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THREE CRITICAL FACTORS IN THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY: PRODUCT, PROCESS AND PERSONNEL (THE 3P PROJECT)

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Abstract

3P derives from the three very important categories / areas in defining a reform process of the national security intelligence analysis, namely:

- **Process** (the analysis activity, with his entire set of methods or means, internal procedures and standards, but also, with its various types of organization);
- **Product** (the results of the analysis activity, the products which are sent to beneficiaries / users and the feedback or the requests for information from the intelligence consumers);
- **Personnel** (the intelligence analyst, as well as the process of its selection and training).

Why these three P? I must confess that the idea of trying to define the analysis activity, and implicitly, the main parts of a reform in this important area for the activity of each intelligence service came following some discussions I had with colleagues, experts and intelligence analysts. I worked, as co-author, to a paper (presented within an international forum) concerning the evolution of intelligence analysis on these three categories: process, product and personnel. Afterward, I found there is a whole literature that defines the management processes (especially in corporations) or the performance in an organization / company in the 3P logic.

So, I will briefly approach, from a theoretical point of view, the subject of intelligence analysis reform, and I will talk about practical component, starting from those three identified essential factors.

Keywords: intelligence, intelligence analysis, national security, security culture, analytical culture, the 3P Project.

Theoretical Premises

The security risks' dynamics after the end of the Cold War is one of the research topics in the international relations, as well as in subsequent areas of the security studies and intelligence analysis. Among the most known authors that treat the subjects of globalization and widening the security concept there are James Rosenau, Alvin Toffler¹, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in the complex interdependences theories or Ikenberry regarding the security strategies².

¹ Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock*, Random House, New York, 1970.

² John Baylis, Steve Smith, *The Globalisation of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations*, Oxford, University Press, Oxford, 2001.

The changes in the national security area were widely treated both within the organizational theories and the rational choice theory (Cummings³, Mullins⁴), as well as in international relations theories (starting from the Graham Allison and Philip Zelikov study on Cuban missile crisis⁵) or in the psychological studies (regarding the change – Carnall, Burke⁶).

The approaches concerning the change into intelligence analysis are mostly of English origin and are limited to debates on reform of security area and inter-agency cooperation. In this field, there are very famous the studies of „The Democratic Control of the Armed Forces” (DCAF Centre, Geneva) or „Kings College”, London, or „RAND Corporation, in US, as well as those on policies’ analysis carried out in an institutional framework (the analysis of the Parliamentary commissions post September 11 or Treverton’s⁷ and Barger’s⁸ studies).

The first scientific concerns (within US intelligence community) belong to Sherman Kent (whose name was given to the most famous research institute in this field, Centre for Intelligence Studies, CIA) and Richard Heuer jr⁹.

The researches on intelligence analysis have been started after the end of the Second World War along with the development of the analytical domain within CIA.

Gradually, but in a pronounced way in the recent years (in the September 11 period) intelligence specialization (SIGINT, OSINT, HUMINT, etc) and technological development led to the some intelligence studies focused on special fields (secrete sources, use of satellites, combating terrorism and organized crime etc.), but offered a less comprehensive perspective over the entire process reform of intelligence analysis.

There have been advanced researches on the developments in the intelligence area, which has been generated by security systems’ reforms and the assessments produced within different intelligence services in Europe and US, as well as by the development of cooperation between services within NATO and EU.

Nowadays, most of the studies concerning the intelligence area have been generated by the emergence, after the end of the Cold War, of some national

³ T. G. Cummings, E. F. Huse, *Organizational Development and Change*, West, St. Paul Minn, 1989.

⁴ L. J. Mullins, *Management and Organizational Behavior*, Pitman Publishing, London, 1989.

⁵ Graham Allison, Philip Zelikov, *Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Addison Wesley, Logman, Inc., New York, 1999.

⁶ C. A. Carnall, *Managing Change in Organisations*, Prentice Hall International, New York, 1990; W. W. Burke, *Organization Change. Theory and Practice*, 2nd Ed. Sage Publications, 2008.

⁷ Gregory F. Treverton, *Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993.

⁸ Deborah G. Barger, *Towards a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs*, www.rand.org

⁹ Richards J. Heuer Jr., *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999.

intelligence communities (in US, Great Britain etc) having the role to harmonize the objectives of intelligence services and to integrate the collected intelligence. These communities have been passing through a process of fundamental changes with impact on every component structure, but they have achieved, in time, their own logic of institutional development which involves transformation processes which differs from the individual ones - of the intelligence agencies.

Other relevant bibliography sources are the professional articles published in various American and European magazines, especially those in the area of intelligence and intelligence analysis, concerning the fails and success of intelligence services in combating the new security threats or managing the “classic” ones. The Parliamentary commissions established in last years (especially after September 11) for assessing the activity of important intelligence services, have revealed the existence of various dysfunctions which favored the appearance of “analysis failures”. In this context, the need for reforming those systems, on several levels, has become imperative.

In US, the report of commission which investigated the activity of intelligence services after September 11 revealed the existence of shortcomings in ensuring the flows of intelligence and mistakes in assessing the available data (minimizing / ignoring the risk or, by contrary, exaggerating it).

With respect to the reform of intelligence analysis intelligence within Romanian intelligence community, there haven't been yet developed researches or studies dealing with this subject in a unitary and comprehensive way.

Elements That Involve the Necessity of Change

Basically, re-conceptualization process of the intelligence paradigm was influenced by the activity of several exogenous and endogenous factors.

- Among the main internal factors, inducing changes in intelligence field there are:

a) the major changes in legislation or national security strategies – as well as those generated by September 11 terrorist attack.

In the last decade, many states updated its doctrines, policies, strategies and legislations on security intelligence and started the reform of security domain (including intelligence) by pursuing specific goals and purposes:

- clarifying and developing the concepts within this domain;
- unequivocally defining the elements representing the condition for national security;
- settling the general consensus on the aimed goals and the involved tools for ensuring or promoting the national security interests;
- improving the architecture of national intelligence system accordingly to security challenges;

b) relevant adjustments of institutions' s budgets as a result of transformation of institutional priorities and the personnel decrease¹⁰;

c) beginning the major reform process after the end of Second World war and after that, the September 11;

d) rising the need to extend the cooperation (at national and especially, international level);

e) modifying the internal requirements of intelligence agencies (both pursuant to modifying the national legislations and the need to adapt to the new challenges);

f) rising the needs on recruiting and guiding the personnel, modifying the organizational culture and the methods and procedures;

In some cases the changes occurred within intelligence domain have been generated by:

- leakage of classified information or discover the targets, methods etc. which have generated legislative investigations or public opinion's pressures;
- intelligence failures (not necessarily those which become public);
- changes of political system or certain governmental politics or decisions (including those of decrease of bureaucracy system);
- the dynamics of internal relationships (cooperation protocols) or external (for example Club of Berne implies adjustments of procedures or sometimes of structures);
- changing the services' leadership (every new leadership is tempted to impose its own perspective);
- institutional necessities (concerning the flexibility and reduce of bureaucracy)

• The most important exogenous determinations are posed by the complex and dynamic developments of the security environment, namely:

a) enhancing the threats area and multiplication the sources with high potential risk – in the context of growing the number of the international actors (as a consequence of disintegration of some multinational States), growing the number of “fragile societies” / “weak States” and assuming an international and mainly regional active role by some emergent powers. I have in view those factors that started to shape the activity of intelligence structures:

- proliferation of actors, conflict sources and type of force used;
- cross-border character, enhancing the scope and the impact of threats;
- technological progress caused by increasing the vulnerabilities of many different and disparate sources;
- prominence of unconventional forms of conflict;
- increasingly targeting violence toward the urban zone and internal security area, duplicate by social tensions generated by economic, ethnic, religious and ideologic conditions¹¹.

¹⁰ Graham Allison, Philip Zelikov, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-147.

¹¹ Gregory Treverton, *The Next Step in Reshaping Intelligence*, Rand Corporation, 2005.

b) emphasizing the globalization process – that generated, among others, the “explosion” of information (multiplication the sources of information) and enhancing the benefits of technical scientific progress – generated, also, the globalization of risks.

We witness a diminishing of classical dichotomies intern-extern and politic-military as of the risks development on the States. Beyond the benefits derived from borders dissolution and growing competitiveness as a consequence of the structural changes, globalization – through phenomena that it generates – determines multiple tensional situations, demanding changes of the security environment.

Division and integration, internationalization and regionalization, centralization and decentralization are several phenomena that create insecurity. Terrorism, organized crime, economic crisis, starvation, climatic changes are global.

In the current social economic conditions, the unequal access to resources makes the difference between states and continues the conflicts inter-States. We witness an increasing of the natural disasters, reducing energy resources, demographic growing related with reducing water and food resources. These phenomena continue to affect the global stability and security. The present situation is the consequence of “breaking down” some States following a deficient governing, precarious economic conditions, maintaining ethnic religious conflicts, weakness of the local and regional co-operation forms, technological difference, etc.

According to Dolghin, the fight for energy resources dominates the geo-politics of the XXI Century. The resources are “where is not necessary” and in the possession of “those who do not deserve them”¹².

The accelerated process of integration, interdependence and communication – usually, defined, through globalization –, appears as the most challenge to the national security system as well as to the States.

Technical scientific progress, accelerated rhythms of IT&C development and diversifying the types of information war have enhanced the perspectives and scope of the planning in the national security institutions and have imposed the necessity of strategic assessments.

Transposed at level of intelligence structures, this situation imposed to overcome the intuitive forms of prevision based on suppositions and extrapolations and the heuristic ones (based on intuition, flair and creativity) and to develop early warning systems;

c) the hardly predictable character of the new types of asymmetric and unconventional threats, comparing by the classical threats, focused on the State security.

¹² Nicolae Dolghin, *Geopolitics. Dependence of Energy Resources*, UNAp Publishing House, Bucharest, 2004.

Currently, the most important challenge that the international community face with is caused by the complexity of the new types of threats. These are difficult to identify, observe and interpret, considering that the security challenges differ from a country to another and from a social group to another. While the classical threats could be geographically localized (risks factors to the Nation-State), the new asymmetric threats could probable affect any zone.

To anticipate and, probably, to shape the future, as well as to promote national security strategies / politics and to adopt decisions with major implications at state level are necessary certain and substantiated prognoses on a variety of domains: economic trends, from technologic development and climatic changes to diversification the forms of fighting (particularly, the atypical forms of conflict as the counterterrorism war).

Getting intelligence and working out national security strategies imply, on long term, to establish the challenging domains and defining objectives. In line with this aspect, utility of the intelligence analysis (strategic prognosis) consist in the fact it could provide an advantage to that person who better knows requires of a future war, and timely draws the necessary conclusion for implementing them.

In order to counteract the new types of risks and threats, intelligence services initiated processes both to change the acting component of the intelligence activity (enhanced competencies for the intelligence services in fields as energy security, food security, etc., determined an increasingly division and specializing of the analysis and collecting data activity) and to increase the role of analytical component (enhancing the anticipative and preventing component) in order to improve the capability of response to these new challenges.

Increasingly more analysts noted that security is not only a military power issue but also an issue of access to intelligence, of understanding the critical role of complementarity between decision and intelligence. The focus is not targeted on combating any more, but on the activity of prevention. This determines a proportional increase of the role and real importance of the intelligence services. It is to be noted the fact that the global development of events formed an unknown issue as domain of study: the relationship between intelligence and security, where intelligence is the strategic resource of power;

d) the non-operative developments (that is not necessary related with the dynamic of the risks and threats (as the technologic ones) to the security). IT & C developments are equally opportunities for modernizing services and also challenges (that could cause further risks and difficulties in monitoring risks);

e) a direct (arming a hostile neighboring country, war) or imminent (environment, health) threat;

f) joining to regional politic / military, economic organizations (e.g. NATO and UE) that imposes new standards, institutionalizes some forms of cooperation (that determines structural reorganization, new objectives and missions etc.).

Usually, the changing in intelligence services is an outcome of simultaneous action of exogenous and endogenous factors.

Praxiological Guiding Marks to Underline the Changing in Intelligence Activity

- The reality showed that their changing is mainly a reactive process that occurs when a inflection strategic point is reached, beyond which the current procedures (“business as usual”) could not efficiently work any more.

For a really changing in the intelligence field, there are necessary an enhanced strategy of transforming, a new doctrinal framework, a rapid adjusting and “continuous learning” system and, in a perspective not so far, transforming the national security system in an intelligence service focused on network (through interconnecting the intelligence platforms of the component structures, disseminating them for analyzing multi-sources, conducting operations in cooperation).

As an argument, it is to be noting that after 2011 9/11, the reform in intelligence field in the majority of the Western countries generated two significant developments:

- at the operational level, developing some intelligence “fusion” capabilities, to integrate data held by different governmental bodies;
- at the strategic level, developing the national intelligence community, as well as the international cooperation, in formats bi and multilateral (with noticeable outcomes, explicitly mentioned for growing the common potential to prevent and counteract the security risks, accommodating the actionable procedures, etc.).

Among the most imperative needs to efficiently manage the current and future risks are the enhancing the national and international cooperation.

- Within the process of changing the intelligence analysis (regardless its level of profoundness or the fact it is revolutionary or, on the contrary, evolutionary) is very important to establish and, subsequently, to monitor:

- the necessities that impose changing (e.g.: modification of the national priorities and objectives after Romana’s joining to NATO and UE, changing the picture of risks and threats to the national security, etc., enhancing the cooperation with Euro-Atlantic services, and also with the other institutions in the national security system);
- the principles and objectives targeted through the process of changing (e.g. defining and implementation of some scientific methods for intelligence analyzing and human resources management, growing the institutional flexibility, the quality of activity and the capacity of response to the challenges as well as the security opportunities, and the strengthening of the institutional profile);

- the achieved or foreseen outcomes, in every relevant component (structural, functional, ruling, resources management, internal and external relationship) and the effects on the component of the intelligence process.

The intelligence reform cannot pursue anything but designing a more efficient and flexible organization, connected to the informational society, capable to rapidly react to the security challenges and to pro-actively follow its responsibilities, open to the public opinion, and functioning not only based on rules and procedures, but also adopting new attitudes and mentalities.

• From a practitioner's perspective, among the main drivers of change one could mention:

- the detailed planning of change stages and the thorough preparation of their launching;
- the consultation of the organization members since the first stages of change planning together with the permanent communication with them, with the purpose of informing the members on the stage objectives and results, as well as on the corrections needed;
- the acceptance and the undertaking of the expected decisions, as well as the exact understanding, by each member, of his / her role within the system;
- the alteration not only of the objectives, tasks, structure and organization but also of the essential features of the organizational culture and mentalities, impacting both the internal environment, as well as the relations with the external environment.

The success of the transformation decisively depends on the people working for the intelligence agencies, on their quality, authority and determination to take over the role of main internal agents of change. However, the success is also the result of the external agents contribution (decision-makers, partner services, etc.), as well as of the people involved in modeling the change (consultants or specialists).

The approach on the change in the intelligence domain must have as starting point intelligence imperatives analysis after the Cold War and taking into account 9/11 events, which lead to the identification of multiple deficiencies at the level of the intelligence communities. Among the deficiencies, one could mention the lack of joint standards and practices for the internal and external structures, the reduced capacity to establish the priorities and use the resources, the plenty of tasks, the complex organization and functioning of the intelligence work, the extreme secrecy and the structural barriers for cooperation.

We must also equally take into account the intrinsic features of the intelligence services (the conservatism, the specific hierarchy, the security agenda etc.), as well as the new requests for them, stemming from the significant shifts in the security environment, the technological boom, and

customers needs and expectations regarding the accuracy of predictions and the control of unexpected developments.

Why 3P?

Starting with the previously mentioned considerations and the day-to-day activity assessments within an intelligence analysis department we could consider that the three Ps are becoming crucial factors in the reform and modernization processes regarding the intelligence analysis within the intelligence communities and services.

The need for an integrated approach of the three factors results from the fact they cannot be analyzed separately:

- it is not feasible to solely improve the analytic process (for example by implementing new scientific methods for analysis, creating new working methodologies or extending the cooperation with the academia), in the absence of professional analysts. The improvement of the analysis process cannot be an objective by itself if it doesn't reside in the augmentation of the predictive dimension, as well as of the analytic products quality;
- it is not desirable human resources training exclusively, in the absence of an increase in the quality of the analysis process and without the two above-mentioned objectives to be materialized in intelligence products improvement and diversification;
- it cannot be achieved an increase in the quality of the analytic products, in order to meet the increasingly complex and diversified customers needs, in the absence of improving the other two factors: the analysis process and the personnel.

● *The First P – The Process*

As long as the intelligence work has as main purpose, generally speaking, to reduce consumers inherent – “natural” uncertainty, specific to the complex national security issues, as well as their induced uncertainty (by manipulation and disinformation operations), the analysis process is mainly oriented to transform the results of the intelligence work into a specific contribution to state's and citizens security.

From a functional perspective, intelligence analysis must have a pivotal role between national security intelligence collection and processing, and dissemination (information).

Any explicative model used in the intelligence studies starts with the intelligence cycle. The classical cycle implies certain logic, even a linear one: request / planning – collection – processing / analysis – dissemination. Analysts and managers from different intelligence agencies with significant traditions are proposing new versions of the classical intelligence cycle where, given the informational flood, the analysis is not only a part of the overall process, but a necessary input to every stage of the cycle.

Therefore, in the launching stage of the intelligence process (the result of either a consumer request, or the internal planning process), the analysis should contribute to the orientation of intelligence collection, the precedence of the objectives etc. Within the collection stage, selecting the targets and risks to be monitored implies an analysis on the priorities of the state and the hierarchy of national security risks. Within the processing stage, the analysis becomes self-referential when it has the objective to assess its own product (along a specific period, taking into account the ratio between the predictions and the effective developments etc.). Furthermore, while disseminated to the intelligence consumers, the analysis is playing a critical role regarding the shape and content of the intelligence product, the feed-back assessment, the identification of ways to consolidate the cooperation between the producer (analyst) and consumer (intelligence customer), and even regarding the development of a common language for them.

From the methodological perspective, it is necessary to improve the analysis processes and products by continuously adapting the structure and the working methods, in a way that the final product to be obtained as fast as possible, at a high quality level and efficiently (cost-benefit ratio).

In order to eliminate the situation where the intelligence analysis is failing due to the limits of the analytical process, a reform of intelligence analysis should envisage to:

- theoretically (re)design the analysis domain, for creating new instruments for work standardization, and developing the methodology extensively (the increase in the number of research methods, including by implementing new methods and techniques used by private intelligence structures - benchmarking, reengineering, risk and strategic management, competitive intelligence etc. - as well as by enlarging their domain for applicability) and intensively (refining/perfecting the used research methods). There also could be extremely useful to import methods from other sciences, especially social sciences, applicable in the current intelligence work.

The necessity of developing a conceptual apparatus for intelligence analysis is build on the concern regarding the elimination of the

- confusions generated by the absence of consensus on the used / operable notions and concepts in intelligence analysis;
- implement lessons learned mechanisms, in order to allow the inventory and sharing (even since the educational process) of the factors influencing analysis work (analysis errors, limits or deficiencies determined by some other factors, such as the psychological ones, the timelines etc.);
 - cross-disciplinary address the security problems / phenomena and elaborate multi-source analytical products;
 - value open / public sources, taking into account that the “open society” and the flood of available information is facilitating the use of “unclassified” methods in motivating and implementing the security policies;
 - focus the analysis work on the development of the capacities and capabilities needed for elaborating predictive / anticipative intelligence products, in order to allow vulnerabilities identification and the countering of the risks challenging national security;
 - push for the use of intuitive-predictive techniques (opportunities analysis, reduced probability assessment, scenario method, concurrent hypotheses analysis, conflicting decisions analysis – corresponding to the strategic intelligence) in order to meet customers requests and needs, focused on assessing the implications and emphasizing the uncertainties.

I would support the idea regarding the need for a conceptual apparatus for intelligence analysis with Johnstons’s¹³ findings, who – after hundreds of interviews and multiple participations to US working teams, immediately after 9/11 / didn’t identified any standard analytical method for intelligence analysis.

The author is mentioning that “*the most common practice is to conduct limited brainstorming on the basis of previous analysis, thus producing a bias toward confirming earlier views. [...] None of the analytic agencies knows much about the analytic techniques of the others. In all, there tends to be much more emphasis on writing and communication skills than on analytic methods. [...] Most training is on-the-job.*”¹⁴

I think that as the operatives have to learn human sources approaching and recruiting techniques, the analysts have to know and use analysis methods.

A particular importance for this complex approach, although a new concept within the domestic intelligence community, has the meta-analysis, which could also be called “the analysis of analysis”. From this perspective, the concept of meta-analysis designates:

¹³ Johnston Rob, *Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community. An Ethnographic Study*, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington DC, 2005.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 3.

- on the one hand, the assessment – mainly in terms of efficiency / operatively – of the degree of harmonization between the methods and techniques employed during the analytical process and national security data and information to be processed with a view to elaborate intelligence products;
- on the other hand, the complex theoretical approach meant to: identify the intimate mechanisms that define the analytical process specific to the intelligence area and to (re)configure the used conceptual and methodological instruments in order to improve analysis and prognosis by stimulating critical thinking.

Johnston¹⁵ endorse the foundation of an “*Improvement Performance Infrastructure*”, able to measure the actual and ideal analytical performances, to compare them (in order to reveal the performance lacks), to intervene (with the aim of improving the analysis) and, subsequent, to measure once again the performance (to evaluate the efficacy of the interventions).

From a structural point of view, the proper projection of the analytical levels’ attributions is essential for setting up networks of communication between the intelligence structures (gathering and analysis) and for establishing various efficient response mechanisms.

The IT platforms have, from this perspective, a major role. They aim at facilitating the interaction (especially as far as the *task-forces* are concerned), improving the operability (in receiving and recognizing the value of the inputs used in elaborating the intelligence produces) as well as in augmenting the interaction between the analysis and intelligence gathering.

● *The Second „P” – The Personnel*

According to the “3P Project”, is indispensable to implement a functional model of professional training (as far as the intelligence analysis is concerned) having as priorities the training of:

- new employed individuals;
- trainers (given that they will have a major role in identifying the existing training needs as well as in upgrading the existing training programs).

As far as the new employees are concerned, the selection of personnel and recruitment policies are essential. After their employment, their intense and staged training is indispensable.

The training has to start from the premise that “what most people know about this job is mostly false. It is the duty of the organization and its recruiters

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 85.

to present its correct image and to work in order to destroy the already established myths”¹⁶.

From a functional perspective, the imperative of developing the analytical capabilities (tactically and strategically) in order to identify the best methods for linking the existing capabilities to the priorities of national security is a fact. This is *sine qua non* goal for the intelligence agencies, most of which having various and extensive programs for training the individuals involved in the analytical activity.

Modernizing this critical component of the analytical intelligence aim at identifying the needs of the analyst’s own needs of selection and professional development, within the framework of his/her career within an analytical department.

The selection methods have to shift from a passive attitude (publishing the educational offer and taking any *Resume* or application into account) to an offensive one: selection on specialized websites, information campaigns in the Universities training the specialists the intelligence agencies need, taking part in job-related activities etc. For some posts (such as top posts) head hunting companies might help.

From a structural perspective, it is important to have various psychological tests (starting with the selection process) focusing on the vocation-aptitudes. Also, professional tests (based on competences and knowledge) can support the recruitment process. Later on, work diagnoses might be extremely helpful, focusing on: the psycho-professional profile of the analyst (as well as on the features for shaping future generations of analysts) and the identification of the performance criteria (allowing the identification of significant elements in assuring the analysts’ efficiency as well as their activity’s evaluation criteria).

Nonetheless, developing experience-exchange mechanisms (between various analytical departments and, also, between areas of intelligence gathering and analysis) and generalizing the good practices might contribute at optimizing the analytical process, broadening the analysts’ knowledge horizon and avoiding the errors as far as their shaping is concerned.

From a relational perspective, is vital to have permanent exchanges of opinion, projections, experience etc. with similar structures within Western intelligence services as well as connections to academically research linked to the national security. Keeping the analysts updated with the realities of the security context as well as the fundamental researches in related fields (economy, international relationships, administrative studies etc.) make possible

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 78.

a proper understanding of the security evolutions they have to evaluate periodically. Attending scientific conferences, seminars and round-tables keep the analysts' minds open, allow them to have initiative and a pro-active attitude (in regards to their study object), to be creative and, in the same time, equally, to practice their critical approach.

“An analysis culture rooted in cooperation and interaction, on decisional relevance, implies automatically the development of a more subtle relationship between the various levels of the intelligence”¹⁷.

From a cognitive perspective, given the inherent difficulties of processing complex information, analysts have to be encouraged to clearly separate the assumptions by deductions and to specify the degree and the incertitude source involved in the meta-analysis which periodically reexamines the key problems in the context. The analysts have to be stimulated to be innovative as well as rigorous, to use the analytical instruments (scientifically validated), to underline the methods presenting various view points and to present (in intelligence products for the decision-makers) not only the limits but also the virtues of analysis.

From a managerial perspective, is important to create an organizational medium for stimulating the analysis and assuring the training in intelligence-related analysis, focused on the endeavor to widen the analyst's mental model.

Given that the analyst has to estimate – based on the available information, his own experience and his own psychological abilities (intuition, creativity, imagination) – the evolution tendencies of the threat indicators or their emergence, there is a risk for the intelligence analysis to be limited by the mental human capabilities and to wear the burden of using “mental fixations” or “lens”¹⁸.

The following are the reasons for which they have to be developed:

- modern policies for the selection of the intelligence analysts (used by Euro-Atlantic Services) and for stimulating the performances (individual or teamwork);
- programs (as diversified as possible) for the training of the analysts, by means of experience exchanges with other Services, connection to trends of scientific research in expertise areas, attending seminars and conferences as well as stimulation of individual permanent training.

Work's fulfillment is very important not only for gaining the optimal status in the performance of the analysts but also for limiting the numbers of resignations in the intelligence agencies. For these reasons, creating an optimal

¹⁷ George Cristian Maior coord., *A Brains War. Intelligence, Information Services and Strategic Knowledge in the XXI Century*, RAO Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010, p. 59.

¹⁸ Richards Heuer Jr., *op. cit.* pp. 45-99.

working environment (based on meritocracy, able to stimulate the professional performances and the access to the management positions) is a must. The non-provoked resignations – also known as “deserting”¹⁹ – have consequences both in keeping the secrecy of the classified information (known by the analysts) as well as in regards to the finances, given the high costs needed for the specialization of this special category of personnel²⁰.

• *The Third P – The Product*

National security has a multidimensional character, requiring an integrated and interdisciplinary approach. Its accomplishment is possible only within the frameworks of the existence of suitable institutional mechanisms between the forces and the *levers* aiming at defending and promoting the national interests.

Countering the actual complex threats implies the implementation of an integrated way of response, involving political, social, diplomatic, informational, military and other categories of elements. It requests: improvement of the relationships with the beneficiaries of national security information in order to have an efficient feed-back, capable of (re)orientate, subsequently, the intelligence activity; strengthening of the cooperation between the specialized structures within national security; opening communication and cooperation channels between the intelligence analysts and the academic scholars or researchers (having an expertise that might contribute to improving the analyses and assessments).

From a methodological perspective, is becoming obvious the fact that, in the actual context, the activity of the institutions involved in assuring the security climate has to be organized in a manner which allows the analysis structures to adapt and to face the new provocations (prefigured by risks and threats’ extension, in regards to the national security).

Given that the demands to inform the decision-makers are based on *actionable* intelligence (tactical analyses needed for taking specific decision in various areas) as well as on *strategic* intelligence (as a consequence of the complex evolutions in the security domain), in the process of reform of the intelligence analysis both analytical types (*tactical and strategic*) have to have an equal importance. The classical terminology might lead, in a first phase, to wrong conclusions: intelligence as analytical product is *actionable* in itself. One might choose a specific course of action or, on a strategic level, might determine (given the available evaluations) the advantages or disadvantages of a certain state policy, the assumed risks and the way that specific policy has impact over national security.

¹⁹ Johnston Rob (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 86.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 87.

One of the unwanted effects of the relationship between the producer and the consumer of intelligence, the *excessive-information*, generates by default certain selection difficulties in the “news-ocean” of the data which reflects correctly a certain reality. The national security reality goes progressively from the *black and white*, concrete reality, to the area of perception, to images on the reality that various actors involved in security build.

In comparison with these changing realities, the tactical intelligence can be an anchor, a substrate of reality, while the strategical intelligence is trying to make a prediction, a transversal vision of all layers of reality. From this point of view, both are vitals and reinforce each other.

The failure analysis of information activity to foresee a surprise (for example: attacks of 11th September 2001, Indian nuclear test in 1998) reveals the importance to be attached to the same extent, strategic assumptions and estimates based on technical indications, the occurrence of minimum tactics indicators which enter at discrepancy with strategic assumptions being able to point out a possible surprise.

In terms of structure, analysis activity involves both support management decision taking at the leadership level, by making available to beneficiaries of products designed to substantiate the adoption and effective implementation of measures to promote national interests.

There are many forms in which information activity is done to inform beneficiaries, but most often support remained, despite technological developments, paper. There are few services (especially in Anglo-Saxon system) currently practice direct networking between producer („briefer”) and consumer (makers of state).

Some analysts believe that the consumer should be careful to catch between the moments when he’s willing to listen and when he’s going to take a decision. Beneficiaries have been and won’t be interesting (for example, ex-president of Unites States, Jimmy Carter) to show importance to the intelligence products and do not count them. That doesn’t mean they are good or bad politicians.

Beyond the concrete forms of development of this relationship is important to build a real partnership based on mutual trust between producer and consumer, allowing the quick and accurate knowledge of the needs of the consumer and capture of relevant reactions so useful for planning the intelligence activities, but also understanding the strength and limits of this kind of activity.

„So, only through a partnership between producers and consumers, often difficult and tortuous one which always must be validated, supported and defended can intelligence define in an effective way those competitive advantages so much needed in strategic knowledge, the only can decide a victory or failure of the state in security field”²¹.

²¹ George Cristian Maior coord, *op. cit.*, p. 31

From relation perspective, a reform in the field of intelligence analysis need to aim at the imperative of adaptation of analytic product both consumers needs and its security agenda to its physiological profile. The implementation of various methods such as neuro linguistic programming or distance personality study can be extremely useful for adequacy of the message to the beneficiary profile.

There are necessary to be implemented clear standards and high exigencies both in ensuring objectivity and credibility of analytical products, and in editing them. These must be two-ply by various auditing and evaluations mechanisms of intelligence products, which can offer monthly rigorous internal perspective about possible errors or efficiency of informing action.

The role of intelligence consumer within the information cycle is very important, assuring the efficiency of the activity of national security. In this respect, one might prospect various typologies of settling the relationship between the producer and the consumer as well as getting the feed-back (allowing permanent adjustments of information's gathering and analysis).

Intelligence structures have to empathize. This means that they have to *put themselves in interlocutor's shoes* (the *consumer's shoes*), to identify their needs (justified needs, related to national security objectives and matching the legal attributions) and to try to accomplish them.

The empathy and the fair attitude and the relation between the producer and the consumer (natural in democracy) suppose that the producer tries to persuade the consumer, knowing or his/hers needs or supposing his/hers misinterpretations or difficulties, understanding his/hers legal, political and public agenda's boundaries and knowing, as well, the producer and consumer's limits, originated in their human condition.

As a former analyst said (one of the few who had the opportunity to become, after a while, beneficiary): "we have to understand that we all make mistakes". We admit so easily the idea that our predecessors were wrong, and history is full of accepted errors (producers and consumers of intelligence), but we do not except that, maybe in this moment, it is possible that someone make mistakes (in an intelligence product) or a beneficiary (adopting to certain decisions)

It is possible that now (when you read these lines) an analyst commits an understanding error or a decedent assumes, today, several decisions, including one to be wrong or to generate perverse effects (unplanned) in future.

Guiding Points for Developing an Analytical Culture within the Intelligence Community in Romania

- One of the aims of any project for changes within the intelligence analysis domain should be the development of an analytical culture in the national intelligence community, in order to implement measures that generate

added-value in the products and process of analysis, as well as the enhancement of the professional training level of analysts.

The development of an analytical culture needs certainly time, given the fact that in the most part of the post-communist period the main institutional objective were targeting to products (intelligence activity outcomes) and not to processes and much less to personnel. According to Treverton, the analysts should become a dynamic for changing, working successively in other security agencies, employing personnel from outside and organizing brainstorming with personnel as routine actions, not as an exception. “They should spend time outside not in their offices, sharing assessments with other experts and verifying their agendas with decision makers”²².

Adjusting the analytical component of the intelligence process to the security environment changes requires development of an analytical culture on three levels:

- at individually level, through reshaping the training and developing programs and attending courses / change of experience with other structures of the security national system, foreign services and academic environment.

Valorizing the potential and developing new competencies and skills of analysts require a coherent program for carrier developing that resulted in well-shaped character of some stages as initializing, training, and permanent development;

- at institutionally (organizationally) level, through reshaping the current practices in the intelligence analysis domain, as well as developing an analytical culture. In this domain, a critical area is represented by developing mechanisms and assimilating the outcomes of some processes and lessons learned that draw out the needs of changing through assessing the previous errors and mistakes;
- with regard to the external environment, through: supporting the analysts’ attendance both as observers and as lecturers at activities, courses, programs conducted by the academic and scientific community; encouraging the analysts’ attendance at change of experience with their counterparts in the foreign partner services, community or Euro-Atlantic security organizations, symposiums, seminars and other forums of foreign co-operations; developing the intra-institutional co-operation through flexible mechanisms of co-ordination and developing tools for timely communication between analysis and operational sectors.

● Actually, “The 3 P Project” furthers, on one hand, a permanent adjusting of the intelligence analysis (on the three above-mentioned levels) in order to cope with the challenges in the security risks domain and, on the other

²² Gregory F. Treverton, *Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information*, op. cit., p. 246.

hand, to introduce scientifically confirmed tools in: the analytical process (methods and techniques from other disciplines), products (adjusting the message to the beneficiary's profile and the consumers' profile too) and the personnel selection and training process.

As for the analytical managers (on different levels) (subject non-approached in this dissertation), I consider they should be permanent focused on the improvement of the performances from the prospective of the three key factors and they should advance from the stance of delivering analytical products to supplying knowledge one. They are not leaders (heads) of departments any more, but also of knowledge. Their authority will be lesser and lesser formal and bureaucratic and increasingly anticipative and informal. They should not indicate the way to do but the way forward of the structures and personnel they lead by.

They should encourage the dynamic forms of organization and ensure the transition from the hierarchical rigid structures to flexible working groups, since the modern intelligence services are lesser pyramidal and increasingly "network-centric" type²³. Any intelligence analytical manager should stop his current activity to prospect his future and to encourage other individuals to act for reaching the "future" desirable persons.

- Any reforming, adjusting plan, etc. should be developed to meet the future or "futures", since is more and more difficult to anticipate what the future day will bring us.

„In a world of uncertainties, the intelligence structures are not relying exclusively on the former succeeding strategies to project the future strategies.”²⁴

World is changing, from an essentially (quantifiably, visibly) threatening one – to one dominated by (diffuse, formless, with lesser predictable developed) risks and surprises (impossible to anticipate); from classical wars to cyber, economic, cognitive ones; from linear, predictable, quantifiable developments to non-linear, accidentally, diffuse ones, from symmetry to multiple asymmetries. Surprises, known in the specialty literature as "black swans", will be increasingly present in our life.

The event "black swan" has three attributes: is an isolated case, "beyond the usual current expectations" since in the past nothing indicated the possibility to occur it; has a significant impact and "retrospective (not inclusively prospective) predictability" that allow us to explain it after its occurring²⁵.

²³ Robert M. Clark, *Intelligence Analysis: A Target – Centric Approach*, CQ Press, Washington DC, 2007.

²⁴ George Cristian Maior coord., *op. cit.*, p. 27.

²⁵ Nassim Nicholas Taleb, *Black Swan. The Impact of the Highly Improbable*, Curtea Veche Publishing House, Bucharest, 2008, p. 13.

We already face with a real tsunami in the information technology domain (it is not an accident that the Romanian Intelligence Service named its strategic vision on 2011-2015 “SRI in the informational era”). Who anticipated wikileaks event? And the “explosion” of the socializing networks? The facebook, twitter enhancing and their use not only socializing but also targeting the political area (see the facebook effect on young people in MENA or “twitter revolution” in the Republic of Moldova) will result in reshaping the social theories. Who thinks that these spontaneous, un-structured and virtual forms of association without obvious political aims, without registered office, without leaders and political platforms form could become non-State significant actors in the sociological or international relationship theories? The influence of an idea or an objective posted on facebook could be stronger than the one promoted by a State institution. Internet intends to replace the written media and soon the audio and video ones.

Betts states that intelligence is a domain in which the fail is unavoidable, as the planning of resources and data collecting is realizable only on the current priorities and not on the future ones. Automatically, the intelligence agencies focus their efforts only on the current risks and not on the future ones that always led to the strategic surprises²⁶.

This is the reason we should change the approaching way, to see reality from many angles (perspectives). We should train our analysts for better facing the future (not current) risks. We should introduce the scenario analysis and simulations in the intelligence analysis (several federal Agencies in US use simulation analytical scenario) as standard procedures in the current activities.

The future is of the futurologists, if they will be integrated in analysts' teams and is also of the SF authors, film directors and scenarist whose opinion should be periodically asked by analysts.

- Besides, at the national security level, forms of inventorying the (probable, improbable) “futures” should be invented. Although the national security is not only a responsibility of certain State institutions but also of the entire society (it is a common assess) and certain domestic vulnerabilities (duplicated by probable errors or lacking of some decisions) and the development of the security environment equally influent the State, society, the citizen. In Romania the resilience concept is not operational. The resilience should be part of the Country National Defense Strategy and transpose in modalities of post-event acting, with very clear implementing procedures, which allow an immediately intervention (any second of delay could resulted in multiplication the consequences).

²⁶ Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failure are Inevitable”, *World Politics*, 31, no. 1, October 1978, p. 78.

I don't want to conclude in a pessimistic tone, but it is necessary to mention I attended many international conferences and symposiums. In those situations, at the same table there are: State (governmental and parliamentary) institutions, intelligence services, NOGs, academics / scientists and persons from the security private area. In Romania, this situation is difficult to image as possibility. The international traditions or vanity determine us to work "with us and for us". We live in a suspicious, apprehensive, anxious society that is fighting the future (or, anyway, it do not intend to shape, develop the future) and its (often unpredictable) consequences implicitly. The future is uncertain as it is a development of self interests.

We do not determine what will be our image or what will make over 20-30 years (by the way, we have no significant study regarding the future image of Romania in 20-30 years), in order plan influencing that future: to already invest in research, education, infrastructure, etc.

In the political programs and security strategies in Romania, since 1990 to present, there is no word "future". Therefore, it is no thinking or interest with this specificity. We have not courses of strategic thinking for civil servants and we have not think-tanks specialized in national security. Probably, this is the moment for planning that infrastructure to ensure the desired future.