and that it is divided into a series of dialects...” in order not to have to “recognize major ethnic divisions with the dominant Han people”. (Olson 1998: vii)

joint catalogue. This was due to attempts at censorship from the Chinese side, amongst other things, of eye witnesses' reports: The image depicted by some Jews of the Japanese occupiers did not meet the image of Japanese cruelty regularly propagated in China. The Germans then published the catalogue on their own – uncensored. This disagreement left a sour taste after an otherwise successful co-operation.

Chinese officials have even censored and abrogated cultural projects involving China abroad. For example, in 1996, the Munich cultural festival “China heute” (China today), to which 180 Chinese artists had been invited, was cancelled by the Chinese Ministry of Culture and the artists were not allowed to leave the country, as it claimed that it had not been informed about the planned participation of dissidents (Meissner 2002: 191f.). And in 1998, the whole cast of a kunqu opera was not allowed to leave China for a performance in Paris (Meissner 2002: 189). To date, China still represses dissident artists. The behaviour of the Chinese government is hard to predict and often takes project partners by surprise. For example, in 2012, a huge co-operation project including governments, major museums and a large foundation resulted in an extensive exhibition of art from around the epoch of the enlightenment and additional discussion fora and salons for thought exchange between European and Chinese intellectuals which had taken years of preparation, co-operation and compromise. The project involved governmental and non-governmental actors on both sides and organisers remained continuously cautious of seeking compromises with Chinese officials. Although the exhibition itself was more a traditional mode of “cultural representation”, the discussion fora were designed to initiate constructive intercultural dialogues. The whole project then suffered a disappointing setback and a very regrettable personal calamity when Chinese artist Ai Weiwei was detained almost simultaneously to the exhibition's opening. Chinese news around this largest exhibition of European art in China turned dead silent and discussion fora turned very cautious. The German public debate was split with some criticising the over-politicisation and the gesture of pointing the pedantic finger at China via an exhibition of art and others criticising the lack of a political edge of it.

These examples all show that, on the one side, new breakthroughs in co-operation projects with China have been made, but, on the other side, insecurities, sensitivities and clashes of ideology continue to exist and often take partners by surprise. Such “authoritarian setbacks” are a definite risk for project co-operation with China and co-operation partners are then often confronted with challenges and criticism both in China and at home – ending up betwixt and between.

Different Types of Actors on Both Sides of the Partnership

The different political roles of arts and culture are also reflected in the types of cultural actors in Europe and China. Europe's emphasis on independence of the arts results in a great variety of non-governmental actors involved in external cultural relations and the arts in Europe and governance remains "very much decentralized" (Liu 2009). Although recently a diversification of cultural actors is under way and non-governmental as well as quasi-non-governmental actors have evolved in China, many cultural actors and all official publishing houses remain state-run. For example, private publishers are officially banned (BIZ Beijing 2014). Therefore, expectations can differ greatly between Chinese and European co-operation partners and different political settings and types of actors entail different organisational cultures, resources, goals and agendas. Among European actors, it is especially those with long-term time horizons, like intermediary cultural institutions and foundations aiming at bridge building between the cultures, that allow for absorbing short-term risks of setbacks and make it possible to continuously work towards better relations in this difficult setting (see Anheier 2012). Unfortunately, foreign-run institutions, international foundations and NGOs in China as well as domestic non-state actors often encounter a general suspicion by the state and a difficult legal situation.²⁸ So any co-operation has to bear these restrictions in mind. While Chinese governmental institutions are a legal option, they often represent a state agenda and have to be chosen well: Some officials are more open and internationally trained in cultural management than others. Non-state partners, on the other hand, often have to look for creative ways for establishing joint projects while remaining in legal limbo.

Fears of Westernisation

Recently, China is rediscovering its own cultural heritage as a resource for nation-building and identity formation after the weakening of Socialist ideology, and as a resource for party legitimacy, international recognition and soft power (see also Ding and Shambaugh in this volume). But next to Socialist and traditional ideals, a third logic of an increasing economisation of culture and entertainment triggers processes of liberalisation and diversification that also produce alternative and subcultures, using, for example, the internet as a space for expression (see Arsène in this volume). These attempts at promoting modernisation and economic growth, traditional Chinese virtues and advancing a Socialist culture – all at the same time – produces internal tensions. Globalisation, growing foreign cultural influences, cultural economisation, and hence growing international cultural market com-

²⁸ See, for example, the Overseas NGO Management Draft Law publicised in 2015. This Draft Law aroused much criticism with its planned tightening of controls of foreign NGOs in China.

petition affect China's outlook on international cultural relations and domestic "cultural security" and propelled a sense that – following former president Hu – "(t)he West is trying to dominate China by spreading its culture and ideology and that China must strengthen its cultural production to defend against the assault." Hu talked about a cultural war and of "international hostile forces (...) intensifying the strategic plot of westernising and dividing China, and ideological and cultural fields are the focal areas of their long-term infiltration..." (Wong 2012). Such a view point can again reduce spaces to manoeuvre for international cultural actors operating with and in China.

Conclusion

In China

"[t]he promotion of traditional culture should help to stabilize the political system, while modern cultural currents – avant-garde art, all kinds of non-conformist cultural activities, non-governmental cultural activities and so on – are still regarded as potentially dangerous. In this context, traditional European culture, especially in its classical manifestations, is welcome – as long as it does not provoke unorthodox and critical thinking [...]." Meissner (2002: 185)

But European cultural actors should try to move away from pure traditional, old-fashioned cultural "representation", which is easily instrumentalised. For culture as a GPG, it is detrimental if European art is used for a framework (i. e. a mega event such as the Shanghai Expo or the Beijing Olympics) that aims at legitimising an authoritarian regime. The aim should be to jointly co-create art and culture and open up spaces for ideas and paths of intercultural expression as well as trying to make room for the critical and contrarian view under the umbrella of international exchange. In this respect, spaces to manoeuvre should be tested. What Anheier (2012: 11) noted as an advantage for foundations i. e. in intercultural dialogue, "...that they can take the long view, and are not necessarily guided by short-term expectations of markets or politics". In the eyes of Kaspar König, former director of the Museum Ludwig in Cologne, should also be honoured in the work ethics of cultural agents dealing with China: In his view, it should not be about earning money and winning contracts. Cultural agents should not act naively but negotiate harder with clear red lines of when to call off a project (see Lorch 2011). Others argue that it is always better to have a dialogue rather than none.

It is important to ask whether that dialogue opens up more space than it closes and does not reinforce boundaries of freedom. This balance is hard to strike and it is a process of gauging the limits which requires a lot of experience and management by perception.

Giving in to censorship requirements and practising self-censorship threatens a project's legitimacy in the eyes of a European public. Not to do so can threaten the realisation of a project in or with China. Institutions with long-term planning horizons can accumulate experience and act as key bridge builders and absorb risks of setbacks and criticism.

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Yiwei Wang: How Can the Belt and Road Initiative Provide Public Goods?²⁹

When I was speaking about the Belt and Road Initiative at the Italian think tank *Instituto Per Gli Studi Di Politica Internazionale* in March 23, 2014, I was asked, whether the Belt and Road Initiative was China's Marshall Plan and in how far it would conceptually go beyond simple trade routes.

Compared with the Marshall Plan, the initiative has richer connotations. According to the initiative, relevant countries should work together to discuss project investment, build infrastructure and share the benefits of cooperation. They should promote as their five major goals policy coordination, facility connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bonds.

The Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road joins 65 countries and regions, but is not limited to those countries, in Central Asia, ASEAN, South Asia, Middle-Eastern Europe, West Asia, North Africa and beyond into a giant economy of 4.4 billion people and about 21 trillion US Dollar GDP, 63 and 29 per cent of respective global total. It is a comprehensive mutual-connectivity network of transportation, consisting of railways, highways, air- and sea-ways, oil and gas pipelines, and transmission lines as well as communications networks.

There are three missions ahead for the Belt and Road Initiative.

1. Seeking a way for global economic growth in the post-crisis era

As globalisation, Americanisation and Westernisation wane in influence, the new engine of global economic growth, China brings its advantages in productivity, technology, funding, experience and development and then model them into cooperation opportunities and market advantages. The Belt and Road Initiative is the result of this transformation and China's all-round opening-up drive.

Through construction of the Belt and Road Initiative, China shares the dividend of its reforms and development and also brings the experience and lessons it has drawn from its own development to other countries. China strives to promote cooperation and dialogue among countries along the Silk Road, set up a new type of global partnership that is more

²⁹ This contribution is based on Yiwei Wang's presentation at the IV. Public Diplomacy Forum, 7-8th October 2015, Berlin.

equal and balanced, and strengthens the foundations for long-term and sustainable development of the world economy.

China's trade with Belt and Road countries has topped 1 trillion US Dollar in 2013, a quarter of the country's total, after a decade of 19% average annual growth, 4% higher than China's overall trade growth, this trade is still expanding fast. In the coming 10 years, trade will increase 1 trillion US Dollar because of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). According to Bloomberg prediction, by 2050, BRI will provide 3 billion global middle class.

2. Realising global rebalancing

Traditional globalisation starts from the sea. Coastal regions and maritime states develop first, while inland countries fall behind, forming a massive wealth gap. Traditional globalisation was ushered in by Europe and carried forward by the US, creating a West-centric world in which the East was subject to the West, rural areas inferior to urban areas and land not as important as the sea.

Nowadays the Belt and Road Initiative is rebalancing the planet. It encourages opening up to the West to promote development of China's Western areas as well as inland like the Central Asian countries and Mongolia. It also advocates the concept of inclusive development in the international community.

At the same time, China takes the initiative in promoting its high-quality production and industries with comparative advantages to the West. Countries along the Silk Road will be the first to benefit from this. This will change the situation in which these countries only served as a corridor for trade and cultural exchanges between the East and West and were less developed in the past. Hence the initiative will overcome the wealth gap and regional imbalance caused by the globalisation that originated with Europeans. It will help build a harmonious world with lasting peace, universal security and common prosperity.

3. Creating a new model for regional cooperation in the 21st century

China's reform and opening-up drive is the greatest innovation in today's world. As an all-around opening up strategy, the Belt and Road Initiative stresses broad consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits. It transcends the Marshall Plan, outbound assistance and globalisation strategies. The initiative introduces new concepts for international cooperation in the 21st century.

For example, the concept of an economic belt is an innovative regional economic cooperation model. A new Eurasian Land Bridge, the China-Mongolia-Russia, China-Central Asia-West Asia and China-Indochina Peninsula economic corridors work as growth poles to benefit surrounding areas. The concept of a Silk Road Economic Belt is different from various economic zones and unions that have appeared in history. The economic belt is more flexible and can be easily applied to broad areas.

All participants are equal. In line with the principle of voluntary participation and coordination for common progress, they shall uphold the Silk Road spirit of being open for cooperation, harmonious and inclusive and mutually beneficial. As was pointed out in the just-published “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”³⁰, the initiative aims at promoting orderly and free flow of economic factors, highly efficient allocation of resources and deep integration of markets.

This will encourage countries along the belt and road to coordinate economic policy and carry out broader, more in-depth regional cooperation of a higher standard. The initiative will encourage countries to jointly create an open, inclusive and balanced regional economic cooperation architecture that benefits all.

Jointly building the belt and road is in the interests of the global community. Reflecting on the common ideals and pursuit of human societies, the initiative is a positive endeavour that seeks new models of international cooperation and global governance. The Belt and Road Initiative will inject new positive energy into world peace and development.

As Confucius said, “If one wishes to stand on one’s own feet, one must help others to stand on their own feet; if one wishes to succeed, one must help others to succeed.” Every country has their own development needs and China’s Belt and Road Initiative aims to help other countries to achieve the goals set down by UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. For instance, 68 per cent of world poverty alleviation can be attributed to China. In today’s world, 1,100 million people are without electric power (350 million in India), and Chinese GRID comparative advantage helps them.

In terms of building infrastructure, China’s BeiDou Navigation Satellite System will provide coverage for countries involved in the Belt and Road Initiative by 2018 and its

³⁰ http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html

coverage will be global by 2020, at which times global networks will no longer have to rely on the internet. This will be advantageous for road building and long-distance education and these initiatives will help people in poor parts of the world to benefit from high technology. In addition, China has a wealth of experience in developing as a country, some developments have been successful, others not so. We can help China's neighbours to learn from our successes and avoid making the same mistakes.

In conclusion, the gap between a Public Goods demand and its provision in today's world underlines the legitimacy of the Belt and Road Initiative.

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Séverine Arsène: China, Internet Governance and the Global Public Interest³¹

Making the Internet for the Public Good

Since the end of the 1970s, a widespread belief in the economic, social and political benefits of the “information society” encouraged many countries, including China, to invest massively in the development of telecommunications. Nowadays the internet has become an essential part of daily life for almost half of the world’s – and China’s – population. It has become a key facilitator in maintaining social networks, finding a job, using public services, accessing useful information, or simply enjoying popular entertainment. Because it is so ubiquitous, there is now a sense that not having access to the internet is a form of exclusion, and some even wonder whether internet access may be considered a human right.

While there is consensus on the general idea that the internet bears a character of public interest, there is much less convergence on the particular implications of this idea. As half of the world’s population still does not have internet access, the idea that access is a right is quite problematic, as well as the question of who should bear the costs of universal access, and how to rebalance the uneven distribution of infrastructure, technology, contents and digital literacy. How to regulate activities online is also a matter of controversy, as economic and political interests diverge, as well as normative preferences. This is further complicated by the great number of layers that the internet is composed of, and therefore the great number of actors implicated in making and managing it.

In this chapter I will describe the main components of global internet governance, and highlight some of the questions it raises in terms of global public interest. I will then discuss the increasingly important role China has played in this framework so far and highlight how the Chinese case points to democratic cracks in the current internet governance system.

The concept of internet governance is most often used³² to refer to the definition of technical standards for the internet and to the management of “critical resources”, like the

³¹ This article was written in February 2016.

³² Denardis and Musiani identify six main objects of Internet governance: administration of critical Internet resources such as names and numbers; establishment of Internet technical standards; access and interconnection coordination; cybersecurity governance; policy role of private information intermediaries; architecture-based intellectual property rights enforcement. Laura DeNardis and Francesca Musiani, “Governance by Infrastructure,” in Francesca Musiani, Derrick L. Cogburn, Laura DeNardis, and

allocation of IP addresses and domain names. These features require global coordination to ensure interoperability and proper information routing. To manage them, members of the industry, engineers, academics and civil society members crafted ad hoc decision-making organisations. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is composed of informal working groups, generally coordinated via mailing lists, which collectively develop and validate new technical standards. The members of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), generally industry players, software editors or academic institutions, elaborate standards and specifications to guarantee universal interoperability of internet technologies. ICANN, a private not-for-profit corporation based in California, was mandated by the U.S. Department of Commerce to coordinate a global network of institutions dedicated to the allocation of IP addresses and domain names. It pioneered a “multistakeholder” model of governance that includes a variety of actors of the industry, along with civil society and engaged individuals, with a consultative role on the part of states.

Beyond the variety of these set-ups, these institutions share the principle that any interested party should be able to participate in the decision-making process, and each of them takes pride in their openness, transparency and inclusiveness. However the technical nature of the issues, the cost of participation and the complicated voting mechanisms go against these stated principles, and debates tend to take place among rather small communities of experts. ICANN in particular has attracted criticism for its bias towards developed countries and lobbies (in 2012 the decision to launch a global bid for new top-level domain names, like .sport or .paris, was particularly controversial) (DeNardis 2014). In general, although these institutions claim that they work for the interests of all internet users, there has been no real reflection or debate on the definition of a global public interest for the internet.

The industry and service providers also play an important role in internet governance, taken in a larger sense. Their decisions on infrastructure, technology, design, business models, and terms of use, all have a direct impact on internet users’ agency, including access to information, privacy, or freedom of speech. For example, Apple and Google’s gatekeeper role come under criticism when they refuse to include applications in the App Store and Play Store, for reasons related to contents that they consider inappropriate (like nudity) or politically sensitive (localising drones in Pakistan for example). Being in the hands of private companies, most decisions are taken by a handful of individuals, with

Nanette S. Levinson (eds), *The Turn to Infrastructure in Internet Governance*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p. 7.

little knowledge or approval of users, and with little possibility to appeal. Despite their claims of acting for the good of humanity (see Google's "do no evil" motto), the great power exercised by these global internet companies lacks transparency and democratic legitimacy. This is detrimental to the companies themselves, as they are confronted with difficult political, ethical, and diplomatic issues that would normally be the responsibility of states.

Faced with increasing concerns regarding cybercrime, like privacy infringement, bullying, scams, traffics, or copyright disputes, states are now paying more attention to all dimensions of internet governance in the name of national public interest and public order. More and more states are therefore passing laws criminalising certain kinds of online activities, enabling the blocking of foreign websites or requesting to host sensitive data on their territories. After revelations by Edward Snowden on the extent of the NSA's global surveillance, and with increased awareness of cybersecurity issues, states have extra motivation to look at the internet through the lens of national interest. As there is a shared concern for the stability and security of the internet, as well as a recognised need to avoid any escalation in potential cyberattacks, cybersecurity is mostly discussed in the framework of intergovernmental dialogue, be it bilateral or multilateral. While this all makes things difficult for industry players who are confronted with multiple and sometimes contradictory regulations, civil society actors warn of a possible "balkanisation" (or in fact localisation) of the internet, which would "kill" the ideal of a global public space.

Global-scale initiatives abound to discuss these issues. In the beginning of the 2000s, the United Nations initiated the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and created the yearly Internet Governance Forum (IGF)³³, with a view to finding a comprehensive, "multistakeholder" framework for internet governance. In 2012, the Dubai summit of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) was the stage of a showdown between supporters and opponents of a proposal to let the ITU take over more responsibilities over the global internet. The status quo prevailed after a Manichean debate where the issue was framed as opposing a "free" and "open" multistakeholder model with an intergovernmental, United Nations-based framework associated with authoritarian governments. In spring 2014, Brazil launched an initiative called Netmundial³⁴, where some 700 delegates from governments, the private sector, civil society, the technical community, and academia produced a roadmap for future internet governance, based on the princi-

³³ <http://www.intgovforum.org>.

³⁴ <https://www.netmundial.org>.

ples of multistakeholderism, human rights, transparency and accountability, among others. In their final declaration, participants “recognised that the internet is a global resource which should be managed in the public interest.”³⁵ But these initiatives have borne few concrete results so far, perhaps because of their ambition to tackle internet governance in an all-encompassing, consensual way, thus ignoring the diversity of mechanisms and issues at stake, and shying away from addressing contentious, political issues. Meanwhile, practical decisions on technology, standards, regulation, design, business models, etc. are taken daily by a myriad of actors for whom public interest is but a secondary concern, and with practically no checks and balances in place.

As these political stakes are coming to light, the global balance of power is also changing, with the advent of new powerful actors such as transnational companies that handle the personal data of billions of people, rights-defence organisations and activists, and governments of developing countries. Among these new actors, the emergence of China as a “new cyber power” has increasingly affected discussions of global internet governance, not only because China’s internet users constitute about 20% of the world’s online population, but also because the Chinese government and businesses have become much more visible and assertive on the global stage.

Chinese Approach to Internet Governance/Sovereignty

In line with global discourses on the “information society”, the Chinese authorities have long seen the internet as a key growth engine and as a strategic tool to develop technological, economic, and cultural power. Domestically, the internet also represents the promise of a more modern and wealthy Chinese way of life, which is crucial to respond to the aspirations of the younger generations and thus sustain the Communist Party’s legitimacy in power.³⁶

In 2010 the Chinese government published a White Paper for the Internet in China, which formulated “cyber sovereignty” as an essential principle to enable China to embrace the internet while containing political risks. With this concept, it claims the right and legitimacy to control online activities in the name of social order and stability, and it calls

³⁵ For more on these initiatives see Derrick L Cogburn, “The Multiple Logics of Post-Sowden Restructuring of Internet Governance,” pp. 25-46, and Nanette S. Levinson and Meryem Marzouki “International Organizations and Global Internet Governance: Interorganizational Architecture,” pp. 47-72, in Francesca Musiani, Derrick L. Cogburn, Laura DeNardis, and Nanette S. Levinson (eds), *The Turn to Infrastructure in Internet Governance*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

³⁶ This section is a synthesis based on previously published articles, referenced below.

for an intergovernmental governance framework and the principle of non-interference in the domestic cyber policy of other countries.

The technical and regulatory set-up of the Chinese internet reflects these principles. In the 1990s, while the Chinese government was massively investing in networks all over the country, it also launched the Golden Shield project to develop cutting-edge filtering and blocking technologies aimed at limiting access to foreign websites and at monitoring online public opinion. Since then, licensing rules for internet service providers and content providers, and systematic verification of “real names” on all popular platforms have ensured political caution from companies and users. More recently, Chinese authorities have imposed further constraints on internet businesses, such as mandatory local storage of sensitive data like banking information, interdiction of foreign investment in internet content providers, or, as proposed in a 2016 draft law on the Domain Name System, registration of domain names with a Chinese service provider for China-based websites.

Taken together, these measures show a will to bring internet infrastructure, businesses and critical data on the Chinese territory within the reach of the Chinese authorities. This facilitates information control (for both censorship and surveillance), guarantees better protection against supposed cybersecurity threats, and provides advantages to Chinese businesses. However it does not, I believe, constitute a separate Chinese ‘intranet’ as is often suggested by metaphors like the “Great Firewall of China”. Indeed, despite these control and localisation measures, the Chinese internet is highly interconnected with global infrastructures. For example, Chinese domain names are set up in compliance with ICANN’s rules; Chinese internet service providers set up servers around the world for better service to overseas customers; foreign IT companies have branches in China to cater to the Chinese market. Chinese authorities want the best of both worlds, with access to the economic and social benefits of the global internet, and even the capacity to project China’s soft power globally, and simultaneously to limit political threats in China. In other words, China has a vested interest in the stability of the global internet infrastructure.

Moreover, the temptation to implement localising measures is not technically a specificity of China. This is part of a strong trend towards more “localisation” of the internet, for a variety of political, legal, cultural and marketing reasons. For instance many countries have also mandated the surveillance and blocking of some content in the name of the protection of citizens, and more and more governments are also calling for a local storage of data out of cybersecurity concerns. Copyright issues also motivate content providers to

limit the availability of cultural products to one specific country or to the customers of one specific network.

The specificities of China and other authoritarian countries in this regard are political. They lie in the extensive focus on political websites and surveillance of opponents, the particularly blurry legal framework and opaque decision-making, as well as the absence of appeal, all of which come down to the absence of a true rule of law. Beyond the heated but simplistic debates on how to preserve the “openness” of the internet, the political set-up of the Chinese internet highlights, if needed, the importance of crafting democratic governance mechanisms to set and enforce legitimate norms and rules for the internet, at both a national and global level.

Pushing for an International Governance Framework

China's leaders and cyber policy experts tend to see the global internet as an “anarchic space” where Western countries, and particularly the U.S., exercise “hegemonic” power as the marginalisation of governments and apparent inclusiveness may in fact mask overwhelming domination by participants from developed, Western countries. Suspicion is especially strong in the case of ICANN because of its links with the American government.³⁷

As a result, Chinese experts and policy-makers have always expressed clear preference for intergovernmental frameworks, especially the UN, where, due to the principle of “one state, one vote”, developing countries are represented on a more equal footing with developed countries, and where civil society and corporate interests usually have no more than a consultative voice. Such frameworks are also bound by standard diplomatic negotiation norms, as opposed to the “rough consensus” principle that prevails in technical and multistakeholder communities, whereby it is difficult for a single actor or state to effectively block or withdraw from any specific measure. China is an active participant in various bilateral and multilateral dialogues, in particular in the field of cybersecurity. However this format is not entirely satisfying for China, as it is not systematically part of the conversation (it is not a member of the G8), and bilateral cooperation is open to suspension from either side in case of diplomatic tensions. For example, when five members of the People's Liberation Army were indicted in the U.S. for cyberespionage in May 2014, China stopped participation in a U.S.-China cybersecurity working group established only

³⁷ Séverine Arsène, *Internet Governance in Chinese Academic Literature. Rebalancing a Hegemonic World Order?*, *China Perspectives*, 2016/2, pp. 25-36.

a year earlier. Top-level cooperation resumed in the autumn of 2015 with the establishment of a U.S.-China High-Level Joint Dialogue on Cybercrime and Related Issues.

Given the uncertainties of such discussion platforms, the Chinese government considers the United Nations to be the ideal framework for global internet governance. The 2010 White Paper states: “China holds that the role of the UN should be given full scope in international internet administration. China supports the establishment of an authoritative and just international internet administration organisation under the UN system through democratic procedures on a worldwide scale.” Chinese representatives spared no efforts throughout the 2000s to push this agenda. At the 2005 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in Tunis, the Chinese government tried, unsuccessfully, to obtain agreement that the responsibilities of ICANN should be transferred to the International Telecommunications Union. At the 2012 Dubai ITU summit, China pushed for enlarging the role of the ITU to include such issues as cybersecurity and the domain name system. In 2011 and in 2015, China teamed up with Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan to propose (without success) a Code of Conduct for Information Security to the General Assembly of the United Nations. This document pleaded for “multilateral, transparent and democratic international internet governance.”

Despite these efforts, the chances are very slim that China will succeed in this quest. It is true that China has been able to obtain small concessions, like the inclusion of the word “multilateral” in the final report of the Ten-Year Review of the World Summit on the Information Society in December 2015. This highlights the fact that China can find allies in global governance institutions, notably with developing countries such as some members of the Group of 77 (which brings together developing countries), as well as more advanced cyber powers such as Russia. However these allies remain in the minority and generally amongst less powerful countries. In particular, although European countries are more nuanced than the United States in their support for the multistakeholder model, and insist more often on the role states can play to defend the interests of citizens, they still stand against the idea of a purely intergovernmental governance model, as this could enable some states to block measures in favour of the Human Rights, or to push for a nation-based architecture of the Internet, deemed by some as “balkanisation.”

The Chinese Way in Multistakeholderism?

In light of this situation, Chinese leaders have had to find their own way within the current governance model. Even as official representatives were publicly expressing criticism of multistakeholder organisations, individual Chinese engineers and academics continued

to participate in meetings and working groups, and contributed to developing essential technology, such as encoding for Chinese-character domain names (to create urls like www.网站.中国).

In the early 2010s, the Chinese leadership seemed to adopt a rather more cooperative attitude. For example, Chinese representatives were sent to participate in the Governmental Advisory Committee of ICANN after nearly a decade of interruption. Lu Wei, former head of the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), and Jack Ma, CEO of the Chinese internet giant Alibaba, are both members of the board of Netmundial. This increased participation by officials and key public figures can be analysed either as a sign of a pragmatic approach by the Chinese government or as a more profound change in strategy and attitude on the international stage, related in part to China's new confidence in its own capacity to defend its interests within the existing global governance framework.

Indeed, in light of the growth of China's internet sector, it seems that China can take advantage of the multistakeholder scheme to advance its agenda, in particular through the private sector. During the last three decades, China has striven to develop "indigenous innovation" in order to reduce its dependency on foreign technology and competencies. It now has the world's most numerous internet users and some of the most dynamic internet businesses (think of Alibaba, Tencent), which are very attractive to the global internet industry, so much so that many internet platforms are ready to make concessions on freedom of speech and handling of personal data in order to access the Chinese market. The apparent rapprochement of Xi Jinping and Lu Wei, former head of the Cyberspace Administration of China, with the American internet giants during the Chinese-American technology forum in September 2015, as well as the trips by Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook's CEO, to China, suggest that the Chinese leadership is now looking to the private sector for alliances at a global level.

Conclusion

In 2014, China initiated a yearly World Internet Conference, held in the Chinese town of Wuzhen, where the former head of the Cyberspace Administration of China, Lu Wei, and in 2015 the Chinese president himself, Xi Jinping, asserted the role of China as a new cyber power, and expressed strong support for the cyber sovereignty principle.

The motto of the conference is "an interconnected world shared and governed by all," in a formulation that adroitly stops short of clarifying whether "all" are states or other actors or both, and how their respective roles should be balanced. However it is clear that

the Chinese leadership sees the internet through the lens of national interest, and more particularly through the interests of the Communist party in power. For Chinese leaders, global cooperation on internet governance is mainly necessary to guarantee the stability of the internet from a technical point of view, and to build “peaceful coexistence” between cyber-sovereigns. But few among the Chinese cyber experts and policy makers believe in the internet as a global public good, as they tend to see this concept as a rhetorical offensive in favour of American hegemony.

Chinese positions seem to have a polarising effect on the global debates on internet governance, with concepts like multistakeholderism, multilateralism and cyber sovereignty referred to in terms of whether the internet can remain “open” or “free”. Such Manichean discussions do not seem to effectively tackle the democratic issues that are raised by the highly transnational and privatised character of internet governance. Indeed, the fact that the Chinese government is now finding its way through the current multistakeholder system, and even more in direct cooperation with global internet giants like Apple or Facebook (despite the latter being blocked in China), underlines the shortcomings of the current global internet governance system in terms of democratic procedures and guarantees. As a result, the formulation of a global public interest for the internet remains a challenge.

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David Shambaugh: China's Soft-Power Push. The Search for Respect³⁸

As China's global power grows, Beijing is learning that its image matters. For all its economic and military might, the country suffers from a severe shortage of soft power. According to global public opinion surveys, it enjoys a decidedly mixed international image. While China's economic prowess impresses much of the world, its repressive political system and mercantilist business practices tarnish its reputation. And so, in an attempt to improve perceptions, Beijing has mounted a major public relations offensive in recent years, investing billions of dollars around the world in a variety of efforts.

Although Beijing's publicity blitz began in 2007 under President Hu Jintao, it has intensified under President Xi Jinping. In October 2011, as Xi was preparing to take power, the 17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) devoted a whole plenary session to the issue of culture, with the final communiqué declaring that it was a national goal to "build our country into a socialist cultural superpower." And in 2014, Xi announced, "We should increase China's soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate China's messages to the world." Under Xi, China has bombarded the world with a welter of new initiatives: "the Chinese dream," "the Asia-Pacific dream," "the Silk Road Economic Belt," the Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road," "a new type of major-country relations," and many others. It is easy to dismiss such talk as "slogan diplomacy," but Beijing nonetheless attaches great importance to it.

China is fleshing out these rhetorical salvos in proposed institutions, such as the New Development Bank (a project organized by China together with Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific. All of these would supplement a host of regional bodies that China has already created in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and central and eastern Europe. Through these institutions, China is meticulously constructing an alternative architecture to the postwar Western order.

And it is backing up its soft-power ventures with serious money: \$50 billion for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, \$41 billion for the New Development Bank, \$40 billion for the Silk Road Economic Belt, and \$25 billion for the Maritime Silk Road. Beijing has also pledged to invest \$1.25 trillion worldwide by 2025. This scale of investment is

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unprecedented: even during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union did not spend anywhere near as much as China is spending today. Together, these recent pledges by Beijing add up to \$1.41 trillion; in contrast, the Marshall Plan cost the equivalent of \$103 billion in today's dollars.

China's diplomatic and development schemes form just one part of a much broader agenda aimed at enhancing its soft power in media, publishing, education, the arts, sports, and other domains. Nobody knows for sure how much China spends on these activities, but analysts estimate that the annual budget for "external propaganda" runs in the neighborhood of \$10 billion annually. By contrast, the U.S. Department of State spent \$666 million on public diplomacy in fiscal year 2014.

Clearly, Beijing is using the strongest instrument in its soft-power toolbox: money. Wherever Chinese leaders travel these days—and between them, Xi and Premier Li Keqiang visited more than 50 countries in 2014—they sign huge trade and investment deals, extend generous loans, and dole out hefty aid packages. Major powers always try to use their financial assets to buy influence and shape the actions of others; in this regard, China is no different. But what is striking about China's investments is how low a return they appear to be yielding. Actions speak louder than words, and in many parts of the world, China's behavior on the ground contradicts its benign rhetoric. In China, "propaganda" is not a derogatory term.

The messengers

The father of soft power, the political scientist Joseph Nye, defined it as emanating largely from society—specifically, cultural, political, and social values. Nye also allowed that a country's political system and foreign policy could earn respect and thus contribute to its soft power. But this definition is premised on the clear demarcation that exists in democratic societies between state and nonstate spheres. In China, the government manipulates and manages almost all propaganda and cultural activities.

The Chinese communist system has always accepted that information must be managed and that people must be indoctrinated. In China, "propaganda" is not a derogatory term. As the country has opened up to the world, the state has had to try harder to maintain its grip on information, and its efforts on this front have become more sophisticated. Now, however, Chinese authorities are trying to control information not only inside China but increasingly outside, too.

The institutional nerve center of this operation is the State Council Information Office (SCIO). Located in a Soviet-era building in central Beijing, it looks like and plays the part of the Ministry of Truth in George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. The SCIO, which forms part of a broader propaganda apparatus, coordinates various propaganda efforts, and it boasts a large staff, a giant budget, and a great deal of bureaucratic clout. Because the SCIO is a key censor and media watchdog in China, the mere mention of its name brings a concerned look to the faces of many Chinese, particularly intellectuals and journalists.

Every December, the SCIO convenes an annual conference at which it outlines guidelines for China's external propaganda work for the coming year. As Jiang Weiqiang, the SCIO's vice minister, explained to me in 2009, the blueprint covers "exhibitions, publications, media activities, exchange programs, 'Year of China' festivals abroad, and other activities." Jiang also called the guidelines "our soft-power strategy." Secret at the time of adoption, the plans are subsequently published in a volume called *China Media Yearbook*.

In addition to its main role of overseeing the media and coordinating all of China's external communications, the SCIO acts as a messenger in its own right: it employs spokespeople, holds press conferences, publishes magazines and books, and produces films. It has even developed an app that provides users with one-stop shopping for all of the government's white papers. Some of the SCIO's propaganda targets Taiwan, Hong Kong, and overseas Chinese communities—all high priority audiences for Beijing. And some of it targets visitors to China, including foreign residents, tourists, and business travelers, through publishing houses such as the Foreign Languages Press and newspapers such as *China Daily* and the *Global Times*. The SCIO is also involved in controlling Internet content, including approving all applications for websites. But the SCIO's principal responsibility is to define the ideas to be propagated abroad and keep other Chinese institutions on message.

The media and the message

A major part of Beijing's "going out" strategy entails subsidizing the dramatic expansion of its media presence overseas, with the goal of establishing its own global media empire to break what it considers "the Western media monopoly." Most prominent among these efforts is the Xinhua News Agency, China's official state news service. From its inception, Xinhua has had a dual role, both domestically and internationally: to report news and to disseminate Communist Party propaganda. Altogether, Xinhua now employs approximately 3,000 journalists, 400 of whom are posted abroad in its 170 bureaus. And Xinhua is

expanding the staffs of its existing bureaus and beefing up its online presence with audio and video content.

Xinhua's global expansion is motivated not just by concern for China's international image but also by money. Xinhua sees an opportunity to compete head-to-head with the main Western newswires, such as the Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters, and Bloomberg. The goal, as one Xinhua official I spoke with in 2010 put it, is to become a "real world international news agency." Xinhua even harbors ambitions of becoming a modern multimedia conglomerate, competing with the likes of News Corp, Viacom, and Time Warner. And once its online video presence expands, it will try to steal market share from 24-hour news channels such as CNN, the BBC, and Al Jazeera.

In its quest for profit, Xinhua publishes descriptive news reports that it markets as a cheaper product than what the Western wire services offer. In 2010, Xinhua had 80,000 paying institutional subscribers, which produced a strong revenue stream. The agency is targeting the developing world in particular, where Western media have a smaller presence and where there is no real domestic competition for international news. Xinhua's inroads there also help fulfill its goal of telling China's story to the world.

China's premier state television channel, CCTV, or China Central Television, has also gone global. It launched its first 24-hour English channel, CCTV International, in 2000 and now broadcasts in six languages around the world. The network is trying to alter its stilted and propagandistic flavor and package its content in more viewer-friendly formats. In 2012, CCTV set up new production facilities in Nairobi, Kenya, and in Washington, D.C., where it unveiled its ambitious CCTV America channel. The Washington operation, CCTV says, will become the global hub of its newsgathering and broadcasting operations.

China is also stepping up its penetration of foreign radio waves. China Radio International, formerly known as Radio Beijing, was founded in 1941 as a wartime propaganda tool against Japan but now has far greater reach. With its headquarters in Beijing, it broadcasts 392 hours of programming per day in 38 languages and maintains 27 overseas bureaus.

These media outlets constitute the major weapons in what China considers a "discourse war" with the West, in which Beijing is pushing back against what it perceives as anti-China sentiment around the world. But other official organs are also playing a direct role in these skirmishes. Chinese embassies now regularly issue press statements rebut-

ting foreign media characterizations of China, take out full-page ads in foreign newspapers, and attempt to intimidate universities and nongovernmental organizations that sponsor events deemed unfriendly to China. Their ambassadors publish op-eds.

There is a harder edge to these efforts, too. The Chinese government now monitors foreign China watchers' and journalists' writings more carefully than ever before and has stepped up its efforts to intimidate the foreign media—both inside and outside China. In Beijing, the SCIO and the Foreign Ministry often call foreign journalists in for “tea chats” to scold them for articles deemed unfriendly to China. The government has refused to renew the visas of a number of journalists (including some from *The New York Times*) and has refused to issue visas for American and European scholars on its blacklist. Outside China, embassy officials sometimes warn newspaper editors not to publish articles on subjects that might offend Beijing.

Thus, like its propaganda apparatus, China's censorship machine is going global. And it appears to be having an impact. In a troubling trend, foreign China scholars are increasingly practicing self-censorship, worried about their continued ability to visit China. The Chinese government has penalized major media outlets, such as Bloomberg, for publishing certain articles. And it has blocked the Chinese-language websites of leading U.S. and British newspapers.

Chinese lessons

Another weapon in China's arsenal is education. About 300,000 foreign students now study in Chinese universities (the vast majority learning the Chinese language), with additional numbers in vocational colleges. Every year, the China Scholarship Council offers some 20,000 scholarships to foreign students. Chinese government ministries, meanwhile, administer a variety of short courses for officials, diplomats, and military officers from developing countries. These classes do teach students tangible skills, but they also try to win hearts and minds along the way.

Chinese universities have yet to break into the global elite, however. Only three mainland universities—Peking, Tsinghua, and Fudan—appear in the *Times Higher Education's* ranking of the world's top 100 schools. The impediments to academic renown are serious. The CCP continues to restrict free thought and inquiry, particularly in the humanities and the social sciences. Chinese universities are rife with cronyism, false credentials, plagiarism, and intellectual property theft. Innovation, the Chinese government's top economic

priority, requires open-ended intellectual exploration to incubate, but Chinese educational pedagogy has yet to escape its historical emphasis on rote memorization and censorship.

China's Confucius Institutes—centers charged with teaching Chinese language and culture abroad—form another key part of the effort to build up China's educational soft power. With 475 centers operating in 120 countries, the Confucius Institutes have established footholds worldwide. (By contrast, Germany's long-established Goethe-Institut has 160 centers in 94 countries, and the British Council maintains some 70 centers in 49 countries.) But the Confucius Institutes have come under sharp criticism. In the United States and Canada, professors have called on universities to close down existing Confucius Institutes or not open new ones on the grounds that they undermine academic freedom. And at a Chinese studies conference in 2014 in Portugal, European Sinologists were rankled when Xu Lin—the director of the Ministry of Education organ that oversees the Confucius Institutes—ordered that pages in the conference program that mentioned Taiwan be torn out. As in the United States, media outlets and legislatures across Europe are now scrutinizing Confucius Institutes, and at least one, at Stockholm University, has decided to shut down as a result.

On another front, Beijing is assertively promoting its culture and society abroad through sports, fine arts, performing arts, music, film, literature, and architecture—and making considerable inroads. Art exhibitions of China's rich imperial past have always been popular around the world; indeed, China's 3,000-plus years of civilizational heritage may be its strongest soft-power asset. Chinese martial artists and other Chinese performers also attract audiences, as does China's growing corps of world-class classical musicians, led by the pianist Lang Lang. Chinese films continue to struggle for international market share, but Chinese authors and architects are more popular than ever. In 2012, Mo Yan won the Nobel Prize in Literature and Wang Shu won the Pritzker Architecture Prize. Even though China's professional basketball, hockey, and soccer teams remain far less competitive than their North American and European counterparts, Chinese athletes are racking up Olympic medals in a wide range of events.

China is also engaging in what it calls "host diplomacy," holding countless governmental and nongovernmental conferences. Large-scale conclaves—such as the Boao Forum for Asia (China's Davos), the China Development Forum, the Beijing Forum, Tsinghua University's World Peace Forum, the World Forum on China Studies, and the Global Think Tank Summit—bring leading figures from around the world to China every year. Some events are real extravaganzas, such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the 2010 Shanghai

World Expo, and the 2014 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting. In 2016, the G-20 summit in Hangzhou is expected to be an equally elaborate showcase.

Then there are the government-affiliated exchange programs. The CCP's International Department (and its front organization, the China Center for Contemporary World Studies) convenes an annual conference called "The Party and the World Dialogue" and brings a steady stream of foreign politicians and intellectuals to China for all-expenses-paid ours. The Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, which is affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has long engaged in similar outreach. Programs like these offer an astute way for the CCP to cultivate relationships with up-and-coming politicians around the world. The Hong Kong-based China-United States Exchange Foundation, meanwhile, amplifies the voices of Chinese scholars through its website and promotes the positions of the Chinese government through the research grants it gives to American institutions. To date, China has not endowed university research centers or faculty professorships. If and when it does, it will learn that in the West, there are real limits to buying political influence on campuses and in think tanks.

The Chinese military maintains its own outreach organizations: the China Institute of International Strategic Studies and the China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies. Both are affiliated with military intelligence and serve as the principal conduits for inviting foreign security specialists to China. These two institutions both broadcast and receive: in addition to explaining China's positions on strategic and military issues to foreigners, they collect views and intelligence from foreign experts and officials.

Several of China's foreign policy think tanks perform a comparable dual function. The most important of these include the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, the China Institute of International Studies, and the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies—all of which are attached to various parts of the Chinese government. To a lesser extent, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences do the same thing, but on a much broader range of issues. In 2009, private donors established the Charhar Institute, which focuses specifically on improving China's overseas image. Taken as a whole, this conglomerate of well-funded institutions and initiatives aimed at boosting China's reputation around the world is a testament to the priority Beijing attaches to the effort.

Can't buy me love

Yet for all the billions of dollars China is spending on these efforts, it has yet to see any demonstrable improvement in its global image, at least as measured by public opinion surveys. In fact, the country's reputation has steadily deteriorated. A 2014 BBC poll showed that since 2005, positive views about China's influence had declined by 14 percentage points and that a full 49 percent of respondents viewed China negatively. Surprisingly, as a 2013 survey by the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project indicates, China's soft-power deficit is apparent even in Africa and Latin America, precisely the regions where one would think the country's appeal would be strongest.

In spite of these meager results, Beijing is still expending enormous effort and resources to change perceptions. Why the disconnect? The answer is that the Chinese government approaches public diplomacy the same way it constructs high-speed rail or builds infrastructure—by investing money and expecting to see development. What China fails to understand is that despite its world-class culture, cuisine, and human capital, and despite its extraordinary economic rise over the last several decades, so long as its political system denies, rather than enables, free human development, its propaganda efforts will face an uphill battle.

Soft power cannot be bought. It must be earned. And it is best earned when a society's talented citizens are allowed to interact directly with the world, rather than being controlled by authorities. For China, that would mean loosening draconian restraints at home and reducing efforts to control opinion abroad. Only then could the country tap its enormous reserves of unrealized soft power.

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
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A New Responsible Power China?

„Experiments have [...] shown that when a group of individuals are given unrestricted access to harvest from a common-pool resource, they substantially overuse it. [...] but changing only one variable, namely, the capacity to communicate with one another, individuals can come to agreements and keep them to harvest very close to an optimal level.“ — Elinor Ostrom, pioneer researcher on Global Public Goods.

It is understood that only through global cooperation can we effectively provide global public goods such as climate and security. However, these challenges now occur at a time when international patterns of decision making are in flux due to the rise of emerging economic and political powers. Emerging economies, like China, play a crucial role. And while we outspokenly share a common interest in providing GPGs and mitigating shared negative effects such as climate change, many obstacles to cooperation between China and Europe remain. As one of the authors mentioned, trust is needed to ensure that geostrategic competition is not a stronger interest than the common good. As part of public diplomacy, engagement for global public goods can aim for international reputation and respect. Is China's engagement in the global governance of GPGs credible in terms of China's projected image as a New Responsible Power?

Authors in this anthology point towards changes in China's mindset and its taking over of new responsibilities in global governance. Taking a look at a variety of GPGs, they, in sum, sketch a picture of China's changing role in global governance and of the remaining differences in ideational concepts and political frameworks between China and Europe, that have to be taken into account for a more informed and sustainable cooperation on GPGs.