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The Romanian Political System after the Parliamentary Elections of November 30, 2008

CRISTIAN PREDA

The elections of November 30, 2008 are the sixth electoral test organized since the fall of communism. These elections have been organized on the basis of a new electoral law – the fourth in two decades¹. All the post-December electoral regulations have been inspired by a proportional philosophy. Until the 2008 scrutiny, the two Chambers were elected on the basis of a PR system with closed lists in plurinominal circumscriptions having as a territorial reference the county and a mechanism of allocation of mandates based on the electoral coefficient and the redistribution of the biggest remainders applied first at the level of the county and then at the national level. The magnitude of circumscriptions has varied from a law to another (see Table 1), being an "implicit threshold" quite important for small parties. An electoral threshold of 3% was introduced in 1992, and then increased, after 2000, to 5% for parties and, respectively 8-10%, depending of the number of parties associated, for coalitions.

For the last decade, many voices of Romanian society, discontent by the vote based on lists, have called for a revolution of the electoral system, more precisely the "introduction of the uninominal vote". A modification in this sense was proposed only in 2007 by the Association Pro Democrația and resumed by the Liberals of the Tăriceanu government. This government has assumed responsibility, October 29, 2007, for a law project that foresaw a mixt electoral system in which half of the members of Parliament were to be designated in uninominal colleges by a majoritarian vote in one round, while the rest of mandates were to be obtained, accordingly to a proportional rule, by the candidates that lost the competition. The project passed the two Chambers but was called for as unconstitutional by the President November 21, 2007, the Court declaring that several of its provisions do not respect the Constitution². In exchange, Traian Băsescu called for a referendum for the adoption of a majoritarian voting system in two rounds, in circumscriptions with one seat. Inspired by the French system for the election of the National Assembly, the project, assumed also by the Partidul Democrat Liberal (PDL), stipulated that each deputy or senator was to be elected if he obtained half

¹ The first post-communist elections were regulated by the Law-decree no. 92 of March 1990. Those from the period 1992-2000 were held on the basis of the Laws no. 68 and 69 of July 1992, modified several times. The 2004 elections were organized on the basis of the Laws no. 370 and 373 of September 2004 and those of 2008 on the basis of the Law 35 of March 2008.

² See the Decision of the Constitutional Court of Romania no. 1177/2007, which answered the Intimation of unconstitutionality of the Law for the election of the Chamber of Deputies and Senate and for the modification and completion of the Law no. 67/2004 for the election of the authorities of the public local administration, of the Law of public local administration no. 215/2001 and the Law no. 393/2004 regarding the Statute of local elected representatives.

plus one of the votes of the electors inscribed on the lists or, when none of the candidates could achieve such a majority, if he occupied the first place in a second turn organized between the first two classified. Even if 81.36% of the electors declared they were favorable to the proposal made by the President, the referendum was invalidated because only 26.51 of the electoral body was present at the polls, the law requiring at least half.

In the end, the Parliament adopted an electoral law in March 2008 that continued neither the PNL project, neither the President project. The Law introduced, at the proposal of a social-democrat senator¹, an eclectic electoral formula, according to which "deputies and senators are chosen in uninominal colleges...through a uninominal vote according to the principle of proportional representation" (art. 5 p. 1). Colleges, sub-unities of circumscriptions, are organized on the basis of a norm of representation of a deputy for each 70 000 citizens and a senator for 160 000 citizens. The college is uninominal because each "political competitor" submits one candidature. But the distribution of mandates is made accordingly to contradictory methods, a combination between a majoritarian formula and a proportional one: as such, win mandates all those candidates that manage to obtain minimum 50% plus one vote in the colleges in which they competed; if they do not achieve this majority, we resort to aspectively at the country level, on the basis of the aggregation of the biggest remainders (art. 48), reuniting for each party the votes granted to candidates that they endorsed. The law created for the first time a circumscription outside the country and introduced an alternative threshold: if a political formation does not obtain the percentages already mentioned it h proportional distribution based on the same method of electoral quotas, calculated at two levels - in each circumscription (county) and, reas to occupy at least six first places in the deputy colleges and three in the senatorial ones to enter the Parliament. In exchange, the March 2008 law specifies that in the case of partial elections a system of vote à *l'anglaise*, that is, majoritarian in one tour (art. 48, let. 17) is used.

The electoral body shrunk from 1990 to 1992, so as to grow then constantly until 2008 when it arrived to almost 18.5 million electors. This evolution was not bereft of surprises: for example, at the 2000 general elections the electoral body amounted to 17 699 727 voters, a number 2 millions bigger than the one from the local elections organized 6 months earlier, when the permanent lists included only 15 641 534 electors. In exchange, as Table 2 indicates, electoral participation followed a downward curb: more than 6/7 in 1990, 3/4 in 1992 and 1996, so as to oscillate around 2/3 in 2000 and 2004, descending dramatically at less than 40% in 2008.

The proportion of valid bulletins, that attest the degree of civic competency, was constantly of 93-95% with only one exception, the 1992 elections when 12% of the votes deposed in the urns were annulled (see Table 3). Unfortunately, until the last elections, it was not known how many of the votes annulled were the expression of protest or the refuse of the "political class". The 2008 law introduced the distinction between annulled and blank votes, differentiating thus the bulletins on which the stamp was not applied correctly and, respectively the bulletins introduced in the urn without a choice for a candidate made by the voter. As Table 3 bis shows, at the November 2008 elections, around 2% of the votes expressed were blank.

¹The paternity of this formula was reclaimed by the PSD deputy Anghel Stanciu, in an interview to the Romanian section of BBC, March 9, 2008.

Between 1990 and 2008, the total number of formations that deposed candidatures at the general elections, alone or in alliances, was of 200 (see Table 4). Sixty percent of the competitors deposed lists once and only 13 of them participated to all the six elections held between the period 1990-2008, of which 11 are, in fact, minority formations (Lipoveni, Germans, Bulgarians, Armenians, Magyars, Turks, Greek, Czech, Slovaks, Polish, Serbian, and Ukrainian). The two parties present six times in front of the electorate are the Partidul Ecologist Român and the Partidul Național Liberal (PNL) that deposed candidatures also in the framework of alliances, PER 3 times and PNL twice¹. The solution of alliances was embraced in fact at each electoral test but became less and less frequent as time passed: indeed, if in 1992 the 79 lists included 92 political formations, at the 2008 elections only two of the 29 competitors that entered the competition for the inferior Chamber were alliances². Paradoxically, from the six elections organized in Romania after 1989, the last four have been won by a coalition or an electoral alliance: after the victory of the Frontul Salvării Naționale in 1990 and respectively of the Frontul Democrat al Salvării Naționale two years later, the 1996 elections were won by the Convenția Democrată Română, in 2000 the Polul Democrat-Social din România imposed itself, four years later – the Uniunea Națională PSD+PUR, and in 2008, the Alianța politică PSD-PC had the most votes.

The number of parties that submitted a candidature decreased with time. If we compare the lists submitted at the six post-communist electoral consultations, we shall see that in a first moment the number of parties is reduced only in what regards the elections for the Senate. In this case the decrease is not the effect of juridical constraints (such as the electoral threshold) but a result of the strategy of the formations of the national minorities: after the 1992 elections, these realized that the Senate is inaccessible for them and stopped submitting lists for the superior Chamber. Only the coming into force of the law of 2003 produced a significant reduction of the participants to the election: if in 1990, to the mandates of the inferior Chamber, aspired 71 political formations, in 2004 these were only 52, including here the formations of the minorities; at the Senate, the decrease is even more important: from 59 in the first year of post-communism to 25 at the 2004 elections. At the first European elections, held November 25, 2007 13 lists of parties and an independent candidate participated to the competition, whereas, in 2008 we have 10 parties in competition for the Senate and 11 for the Chamber of Deputies (see Table 5). Not only the number of parties but also the number of their members decreased after 2003. Thus, the 27 parties existing in 2003 had together 1 735 430 partisans, that is, 10% of the citizens that have the right to vote, whereas at the end of 2007, as table 6 shows, the 21 parties had in total 1 302 417 members.

The number of parliamentary parties resulting of the post-communist elections varies, as table 7 indicates, between 5 and 12 in the Senate and, respectively, between 24 and 27 at the Chamber of Deputies, the latter including the formations of minorities that do not surpass the threshold but gain representation with one

¹ For the problem of volatility see Maurizio COTTA, "Structuring the New Party Systems after the Dictatorship. Coalitions, Alliances, Fusions and Splits During the Transition and Post-transition Stages", in Geoffrey PRIDHAM & Paul G. LEWIS (edited by), *Stabilising Fragile Democracies*, Routledge, London and New York, 1996, pp. 70-71.

²These are the Political Alliance PSD + PC and the Partidul Verde Ecologist, an alliance of the Partidul Verde and PER. The numbers indicated include the formations of national minorities.

mandate, formations which number rose from 11 in 1990 to 13 two years later, to 15 in 1996 and to 18 after the 2000 elections. The 2000 elections represent a key moment in the consolidation of the Romanian political stage. At the 2004 elections we have practically the same parties with the specification that two of the parties (PDSR and PSDR) had merge (under the name of PSD). In exchange, the 2008 elections eliminate a parliamentary party, the Partidul România Mare (PRM).

An important parameter for the characterization of the political system, the effective number of parties calculated after the formula of Marku Laakso and Rein Taagepera portrays a dramatic instability of the Romanian political spectrum: in 19 years the political system of Romania experienced three different formulas because it passed from the quasi-absolute domination of one party in 1990 to the multi party model without a dominant party between 1992 and 1996, so as to gain in 2000 the traits of a multi party system with a dominant party. After the 2004 elections, Romania had again a multi party system without a dominant party, a fact confirmed after the 2008 elections (see Table 8). The average value of the effective number of parties (N = 3.69) situates the Romanian system in the table established by Lijphart after the study of 36 democracies, very close to the one of Iceland (3.72) with the difference that the number of elections that took place in Romania is smaller, and the difference between the minimum and the maximum value is bigger than in the Icelandic case. If we exclude the 1990 elections, than the average effective number of parties has the value of 4.10 (with a minimum of 3.19 and a maximum of 5.18), the Romanian system becoming closer to the Belgian one¹.

The dimensions of the legislative have been, during the entire post-communist period, favorable to the expression of a very high proportionality because the Parliament is, as Table 9 shows, oversized: in fact, far from respecting "the rule of cubic root" - conforming to which the total number of mandates of the inferior Chamber tends to be equal to the cubic root of the number of the population – the Romanian legislative corresponds to a population of 36 million people, much more than the actual population of the country. But this favorable condition was not put to a good use. Between 1992 and 2000 the electoral system produced what Daniel Barbu called "proportional non-representativeness"², in the sense that a considerable number of votes were granted to parties that did not enter the Parliament, being redistributed to parties that surpassed the legal electoral threshold: for example in 2000, 20% of the choices of the voters, or in absolute terms around 2.3 million votes for the Chamber and 2.2 million for the Senate did not find their political expression in Parliament. In 2004, the weight of these "squandered" votes decreased significantly in both Chambers, reaching around 11-13%. At the elections for the European Parliament of November 2007, the five parties that obtained mandates (PD, PSD, PNL, PLD, UDMR) and the independent candidate that managed to gain a seat in PE achieved together 4 197 345 of votes of the 5 122 226 valid votes, thereby squandered votes represented 924 881 votes (18.05%). The elections of November 2008 constituted in this sense a surprise, as they reduced the percentage to 6-7% (see Table 10).

Votes' redistribution in favor of parties that passed the electoral threshold was beneficial primarily to the party classed on the first place. Sometimes, as in

¹See Arend LIJPHART, Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1999 – quoted after Modele ale democrației, Romanian transl. by C. Constantinescu, Polirom, Iași, 2000, p. 85.

² Daniel BARBU, Republica absentă, Nemira, București, 1999, pp. 163-180.

1990 or 2000, the electoral bonus was of 10%, other times the difference between the percentage of votes and that of mandates was minimal. In 2008, as it can be seen from Table 11, this difference barely surpassed 1%. What is even more interesting is the fact that the increase in non-representativeness was accompanied by a progressive reduction of the effective number of mandates allocated through the redistribution of votes granted to the parties that did not pass the electoral threshold, even though, especially in the case of the Senate, this proportion remained, including in 2004 of over 50%. In 2008 the system of transformation of votes into mandates changed, the candidates that obtained half plus one of the votes in the college in which they ran won a seat of deputy or senator, while the other mandates were redistributed proportionally at the level of the county and then, again proportionally, at the national level. In spite of the majoritarian bonus the system evolved practically in the parameters of 2004 as Table 12 shows. It is interesting to remark that the number of mandates distributed following the "direct" victory in colleges was of 85 at the Chamber (around 27%) and 31 at the Senate (around 22%). This means that the number of mandates distributed at the level of the county - 160, respectively 41 - was the determining factor in the creation of the general equilibrium of representation.

Electoral disproportionality measured with the help of the formula of Michael Gallagher is in the case of the Romanian political system of 18.47, a value that places it between the last two cases of democracies in the classification realized by Arend Lijphart, more exactly between Jamaica (17.75) and France (21.08). This positioning is surprising if we take into account the fact that the Jamaican system is a pluralitarian one and the French one a majoritarian one while the Romanian system is – at least through its intentions – a proportional system. In the list realized by Lijphart the closest PR systems by their characteristics to the Romanian system are those of Venezuela (G=14.41), Costa Rica (G=13.65) and Columbia (G-10.62), all three considered as veritable examples of the mode in which can be perverted the proportional logic. Overcoming the disequilibria produced in these three countries, the Romanian system is the most disproportional PR known system. More than this: Venezuela, Colombia and Costa Rica are, as Romania, presidential democracies but the disproportionality which affects them is due before everything to presidential disproportionality and not to the legislative one; in Romania the exact contrary occurs, while in our case legislative disproportionality varies as it can be seen in table 13, between 4.36 and 9.38, in Venezuela, Colombia and Costa Rica, according to Lijphart¹, the same parameter varies between 2.96 and 4.28. The majoritarian effects of the Romanian political-electoral system remain very significant even after the last elections, although somehow diminished.

The voting system introduced in 2008 has had major inequitable effects. As Table 14 shows, there is no correspondent between the number of mandates won, the number of first placed seats obtained in colleges and the number of colleges won with absolute majorities: PSD is the first from the point of view of seats won with 50%+1, the first one from the point of view of votes obtained at the national level, but the second one from the point of view of mandates won. PNL has 37 first seats in the Chamber (4 being won with more than 50%+1) and 15 first seats at the Senate (1 with a majority in the college), but 65 deputy seats and 28 senators. PDL obtained 196 first seats in colleges and only 166 mandates. If we take

¹ Arend LIJPHART, Patterns of Democracy...cit., pp. 156 and 159.

into consideration the biggest circumscription (see Table 14-3), the one represented by the municipality of Bucharest, we observe that in the 28 colleges, only 3 candidates gained the mandate with more than half of the votes of the citizens who came to the urns in the college (2 from PSD and one from PDL). PNL, which was third in 25 of the 28 colleges, obtaining also a second place and two fourth places, reached 5 mandates. PDL was in the first place in 20 colleges gaining 12 mandates, and PSD, winner of the other 8 first places won 11 mandates, of which 4 on the second place!

The 2008 elections did not modify radically the landscape of political parties. In fact, only ten of the 200 parties that have participated to elections between 1990 and 2008 have managed to pass at least three electoral tests, obtaining actually each time, between 85% and 98% of the parliamentary mandates. Thus, these ten parties are those that played a decisive role in Romanian political life (see Table 15). The 2008 elections brought about two novelties: the first is the loosing by the PRM of the statute of parliamentary party after four legislatures in which it had between 3 and 20 % of the mandates. The second novelty is brought by the third consecutive entry into Parliament of the representatives of the Partidul Conservator (PC): as in the past this thing happened in the framework of an alliance with the social-democrats. As Table 15 shows the other 9 parties had different strategies in what concerns the access to the legislative and the participation to government was not conditioned by the embracement of one of these strategies. Derived from a "common branch" - called in 1990 Frontul Salvării Naționale - PDSR and PD have chosen different paths to impose themselves in front of the electorate. Under the name of FDSN in 1992, of PDSR in 1996 and 2000, of PSD after 2001, the party regrouped around Ion Iliescu participated alone to the electoral tests of 1992 and 1996 (winning the first and loosing the second) and in coalition after 2000, 2004 and 2008 (winning elections in the three cases but participating to the government only after 2000 and 2008). Partidul Democrat which became after December 2007, Democrat Liberal, presented itself alone in 1992 (under the name of FSN) as in 2000 and 2008, respectively, in coalition with PSDR in 1996 and with PNL in 2004 managing to enter the government not only in these two cases, but also after the elections of 2008. Partidul Social Democrat Român (PSDR), alone in 1990, became member of the Convenția Democratică din România in 1992, of the Uniunea Social-Democrată in 1996 and of the Polul Democrației Sociale din România (PDSR) in 2000, these last two alliances allowing it to participate to the government. The fourth successful party, Partidul Ecologist Român was alone in 1990, than a member of the CDR in 1992 and 1996, elections following which it obtained a few mandates. Participating once again alone in 2000 and 2004, it was not able to send representatives in Parliament and in 2008, PER allied itself with Partidul Verde inside the Alianța Partidul Verde Ecologist but failed again to enter the Parliament. At their turn, Partidul Național Țărănesc Creștin Democrat (PNŢCD) and Partidul Național Liberal chose different strategies: PNL had its own lists in 1990, 1992, 2000 and 2008 (the second time missing the entry in Parliament) and was part of the winning coalition (CDR) in 1996; in 2004 it submitted common candidatures together with the democrats, under the name of Alianța Dreptate și Adevăr PNL-PD, managing to form the government even if they came up second at the legislatives. After it submitted its own list in 1990, PNTCD opted for the variant of the coalition for the electoral tests organized between 1992 and 2000, this formula bringing to it the second place in 1992, the first place in 1996 and total failure at the 2000 elections (under the name CDR2000). In 2004 it failed again to enter the Parliament this time on its own lists and in 2008 it stopped presenting candidatures. Uniunea Democrată a Maghiarilor din România (UDMR) passed alone all the six electoral tests, with an average of 25 deputies and 11 senators. Partidul Unității Naționale a Românilor (PUNR) surpassed the threshold both in coalition (in 1990, together with the Partidul Republican) and when it had its own lists (1992 and 1996); in 2000, associated with Partidul Național Român it failed to enter the Parliament; the same thing happened four years later when it had no more electoral allies; the party was erased from the Register of Political Parties in 2006. Finally, Partidul România Mare participated alone both to the four victorious electoral tests and to the failed one of 2008.

If we don't follow the electoral strategies of parties but the ideological relations between them, departing from the criteria used after 1989 to describe the politics of Central and Eastern Europe¹, we have a more complex picture, with nine ideological families. As it can be observed easily from Table 16, four of these families – the greens, the extreme left, the minimalist agrarians and the defenders of particular interests – have an insignificant presence between one and two percents, even though sometimes, as it was the case with the greens at the beginning of the transition, they managed to send elected representatives in the Chambers. The other families have a sinuous evolution. The scene is dominated by social-democrats who have an electoral mean of over 40 percents and who never descended below 30%, being divided until the 2004 elections including when one of the parties of this direction - Partidul Democrat - made a radical ideological realignment, entering the family of European popular. The liberals and modernist conservatives are just as divided as the social-democrats with a mean of over 20% with very strong variations from one electoral test to the other, but with a spectacular consolidation in the last years, which led to the 2008 situation when two right parties – PNL and PDL – had together more than half of the options expressed at the urns. On the third place from the point of view of the electoral score is the family of national-populist and extreme-right with a mean of 10.81 in the six elections: after a historic maximum in 2000, when PRM gathered one fifth of the votes expressed, at the 2008 elections this family descended at 5 percents, results that add in fact the performances of PRM (3.15%) and the Partidul Noua Generație-PNG (2.27%). On the following place in the general classification, with almost 9 percents, is the family of national minorities formed of UDMR and a number of 11-18 formations of other minorities. Finally, on the fifth place, organized around PNTCD, is the agrarian Christian-popular family and of the identitarian right, with an average score of 7 percents, but in a strong downward since 2000².

Because of the division of political families and the profound polarization of the party system, many times the articulation of majorities is placed under the sign of the unpredictable and of fragility. This fact is even more clear as, excepting the 1990 elections that had as a result "a won majority", the electoral system had as a main political consequence the appearance of "natural minorities" and, in consequence, the negotiation of the formation of plural parliamentary majorities and, in several cases, instable. It has to be added that in three out of four cases,

¹Christian VANDERMOTTEN, Pablo MEDINA LOCKHART, "La géographie électorale de l'Europe centre-orientale", in Jean-Michel DE WAELE (ed.), *Partis politiques et démocraties en Europe Centrale et Orientale*, Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 2002, pp. 17-34.

² For other details see Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, *Regimul*, *partidele și sistemul politic din România*, Nemira, București, 2008, pp. 108-117. The following fragments resume, in a form updated with the results of 2008, paragraphs of the quoted volume, specially pp. 123-126.

respectively in 1992, 2000 and 2004 these parliamentary majorities were not found integrally at the level of the government formula, the cabinets Nicolae Văcăroiu, Adrian Năstase and Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu being minority cabinets (see Table 17). Let's remark finally the decisive weight of the electoral formula that allowed, between 1992 and 2004, that coalitions with a minority of votes have a majority of parliamentary mandates. The 2008 elections are inscribed in a different logic, the "grand coalition" realized by the PSD and PDL had at the urns two thirds of the votes expressed.

The political color of these majorities and its adversaries is changing significantly after each election. Between 1990 and 1992 we have the powerful domination of a left linked rather to the neo-communist identity than to the European values: intolerant with its political adversaries, arriving to the use of force (with the occasion of the incursions of miners in Bucharest in May 1990 and September 1991), nostalgic of a totalitarian economic past, with cultural options constructed around a national identity defined on an ethnic basis and opposing the occidentalization of the public space, this left had against it an alliance rather informal and, in any case, incoherent², constituted by the Liberals (PNL), the fraction PNȚCD and the members of the Magyar minority (in total around 16% of the votes in 1990); beginning with 1991 after it eliminated Petre Roman, the left directed by President Iliescu on the path of the radical refuse of political and economic reform found in the small liberal party an ally of circumstance to support a government led by Theodor Stolojan and which was meant to prepare the new elections. Between 1992 and 1996, the nationalist-identitarian options and conservative of the economic and social structures of the previous regime formed a weak majority (42% of votes, 51% in mandates), but which knew to impose itself in front of a liberal right lacking unity (6.5% of the votes in Parliament versus 3.6% outside of it), in front of a Christian-agrarian family that held only 10% of the parliamentary seats, face to a social-democrat adversary (FSN/PD) refused for a long time as a partner by the supporters of modernization (10% of votes) and in front of a Magyar minority which was reduced to the statute of "committed spectator" (7.5%). Between 1996 and 2000, the political system was defined by the fragile equilibrium between a pro-occident and liberal in economy coalition, but very divided on social and administrative problems (with almost 50% of votes – CDR3, USD and UDMR, each in part being already a coalition), and, on the other side, a left losing speed (PDSR) and which made an appeal, once in opposition, to the national-populists and radical-extremists, nostalgic of communism regrouped around PUNR and PRM. After the 2000 elections, social-democracy – still lacking unity, but under a different formula (PDSR and PSDR merging against PD) – opened its gates to a collaboration with the party of the Magyar minority (UDMR), abandoning the alliance with the extreme-right (PRM). The occidentalist right lost thus not only the support of the Christian-democrats (that could not enter the Parliament anymore and who ex-

¹ For such a characterization, see for example Guy HERMET, *Le passage à la démocratie*, Presses de Sciences Po, Paris, 1996, p. 72.

² The lack of unity and incoherence of the opposition in this period were already remarked by Tom GALLAGHER, in an article that compares the reinvention of democracy in Romania and Portugal, "The Emergence of New Party Systems and Transitions to Democracy. Romania and Portugal Compared", in Geoffrey PRIDHAM & Paul G. LEWIS (eds.), *Stabilising Fragile Democracies*, cit., p. 211.

³ An analysis of CDR can be found in Dan PAVEL, Iulia HUIU, "Nu putem reuși decât împreună". O istorie analitică a Convenției Democratice, 1989-2000, Polirom, Iași, 2003.

perienced at their turn at the beginning of 2001 internal division), but also that of UDMR, who became a faithful member of the new parliamentary majority. The 2004 elections created an unseen situation in Romanian politics. Three are the traits of this situation. In the first place, the elections confirmed the parliamentary statute of the six parties that had entered the Chambers four years before. In other words: for the first time after 1989 there was no new party entering the Parliament and no party that lost its parliamentary status. What changed was the weight of mandates, the big winner in relation to the 2000-2004 legislature being PNL, and the big loser – PRM. In the second place, contradicting (almost) all the sociological and politological estimations, the electorate voted one winner at the parliamentary elections - that is the National Union PSD+PUR (with around 37% of the votes) – and a winner for the presidential elections supported by the second placed at the legislatives – Alianța DA (which had won 31.3% of the votes). The third novelty resides in the post-electoral faith of alliances realized for elections. If in 1996 and 2000 the coalitions that had won elections formed the government, in 2004, the winning coalition in elections (formed of PSD and PUR) broke, PUR passing to the side of the Alianta PNL-PD to form the government, after having supported, in a first moment, December 20, 2004, PSD and PRM for the election of the presidents of the two Chambers. The victory in the presidential elections of the candidate of the Alianța DA, Traian Băsescu, led thus to the distribution of power, a natural corollary in fact, of the proportionalist effects of the legislative election itself. Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu became prime minister with the vote of 265 of the 465 senators and deputies from PNL, PD, UDMR and PUR, but also from the national minorities. It was a majority more eclectic than the ones that succeeded themselves since 1990, that is more than the revolutionary and national-identitarian left (of 1990-1992), more than the left conservatism with a powerful nationalist tint (from 1992-1996), than the center-right liberalism, ambiguous and varied, open to radical occidentalization (of 1996-2000), and more than social-democracy looking for a reformist definition in economy and of a protecting vision in the social field (2000-2004). The situation changed radically at the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007 when PUR (which had become Partidul Conservator) left the government, and then the PD was eliminated from the cabinet. Instead of a quadripartite cabinet, April 2nd, 2007 a bicolor government, PNL-UDMR, was sworn in. As the government defined itself primarily in opposition to the president it was in fact the creation of a regime of cohabitation with an ultra-minority government supported by a coalition that did not want to display itself publicly; a coalition which meant however, a massive political bloc of almost four fifths of the entire legislative (see Table 18). Thus, the weakest direct support created the most compact direct support. The 2008 elections brought in exchange to the government a bicolor coalition PSD-PDL. Its creation was possible as, for the fourth time after the fall of communism the organizers of elections went to the opposition.

Since 1996, Romania has a democratic culture based on discontinuity or rupture and not on consensus or equilibrium. This aspect is important for Romania which knew the unique party under communism and in the inter-war period had what Mattei Dogan called "governmental Parliaments and not parliamentary governments", in so much as the organizer of the election designated by the King won without mistake the elections.

¹Mattei DOGAN, "Romania, 1919-1938", in Myron WEINER, Ergun OZBUDUN (ed.), *Competitive Elections in Developing Countries*, Duke University Press, 1987, pp. 369-389.

TABLES

Table 1 *Magnitude of Circumscriptions (1990-2008)*

		Chamber of Deputies			Senate				
		1990	1992-2000 2004 2008		1990	1992-2000	2004	2008	
1	Alba	7	6		5	2	3		2
2	Arad	8	7		8		3		
	Argeș	11	10	ç)	3		4	
	Bacău	12	11	1	0	3	5		4
5	Bihor	11		9		3		4	
6	Bistrița-Năsăud	6	5		4		2		
7	Botoșani	8	7		6	2		3	
8		12	9	9	8	3		4	
9	Brăila	7	6	5	5		2		
10	Buzău	9		7			3		
11	Caraș-Severin	7		5			2		
12	Călărași	6		5			2		
13	Cluj	12	11	1	0	3	5		4
14	Constanța	12	11	1	0	3	5		4
	Covasna		4				2		
16	Dâmbovița	10		8			3		
17	Dolj	13	11	1	0	4		5	
	Galați	11		9		3		4	
19	Giurgiu	5		4			2		
20	Gorj		6			2	3		2
21	Harghita	6		5			2		
22	Hunedoara	9	8	7	7		3		
23	Ialomiţa	5		4			2		
24	Iași	14		12		4		5	
25	Maramureș	9	8	7			3		
26	Mehedinți		5	4	Į.		2		
27	Mureș	10	9	8	3	3		4	
28	Neamţ	10		8		3	4		3
	Olt	9		7			3		
	Prahova	15		12		4		5	
31	Satu-Mare	7	6	5	,	2	3		2
32	Sălaj	5		4			2		
	Sibiu	8		6			3		
	Suceava	12		10		3		4	
35	Teleorman	8	7	ϵ			3		
36	Timiș	12	10	9	10	3		4	
37	Tulcea	5		4			2		
	Vaslui	8		7		2		3	
	Vâlcea	7		6		2		3	
40	Vrancea	7		6			2		
41	Mun. București	39	29	2	8	14	13		12
42	Sect. Agr. Ilfov	-		4		-		2	
43	Foreign countries	-	-	-	4	-	_	_	2
	Total	387	328	314	316	119	143	137	137

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In 1990 the numbering of circumscriptions and the number of deputies and senators was done on the basis of the law-decree no. 92/March 1990, through the Government decision no. 283 of March 19, 1990 (publ. in Monitorul Oficial, no. 39/21 March 1990); as the Electoral law tolerated, through art. 14 a deviation of 15% in accordance with the population of the circumscriptions, the number of deputies was not of 387 as the law-decree mentioned, but of 397. The electoral law of 1992 fixed at its turn the election in circumscriptions (art. 3. para. 1), and in annex 1 described their magnitude; then appears, as a new circumscription, the Agricultural Sector Ilfov. If at the next elections, of 1996, circumscriptions remained unchanged, in exchange, OUG no. 129/30 June 2000 introduced a new numbering of electoral circumscriptions: if the numbering of 1992 reproduced the alphabetical order of counties, with the exception of the "Agricultural Sector Ilfov", which was placed, under number 42, at the end of the list, after "the Municipality of Bucharest", the June 2000 ordinance introduced the Ilfov circumscription between Iași and Maramureș and re-numbered the following sections. The ordinance also modified the magnitude of some of the circumscriptions; the reform of the magnitude was limited: it consisted in the decrease with one mandate (in the Cluj county) of the number of deputies and the reduction with one unity of the magnitude of the senate circumscriptions of the Alba, Gorj and Satu Mare counties. The number of deputies of the 2000-2004 legislature is thus of 327 (to which are added the deputies of national minorities), and that of senators is of 140. The 2004 electoral law reduced the magnitude both at the Chamber and at the Senate, limiting in this way the number of organization of minorities that can be represented in the inferior Chamber to 18 (cf. art. 4, para. 2). The 2008 electoral law made some minimal changes: the magnitude was reduced in several counties so as to include in almost the same limits seats for the new circumscription created, that of Romanian in foreign countries. For the rest the number of deputies of Arad was increased with a seat after the vote. If the average magnitude can be regarded as an "implicit threshold" and if the reasonable report between the two variables is S=75% (M+1), where S is the threshold and M the average magnitude (cf. Arend LIJPHART, Patterns of Democracy...cit., pp. 149-150), than in the Romanian case, the average magnitude constitutes an obstacle for representativeness. At the 2004 elections, we have a level of magnitude of 3.26 for the Senate and 7.9 for the Chamber and, thus, an implicit threshold of over 17% for the Senate (three times bigger than the explicit threshold for parties) and, respectively of over 8% for the Chamber (that is more than the explicit threshold fixed in 2000 for the coalitions of two parties).

Table 2 *Electoral Body and Participation*

Election	ALEP	APU	%
AG – 20.05.1990	17 200 722	14 825 017	86,18
AG – 27.09.1992	16 380 663	12 496 430	76,28
AP2 – 11.10.1992	16 380 663	12 153 810	74,19
AG – 03.11.1996	17 218 654	13 088 388	76,01
AP2 – 17.11.1996	17 230 654	13 078 883	<i>75,</i> 90
AG – 26.11.2000	17 699 727	11 559 458	65,31
AP2 – 10.12.2000	17 711 757	10 184 715	<i>57,</i> 50
AG – 28.10.2004	18 449 676	10 794 653	58,51
AP2 – 12.12.2004	18 316 104	10 112 262	55,21
EUR -25.11.2007	18 224 597	5 370 171	29,47
AG – 30.11.2008	18 464 274	7 238 871	39,20

The first column contains the type (AG = general elections; AP2 = the second tour of presidential elections, EUR = European elections) and the date of the election. The second column indicates the number of electors according to the permanent electoral lists (ALEP), the third the number of voters present at the urns (APU), and the fourth electoral participation, in percentages (%). At the 1990 elections, the Central Electoral Bureau mentioned a different number of voters present at the urns at the three elections for the Chamber of Deputies (CD), Senate (S) and Presidency (P), and so I also calculated participation for each one: in the table appears the number from the CD; for the Senate, APU was 14 825 764 (86,19%), and at the Presidency, 14 826 616 (86,19%).

Table 3 *Valid Votes Expressed at the Post-1989 Elections*

Election	VVE	%VVE – APU	%VVE – ALEP
AG – 20.05.1990	13 707 159 (CD)	92,45 (CD)	79,68 (CD)
	13 956 180 (S)	94,13 (S)	81,13 (S)
	14 378 693 (P)	96,97 (P)	83,59 (P)
AG – 27.09.1992	10 880 252 (CD)	87,06 (CD)	66,42 (CD)
	10 964 818 (S)	87,74 (S)	66,93 (S)
	11 898 856 (P)	95,21 (P)	72,63 (P)
AP2 – 11.10.1992	12 034 636	99,01	73,46
AG – 03.11.1996	12 238 746 (CD)	93,50 (CD)	71,07 (CD)
	12 287 671 (S)	93,88 (S)	71,36 (S)
	12 652 900 (P)	96,67 (P)	73,48 (P)
AP2 – 17. 11.1996	12 972 485	99,18	75,28
AG – 26.11.2000	10 839 424 (CD)	93,77 (CD)	61,24 (CD)
	10 891 910 (S)	94,22 (S)	61,53 (S)
	11 212 974 (P)	97,00 (P)	63,35 (P)
AP2 – 10.12.2000	10 020 870	98,39	56,57
AG – 28.11.2004	10 188 106 (CD)	94,38 (CD)	55,22 (CD)
	10 231 476 (S)	94,78 (S)	55,46 (S)
	10 452 205 (P)	96,83 (P)	56,65
AP2 – 12.12.2004	10 008 314	98,97	54,64
EUR – 25.11.2007	5 122 228	95,38	28,10
AG – 30.11.2008	6 886 794 (CD)	95,14 (CD)	37,29 (CD)
	6 888 055 (S)	95,15 (S)	37,30 (S)

The first column contains the type (AG = general elections; AP2 = the second tour of presidential elections, EUR = European elections) and the date of the election. The second indicates the total number of valid votes expressed (VVE) and the third the percentage of valid votes expressed in relation to the number of electors present at the urns (%VVE – APU), and the fourth column the percentage of valid votes expressed, calculated in relation to the number of electors in the permanent electoral lists (%VVE – ALEP). The data was indicated – where it was the case – separately for the Chamber of Deputies (CD), Senate (S), respectively for the presidential elections (P) and the European ones (EUR).

Table 3 bis *Null Votes at the Post-1989 Elections*

Election	TVN	TVN %
AG – 20.05.1990	1 117 858 (CD)	7,54 (CD)
	869 584 (S)	5,86 (S)
	447 923 (P)	3,02 (P)
AG – 27.09.1992	1 591 071 (CD)	12,73 (CD)
	1 507 623 (S)	12,06 (S)
	580 017 (P)	4,64 (P)
AP2 – 11.10.1992	116 092	0,95
AG – 3.11.1996	834 687 (CD)	6,37 (CD)
	785 977 (S)	6,00 (S)
	426 545 (P)	3,25 (P)
AP2 – 17.11.1996	102 579	0,78
AG – 26.12.2000	706 761 (CD)	6,11 (CD)
	653 834 (S)	5,66 (S)
	484 643 (P)	3,00 (P)
AP2 – 10.12.2000	160 264	1,57
AG – 28.11.2004	599 641 (CD)	5,55 (CD)
	556 128 (S)	5,15 (S)
	339 010 (P)	3,14 (P)
AP2 – 12.12.2004	103 245	1,02
EUR – 25.11.2007	246 555	4,62
AG – 30.11.2008	210 994 (CD)	2,91 (CD)
	172 884 (S)	2,39 (S)

The first column contains the type (AG = general elections; AP2 = the second tour of presidential elections, EUR = European elections) and the date of the election. The second one indicates the total number of null votes (TVN), and the last one the percentage of null votes in comparison to the number of electors present at the urns (TVN%), at the elections for the Chamber of Deputies (CD), Senate (S) and Presidency (P). In 2008, were counted for the first time the blank votes: these were 139 139 at the Chamber (1.92%) and 176.217 for the Senate (2.43%).

Table 4 *Electoral Volatility*

No. participations	Electoral years	NP
	1990	30
	1992	27
One neuticination	1996	22
One participation	2000	23
	2004	14
	2008	2
	1990 & 1992	21
	1992 & 1996	3
Two participations	1996 & 2000	5
	2000 & 2004	2
	2004 & 2008	1

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No. participations	Electoral years	NP
	1990 & 1992 & 1996	4
	1990 & 1996 & 2000	1
	1992 & 1996 & 2000	6
Three participations	1992 & 2000 & 2004	1
	1996 & 2000 & 2004	3
	1996 & 2004 & 2008	1
	2000 & 2004 & 2008	3
	1990-2000	3
Four participations	1992-2004	2
	1996-2008	3
Ti	1990-2004	2
Five participations	1992-2008	8
Six participations	1990-2008	13
Total		200

The calculation was made keeping in mind the following rules: I numbered the parties and the unions indifferent if they participated with their own lists or on the lists of alliances; the simple change of name of a party does not mean the appearance of a new actor; in exchange, I considered that a party disappears if it is absorbed by another formation under the name of this one or under a new one. I considered that Partidul Democrat Liberal (ex PD (FSN), ex PD) and, respectively Partidul Social Democrat (ex FDSN, ex PDSR) had five electoral participations (1992, 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008); I kept into account the fact that, beyond their common origin – Frontul Salvării Naționale –, each of the two parties followed a path of re-foundation beginning in March 1992.

 Table 5

 Parties Inscribed and Lists Submitted at the General Elections

Date	Parties	Lists submitted		
Date	inscribed	Chamber	Senate	
28 January 1990	30			
20 May 1990	80	71	59	
27 September 1992	155	79	65	
15 July 1993	159			
1 October 1994	161			
1 January 1996	200			
3 November 1996	75	64	37	
26 November 2000	73	68	37	
28 November 2004	64	52	25	
30 November 2008	38	29	10	

The information about the parties inscribed comes from several sources: George VOICU, *Pluripartidismul. O teorie a democrației*, All, București, 1998, p. 213 (for 1990 and 1994), from the collection *Partide politice*, Agenția de presă Rompres, București, 1993 (for 1992 and 1993); Alexandru RADU, *Nevoia schimbării. Un deceniu de pluripartidism în România*, Editura "Ion Cristoiu", București, 2000, p. 16 (for 1996; at pp. 341-345, the same author indicated

45 de parties existing in mid April 1999, without including in this number the formations of minorities, included in the data for 1990-1996); the Central Electoral Bureau (for the data of 2000 and 2004). If after 2000, the number of minorities legally recognized was fixed at 18 (the number of organizations being bigger, in the conditions where some of the minorities are represented by several formations), in exchange, the number of parties was reduced: January 1st 2003 there were 37 (cf. Roxana ANDRONIC, Bogdana PĂUN, "Legea partidelor nu sperie nici formațiunile de buzunar", Ziua, January 23, 2003), at the fixed term for the re-registration of parties – that is July 18, 2003 – there were 27 left, and July 15, 2004 there were 30 inscribed (cf. Stan STOICA, *Dicționarul partidelor politice din România 1989-2004*, IVth ed., Editura Meronia, București, 2004, pp. 139-144). The column for the Chamber includes the formations of minorities. Since the European elections of 2007 BBC began to publish on each site of elections the list of the formations inscribed at the Tribunal.

Table 6Party Sympathizers

	Name of the party	01.07.2003	31.12.2007
1	Partidul Național Liberal	120 115	116 134
2	Partidul Ecologist Român	34 810	28 705
3	P. Național Țărănesc Creștin Democrat	56 163	35 602
4	Partidul Democrat	148 000	86 461
5	Partidul Social Democrat	300 000	290 116
6	Partidul Conservator	95 314	90 663
7	Acțiunea Populară	33 365	-
8	Federația Ecologistă din România	44 348	R
9	Partidul România Mare	201 827	106 <i>7</i> 97
10	Partidul Național Liberal Câmpeanu	28 391	R
11	Partidul Socialist al Muncii	61 052	R
12	Partidul Socialist al Renașterii Naționale	35 469	R
13	Partidul Unității Națiunii Române	54 402	R
14	Partidul Alternativa Ecologistă	31 041	26 588
15	Uniunea pentru Reconstrucția României	32 380	R
16	Partidul Socialist Unit	44 081	R
17	Partidul Muncitoresc Român	32 657	R
18	Partidul Lege și Ordine	28 440	-
19	Partidul Social Democrat C.Titel Petrescu	29 743	29 503
20	Partidul Noua Generație	32 000	92 499
21	Partidul Socialist Român	31 292	28 187
22	Partidul Popular și al Protecției Sociale	50 000	38 836
23	Partidul Popular Creștin	27 696	R
24	Partidul Forța Dreptății	65 994	1
25	Partidul Popular din România	65 000	26 068
26	Partidul Național Democrat Creștin	26 138	29 031
27	Partidul Creștin Democrat	25 712	-
28	Partidul Renașterea României		26 844
29	Partidul Alianța Socialistă	-	36 517

	Name of the party	01.07.2003	31.12.2007
30	Partidul Republican	-	63 295
31	Forța Democrată	-	31 724
32	Partidul Inițiativa Națională	-	25 941
33	Partidul Verde	-	26 034
34	Partidul Liberal Democrat	-	66 872
Tota	1	1 735 430	1 302 417

The information in the table is taken from *The register of political parties* of April 2004, of the article of Lucian GHEORGHIU, "27 de partide au rămas în viață", Cotidianul, July 18, 2003 as from the documents entitled The register of political parties. Law no. 14/2003, published by the Central Electoral Bureau with the occasion of the elections of June and November 2008. Of the 27 parties existing on July 1st, 2003, nine were erased from the Register of political parties, (a fact noted with an R in the table) because they have undergone processes of merger/absorption: it is the case of Federația Ecologistă din România and Partidul Popular Creştin (erased at 27.11.2003 following its fusion with PNL), the Partidul Naţional Liberal Câmpeanu (erased 27.11.2003, following its fusion with PNL), the Partidul Socialist al Renasterii Nationale and Partidul Socialist al Muncii (erased 22.10.2003 and respectively 05.12.2003, after they were absorbed by Partidul Social Democrat), the Partidul Unității Națiunii Române (erased la 09.08.2006, after it was absorbed by the Partidul Conservator), the Uniunea pentru Reconstrucția României (erased 10.03.2006, after it was absorbed by PNŢCD), the Partidul Socialist Unit and Partidul Muncitoresc Român (erased 07.04.2006 after they united under the name Partidul Stângii Unite). Other four parties, being quoted in the table with their actual denominations: it is the case of Partidul Umanist din România Social-Liberal which became since October 2005 Partidul Conservator, the Partidul Noua Democrație which changed its name in January 2007 in Partidul Alternativa Ecologistă, the Partidul Pensionarilor și Protecției Sociale, which preferred since October 2005 to be called Partidul Popular și al Protecției Sociale and the Partidul Tineretului Democrat, which became since 2005 Partidul Lege și Ordine. Four existing parties in 2003 did not submit lists at the end of 2007; in exchange, at the positions 28-34 of the table appear parties created after July 1st 2003, which presented signatures of the adherents in the term imposed by art. 27 of the law 14/2003. In total, January 1st, 2008 there were 21 parties politically active which declared the number of their members. In the spring of 2008, there were in the Register of parties, 11 political formations without having submitted lists with supporters at the end of 2007: Partidul Tinerilor din România (created in 2003 in the commune Voinești of Dâmbovița), Partidul Demnității Naționale (created in February 2004 by an ex candidate for the presidential, Eduard Gheorghe Manole), Partidul Pentru Patrie (politically active in the period 1996-2004), Uniunea Creștin Socială (established in 2004 under the name Blocul Național Democrat), Forța Civică (created in 2004 under the name of Partidul Creştin), Partidul Comunistilor Nepeceristi (created in 2006 in the village Urechești of the commune Cicănești in the county Argeș), Partidul Popular Agrar (created in February 2006 in Bucharest), Miscarea Conservatoare din România (established in December 2006), Uniunea Populară Social-Creștină (created in November 2006), Partidul României Europene (created in January 2007), as the already recalled Partid al Stângii Unite, resulted from the merger of PSU-PMR. The Register records also the registration in March 2008 of the Partidul Civic Maghiar - Magyar Polgari Part, and in August 2008 of the Partidul Uniunea Ecologistă din România, as the existence of four political alliances (Alianța Dreptate și Adevăr – Partidul Național Liberal – Partidul Democraț, then Alianța Partidul Popular European (Creștini Democrați) și Democrați Europeni, Alianța Uniunea Verde Ecologistă and Alianța Politică PSD+PC. The decrease in the number of members from 1 735 430 to 1 302 417 is explained by the reduction of these numbers for all parties, with the exception of two: PNG, which increases three times and PNŢCD, with an increase of 3000 members. In some cases, the phenomenon is hard to explain: for example, even though PSD absorbed two parties – PSM and PSRN – that had together almost 100 thousand members, the social-democrats decrease however from 300 to 290 thousand of sympathizers. With important quotas of confidence and on the first place at the Europeans of 2007, PD has a decrease from 148 thousands to 86 thousands of members: that is a diminution of over 40%, explained probably by the fact that the formation submitted lists only from 21 counties. The record belongs to PRM with a reduction of almost 50%. The distribution on counties holds its own surprises as results from table 6 bis.

Table 6 bisDistribution of Sympathizers in Counties

Name	NJ	Minimal				Maximum	
PNL	41	CV 311	IF 724	SV 860	DJ 5 141	BV 5 176	CT 6 519
PER	37	TM 1	HD 1	GJ 6	BR 1 721	BC 2 211	B 2 862
PNŢCD	40	VN 16	BR 80	MH 210	CL 2 555	TN 2 995	B 4 035
PD	21	CL 761	CV 927	BH 992	HD 6 673	B 10 967	BV 11 932
PSD	42	CV 772	HR 798	TR 1.653	NT16 074	DB 18 459	B 31 641
PC	40	TL 80	HR 157	CJ 257	VL 8 030	BC 8 900	GL 11 091
PRM	42	HR 194	SM 420	GR 710	NT 6 083	CT 6 455	SV 9 269
PAE	23	SB 724	MH 731	BZ 741	BV 1 755	TL 1 830	GL 5 249
PSDCTP	38	CS 1	GJ 1	SJ 2	AR 2 068	CT 2 240	B 4 648
PNG	41	CV 392	SJ 854	TM 879	OT 4 703	VN 4 867	B 5 166
PSR	33	GR 6	IS 9	SV 23	VL 1 704	GL 1 793	B 2 506
PPPS	30	SJ 294	BH 364	VS 455	TR 2 536	AG 2 658	B 4 455
PPR	36	AR 40	AG 40	BR 40	VL 1 520	BN 1700	B 2 180
PNDC	34	BH 12	CJ 13	HR 24	DB 2 030	PH 2 459	DJ 4 497
PRR	23	TM 703	BR 720	TL 822	IS 1 492	B 2 457	VS 3 277
PAS	37	CV 20	SM 60	BV 75	GJ 1 828	CJ 2 175	HD 2 763
PR	25	TM 95	MH 318	BH 320	GR 3 653	VL 16 840	BT 17 340
FD	20	IF 337	BR 707	GJ 825	VN 2 010	B 2 241	TM 3 811
PIN	20	VL 797	BV 861	GL 904	IS 1 640	TM 1 640	MS 1 890
PV	25	TL 53	BC 283	BR 501	BV 1 635	B 2 056	GL 2 495
PLD	39	TL 119	SJ 146	IF 153	DB 3 674	VL 4 180	SV 4 505

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In table, I noted with NJ = the number of circumscriptions/counties from where come the sympathizers; Minim = the 3 counties with the smallest number of sympathizers (county/their number). At PNL lack all together the lists from Harghita and in Bucharest the liberals only have 1 769 members. PSD has lists in all the counties. At PNŢCD, lists in 40 counties, without Harghita and Covasna. At PRM all the counties but in Bucharest only 3 583. At PSDCTP are missing the counties Bihor, Covasna, Maramureș și Sibiu. At PC, without Sălaj and Satu Mare and in Bucharest 1 409 members. At PNG is missing Harghita. PAS has in Bucharest only 1 872 (the fourth filial as dimension). At PR exists only two over-dimensioned branches: In Vâlcea and Botoșani. PLD has no lists at Covasna, Buzău and Caraș Severin, and in Bucharest it has 3 363 members.

Table 7Parliamentary Forces (1990-2004)

Year of election	Senate		Chamber of Deputies		
lear of election	Α	В	A	В	С
1990	7	7	16	16	11
1992	8	12	7	12	13
1996	6	12	6	12	15
2000	5	7	5	7	18
2004	4	6	4	6	18
2008	4	5	4	5	18

The table indicates for the two Chambers of Parliament the total number of political forces that passed the electoral threshold, coalitions and alliances taken as a whole (A), the number of parties that entered the Senate or the Chamber, each member of the coalition taken separately (B) and the number of minority organizations other than UDMR that entered the Chamber even though they did not pass the threshold (C). For 1990 the threshold was 0 but UDMR was still counted separately of the other minority formations.

Table 8The Effective Number of Parties (1990-2008)

ELECTION	N_A	N _B	N
1990	1,6297	1,6297	1,6297
1992	4,7502	5,6116	5,1809
1996	3,8936	5,9900	4,8293
2000	3,2273	3,6791	3,4532
2004	3,0321	4,6882	3,8602
2008	3,1986	3,1986	3,1986
AVERAGE			3,6920

The table contains the values of the effective number of parties (N) calculated – to describe the party system – after the formula of Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera N = $1/\Sigma$ s₂², where s, is the proportion of the seats of the party I (cf. Arend LIJPHART, Patterns of Democracy...cit., p. 79). Keeping in mind that the presence of minorities in the inferior Chamber complicates the system of representation, I made the calculation departing from the Senate (see Cristian PREDA, România postcomunistă și România interbelică, Meridiane, București, 2002, pp. 51-52); I calculated two parameters: N_A and N_B , taking into account first coalitions/alliances as a whole (NA) and then taking into account parliamentary parties separately (N_B) , more precisely those parties that obtained at least 1% of parliamentary seats (cf. Arend LIJPHART, Patterns of Democracy...cit., pp. 76-80); I determined than the parameter of the effective number of parties (N) as an arithmetic mean of N_a and N_B . For 2004 I also calculated the parameter for the Senate (the values are inscribed in the table), but also for the Chamber; in this second case I took into consideration first the group of minorities as such, neglecting in the case of the second parameter each formation taken separately, as none obtained 1% of mandates; the values obtained this way ($N_A = 3.3322$; $N_B = 4.0717$ and N = 3.7019) are very close of the ones that resulted from the calculation made on the basis of the mandates of the Senate. More than this, the calculation N can be made by taking into account the Chambers reunited, more precisely the weight of parliamentary groups at the level of the Parliament reunited; the calculation is relevant because, although after the 2004 elections, parties have quasi-identical power at the Senate and in the inferior Chamber, ensuring the majority involves, in fact, different constraints in each Chamber as at the level of the Parliament reunited. Departing from the observation that of the 469 seats of Parliament reunited at the end of 2004 PSD held 159 (33.9%) PNL – 92 (19.62%), PD – 69 (14.71%), PRM also 69 (14.71%), UDMR - 32 (6.82%), PUR - 30 (6.40%), and the group of minorities 18 mandates (that is 3.84%), the value of N is 4.8333, indicating – as the other values taken separately for the Senate and the Chamber - that we are dealing with a multi-party system without a dominant party. For 2008 I ignored the mandates of PC from the alliance Alianta PSD+PC, because the number was negligible – one mandate at the Senate (the 4 of the Chamber representing a little over 1%).

Table 9Oversize of the Legislative

Year	Mandates
1990	397
1992	341
1996	343
2000	345
2004	332
2008	334
Optimum	282

The table indicate the mandates of the inferior Chamber, including the places granted to the minority formations and, on the last row the optimum dimensions of the legislative, departing from the rule "of the cubic root" (cf. Arend LIJPHART, *Patterns of Democracy...*cit., p. 151).

Table 10
"Squandered" Votes (1992-2008)

		Senate	e	Chamber of Deputies				
	VVEPP	VVE	VI	VI%	VVEPP	VVE	VI	VI%
1992	9 360 739	10 964 818	1 604 079	14,63	8 765 014	10 880 252	2 115 238	19,45
1996	10 239 125	12 287 671	2 048 546	16,67	10 049 643	12 238 746	2 189 103	17,89
2000	8 723 251	10 891 910	2 168 659	19,92	8 464 543	10 839 424	2 374 881	21,91
2004	9 081 077	10 231 476	1 150 399	11,24	8 866 774	10 188 106	1 321 332	12,96
2008	6 396 804	6 888 055	491 251	7,13	6 466 288	6 886 794	420 506	6,10

In the first column is indicated the year of the election. VVEP indicates the total number of valid votes expressed for the parties that passed the electoral threshold. VVE is the total number of valid votes expressed. VI means squandered votes, that is, granted to parties that could not pass the threshold, in absolute numbers (VI). VI% is the percentage of squandered votes from the total of valid votes expressed.

Table 11 *Electoral Bonus for the Winners of Elections*

Year	Chamber	Senate
1990	- 0,07	+10,29
1992	+6,60	+5,97
1996	+5,40	+6,37
2000	+8,31	+9,33
2004	+4,48	+3,13
2008	+1,04	+1,61

We indicate here the bonus granted to the party that was first in the classification – Frontul Salvării Naționale (1990), Frontul Democrat al Salvării Naționale (1992), Convenția Democrată Română (1996), Polul Democrat-Social din România (2000), Uniunea națională PSD+PUR (2004), Alianța Politică PSD+PC (2008) – calculated as a difference between the percentage of seats and the percentage of votes obtained.

Table 12 *The Number of Mandates and their Allocation (1992-2008)*

		Senate		Chamber of Deputies				
	MS	MSR	%MSR	MD	MDR	%MDR		
1992	143	94	65,74	341	125	36,66		
1996	143	85	59,45	343	118	34,41		
2000	140	72	51,43	345	110	31,89		
2004	137	71	51,82	314	71	22,61		
2008	137	65	47,44	315	<i>7</i> 0	22,22		

The first column indicates the year of elections. The following three specify the total number of senator mandates (MS), the number of mandates of senator allocated after the redistribution of votes obtained by the formations that do not reach the threshold (MSR)

and, respectively the percentage of mandates of senator allocated as a result of redistribution (%MSR). The last three columns contain the total number of mandates of deputy, without the ones of minorities (MD), the number of mandates of deputy allocated after redistribution (MDR) and the percentage of mandates of deputy allocated as a result of redistribution (%MDR). For 2008 I introduced in the columns MSR and MDR all the mandates allocated in the second stage of allocation, at the national level.

Table 13 *Electoral Disproportionality (1990-2008)*

	G_{L}	G_{p}
1990	7,86	93,19
1992	5,88	38,66
1996	7,03	45,59
2000	9,38	33,17
2004	4,98	48,77
2008	4,36	-
Means	6,58	51,88

The table contains the parameters of legislative disproportionality (G_L) and presidential disproportionality (G_p) for the period 1990-2008, as well as, on the last row, the average values of these ones; the general value of G, calculated as a geometrical mean of the two parameters is G=18.47. The parameter of legislative disproportionality was calculated after the formula of Michael Gallagher $G_L = \sqrt[1]{2} \sum (v_i - l_i)^2$, where v_i = the percentage of votes obtained by a party and l_i = the percentage of seats obtained by that party, taking into account all the parties that obtained minimum 1%; for the entire period, the table contains the data calculated departing from the result of elections at the Senate; in fact, for 2004, the parameter of legislative disproportionality has values very close if it is calculated for the Senate (4.98), respectively for the Chamber (4.31). In 2008 the difference is somewhat bigger: 3.27 for the Chamber and 4.36 for the Senate. Presidential disproportionality is equal to the score of the defeated candidate in the second tour of elections. For 1990-2000 the calculations can be found in the volume Cristian PREDA, *România postcomunistă*...cit., pp. 59-60.

Table 14 *Mandates, First Places and Majorities in 2008*

	С	ham. D	ep.	Senate			
Party	M L1 MAJ			M	L1	MAJ	
PSD	114	117	40	51	55	12	
PDL	115	138	27	49	58	11	
PNL	65	37	4	28	15	1	
UDMR	22	23	14	9	9	7	
Total	316	315	85	137	137	31	

M is the number of mandates, L1 is the number of first places won in colleges. MAJ is the number of colleges won with more than half of the votes in colleges. In the table, PSD appears together with its ally, PC. The difference between L1 and M in the case of the Chamber of Deputies is explained by the increase of the magnitude of the circumscription of Arad with one seat.

Table 14 bis *Allocation of Mandates on Counties in* 2008

BN 4 2 1 PDL 2 0 0 BT 6 4 0 3 2 0 BV 8 6 1 PDL 4 2 0 BR 5 3 1 PSD 2 1 1 PSD BZ 7 6 1 PSD + 1 PNL 3 1 0 CS 5 3 0 2 0 0 CL 5 4 1 PNL 2 0 0 CJ 10 8 2 PDL 4 1 1 PDL CT 10 9 4 PSD 4 3 1 PSD CV 4 3 3 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM DB 8 6 4 PDL + 1 PSD 3 2 2 PDL DJ 10 9 4 PSD 5 3 2 PSD GL 9 7 3 PSD 4 2 </th <th>Country</th> <th></th> <th>Chambe</th> <th>r of Deputies</th> <th></th> <th>Sena</th> <th>nte</th>	Country		Chambe	r of Deputies		Sena	nte
AR 8 5 5 PDL 3 2 2 PDL AG 9 7 3 PSD 4 3 2 PSD BC 10 9 2 PSD 4 3 1 PSD BH 9 7 2 UDMR 4 2 1 UDM BN 4 2 1 PDL 2 0 0 BT 6 4 0 3 2 2 0 BV 8 6 1 PDL 4 2 0 BR 5 3 1 PSD 2 1 1 PSD BZ 7 6 1 PSD + 1 PNL 3 1 0 CS 5 3 0 2 0 0 CL 5 4 1 PNL 2 0 0 CL 5 4 1 PNL 2 0 0 CL 5 4 1 PNL 2 0 0 CT 10 9 4 PSD 4 3 1 PSD CV 4 3 3 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM DB 8 6 4 PDL + 1 PSD 3 2 2 PDL DJ 10 9 4 PSD 5 3 2 PSD GR 4 3 1 PNL 2 1 1 PNL GJ 6 4 3 PSD 4 2 1 PSD GR 4 3 1 PNL 2 1 1 PNL GJ 6 4 3 PSD 2 2 0 0 GR 4 3 1 PNL 2 1 1 PNL GJ 6 4 3 PSD 2 2 1 1 PSD HR 5 4 4 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM HD 7 5 1 PDL 3 1 0 IL 4 2 1 PSD 2 0 0 IS 12 11 0 5 3 0 IF 4 3 0 0 2 0 0 IF 4 3 0 0 2 0 0 IF 4 3 0 0 2 0 0 IF 4 3 1 UDMR 4 1 1 UDM NT 8 7 2 PSD + 2 PDL 3 2 1 PSD PH 12 10 1 PSD + 1 PDL 3 2 1 PSD SM 5 3 1 UDMR 4 1 1 UDM NT 8 7 2 PSD + 2 PDL 3 2 1 PSD SM 5 3 1 UDMR 2 1 PSD SM 5 3 1 UDMR 2 1 PSD SM 5 3 1 UDMR 2 1 PSD TM 10 8 2 PDL 4 1 1 PDL TT 4 2 0 0 0 VS 7 5 1 PSD 3 1 0 VS 7 5 1 PSD 3 1 0 VS 7 5 1 PSD 3 1 1 PSD TM 10 8 2 PDL 4 1 1 PDL TT 4 2 0 2 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 3 1 1 PSD	County	M	JUD	50%+1	M	JUD	50%+1
AG 9 7 3 PSD 4 3 2 PSD BC 10 9 2 PSD 4 3 1 PSD BH 9 7 2 UDMR 4 2 1 UDM BN 4 2 1 PDL 2 0 0 BT 6 4 0 3 2 0 BV 8 6 1 PDL 4 2 0 BR 5 3 1 PSD 2 1 1 PSD BZ 7 6 1 PSD + 1 PNL 3 1 0 CS 5 3 0 2 0 0 CL 5 4 1 PNL 2 0 0 CJ 10 8 2 PDL 4 1 1 PDL CT 10 9 4 PSD 4 3 1 PSD CV 4 3 3 UDMR 2 2	AB	5	4	3 PDL	2	0	0
BC 10 9 2 PSD 4 3 1 PSD BH 9 7 2 UDMR 4 2 1 UDM BN 4 2 1 PDL 2 0 0 BT 6 4 0 3 2 0 BV 8 6 1 PDL 4 2 0 BV 8 6 1 PDL 4 2 0 BR 5 3 1 PSD 2 1 1 PSD BZ 7 6 1 PSD + 1 PNL 3 1 0 CS 5 3 0 2 0 0 CL 5 4 1 PNL 2 0 0 CJ 10 8 2 PDL 4 1 1 PDL CT 10 9 4 PSD 4 2 1 PDL CT 10 9 4 PSD 5 3	AR	8	5	5 PDL	3	2	2 PDL
BH 9 7 2 UDMR 4 2 1 UDM BN 4 2 1 PDL 2 0 0 BT 6 4 0 3 2 0 BV 8 6 1 PDL 4 2 0 BV 8 6 1 PDL 4 2 0 BR 5 3 1 PSD 2 1 1 PSD BZ 7 6 1 PSD + 1 PNL 3 1 0 CS 5 3 0 2 0 0 CL 5 4 1 PNL 2 0 0 CL 5 4 1 PNL 2 0 0 CV 4 3 3 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM DB 8 6 4 PDL + 1 PSD 3 2 2 PDL CV 4 3 3 UDMR 2 1 PDL	AG	9	7	3 PSD	4	3	
BN 4 2 1 PDL 2 0 0 BT 6 4 0 3 2 0 BV 8 6 1 PDL 4 2 0 BR 5 3 1 PSD 2 1 1 PSD BZ 7 6 1 PSD +1 PNL 3 1 0 CS 5 3 0 2 0 0 CL 5 4 1 PNL 2 0 0 CJ 10 8 2 PDL 4 1 1 PDL CT 10 9 4 PSD 4 3 1 PSD CV 4 3 3 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM DB 8 6 4 PDL +1 PSD 3 2 2 PDL DJ 10 9 4 PSD 4 2 1 PSD GL 9 7 3 PSD 4 2 <td>BC</td> <td>10</td> <td>9</td> <td>2 PSD</td> <td>4</td> <td>3</td> <td>1 PSD</td>	BC	10	9	2 PSD	4	3	1 PSD
BT 6 4 0 3 2 0 BV 8 6 1 PDL 4 2 0 BR 5 3 1 PSD 2 1 1 PSD BZ 7 6 1 PSD + 1 PNL 3 1 0 CS 5 3 0 2 0 0 CL 5 4 1 PNL 2 0 0 CJ 10 8 2 PDL 4 1 1 PDL CT 10 9 4 PSD 4 3 1 PDD CT 10 9 4 PSD 4 3 1 PDD CT 10 9 4 PSD 4 3 1 PDD CT 10 9 4 PSD 3 2 2 PDL DJ 10 9 4 PSD 3 2 2 PDL DJ 10 9 4 PSD 3 2 <td>BH</td> <td>9</td> <td>7</td> <td>2 UDMR</td> <td>4</td> <td>2</td> <td>1 UDMR</td>	BH	9	7	2 UDMR	4	2	1 UDMR
BV 8 6 1 PDL 4 2 0 BR 5 3 1 PSD 2 1 1 PSD BZ 7 6 1 PSD + 1 PNL 3 1 0 CS 5 3 0 2 0 0 CL 5 4 1 PNL 2 0 0 CJ 10 8 2 PDL 4 1 1 PDL CT 10 9 4 PSD 4 3 1 PSD CV 4 3 3 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM DB 8 6 4 PDL + 1 PSD 3 2 2 PDL DJ 10 9 4 PSD 5 3 2 PSD GL 9 7 3 PSD 4 2 1 PSD GR 4 3 1 PNL 2 1 PNL GJ 6 4 3 PSD 2 0 0		4	2	1 PDL		0	0
BR 5 3 1 PSD 2 1 1 PSD BZ 7 6 1 PSD + 1 PNL 3 1 0 CS 5 3 0 2 0 0 CL 5 4 1 PNL 2 0 0 CJ 10 8 2 PDL 4 1 1 PDL CT 10 9 4 PSD 4 3 1 PSD CV 4 3 3 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM DB 8 6 4 PDL + 1 PSD 3 2 2 PDL DJ 10 9 4 PSD 5 3 2 PSD GL 9 7 3 PSD 4 2 1 PSD GR 4 3 1 PNL 2 1 PNL 1 1 PNL GJ 6 4 3 PSD 2 0 0 HR 5 4 4 UDMR 2 </td <td>BT</td> <td>6</td> <td>4</td> <td>0</td> <td>3</td> <td>2</td> <td>0</td>	BT	6	4	0	3	2	0
BZ 7 6 1 PSD + 1 PNL 3 1 0 CS 5 3 0 2 0 0 CL 5 4 1 PNL 2 0 0 CL 5 4 1 PNL 2 0 0 CJ 10 8 2 PDL 4 1 1 PDL CT 10 9 4 PSD 4 3 1 PSD CV 4 3 3 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM DB 8 6 4 PDL + 1 PSD 3 2 PSD GL 9 7 3 PSD 4 2 1 PSD GR 4 3 1 PNL 2 1 PSD GR 4 3 PSD 4 2 1 PSD GR 4 3 PSD 2 0 0 HR 5 4 4 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM HB	BV		6	1 PDL		2	-
CS 5 3 0 2 0 0 CL 5 4 1 PNL 2 0 0 CJ 10 8 2 PDL 4 1 1 PDL CT 10 9 4 PSD 4 3 1 PSD CV 4 3 3 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM DB 8 6 4 PDL + 1 PSD 3 2 2 PDL DJ 10 9 4 PSD 5 3 2 PSD GL 9 7 3 PSD 4 2 1 PSD GR 4 3 1 PNL 2 1 1 PNL GJ 6 4 3 PSD 2 0 0 HR 5 4 4 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM HD 7 5 1 PDL 3 1 0 IS 12 11 0 5	BR	5	3	1 PSD	2	1	1 PSD
CL 5 4 1 PNL 2 0 0 CJ 10 8 2 PDL 4 1 1 PDL CT 10 9 4 PSD 4 3 1 PSD CV 4 3 3 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM DB 8 6 4 PDL + 1 PSD 3 2 2 PDL DJ 10 9 4 PSD 5 3 2 PSD GL 9 7 3 PSD 4 2 1 PSD GR 4 3 1 PNL 2 1 1 PNL GJ 6 4 3 PSD 2 0 0 HR 5 4 4 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM HD 7 5 1 PDL 3 1 0 IS 12 11 0 5 3 0 IF 4 3 0 2	BZ	7	6	1 PSD + 1 PNL	3	1	0
CJ 10 8 2 PDL 4 1 1 PDL CT 10 9 4 PSD 4 3 1 PSD CV 4 3 3 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM DB 8 6 4 PDL + 1 PSD 3 2 2 PDL DJ 10 9 4 PSD 5 3 2 PSD GL 9 7 3 PSD 4 2 1 PSD GR 4 3 1 PNL 2 1 1 PNL GJ 6 4 3 PSD 2 0 0 HR 5 4 4 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM HD 7 5 1 PDL 3 1 0 IL 4 2 1 PSD 2 0 0 IS 12 11 0 5 3 0 IF 4 3 0 2	CS	5	3	0	2	0	0
CT 10 9 4 PSD 4 3 1 PSD CV 4 3 3 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM DB 8 6 4 PDL + 1 PSD 3 2 2 PDL DJ 10 9 4 PSD 5 3 2 PSD GL 9 7 3 PSD 4 2 1 PSD GR 4 3 1 PNL 2 1 1 PNL GJ 6 4 3 PSD 2 0 0 HR 5 4 4 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM HD 7 5 1 PDL 3 1 0 IL 4 2 1 PSD 2 0 0 IS 12 11 0 5 3 0 IF 4 3 0 2 0 0 IS 12 11 0 3 2	CL	5	4	1 PNL	2	0	0
CV 4 3 3 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM DB 8 6 4 PDL + 1 PSD 3 2 2 PDL DJ 10 9 4 PSD 5 3 2 PSD GL 9 7 3 PSD 4 2 1 PSD GR 4 3 1 PNL 2 1 1 PNL GG 4 3 PSD 2 0 0 HR 5 4 4 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM HD 7 5 1 PDL 3 1 0 IL 4 2 1 PSD 2 0 0 IS 12 11 0 5 3 0 IS 12 11 0 5 3 0 IF 4 3 0 2 0 0 MM 7 5 0 3 2 0	CJ	10	8	2 PDL	4	1	1 PDL
DB 8 6 4 PDL + 1 PSD 3 2 2 PDL DJ 10 9 4 PSD 5 3 2 PSD GL 9 7 3 PSD 4 2 1 PSD GR 4 3 1 PNL 2 1 1 PNL GR 4 3 1 PNL 2 0 0 HR 5 4 4 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM HD 7 5 1 PDL 3 1 0 IL 4 2 1 PSD 2 0 0 IS 12 11 0 5 3 0 IF 4 3 0 2 0 0 IS 12 11 0 5 3 0 IF 4 3 0 2 0 0 MM 7 5 0 3 2 0	СТ	10	9	4 PSD	4	3	1 PSD
DJ 10 9 4 PSD 5 3 2 PSD GL 9 7 3 PSD 4 2 1 PSD GR 4 3 1 PNL 2 1 1 PNL GJ 6 4 3 PSD 2 0 0 HR 5 4 4 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM HD 7 5 1 PDL 3 1 0 IL 4 2 1 PSD 2 0 0 IS 12 11 0 5 3 0 IF 4 3 0 2 0 0 MM 7 5 0 3 2 0 MM 7 5 0 3 2 0 MM 7 5 0 3 2 0 MM 7 6 3 PSD + 1 PDL 3 2 1 PDL	CV	4	3	3 UDMR	2	2	2 UDMR
GL 9 7 3 PSD 4 2 1 PSD GR 4 3 1 PNL 2 1 1 PNL GJ 6 4 3 PSD 2 0 0 HR 5 4 4 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM HD 7 5 1 PDL 3 1 0 IL 4 2 1 PSD 2 0 0 IS 12 11 0 5 3 0 IF 4 3 0 2 0 0 MM 7 5 0 3 2 0 MM 7 5 0 3 2 0 MM 7 5 0 3 2 0 MM 4 2 1 PDL 2 1 1 PDL MS 8 6 3 UDMR 4 1 1 UDM	DB	8	6	4 PDL + 1 PSD	3	2	2 PDL
GR 4 3 1 PNL 2 1 1 PNL GJ 6 4 3 PSD 2 0 0 HR 5 4 4 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM HD 7 5 1 PDL 3 1 0 IL 4 2 1 PSD 2 0 0 IS 12 11 0 5 3 0 IF 4 3 0 2 0 0 MM 7 5 0 3 2 0 MM 7 5 0 3 2 0 MM 4 2 1 PDL 2 1 1 PDL MS 8 6 3 UDMR 4 1 1 UDM NT 8 7 2 PSD + 2 PDL 3 2 1 PDL OT 7 6 3 PSD + 1 PDL 5 4	DJ	10	9	4 PSD	5	3	2 PSD
GJ 6 4 3 PSD 2 0 0 HR 5 4 4 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM HD 7 5 1 PDL 3 1 0 IL 4 2 1 PSD 2 0 0 IS 12 11 0 5 3 0 IF 4 3 0 2 0 0 MM 7 5 0 3 2 0 MM 7 5 0 3 2 0 MM 4 2 1 PDL 2 1 1 PDL MS 8 6 3 UDMR 4 1 1 UDM NT 8 7 2 PSD + 2 PDL 3 2 1 PDL OT 7 6 3 PSD + 1 PDL 3 2 1 PSD PH 12 10 1 PSD + 1 PDL 5 4 0 SM 5 3 1 UDMR 2 0 0 <td>GL</td> <td>9</td> <td>7</td> <td>3 PSD</td> <td>4</td> <td>2</td> <td>1 PSD</td>	GL	9	7	3 PSD	4	2	1 PSD
HR 5 4 4 UDMR 2 2 2 UDM HD 7 5 1 PDL 3 1 0 IL 4 2 1 PSD 2 0 0 IS 12 11 0 5 3 0 IF 4 3 0 2 0 0 MM 7 5 0 3 2 0 MM 7 5 0 3 2 0 MH 4 2 1 PDL 2 1 1 PDL MS 8 6 3 UDMR 4 1 1 UDM NT 8 7 2 PSD + 2 PDL 3 2 1 PDL OT 7 6 3 PSD + 1 PDL 3 2 1 PSD PH 12 10 1 PSD + 1 PDL 5 4 0 SM 5 3 1 UDMR 2 0 <td>GR</td> <td>4</td> <td>3</td> <td>1 PNL</td> <td>2</td> <td>1</td> <td>1 PNL</td>	GR	4	3	1 PNL	2	1	1 PNL
HD	GJ	6	4	3 PSD	2	0	0
IL 4 2 1 PSD 2 0 0 IS 12 11 0 5 3 0 IF 4 3 0 2 0 0 MM 7 5 0 3 2 0 MM 7 5 0 3 2 0 MH 4 2 1 PDL 2 1 1 PDL MS 8 6 3 UDMR 4 1 1 UDM NT 8 7 2 PSD + 2 PDL 3 2 1 PDL OT 7 6 3 PSD + 1 PDL 3 2 1 PDL OT 7 6 3 PSD + 1 PDL 5 4 0 SM 5 3 1 UDMR 2 1 1 UDM SJ 4 3 1 UDMR 2 0 0 SB 6 4 1 PDL + 1 PSD 3 <t< td=""><td>HR</td><td>5</td><td>4</td><td>4 UDMR</td><td>2</td><td>2</td><td>2 UDMR</td></t<>	HR	5	4	4 UDMR	2	2	2 UDMR
IS 12 11 0 5 3 0 IF 4 3 0 2 0 0 MM 7 5 0 3 2 0 MH 4 2 1 PDL 2 1 1 PDL MS 8 6 3 UDMR 4 1 1 UDM NT 8 7 2 PSD + 2 PDL 3 2 1 PDL OT 7 6 3 PSD + 1 PDL 3 2 1 PSD PH 12 10 1 PSD + 1 PDL 5 4 0 SM 5 3 1 UDMR 2 1 1 UDM SJ 4 3 1 UDMR 2 0 0 SB 6 4 1 PDL + 1 PSD 3 1 0 SV 10 8 2 PDL 4 3 2 PDL TR 6 4 2 PSD + 1 PNL <t< td=""><td>HD</td><td>7</td><td>5</td><td>1 PDL</td><td>3</td><td>1</td><td>0</td></t<>	HD	7	5	1 PDL	3	1	0
IF 4 3 0 2 0 0 MM 7 5 0 3 2 0 MH 4 2 1 PDL 2 1 1 PDL MS 8 6 3 UDMR 4 1 1 UDM NT 8 7 2 PSD + 2 PDL 3 2 1 PDL OT 7 6 3 PSD + 1 PDL 3 2 1 PSD PH 12 10 1 PSD + 1 PDL 5 4 0 SM 5 3 1 UDMR 2 1 1 UDM SJ 4 3 1 UDMR 2 0 0 SB 6 4 1 PDL + 1 PSD 3 1 0 SV 10 8 2 PDL 4 3 2 PDL TR 6 4 2 PSD + 1 PNL 3 1 1 PSD TM 10 8 1 PDL	IL	4	2	1 PSD	2	0	0
MM 7 5 0 3 2 0 MH 4 2 1 PDL 2 1 1 PDL MS 8 6 3 UDMR 4 1 1 UDM NT 8 7 2 PSD + 2 PDL 3 2 1 PDL OT 7 6 3 PSD + 1 PDL 3 2 1 PSD PH 12 10 1 PSD + 1 PDL 5 4 0 SM 5 3 1 UDMR 2 1 1 UDM SJ 4 3 1 UDMR 2 0 0 SB 6 4 1 PDL + 1 PSD 3 1 0 SV 10 8 2 PDL 4 3 2 PDL TR 6 4 2 PSD + 1 PNL 3 1 1 PSD TM 10 8 1 PDL 4 2 1 PDL TU 4 2 0 2 1 1 PDL VS 7 5 1 PSD 3 1 0 VL 6 4 2 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 2 1 1 PSD B 28 27 2 PSD + 1 PDL 12 11 0	IS	12	11	0	5	3	0
MH 4 2 1 PDL 2 1 1 PDL MS 8 6 3 UDMR 4 1 1 UDM NT 8 7 2 PSD + 2 PDL 3 2 1 PDL OT 7 6 3 PSD + 1 PDL 3 2 1 PSD PH 12 10 1 PSD + 1 PDL 5 4 0 SM 5 3 1 UDMR 2 1 1 UDM SJ 4 3 1 UDMR 2 0 0 SB 6 4 1 PDL + 1 PSD 3 1 0 SV 10 8 2 PDL 4 3 2 PDL TR 6 4 2 PSD + 1 PNL 3 1 1 PSD TM 10 8 1 PDL 4 2 1 PDL TU 4 2 0 2 1 1 PDL VS 7 5 1 PSD 3 1 0 VL 6 4 2 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 2 1 1 PSD B 28 27 2 PSD + 1 PDL 12 11 0	IF	4	3	0	2	0	0
MS 8 6 3 UDMR 4 1 1 UDM NT 8 7 2 PSD + 2 PDL 3 2 1 PDL OT 7 6 3 PSD + 1 PDL 3 2 1 PSD PH 12 10 1 PSD + 1 PDL 5 4 0 SM 5 3 1 UDMR 2 1 1 UDM SJ 4 3 1 UDMR 2 0 0 SB 6 4 1 PDL + 1 PSD 3 1 0 SV 10 8 2 PDL 4 3 2 PDL TR 6 4 2 PSD + 1 PNL 3 1 1 PSD TM 10 8 1 PDL 4 2 1 PDL TU 4 2 0 2 1 1 PDL VS 7 5 1 PSD 3 1 0 VL 6 4 2 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 2 <td>MM</td> <td>7</td> <td>5</td> <td>0</td> <td>3</td> <td>2</td> <td>0</td>	MM	7	5	0	3	2	0
NT 8 7 2 PSD + 2 PDL 3 2 1 PDL OT 7 6 3 PSD + 1 PDL 3 2 1 PSD PH 12 10 1 PSD + 1 PDL 5 4 0 SM 5 3 1 UDMR 2 1 1 UDM SJ 4 3 1 UDMR 2 0 0 SB 6 4 1 PDL + 1 PSD 3 1 0 SV 10 8 2 PDL 4 3 2 PDL TR 6 4 2 PSD + 1 PNL 3 1 1 PSD TM 10 8 1 PDL 4 2 1 PDL TU 4 2 0 2 1 1 PDL VS 7 5 1 PSD 3 1 0 VL 6 4 2 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD </td <td>MH</td> <td>4</td> <td>2</td> <td>1 PDL</td> <td>2</td> <td>1</td> <td>1 PDL</td>	MH	4	2	1 PDL	2	1	1 PDL
OT 7 6 3 PSD + 1 PDL 3 2 1 PSD PH 12 10 1 PSD + 1 PDL 5 4 0 SM 5 3 1 UDMR 2 1 1 UDM SJ 4 3 1 UDMR 2 0 0 SB 6 4 1 PDL + 1 PSD 3 1 0 SV 10 8 2 PDL 4 3 2 PDL TR 6 4 2 PSD + 1 PNL 3 1 1 PSD TM 10 8 1 PDL 4 2 1 PDL TU 4 2 0 2 1 1 PDL VS 7 5 1 PSD 3 1 0 VL 6 4 2 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 2 1 1 PSD B 28 27 2 PSD + 1 PDL<	MS	8	6	3 UDMR	4	1	1 UDMR
OT 7 6 3 PSD + 1 PDL 3 2 1 PSD PH 12 10 1 PSD + 1 PDL 5 4 0 SM 5 3 1 UDMR 2 1 1 UDM SJ 4 3 1 UDMR 2 0 0 SB 6 4 1 PDL + 1 PSD 3 1 0 SV 10 8 2 PDL 4 3 2 PDL TR 6 4 2 PSD + 1 PNL 3 1 1 PSD TM 10 8 1 PDL 4 2 1 PDL TU 4 2 0 2 1 1 PDL VS 7 5 1 PSD 3 1 0 VL 6 4 2 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 2 1 1 PSD B 28 27 2 PSD + 1 PDL<	NT	8	7	2 PSD + 2 PDL	3	2	1 PDL
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SJ 4 3 1 UDMR 2 0 0 SB 6 4 1 PDL + 1 PSD 3 1 0 SV 10 8 2 PDL 4 3 2 PDL TR 6 4 2 PSD + 1 PNL 3 1 1 PSD TM 10 8 1 PDL 4 2 1 PDL TU 4 2 0 2 1 1 PDL VS 7 5 1 PSD 3 1 0 VL 6 4 2 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 2 1 1 PSD B 28 27 2 PSD + 1 PDL 12 11 0	PH	12	10	1 PSD + 1 PDL	5	4	0
SB 6 4 1 PDL + 1 PSD 3 1 0 SV 10 8 2 PDL 4 3 2 PDL TR 6 4 2 PSD + 1 PNL 3 1 1 PSD TM 10 8 1 PDL 4 2 1 PDL TU 4 2 0 2 1 1 PDL VS 7 5 1 PSD 3 1 0 VL 6 4 2 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 2 1 1 PSD B 28 27 2 PSD + 1 PDL 12 11 0	SM	5	3	1 UDMR	2	1	1 UDMR
SB 6 4 1 PDL + 1 PSD 3 1 0 SV 10 8 2 PDL 4 3 2 PDL TR 6 4 2 PSD + 1 PNL 3 1 1 PSD TM 10 8 1 PDL 4 2 1 PDL TU 4 2 0 2 1 1 PDL VS 7 5 1 PSD 3 1 0 VL 6 4 2 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 2 1 1 PSD B 28 27 2 PSD + 1 PDL 12 11 0	SJ	4	3	1 UDMR	2	0	0
SV 10 8 2 PDL 4 3 2 PDL TR 6 4 2 PSD + 1 PNL 3 1 1 PSD TM 10 8 1 PDL 4 2 1 PDL TU 4 2 0 2 1 1 PDL VS 7 5 1 PSD 3 1 0 VL 6 4 2 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 2 1 1 PSD B 28 27 2 PSD + 1 PDL 12 11 0		6	4	1 PDL + 1 PSD	3	1	0
TM 10 8 1 PDL 4 2 1 PDL TU 4 2 0 2 1 1 PDL VS 7 5 1 PSD 3 1 0 VL 6 4 2 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 2 1 1 PSD B 28 27 2 PSD + 1 PDL 12 11 0	SV	10	8		4	3	2 PDL
TM 10 8 1 PDL 4 2 1 PDL TU 4 2 0 2 1 1 PDL VS 7 5 1 PSD 3 1 0 VL 6 4 2 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 2 1 1 PSD B 28 27 2 PSD + 1 PDL 12 11 0	TR	6	4	2 PSD + 1 PNL	3	1	1 PSD
TU 4 2 0 2 1 1 PDL VS 7 5 1 PSD 3 1 0 VL 6 4 2 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 2 1 1 PSD B 28 27 2 PSD + 1 PDL 12 11 0			8			2	1 PDL
VS 7 5 1 PSD 3 1 0 VL 6 4 2 PSD 3 1 1 PSD VN 6 5 3 PSD 2 1 1 PSD B 28 27 2 PSD + 1 PDL 12 11 0		4	2	0	2	1	1 PDL
VN 6 5 3 PSD 2 1 1 PSD B 28 27 2 PSD + 1 PDL 12 11 0	VS	7	5	1 PSD		1	0
B 28 27 2 PSD + 1 PDL 12 11 0	VL	6	4	2 PSD	3	1	1 PSD
B 28 27 2 PSD + 1 PDL 12 11 0	VN	6	5	3 PSD	2	1	1 PSD
	В	28	27		12	11	0
	43	4	2	0	2	1	0
Total 315 245 85 137 72 31	Total	315	245	85	137	72	31

M is the magnitude, that is, the number of deputies/senators on circumscription. JUD designates the number of mandates allocated at the level of the county. On the column 50%+1 appears the number of mandates allocated following the "direct" victory, with minimum 50%+1 of the votes of the college. In Arad, the magnitude for CD fixed by the law was 7, being increased with one mandate after the elections. In what regards the numbers of the column JUD, they differ from the data of BEC in the case of CV for the Chamber and in the cases of AR, CV, HR, MH, SM, and TL for the Senate in the sense in which at BEC appears in each case with one unity less. The explication is simple: in these cases, BEC ignored one directly won mandate because the party of winners did not reunite at the level of the county the corresponding electoral coefficient. The mandates won with minimum 50%+1 are still won at the level of the circumscription and thus they appear in the table. The 85 mandates won "directly" at the Chamber pertain 40 PSD 27 PDL, 14 UDMR and 4 PNL, while the 31 of the Senate were won 12 by PSD, 11 by PDL, 7 by UDMR and one by PNL.

Table 14-3 *Parties and Mandates in the Bucharest Circumscription*

Col.	I	II	III	M
1	PDL 4 828	PSD 4 182	PNL 3 793	PNL
2	PDL 4 778	PSD 3 931	PNL 3 653	PNL
3	PDL 5 431	PNL 4 749	PSD 4 711	PNL
4	PDL 10 845	PSD 8 093	PNL 5 195	PDL
5	PDL 6 577	PSD 6 013	PNL 3 249	PSD
6	PSD 8 790	PDL 7 070	PNL 2 393	PSD
7	PDL 6 930	PSD 6 711	PNL 2 690	PSD
8	PDL 7 936	PSD 5 809	PNG 4 101	PDL
9	PDL 8 531	PSD 6 069	PNL 3 781	PDL
10	PDL 7 004	PSD 4 659	PNL 2 837	PDL
11	PDL 8 127	PSD 4 379	PNL 2 394	PDL
12	PDL 8 362	PSD 5 445	PNL 2 246	PDL
13	PDL 8 160	PSD 5 429	PNL 1 700	PDL
14	PDL 8 019	PSD 5 656	PNL 2 333	PDL
15	PDL 8 723	PSD 3 616	PNL 1 188	PDL
16	PDL 5 730	PSD 5 128	PNL 2 639	PSD
17	PSD 4 773	PDL 4 607	PNL 2 011	PSD
18	PSD 9 038	PDL 7 066	PNL 3 441	PSD
19	PSD 11 530	PDL 9 774	PNL 2 599	PSD
20	PSD 12 214	PDL 5 301	PNG 3 600	PSD
21	PSD 5 557	PDL 4 853	PNL 2 593	PSD
22	PSD 3 938	PDL 3 323	PNL 3 315	PNL
23	PSD 10 415	PDL 4 907	PNL 2 144	PSD
24	PDL 8 729	PSD 7 023	PNL 3 819	PDL
25	PDL 11 385	PSD 7 471	PNL 4 313	PDL
26	PDL 6 234	PSD 4 919	PNL 3 642	PSD
27	PDL 6 291	PSD 4 706	PNL 3 069	PNL
28	PDL 7 546	PSD 5 213	PNL 2 452	PDL

On the first column (Col) appears the number of the college. On columns I, II and III – the occupiers of the first place, the second and the third, as the number of votes obtained. M indicates the party to which the mandate was allocated with italics being marked the cases in which candidates obtained the mandate with minimum 50%+1.

Table 15Parties that Passed at Least 3 Electoral Tests

Danter	19	90	19	92	19	96	20	00	20	04	20	08
Party	CD	S	CD	S	CD	S	CD	S	CD	S	CD	S
PSD	263	92	117	49	91	41	139	59	113	46	110	48
PDL	203	92	43	18	43	22	31	13	48	21	115	51
PRM	1	1	16	6	19	8	84	37	48	21	1	-
PNL	29	9	-	-	25	16	30	13	64	28	65	28
PSDR	2	1	10	1	10	1	10	3	-	1	-	-
UDMR	29	12	27	12	25	11	27	12	22	10	22	9
PNŢCD	12	1	41	21	83	27	-	-	-	1	1	-
PUNR	9	2	30	14	18	7	-	-	1	1	1	-
PER	8	1	4	-	5	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
PC		1	-	-	-	-	6	3	19	11	4	1

The table indicates the number of parliamentary mandates obtained either individually, either in coalitions by the parties that passed three out of the five electoral tests, indifferently if they are still in Parliament or not (this is how is explained the fact that appear here PNŢCD and PUNR, absent of the first two legislatures) and indifferent of the fact if they still exist or not (PSDR, for example merged in 2001 with PSDR under the name PSD). I used the present acronyms (and not, for example FDSN – the name that PDSR had at the 1992 elections). For the year 1990 I mentioned, both at the Chamber (CD) as in the Senate (S), the mandates obtained by FSN, of which were detached PSD and PD.

Table 16
The Scores of the Political Families of Romania (1990-2008)

	1990	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	Average
Greens	2,62 MER	0,98 PER*	1,24 PER*	0,84 PER	0,72 FER	0,26 PVE	
	1,69 PER	2,25 MER	0,25 FER*				1,81
	4,31	3,23	1,49	0,84	0,72	0,26	·
	0,38 PDM	3,04 PSM	2,29 PS	0,71 PSM	0,44 PSU	0	
C			2,15 PSM	0,48 PMR	0,35 PMR		
Communists &			1,73 PSMR		0,25 PAS		2,02
extreme left					0,28 PSR		,
	0,38	3,04	6,17	1,19	1,32	0	
	1,83 PDAR	2,99 PDAR	0,84 PNŢ	0,43 PNŢ	0	0	
Agrarian		0,45 PNŢ		·			1,09
minimalists	1,83	3,44	0,84	0,43	0	0	

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	1990	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	Average
	66,31 FSN	27,72 FDSN	21,52 PDSR	36,61 PDSR	36,61 PSD	33,09 PSD	
	1,05 PSoDR	2,40 PSDR*	10,48 PD*	7,03 PD	0,78 FD	,	
Social-democrats	0,53 PSDR	10,19 FSN	2,44 PSDR*		0,21 PND		43,07
		0,87 PsoDR			0,2 PSDCTP		Í
	67,89	41,18	34,44	43,64	37,80	33,09	
	6,41 PNL	3,12 PAC*	6,18 PNL*	6,89 PNL	31, 33 ADA	18,57 PNL	
Liberals and	l '	2,64 PNLAT*	1,24 PNLCD*	4,07 APR		32,36 PDL	
conservatives	0,15 PLLR	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	1,57 ANL	1,40 PNLC			
maximalist and		0,72 PNLCD*	0, 7 9 ANLE	,			20,33
modernist		0,58 NPL	0,08 PLC	0,03 ULB			
		0,51 ULB					
	6,83	10,20	9,86	12, 84	31,33	50,93	
l	2,56 PNȚCD	10,01 PNȚCD*	20,51 PNȚCD*	5,04 CDR	1,86 PNȚCD	0	
Agrarian,			0,74 PAR*	2000	0,47 AP		
Christian					0,32 URR		6,92
populists and/or							·
identitarian right	2,56	10,01	21,25	5,04	2,65	0	
	2,12 PUNR	<i>7,7</i> 2 PUNR	4,46 PRM	19,48 PRM	12,99 PRM	3,15 PRM	
National-populists		3,89 PRM	4,35 PUNR	1,38 PAN	2,24 PNG	2,27 PNG	
on an ethnic or					0,52 PUNR		10,81
religious basis,					0,27 PNDC		
extreme right	2,12	11,61	8,81	20,86	16,02	5,42	
D (1 (0,48 GDC	1,63 PR	1,44 PPR	0,66 PPR	0,18 APCD	0,12 PPCD	
Defenders of	0,34 PLS	0,73 SND	0,87 GDC		0,16 PTD		
specific interests,	0,32 PRNR				0,18 other		1,24
diverse	0,32 PTLDR						
	1,46	2,36	2,31	0,66	0,52	0,12	
Minarities	7,23 UDMR	7,46 UDMR	6,63 UDMR	6,80 UDMR	6,19 UDMR	6,17UDMR	
Minorities	0,99 other	1,43 other	1,71 other	2,57 other	2,88 other	3,45 other	8,92
	8,22	8,89	8,34	9,37	9,07	9,62	

I took into consideration the categories of party families defined by Christian VANDERMOTTEN, Pablo MEDINA LOCKHART, "La géographie électorale de l'Europe centre-orientale", in Jean-Michel DE WAELE (ed.), Partis politiques et démocraties...cit., pp. 17-34. The results are those for the Chamber of Deputies, the scores being calculated on the basis of performances of one or several parties that participated alone or in alliances (this last case is indicated with the help of an asterisk, the score being deducted proportionally with the weight of the respective formation in alliance). I used the following acronyms: ADA = Alianța Dreptate și Adevăr (PNL-PD); ANL = Alianța Națională Liberală; ANLE = Alianța Național-Liberală Ecologistă; AP = Acțiunea Populară; APCD = Alianța Popular Creștin Democrată (PPR+Partidul Renașterea României); APR = Alianța pentru România; CDR 2000 = Convenția Democrată Română 2000; FD = Forța Democrată din România; FDSN = Frontul Democrat al Salvării Naționale; FER = Federația Ecologistă din România; FSN = Frontul Salvării Naționale; GDC = Gruparea Democratică de Centru; NPL = Noul Partid Liberal; MER = Mișcarea Ecologistă din România; PAC = Partidul Alianței Civice; PAN = Partidul Alianța Națională (ex-PUNR + PNR = Partidul Național Român); PAR = Partidul Alternativa României; PAS = Partidul Alianța Socialistă; PD = Partidul Democrat (ex-FSN); PDAR = Partidul Democrat-Agrar din România; PDM = Partidul Democrat al Muncii; PDSR = Partidul Democratiei Sociale din România (ex-FDSN);

PER = Partidul Ecologist din România; PLC= Partidul Liberal Creștin; PLDR = Partidul Liberal Democrat Român (ex-PNLCD); PLLR = Partidul Liberal (al Libertătii) din România; PLS = Partidul Liber-Schimbist; PMR = Partidul Muncitoresc Român; PND = Partidul Noua Democrație; PNDC = Partidul Național Democrat Creștin; PNG = Partidul Noua Generație; PNL = Partidul Național Liberal; PNLAT = Partidul Național-Liberal Aripa Tânără; PNLC = Partidul Național Liberal Câmpeanu; PNLCD = Partidul Național Liberal Convenția Democrată; PNT = Partidul Național Țărănesc; PNŢCD = Partidul Național Țărănesc Creștin-Democrat; PPCD = Partidul Popular și al Protecției Sociale din România; PPR = Partidul Pensionarilor din România; PR = Partidul Republican; PRM = Partidul România Mare; PRNR = Partidul Reconstructiei Nationale din Romănia; PS = Partidul Socialist; PSD = Partidul Social Democrat (PDSR+PSDR); PSDCTP = Partidul Social Democrat Constantin Titel Petrescu; PSDR = Partidul Social-Democrat Român; PSM = Partidul Socialist al Muncii; PSMR = Partidul Socialist Muncitoresc Român; PSoDR = Partidul Socialist Democratic Român; PSR = Partidul Socialist Român; PSU = Partidul Socialist Unit; PTD = Partidul Tineretului Democrat; PTLDR = Partidul Tineretului Liber Democrat din România; PUNR = Partidul Unității Naționale a Românilor/Partidul Unității Națiunii Române; PUR = Partidul Umanist din România; PVE = Partidul Verde Ecologist, alianță a PER și Partidului Verde; UDMR = Uniunea Democrată a Maghiarilor din România; SND = Solidaritatea Național-Democrată; ULB = Uniunea Liberală Brătianu; URR = Uniunea pentru Reconstructia României.

 Table 17

 Governmental Formulas and Parliamentary Majorities (1990-2004)

	Government f	ormula	1	Parliamentary majority			
	Composition	Votes	Man- dates	L Composition L		Man- dates	
1990-1991	FSN	66,31	66,24	FSN	66,31	66,24	
1991-1992	FSN+PNL	72,72	73,54	FSN+PNL	72,72	73,54	
1992-1996	FDSN	27,71	34,31	FDSN+PRM+PUNR+PSM	42,34	51,60	
1996-2000	CDR+USD+UDMR	49,71	58,29	CDR+USD+UDMR	49,71	58,29	
2000-2004	PSD+PUR	36,61	44,92	PSD+PUR+UDMR	43,40	52,74	
2004-2007	DA+UDMR+PUR	44,70	46,18	DA+UDMR+PUR+ minorities	46,87	51,60	
2007-2008	PNL+UDMR	24,18	22,50	PNL+UDMR+PSD+PC+ minorities	63,66	79,00	
2008-	PDL+PSD	65,65	66,96	PDL+PSD	65.65	66,96	

The table designates the votes and mandates obtained in the Chamber of Deputies. I took into account the composition of governments as that of majorities at the beginning of the mandate without considering neither the intra-parliament mobility, nor the repositioning such as that of PUR – which remained in the government formula of 2000-2004 with PSD only until 2003. I did not distinguish between the three governments of 1996-2000 (led by Victor Ciorbea, Radu Vasile and Mugur Isărescu), because their parliamentary support was identical. I distinguished nonetheless between the two Tăriceanu governments very different one from another.

Table 18 *The Evolution of the Mandates of Parties in the Period* 2004-2008

PARTID	28.12.2004			03.04.2007			01.12.2008		
	CD	S	CD+S	CD	S	CD+S	CD	S	CD+S
PSD	113	46	159	107	43	150	105	43	146
PNL	64	28	92	51	22	73	60	24	78
PD*	48	21	69	50	21	71	67	23	76
PRM	48	21	69	30	17	47	21	16	45
UDMR	22	10	32	22	10	32	22	10	32
PUR (PC)	19	11	30	19	12	31	19	10	26
Minorities	18	0	18	18	0	18	18	0	18
Indep.**	0	0	0	32	12	44	13	11	42
Total***	332	137	469	329	137	466	323	137	460

The data considered in the table are 28.12.2004 – the investiture of the 2nd Tăriceanu cabinet; 03.09.2007 – the beginning of the last parliamentary session of the 2004-2008 legislature and, respectively 01.12.2008, the end of the legislature. Some supplementary specifications: * of February 2008 – PDL; ** among the independents April 3, 2007, 26 belonged to PLD, 18 at the Chamber and 8 at the Senate; *** – the 3 missing mandates at 03.04.2007, respectively the 6 missing mandates at 03.09.2007 are a consequence of the freeing of some posts occupied by the members of the Alianța DA. At the end of the legislature there were 9 vacant mandates at the Chamber.