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Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Ercolani, G. (2011). From George Smiley to Quantum or on Fiction, Reality and Creativity around Security. *Annals of the University of Bucharest / Political science series*, *13*(2), 35-64. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-378434

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FROM GEORGE SMILEY TO QUANTUM OR ON FICTION, REALITY AND CREATIVITY AROUND SECURITY

GIOVANNI ERCOLANI

Abstract

This paper aims to bring together the two realms of spy-story (fiction) and Security Studies (reality) along the time of the Cold War and after the implosion of the Soviet Union. It is conceived in terms of an intellectual exercise in which fictional narrative and academic research are put together in order to test their respective "representations" of reality. It debates the problem that is still into the protocol of work of the intelligence community – an old paradigm of "certification" and interpretation of reality is imposed, framing a dynamic and global world into the fragile limits of blind schemes, which unfortunately are reflected in the result of a bureaucratic mind.

Keywords: international relations, securitization, security sectors, intelligence studies, intelligence community, security communities, security studies.

My paper aims to bring together the two realms of spy-story (fiction) and Security Studies (reality) along the time of the Cold War and after the implosion of the Soviet Union.

This intellectual exercise in which fictional narrative and academic research are put together in order to test their respective "representations" of reality, is not an eccentric divertissement but can be read as an approach which, in my opinion, has its root in the philosophy of science literature.

If the western countries' academic environment together with their respective intelligence communities were busy in producing the "reality", and the "real" picture of our common enemy (Soviet Union), their scientific results were, unfortunately, very distant from the "real" object of their study and analysis.

However, despite the fact that after the implosion of the Soviet Union the majors International Relations and Security theories where criticised and found inconsistent in their "scientific" production, still their approach play a major role in the production of the nowadays paradigm of reference in the western world.

If the big dilemma is linked to the production of "ways of knowing" more familiar to the environment of the philosophy of science, I can say that the same problem is reflected into the work of the "rigid" scientific world which has been incapable to produce intuitions able to explain the "world out there", while other "fiction" works have been able to observe and foresight other "liquid" realities.

The problem is that still into the protocol of work of the intelligence community an old paradigm of "certification" and interpretation of reality is imposed, framing a dynamic and global world into the fragile limits of blind schemes, which unfortunately are reflected in the result of a bureaucratic mind.

1. George Smiley's World and the Orthodox Security Studies Paradigm

I want to take the fictional character of George Smiley¹, produced by the imagination of the British writer John le Carre', and demonstrate that despite the fact that he came from fictional literature, he embodied perfectly the "paradigm" in fashion among intelligence and academic members of what constituted "intelligence" during the Cold War period.

If George Smiley's world then can stereotype the Cold War intelligence community, on the same level the Security Studies theories, better grouped under the label of "Orthodox Security Studies" (OSS), because of their preference to see security issues through military lens, can represent here in my paper the scientific results of that academic environment which theorizing on security and insecurity problems produced a process of "certification".

Despite the fact that these two separate worlds, fiction and "academic scientific" reality, can be seen as rationally opposed, at the very end each one of them produced two identical hermeneutical circles in which the same narrative was fabricated with the aim to create a plot in which quite the same enemy, threats, and of course solution were presented in both environments.

The link between George Smiley and the OSS community (and the OSS security certification) strongly supported not only by political elites but by various agencies, can be seen in the common assemblage of the stereotype of the enemy who leaving his human condition took the shape of the nuclear weapon.

In his way, the British spy had to spy (and the academic environment had to research) on what the political elites were concerned, in what in their paradigm of interpretation was considered an enemy, and what constituted a security problem, then on the military aspects, not the human one, summarizing in a simple equation: a security problem was a military problem to be solved through military means.

In this paradigm George Smiley was trained, domesticated, and convinced, according to a certificated protocol of interpretation, that what he had to search

¹ George Smiley is a fictional character created by John le Carré. Smiley is an intelligence officer working for MI6 (often referred to as "the Circus" in the novels and films), the British overseas intelligence agency. He is a central character in the novels Call for the Dead; A Murder of Quality; Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy; The Honourable Schoolboy; and Smiley's People, and a minor character in a number of others, including le Carré's breakthrough novel The Spy Who Came in From the Cold, The Looking Glass War and The Secret Pilgrim.

for was the "military" aspect of "security", and unfortunately the same happened inside the academic milieu.

I have to add that, writing myself from a Western country, all the above aspects found their territorial space into the geographical dimension of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, then the NATO-OSS and Smiley's security-intelligence paradigm was not only the same but was even "imposed" on the territory of the enemy, like pretending that the enemy was going to play on the same chess game as us.

However, as I said before, the enemy was dehumanized, he was not "human" (or at least he was human like us-NATO), then he became a "nuclear weapon" which like a pawn was moved and used according to the same emotions, motivations, way of thinking, and perceptions which referring to our certified paradigm were the only rule of the game.

As a result there was the assemblage of a "scientific" paradigm which defined security solely in military terms, where the enemy had not a soul, not even an identity, and where the "nuclear weapon" ended to represent a totem around which a whole academic, political, and intelligence protocol was constructed.

At this point I would like to introduce the reader to some concepts developed by Security Studies in order to demonstrate the evolution of some approaches and definitions in this dynamism which will contribute, I hope, to the abandon of an old paradigm (orthodox) to a new one (liquid) more close to the reality of nowadays.

My approach is justified by the fact that the meaning of "security", as I will demonstrate here, is more wide, comprehensive, and fluid, then the one "officially certified" by the OSS which is definitely solid and constructed around a military protocol of interpretation which produced a parallel intelligence community which is unmistakably unprepared to deal with "cellular system"².

2. Security Studies: From Orthodoxy to Liquidity

I will start with linking the topic of security studies between two terms: orthodoxy and liquidity.

² According Arjun Appadurai: "'Vertebrate systems' work off of traditional nationalist models – propagating symbols, such as flags, and originary stories of the nation-state affiliated with structures national identity. 'Cellular systems' (international) offer more leaky modes of exchanges and mobile borders. These include various cyber communities, including terrorist networks, as well as transnational corporations, producing the movement of people, money, and products outside official regulatory channels. Cellular systems take more abstract, at times predatory, forms, eroding more "unified" national structures through the accelerated and shapeshifting forms of entities such as finance capital." See A. Appadurai, *Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger*, Durham, Duke University Press, 2006.

Both terms found an historical position in the period that stretches from 1991 up to 2010 (date of the adoption of the NATO new Strategic Concept), and this is because the facts which have been registered in this lapse of time will represent the mirror in which "security" will be reflected.

2.a. Orthodox Security: The Cold War Period

The Cold War period ended with the implosion of the Soviet Union, and we are well aware that the Soviet Empire was not defeated by any army, any foreign conquest, not to mention any atomic bomb.

"Security studies may be defined as the study of the threat, use, and control of military forces", and definitely the supremacies of strategic studies on security studies was very well reflected even inside the academic Department of Political Science and International Relations.

Just to pronounce the word "security" and in our mind the uniformed image of a soldier used to appear, and the same, unfortunately, happen again today: security was, and is, synonymous with defence and defence with military forces and military attacks.

Due to the above correlation, the construction of the enemy's identity was a priority, and then shaped by the domestic politicians, the military intelligence, and the media, as a chorus of agencies. This was, as it is, a pedagogic, a learning process in which stereotyping the "enemy" enforce the construction of our own identity: considering the other our enemy, we were forced to define us as the opposite of the supposed enemy. In this orthodox, rigid opinion, of security (OSS), our identity was constructed on this side of the wall, while on the other side another opposed identity was constructed.

I can even push this idea to look at the "Iron Curtain" as a real curtain that was dividing two parallel stages in which, in each one of them, two similar plays were performed: the "Great Theatre of the Cold War", using a reference to the baroque Spanish play writer Pedro Calderon de la Barca'.

"El Gran Teatro del Mundo", in which until the curtain was down, we see a play within a play, and we know that the two theatres, in a way and in another were hermeneutical isolated. In it every author, every actor, every theory, and every ideology, being in a position not to be confronted or challenged by the opposite, were retaining a monopolistic position.

Therefore they were two antagonistic ideological monopolies and "scientific" paradigms for the construction of meanings.

³ S. Walt (1991), "The Renaissance of Security Studies", *International Studies Quarterly*, 35 (2), pp. 211-239.

Even the NATO countries intelligence services, which were operating inside the other theatre, were incapable in foretelling the implosion of the devil's empire, or understand from the local social political context what was going on. Indeed, in military terminology, each one of the theatres was representing potential theatres for military operations.

Using the orthodox approach in which security and the military go hand in hand, the two military organisations, that found a justification and a *raison d'être* on the above interpretation, were respectively NATO and the countries forming the Warsaw Pact. Each organisation drawn a geopolitical space of operation divided by a wall and an iron curtain. Indeed NATO article 5 (and 6) of the North Atlantic Organisation frames security and insecurity inside the idea of an armed attack against the territory and on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties⁴.

We can recognise that the containment and the deterrence policies prevented the two sides to come to a direct armed confrontation with catastrophic results, but the point here is to analyse and ask: why, even after the end of the Cold War pantomime, the concept of "security" and the activity of the intelligence service continues to concentrate and to be linked together to a military approach?

To understand it we have to come back to the etymological meaning of "security" (Latin "securus+tas"): freedom from care; carelessness.

It is confronting the above incontestable meaning with the imposed "imaging" and paradigm of security (security = military forces), and the recent historical events, that the break represented by the emergence of Critical Security Studies (CSS) forms a productive moment in re-interpretation and reframing security providing the inspiration for a new paradigm and then not only protocol but theory.

In their totality, the rich contributions brought by the auto defined schools of Copenhagen, Paris, Aberystwyth, and other CSS authors which do not want to see themselves entrapped inside a static dogma, is revolutionary in scientific terms. But why is their approach revolutionary?

According to Mary Kaldor "Social science is about telling stories"⁵ and indeed, like Don Quijote and Sancho Panza, our condition is to be completely surrounded and immersed into stories. Stories which are told to us through the use of a language, images, media, etc., but the story can be a language in itself because "language itself conditions, limits, and predetermines what we see. Thus, all reality is constructed through language, so that nothing is simply 'there' in an unproblematic way – every-thing is a linguistic/textual construct. Language doesn't record reality, it shapes and creates it, so that the whole of our universe is textual."⁶ As John the Evangelist wrote, "In the beginning, was the word".

⁴ The North Atlantic Treaty is available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm.

M. Kaldor, *Human Security*, Cambridge, Polity, 2007.

⁶ P. Barry, *Beginning Theory: an Introduction to Literary and Cultural Theory*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2002.

Critical Security Studies represent a moment of opening the frame in which the story of security has been told. Furthermore CSS has allowed glimpsing at security issues at more multidimensional levels, drawing on board other sciences that until that moment were not part of the official protocol and working instruments.

Indeed Ken Booth writing on CSS talks about "emancipation": "Emancipation is the theory and practice of inventing humanity, with a view to freeing people, as individuals and collectivities, from contingent and structural oppressions. It is a discourse of human self creation and the politics of trying to bring it about."⁷

The above process is supported by the works of Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, who reformulated a new framework for security analysis.

Buzan⁸ developed the sectorial analysis of security in which the military security is only one of five sectors, joined by the environmental, economic, societal and political security. Then in 1998 with the publication of "Security: A new framework for analysis", they developed an approach to the process of securitization in which security is treated as a speech-act, as a linguistic performance which re-constitutes the world it represents.

Let's have a look to the constant elements accumulated until here: security, military, stories, language, frame, emancipation, sectors, speech-act. The link between the essence of security (*securitas*), its representation-frame (military or the Buzan five sectors), emancipation-oppression, and speech-act is astonishing. But what have they in common?

If according to the orthodox approach to security (OSS) the referent object of security is the state itself, in the field of CSS and human security, the referent object is the human being, or the human community, not the citizen of a particular state, or the state itself.

It is for the above reason that I suggest an approach to security in which elements of psychology, sociology, NLP (Neuro-Linguistic Programming) together with the CSS visions can re-establish a return to the very meaning of security. Coming back to Don Quijote and Sancho Panza, we all know that both are literary characters, but using their images I would like to link them together to our capacity of memorizing.

"The brain has two memory system, one for ordinary facts and one for emotionally charged ones" and indeed our brain is formed by two opposite hemisphere, the right and the left one. Both hemispheres perform distinctive actions, and for the effect they memorise facts and / or emotions, I would like to say that in our brain both Don Quijote (emotions) and Sancho Panza (facts) live.

⁷ K. Booth (ed.), Critical Security Studies and World Politics, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.

⁸ B. Buzan, *People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.

⁹ B. Buzan, O. Waewer and J. de. Wilde, Security: A new Framework for Analysis, Boulder CO, Lynne Rienner, 1998.

D. Goleman, *Emotional Intelligence*, London, Bloomsbury, 1996.

Security is invoked and affected by both reason and facts and emotion and intuition. We are at the same time Don Quijote and Sancho Panza, and the way external events are perceived and memorized, we build up our personal mind map of our perceptions, which create a state and drives our behaviour.

According to Ernest Cassirer, ¹¹ mankind, in order to mentally adjust himself to the immediate environment, and through his capacity to imagine, is capable of creating a new dimension of reality, defined as a symbolic system. "He lives rather in the midst of imaginary emotions, in hopes and fears, in illusions and disillusions, in his fantasies and dreams".

The orthodox approach to security calls in the image of military threats, the sound of bombs, the memories of atrocities, and the idea of chaos. Waltz in his Theory of International Politics ¹² talks about "anarchy" in which it is understood as the lack of a superior authority in the international system (an authority with enforcing power). He suggests that anarchy itself is the location of fear. The structure of anarchy means states must compete for power in order to survive in this self-help system. According to him the security dilemma is an attribute of international anarchy.

But Cynthia Weber focuses her research on fear and International Relations Theory and assert that "anarchy does not create the fear that Waltz theories in Theory of International Politics. Rather fear creates the effects that Waltz attributes to anarchy – prioritizing survival, self help over cooperation, and either conflict or competitive balancing. (...) The fear is the fear of fear itself. (...) Fear, then, is the final supplement of Waltz's theory."¹³

Then we can add other elements which play a role in the construction of the idea of OSS: anarchy and fear. Definitely both terms provide to our brain not only negative images more than positive one, but strong emotions. These emotions have psychological repercussion on human behaviours. What I have been constructing so far is a representation of a space which operates at geographical and emotional level, and which frame our perception of the reality making prevailing the emotional aspects. A fastened space, a "geopolitical imagination" I would like to say, which likes the "*Mancha*" of Don Quijote and Sancho Panza has been reinterptretaded and opened through out the intellectual contributions of Critical Geopolitics¹⁴.

This space is what Cassirer (mentioned above) calls the "symbolic space": for his capacity to create signs and symbols which help him to interact with reality, the human being, then not more a positivist rational animal, becomes an animal symbolicum, and like such lives in a symbolic space, and this is a space which frames even his capacity of imagination.

¹¹ E. Cassirer, *An Essay on Man*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1974 [1944].

¹² K. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading MA, Addison-Wesley, 1979.


C. Weber, *International Relations Theory – A Critical Introduction*, London, Routledge, 2005.

¹⁴ G. O'Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics*, London, Routledge, 1996; G. O'Tuathail and S. Dalby (eds.), *Rethinking Geopolitics*, London, Routledge, 1998.

Then security becomes an emotional space in which organisms learn to fear and in which fear is associated to particular stimuli: in the case of OSS, the utterance and use of the word "security" constructs the world of security... military threat, chaos, anarchy, etc.

Due to the fact those images have emotional repercussions to the individuals I would like to match the above correlation to a psychologically process defined as classical conditioning¹⁵ and conditioned reflex, more simply known by the example of Pavlov's dog.

The classic experience of Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936) is that of the dog, the bell, and the salivation to the view of a piece of meat. Whenever we present to the dog a piece of meat, seeing and sniffing it and makes the animal salivate. If we ring a bell, what is the effect on the animal? An orienting reaction. It simply looks around and turns its head to look for where that sound stimulus comes from. If we repeatedly ring the bell, and immediately after show the meat and give it to the dog, after a certain number of times, simply ringing the bell provokes salivation in the animal, preparing its digestive system to receive the meat. The bell becomes a sign of the meat that will come later. The whole body of the animal reacts as if the meat was already present, with salivation, digestive secretions, digestive motricity, etc. A stimulus that has nothing to do with feeding, a mere sound, becomes then capable to induce digestive modifications.



¹⁵ Classical Conditioning is a form of associative learning that was first demonstrated by Ivan Pavlov. The original and most famous example of classical conditioning involved the salivary conditioning of Pavlov's dogs. During his research on the physiology of digestion in dogs, Pavlov noticed that, rather than simply salivating in the presence of meat powder (an innate response to food that he called the unconditioned response), the dogs began to salivate in the presence of the lab technician who normally fed them. Pavlov called these psychic secretions. From this observation he predicted that, if a particular stimulus in the dog's surroundings were present when the dog was presented with meat powder, then this stimulus would become associated with food and cause salivation on its own. In his initial experiment, Pavlov used bells to call the dogs to their food and, after a few repetitions, the dogs started to salivate in response to the bell. Thus, a neutral stimulus (metronome) became a conditioned stimulus (CS) as a result of consistent pairing with the unconditioned stimulus (US - meat powder in this example). Pavlov referred to this learned relationship as a conditional reflex (now called Conditioned Response).

We can then assume that any time the alarm bell of security is ringed, stressful physical and emotional human reactions are lived.

Still now in Paris, every day at high noon, the old Second World War air raid sirens are howling: a message which remember us how the local population at that time was living in fear of attacks, destruction and death.

Clearly "our emotions have a mind in their own, one which can hold views quite independently of our rational mind. (...) Those unconscious opinions are emotional memories; their storehouse is the amygdala." ¹⁶

In humans the amygdale is an almond shaped cluster of interconnected structure perched above the brainstem, near the bottom of the limbic ring. There are two amygdalas, one for each side of the brain, nestled toward the side of the head¹⁷. "The amygdale is the specialist for emotional matters. If the amygdale is severed from the rest of the brain, the result is a striking inability to gauge the emotional significance of events (...) and more than affection is tied to the amygdale; all passion depends on it." In dangerous or threatening situation "the emergency route from eye or ear to thalamus to amygdale is crucial: it saves time in an emergency, when an instantaneous response is required. But this circuit from thalamus to amygdale carries only a small portion of sensory messages, with the majority taking the main route up to the neocortex. So what registers in the amygdale via this express route is, at best, a rough signal, just enough for a warning. As LeDoux points out, 'You don't need to know exactly what something is to know that it may be dangerous." The OSS in my opinion

¹⁶ Daniel Goleman (1996), "Emotional Intelligence".

The amygdalae (Latin, also corpus amygdaloideum, singular amygdala, from Greek αμυγδαλή, amygdalē, 'almond', 'tonsil', listed in the Grey's Anatomy as the nucleus amygdalæ) are almond-shaped groups of nuclei located deep within the medial temporal lobes of the brain in complex vertebrates, including humans. Shown in research to perform a primary role in the processing and memory of emotional reactions, the amygdalae are considered part of the limbic system. In complex vertebrates, including humans, the amygdalae perform primary roles in the formation and storage of memories associated with emotional events. Research indicates that, during fear conditioning, sensory stimuli reach the basolateral complexes of the amygdalae, particularly the lateral nuclei, where they form associations with memories of the stimuli. The association between stimuli and the aversive events they predict may be mediated by long-term potentiation, a lingering potential for affected synapses to react more readily. Memories of emotional experiences imprinted in reactions of synapses in the lateral nuclei elicit fear behavior through connections with the central nucleus of the amygdalae. The central nuclei are involved in the genesis of many fear responses, including freezing (immobility), tachycardia (rapid heartbeat), increased respiration, and stress-hormone release. Damage to the amygdalae impairs both the acquisition and expression of Pavlovian fear conditioning, a form of classical conditioning of emotional responses. The amygdalae are also involved in appetitive (positive) conditioning. It seems that distinct neurons respond to positive and negative stimuli, but there is no clustering of these distinct neurons into clear anatomical nuclei. Different nuclei within the amygdala have different functions in appetitive conditioning.

Daniel Goleman (1996), *Emotional Intelligence*.

¹⁹ Ibid.

has pretended to work in this way, and this is a view I reject in this paper because of its repercussion on the intelligence activity.

Inside the NATO countries, any time the security bell was ringed (the rough signal) the people's amygdales were alarmed and everybody was starting to look for the "communist devil" wearing the soviet combat uniform. A show of paranoia in which even if the "communist devil" was not there, the simple suspicious made his presence real. We all know how manipulative, and oppressive, has been in both theatres the hunting for the ideological enemy in order to construct homogeneous cultural scripts.

And this because, as Buzan highlights, "The difference between normal challenges and threats to national security necessarily occurs on a spectrum of threats that ranges from trivial and routine, through serious but routine, to drastic and unprecedented. (...) The labelling of an issue as a security problem by the government automatically legitimizes the use of exceptional means."20

This "labelling process" which I see as a "certification process" is very well represented by the fact that either George Smiley's world (and the majority of the spy literature and movies at the time) as the OSS were pointing and moving into the same Vertebrate-Solid "Geopolitical-Narrative Framework" 21 as a Security's Interpretative Dimension.

However the implosion of the Soviet Union, and the disappearance of the "iron curtain" brought to an end not only the Cold War but, and with it, the conditioned reflex....the looking for, or the imagining (like Don Quijote) the threatening big enemy, and as a consequence our George Smiley did not know on what to spy.

Now for whom the bell tolls? If someone was still continuing to ring the bell in order to alarm people with old memories of red phantoms, well...the show was over and the bell was only tolling for the death of the Orthodox Security approach, the end of ideologies, and as someone wrote, for the end of history. A bell was tolling for a war never fought, a victory never achieved, an enemy never defeated, and a standing army of soldiers and spies without a mission. But the causes of the OSS-Intelligence crises were not only the implosion of the Soviet Union, other reasons were linked to technological innovation, the use of new media and means of transport and communication,

²⁰ Barry Buzan (1991), "People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security

Studies in the Post-Cold War Era".

21 "A 'geopolitical-narrative-framework' is a physical and intellectual-symbolic space (as a hermeneutical circle), in which emotions and perceptions are elaborated through a narrative (narrative is a re-presentation of real or invented events), in order to produce a particular image and meaning to be attached to the word "security". It is a space in which the reader, "volente o nolente", willy-nilly, is part of it and where he is called to play an active emotional/interpretative role. As a result, the emotional state of the reader depends on the opinion-narrative of others." Giovanni Ercolani, "Keeping Security and Peace: Behind the Strategicalization of NATO's 'Critical Security Discourse", The Journal of Security Strategies, Year: 7, Issue: 14, December 2011, p. 54.

and the more mobility of people around the world. Undoubtedly society and the world were changing, and the rigid frame was grumbling down: unfortunately the OSS-Intelligence community remained prisoner into the same Vertebrate-Solid "Geopolitical-Narrative Framework" which they produced and from which they survived.

2.b. Security and Liquidity

As the Cold War helped the construction of opposed marks of identity developed by the two opposite factions, the end of the Cold War has provoked the slow disappearance of net, clear, identifiable, *identi-cal*²² characters. Now we have passed "from the 'solid' to the 'fluid' phase of modernity; and fluids' are so called because they cannot keep their shape for long, and unless they are poured into a tight container they keep changing shape under the influence of even the slightest of forces. In a fluid setting, there is no knowing whether to expect a flood or a drought – it is better to be ready for both eventualities. Frames, when (if) they are available, should not be expected to last for long. They will not be able to withstand all the leaking, seeping, trickling, spilling – sooner rather than later they will drench, soften, contort and decompose."²³

In order to continue our intellectual journey which started in the time of orthodox security and will end in the 2010, in which I call now, the time of liquid security. I need to reassert some historical moments.

With the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, the western organisation which motivated its existence in the name of an external enemy attack started to suffer of identity problem. Until that moment for NATO countries, the identification of the threat and the enemy have been always clear, not to mention the territory of the supposed battlefield. Even the "security intellectual" field was dedicated to speculations on countries belonging to one side or the other of the iron curtain. In our case, the centre was represented by the national security of the NATO members, and being a centre, there was a geographical periphery, which was not on the security agenda, because...not the centre.

The conflicts which erupted in the periphery, if they were not regarded and certified of "strategic importance" on the big chess game between the two superpowers, they were left there, in this periphery of not importance. The situation was overturned completely after 1991. If until that moment it was possible to live in peace, well protected, and isolated in our fortresses, the new conflicts which exploded around us become a security concern for us too (We-NATO): the centre became the periphery and the periphery the centre. Without entering into the details (because the literature on these topics is very extensive)

 $^{^{22}}$ "Identity" in English has its origin in the Latin *idem*: same.

²³ Z. Bauman (2004), "Identity", Cambridge: Polity.

after 1991 we saw not only the explosion of unforeseeable conflicts but these conflicts were in their shape completely new and at the beginning irrelevant for NATO. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq were not considered by the strategists of NATO as possible theatres of any intelligence activity, military involvement and operations. NATO was structured to win a war in the classical sense, not to provide and project security behind its *vallum*. It was not just the context which changed, but the nature and the paradigm attached to the concept of security.

It this with the involvement in these conflicts that NATO, obsessed in staying alive after the vanishing of its mortal enemy, had to re-invent itself. In contrast, to redefining its mission it had to reframe (and re-bureaucratize in Weberian sense) the concept of security no longer monopolized by a military syntax. Apparently they realized that the simple equation "a security problem is a military problem to be solved through military means" was not valid any more and that in it we needed to add more variables. However NATO was organised to fight a war, but the new conflicts in which [it] decided to operate, had new shapes so much different from the ones its military manoeuvres were staged. At this point I would like to insert in my analysis a specific clarification due to the fact that we are dealing with terms which have origin in Latin as security-securitas. Referring to the etymologic meaning of 'war' we can trace back its origin in the Indo-European root 'wers', to confuse, mix up." For the Romans, bellum was what we translate nowadays as war.

War-Warre-Guerra entered into Medieval Latin because of the Germanic invasion inside the Roman Empire. Then "Guerra" refers to a conflict characterised by confusion, disorder, strife, the confusion of all against all, and not the dispute, the duel, the formalised confrontation, that lays the etymological meaning in the Latin bellum.

Then I can argue that we can have two type of war:

- "bellum-war", the dispute, the duellum;
- "wers-war" identify by disorder, and confusion.

Therefore NATO (and the OSS approach which finds in NATO its armed hand), had been geared to fight "bellum-war", and not "wers-war". Despite the above NATO has had now to confront itself with "wers-war".

The conflicts which come to stage after the implosion of the Soviet Union have been variously characterized as:

• "new war" in which, opposite to what Mary Kaldor defines as "old war" (war between states in which the aim is to inflict maximum violence, then are becoming an anachronism) we are in front of a new type of organized violence which could be described as a mixture of war, organized crime and massive violations of human rights. According to Kaldor actors are

²⁴ Mary Kaldor (2006), "New & Old War", Cambridge: Polity.

both global and local, public and private. These new wars are fought for particularistic political goals using tactics of terror and destabilization that are theoretically outlawed by the rules of modern warfare.

- "War amongst people": "it is the reality in which the people in the street and houses and fields – all the people, anywhere – are the battlefield. Military engagements can take place anywhere: in the presence of civilians, against civilian, in defence of civilians. Civilians are the targets, objectives to be won, as much an opposing forces." In contrast to what Gen. Rupert Smith defines as "interstate industrial war", the new paradigm of war amongst people is based on the concept of a continuous criss-crossing between confrontation and conflict, regardless of whether a state is facing another state or a non-state actor. Rather than war and peace, there is not predefined sequence, nor is peace necessarily either the starting or the end point: conflicts are resolved, but not necessarily confrontations."25 And personally I see here that violence will have much more in common with "the cudgel of people's war" ("That without consulting anyone's tastes or rules, and regardless of anything else, it rose and fell with stupid simplicity, but consistently")²⁶ than the Clausewitz's duel. There is more about war in Tolstoy's "Peace and War" and in the words of the General Kutuzov than in "On the War" of Clausewitz.
- "Large group identity-conflict", in which a threat against a large group identity brings a psychological regression that can spark an identity conflict. Here "the concept of large-group identity describes how thousands or millions of individuals, most of whom will never meet in their life-times, are bound by an intense sense of sameness by belonging to the same ethnic, religious, national, or ideological group. (...) When large groups are threatened by conflict, members of the group cling evermore stubbornly to these circumstances in an effort to maintain and regulate their sense of self and their sense of belonging to a largegroup. At such times, large-groups process become dominant and large-group identity issue and rituals are more susceptible to political propaganda and manipulation. Political, economic, legal, military, and historical factors usually figure prominently in any attempt to manage and solve large-group conflicts, but it is also necessary to consider the profound effect of human psychology, especially specific large-group processes that evolve under stress or after massive trauma and are manipulated by leaders."27.

²⁵ Rupert Smith (2005), "The Utility of Force – The art of War in the Modern War", London: Allen Lane.

Leo Tolstoy (1997 [1869]), "War and Peace", London: Penguin Popular Classics, p. 1139.

V. Volkan, (2004), "Blind Trust", Charlottesville, Virginia: Pitchstone Publishing.

• Hybrid conflicts: "Although conventional in form, the decisive battles in today's hybrid wars are fought not on conventional battlegrounds, but on asymmetric battlegrounds within the conflict zone population, the home front population, and the international community population. *Irregular, asymmetric battles fought within these populations ultimately* determine success or failure. Hybrid war appears new in that it requires simultaneous rather than sequential success in these diverse but related 'population battlegrounds.' (...)Thus, hybrid wars are a combination of symmetric and asymmetric war in which intervening forces conduct traditional military operations against enemy military forces and targets while they must simultaneously--and more decisively--attempt to achieve control of the combat zone's indigenous populations by securing and stabilizing them (stability operations). Hybrid conflicts therefore are full spectrum wars with both physical and conceptual dimensions: the former, a struggle against an armed enemy and the latter, a wider struggle for, control and support of the combat zone's indigenous population, the support of the home fronts of the intervening nations, and the support of the international community. In hybrid war, achieving strategic objectives requires success in all of these diverse conventional and asymmetric battlegrounds. At all levels in a hybrid war's country of conflict, security establishments, government offices and operations, military sites and forces, essential services, and the economy will likely be either destroyed, damaged, or otherwise disrupted. To secure and stabilize the indigenous population, the intervening forces must immediately rebuild or restore security, essential services, local government, self-defense forces and essential elements of the economy. Historically, hybrid wars have been won or lost within these areas. They are battlegrounds for legitimacy and support in the eyes of the people."²⁸

But still, new-war, war amongst people, large group identity-conflict, and hybrid conflict, all of them retain this ambivalence of "wers-war" in which we have been forced to look at them, and where the primacy is still given to the word "war".

CSS and the recent contributions from Contemporary Conflict Resolution studies suggest us that the above conflicts, and if we identify them on a map we can picture in front of us, no one of them was concluded with a peace agreement. What CSS also does is to insist on the critical epistemology, the critical research practice, which, as Booth (cited above) argued, offers an emancipatory approach into this difficult material.

We have to start to see at these and future conflicts through the lens of peace, then not win war ("bellum-war", and or "wers-war") but the priority is to win security. Then a new position from which see the conflict and win it. In a very cynical way mythology already presented the case to win a war in using

²⁸ John J. McCuen, (2008), "Hybrid Wars", *Military Review* (March-April 2008): 107-113.

the narrative of peace. The Trojan horse had a peaceful meaning for the Trojans, because it was the emblem of their city, but not for the Greek. Presented as a gift for peace the natural reaction of the Trojans was to open the door of their city. And I ask, was it another rough signal? We know the events that followed. Ulysses was condemned by the God Poseidon (the God of the Sea, Earthquakes and Horses) to wander ten years before returning to his home land. And his return was helped by the Goddess Athena, the Goddess of strategic warfare, wisdom, and heroic endeavour.

Then the cunning of Ulysses (his way to be liquid in his warfare approach and to understand the enemy local culture-symbolism) and not the muscle of the semi-god Achilles brought to an end a long war (10 years of "certified" military strategies and I say Orthodox Security) and victory to the Greeks.

3. The Need of a Paradigm Shift: from the Achilles' to the Ulysses' Paradigm

An epistemological paradigm shift was called a scientific revolution by epistemologist and historian of science Thomas Kuhn in his book "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" (1962). A scientific revolution occurs, according to Kuhn, when scientists encounter anomalies which cannot be explained by the universally accepted paradigm within which scientific progress has thereto been made. The paradigm, in Kuhn's view, is not simply the current theory, but the entire worldview in which it exists, and all of the implications which come with it. It is based on features of landscape of knowledge that scientists can identify around them.

The necessity to move from an Achilles' paradigm which was focused on the wall, on the nuclear weapons, and not on what the local society (the enemy) was living inside their own culture, is strongly supported by the recent innovations inside NATO community on what is considered security.

If we follow the evolutions of the NATO discourse up to the adoption of the recent NATO New Strategic Concept (Lisbon, 10^{th} Nov 2010) we can see how the military organisation has understood the need of a "paradigm shift", then a new paradigm, a liquid one, which not only will help to adapt its organization to the new threats, but will contribute on how to perceive and certified them, and consequently to address its intelligence community.

The new NATO's paradigm was provided by the "NATO emerging security challenges" as reported on the speech of the NATO Secretary General Rasmussen on emerging risks (London, Oct 1, 2009). "The challenges we are looking at today cut across the divide between the public and the private sectors" the NATO Secretary General said. Furthermore, his speech embraced the following pretexts for NATO interventions which his own words this future "casus belli" include: a.) piracy; b.) cyber security / defence; c.) climate change; d.) extreme


²⁹ At: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_57785.htm

weather events – catastrophic storms and flooding; e.) the rise of sea levels; f.) population movement ...populations will move in large numbers...always where someone else lives, and sometimes across borders; g.) water shortages; h.) droughts; i.) a reduction in food production; î.) the retreating of the Arctic ice for resources that had, until now, been covered under ice; j.) global warming; k.) CO2 emissions; l.) reinforcing factories or energy stations or transmission lines or ports that might be at risk of storms or flooding; m.) energy, where diversity of supply is a security issue; n.) natural and humanitarian disasters; o.) big storms, or floods, or sudden movements of populations; p.) and fuel efficiency, thus reducing our overall dependence on foreign sources of fuel.

As Rick Rozoff pointed out in a 2009 article, "none of the seventeen developments mentioned can even remotely be construed as a military threat and certainly not one posed by recognized state actors" 30.

On the other hand, the NATO map was provided by Lieutenant General Jim Soligan, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff, of the NATO Allied Command Transformation on Apr 17, 2009, at "The Second International Symposium on Strategic and Security Studies", organized in Istanbul by the University of Beykent, one of Istanbul's many universities³¹.

In his presentation, the NATO General showed a map of potential areas of intervention for NATO and defined potential regions of crisis as "Multiple Stress Zones", adding that "Instability is likely to be greatest in areas of Multiple Environmental Stress".



Rick Rozoff, "Thinking the Unthinkable: NATO's Global Military Road Map", *Global Research*, October 3, 2009, at http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=15506.

Jim Soligan, "The Transformation of Defence: NATO Perspectives", in Sait Yilmaz (ed), *The National Defense in the 21st Century*, Istanbul: Beykent University, 2009.

According to General, the impact of these Emerging Security Challenges on NATO will produce security and military implications. The Security Implications are: a.) rethinking Article 5; b.) enhancing and creating new partnerships; c.) expanded opportunities to positively shape and influence ideas, values, and events and d.) changes in military operations: e.) technological vulnerabilities.

While as Military Implications, NATO will have to:

- adapt to the demands of hybrid;
- adapt force structures, doctrine to train other nation's security forces;
- adapt C2 and organizational structures;
- enhance WMD detection and Consequence Management;
- strengthen EU/NATO/UN relationships, and
- win the Battle of the Narrative.

If we overlap General Soligan's presentation with the speech of the NATO Secretary General, we will see that not only the main points regarding the possible security challenges are the same but, at geopolitical level, the threats – Multiple Stress Zone – are all outside the territories of NATO countries.

If, until the implosion of the Soviet Union, the terminology of the balance of power, nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union, and the communist enemy was framed in a "defence" vernacular, now – with the disappearance of a concrete, identifiable and definable enemy – the foe becomes a situation (Multiple Stress Zone) in which the particular interests of NATO countries are at risk.

Consequently if we look at the above map we can understand the strong necessity to move from what I call the Achilles' paradigm to the Ulysses' one in which a new way to make intelligence is a vital imperative: all the area of possible operations are outside the cultural-symbolic territory of the NATO countries.

However the above security discourse not only doesn't mention any particular stereotype of enemy but pay a particular attention to new actors as "liquid-cellular-fluid enemies".

4. "Liquid-Cellular-Fluid Enemy" and SpECTRE

If we follow the archaeology of the NATO new security paradigm discourse (how it moved from a defence-Achilles' paradigm to a Security-Ulysses' one) we can really understand the challenges we will face and how the need to reform the intelligence community is a vital priority for our security.

The first official change happened with the approval of the NATO New Strategic Concept (signed April 24th 1999) in which two specific articles mention the possibility to have the NATO countries' interests jeopardized by "critical-security threats" and then to start glimpsing on what was going on outside the NATO wall.

³² Roland Dannreuther, *International Security – The Contemporary Agend*a, Cambridge, Polity, 2008, p. 210.

With this 1999 NATO Strategic Concept, the Alliance started developing a role in collective security³³ and Articles 20 and 24 are very clear examples of linking threat-instability-interests:

- Art. 20: "Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability";
- Art. 24: "Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources".34

In 2006, at the Riga NATO summit, entitled "Transforming NATO in a New Global Era"35, three important moments stood apart. The first was the declaration made by the former American President George Bush Jr. according to whom "NATO is in transition from a static force to an expeditionary force", then in line with Rasmussen's more recent speeches. The other two moments were embodied by two specific initiatives which confirmed the inseparable link between energy security, global war on terror and a new NATO geopolitical map.

The first was made by the American Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which comparing energy to a weapon suggested the possibility for NATO countries to invoke art. 5 in the case their energy supplies were cut off by force³⁶. The other, promoted by Jamie Shea, Director of Policy Planning, saw the possibility for the creation of a NATO Energy Security and Intelligence Analysis Cell responsible for the gathering of information on terrorism and energy security from various sources³⁷.

Another important moment was represented by the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit in which the American initiative to let Georgia join the Alliance was rejected by various NATO members. I cannot see the importance of Georgia in NATO without thinking about the strategic and economic importance of the various pipelines which, crossing the territory of Georgia, carry energy resources from Central Asia. Despite American pressure on this initiative other Alliance countries understood that in case of troubles in Georgia (as was the case in Aug 2008) resolution was not through military means, something which in reality happened.

The last historical moment in the construction of this narrative is represented by the recent NATO Strategic Concept approved in Lisbon on Nov 10th, 2010 (NNSC 2010). Accordingly, the defence and security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation "will be based on an Active Engagement, Modern Defence":

"4. The modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set of challenges to the security of NATO's territory and populations. In order to

Aybet Gulnur, "NATO's Developing Role in Collective Security", Sam Papers No. 4/99, posted at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ac/aca/acad/02/01.htm.

NATO Summit, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept", at: www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm.
At: http://www.rigasummit.lv/en/

Judy Dempsey, "U.S. lawmaker urges use of NATO clause", *International Herald* Tribune, November 29, 2006.

Jamie Shea, "Energy security: NATO's potential role", NATO Review, Autumn 2006.

assure their security, the Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively three essential core tasks, all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members, and always in accordance with international law:

- Collective defence. NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.
- Crisis management³⁸. NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing

(http://www.army.mil/article/13079/army-unveils-new-stability-operations-manual/).

While NATO is adopting a Crisis Management approach, one of the major author/actor of the Alliance, the United States of America, has embarked, since the terrorist attack of Sept 11th, 2001, in a massive re-adaptation of its "defence" apparatus in various sectors and through new methodologies and style. "America is at war, and we live in a world where global terrorism and extremist ideologies are realities. The Army has analytically looked at the future, and we believe our Nation will continue to be engaged in an era of 'persistent conflict' - a period of protracted confrontation among states, nonstate, and individual actors increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends." This is what the USA Army General Williams V. Wallace wrote on the foreword the FM 3-0 American Army Operations Manual (Feb 2008 at: http://www.jmrc.hqjmtc.army.mil/jmrc_command_docs/ref_fm3_0.pdf) . The USA final product which resembles to the NATO one of Crisis Management is represented then by "Stability Operations". To arrive to this final product the American administration has operated in various sectors always keeping in mind the original purpose to be "engaged in persistent conflict" (in the Multiple Stress Zones?). In 2001 the State Department initiated a program of Critical Language Scholarship Program for American students of Arabic, Persian, Azerbaijani, Bangla/Bengali, Hindi, Indonesian, Korean, Punjabi, Turkish, Urdu, Chinese, Japanese, and Russian (http://clscholarship.org/). At the same time in 2006 the USA started putting in practice the "Lawrence Legacy" (as the US forces will be engaged in irregular warfare around the world, using "an indirect approach", they should build and work with others, and seek "to unbalance adversaries physically and psychologically, rather then attacking them where they are strongest or in a manner they expect to be attacked". In the USA 2006 "Quadrennial Defence Review "available at http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/.). Then in Oct 2008 the Field Manual 3-07 Operations" (http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf), stability operations into doctrine after they were introduced in the above mentioned FM 3-0, Operations, and where their importance were elevated to the same level as offensive and defensive operations. "America's future abroad is unlikely to resemble Afghanistan or Iraq, where we grapple with the burden of nation-building under fire" said Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV, commanding general of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. "Instead, we will work trough and with the community of nations to defeat insurgency, assist fragile states and provide vital humanitarian ait to the suffering. Achieving victory will assume new dimensions as we strengthen our ability to generate 'soft' power to promote participation in government, spur economic development and address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world. At the heart of this effort is a comprehensive approach to stability operations that integrates the tools of statecraft with our military forces, international partners, humanitarian organizations; and the private sector."

crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.

• Cooperative security. The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO's standards."³⁹

Therefore overlapping the NATO narrative and the Gen. Soligan map we see how the importance to know the human terrain, the "other" culture, in short to have that capacity of the Ulysses' gaze, to translate foreign symbols in tactical tools for his own strategy and security, become valid capabilities.

However we have to go back to the fiction world of spy story and see how this world in a way was more able to perceive what was going on in the real world despite the "scientific" evidences provided by the academic and George Smiley-Achilles' paradigm.

This is a necessity because the intelligence activity conducted in a "liquid paradigm" must be ready to interpret various messages coming from different sources.

If during the Cold War period the intelligence services of the NATO countries were not able to understand the capability, intention, and reality of our mortal enemy, there is the danger that we can reproduce the same situation right now on focusing too much on stereotype image of our enemy or potential enemies and then to remain fossilized on the Achilles' paradigm. There is but an intuition which comes from the world of fiction literature, and more precisely from a former member of the English Secret Service, and which links the period of the Cold War to 2008. If we had to drawn a line between the year 1961 (SpECTRE's first and last appearance as a worldwide power is in the novel "Thunderball" published in 1961), and the year 2008 (the last James Bond movie "Quantum of Solace" was released in the 2008) we can see a constant in the message of James Bond/Ian Fleming.

Ian Fleming, a member himself of the British Naval Intelligence Division during the Second World War, was very aware, thanks to his various professional experiences (and his acquaintance with people of different levels and occupations), of the existence of real menaces well beyond the stereotyping "enemies" depicted during the Cold War. SpECTRE (Special Executive for Counter-intelligence, Terrorism, Revenge and Extortion) came to existence in

³⁹ NATO 2010 New Strategic Concept, at: http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf.

⁰ Ian Fleming (1961), *Thunderball*, London: Penguin Books.

the 1961, the same year of the Cuban Missile Crisis, then in a moment of strong tension between the major players in the Cold War confrontation, but Fleming was not afraid of the Soviet/Communist threat. SpECTRE is a global criminal organization, organized as a "multinational", where the terrorist activity is only one among its diversified strategic criminal activities aimed to conquer the world. SpECTRE, has is office in 136 bis Boulevard Haussmann, Paris, and use as a cover, an international organization (or NGO), which main mission is to help "oppressed people": FIRCO (*Fraternité Internationale de la Résistance Contre l'Oppression*). Of course here we are talking about fictional characters, but the resemblance to the activities of recent terrorist-criminal organisations is stunning.

Not to talk about the other organisation Quantum created by the mind of the script player of the more recent James Bond movies (Casino Royale, 2006; Quantum of Solace, 2008). But while the goals of SpECTRE were revealed, Quantum has more nebulous shape and motives. Here again we are confronted with a "multinational" criminal organisation in which one of the leaders maneuvers his company, Greene Planet (again a NGO, which interest are focused on environmental problems; we are in 2008), to take control of Bolivia's water supply, which might be part of a larger terrorist plot. Let's overlap the James Bond visual messages and we come up with the "liquid, invertebrate, molecular, and impalpable" structure of criminal organization that during the time (1961-2008), and without being involved in political ideologies or religious credo, or linked to any state in particular, has been able to operate and make profits from legal high finance investment, energy resources, money laundry, drug, prostitution, and may be even outsourcing terrorist activities in order to spread fear and take advantages from it. Can we move aside this popular literature in defining it pure fiction (Oscar Wilde should have use "dry goods"), or here we have elements which can be used for further and different use?

At the end of the Second World War the threat of ethno-nationalist-political-religious terrorist organizations started to spread around and with it the phenomenon of organized crime. But the structure of these organizations were copies of the vertebrate, bureaucratic structures present in the State apparatus, the typical pyramidal, hierarchical configuration of the Army, the Police, Intelligence agencies, the Ministry, etc. Now days the dimension of this union of forces between criminal-terrorist enterprises doesn't overlap with the static structure of their enemy, the State, but, on the contrary, it is exactly the copy (cellular-fluid) of the various multinational, franchising, investment companies that have made the financial world their battle fields.

It is on the liquidity of this form of threat that we have to focus our attention, but until we will persist in the same paradigm in perceiving the threat itself and our protocol of response to it, in a rigid-military way, we will be condemned to repeat the same mistakes. This liquid threat is more vicious because, as said before, doesn't refer to any particular ideology or religion, but

to a human weakness: "quantum" is a Latin world, and in English can be translates in "How much"? Definitely this world financial crisis, that is not a crisis at all but a new dangerous reality will produce a lot of potential labour force for the above Quantum organisations.

If we want to use again the word "conflict" I call the combination of threat/response as a "liquid conflict".

In "liquid conflict" there are more than two dimensions, and the field is open, not framed by borders or treaties, and the conflicting parties are liquid too: "the new wars are 'globalized' wars" The threatening entity can be a combination of all the forms the conflict-actors-motivation can assume and that I presented above. The contrasting side, the "securitizer" should be liquid too because must enter in this conflict not in a rigid form but will have to adapt itself to the "local terrain", taking in consideration that with the passage of time, and the mutation of situations, its attitude toward the participation into the conflict becomes a liquid too. We live in complex and open societies were different sentiments, affiliations, and loyalties coexist, and where is quite difficult to establish the contours of real and "imagined communities" which are present in a "securitizer" state. Therefore people living into the frame of the same state can be interpellated, and be loyal to different communities which can not be the state itself where they reside, mining then even the basic concept of state and its social contract.

The idea of "liquid conflict" call in a major collaboration between various sectors of our society, and members of our society which is always moving and changing. This new form of conflict presuppose that we have to leave the door open to various analysis and interpretations of the human nature, and much more when we deal with insecure wannabe situations. Who could have possibly imagined the sparking historical situations which brought to the First World War, the Second one, and the Global War on Terrorism? History is not linear, and if there on this planet an animal which is the most dangerous, definitely this is the human being.

The necessity to go back to "securitas" means not only an epistemological position but a return to the intrinsic message encapsulated in the Latin word securitas, in which the human, as a superior entity, return in possession of his dignity. The critic position is the position of a judge, and "critic" has its origin

[&]quot;The new wars are 'globalized' wars. They involve the fragmentation and decentralization of the state. Partecipation is low relative to the population both because of lack of pay and because lack of legitimacy on the part of the warring parties. There is very little domestic production, so the war effort is heavily dependent on local predation and external support. Battles are rare, most violence is directed against civilians, and cooperation between warring factions is common. Those who conceive the war in traditional Clausewitzean terms, based on definable geo-political goals, fail to understand the underlying cested interests, both political and economic, in the continuation of war." Mary Kaldor (2006), New & Old War, Cambridge: Polity, p. 95.

⁴² Benedict Anderson, (2006 [1983]), *Imagined Communities*, London: Verso.

in the Greek *kritikos*: judge, and as any good judge, before taking a responsible decision, he want to listen more versions, and from more people about the events, and this is sometime the position of the Political Scientist.

CSS help us to understand the relativism of our positions, of our "framed-certified" perceptions, and it presents itself as a "reforming" voice, in which scepticism can become a key to open the door of this space in which we have been enclosed like in the Plato's cave, or in the hallucinated world of Don Quijote.

For the above reasons, and with the purpose to secure our societies, and our existence, because we as human beings are all connected each other as liquids are, we have go back to basic philosophical, ontological questions:

- What is reality?
- What is real knowledge?
- What we can do?

Only after having answered the above questions we will be able to approach the topic of security from a different optic and then produce a liquid paradigm. A new paradigm born out not from the "certified" label, or the "rough signal", or even the Pavlov's bell, but from the fact that has decided to fix as a referent centre the etymological meaning of security as "securitas" (freedom from care; carelessness, safety, security).

The original significance of security-*securitas* must be the orthodoxy, the doctrine, and more under the light of the global society.

In fixing this unchangeable meaning, as a centre, and accepting that the referent object is not a tribe or the national interest of a particular tribe, but the human society, then all the answers to the following questions will provide us, any time they do not much with the centre, with a distance, which represent the manipulation, the "appearance", the cacophony, in which every wannabe security discourse has been disguised.

- What is being secured?
- What is being secured against?
- Who provide security?
- What methods can be undertaken to provide it?

It will be the gap between the *securitas*-centre and the various "security discourses", which could be seen as a window. Bigger the distance between the too points, bigger the window, which will open our eyes and show us that in front of us we have real windmills and not frightening giants.

But CSS at the same time provide us with very practical tools when we go back to the Buzan's security sectors theory.

The five sectors of security: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental, all of them they have to play as a security team.

The five sectors can become liquid tools (a new intelligence paradigm) to face liquid threats but with the purpose not to win a "wers-war", a "bellum-war" or all the other variants analysed above, but with the aim to win security,

because this liquid threats infiltrate societies (I am more afraid of the spectre of Quantum then the spectre of terrorism), and borders or walls do not stop them.

But again the problem remain on the credibility of the message and of the impartiality of actors because as recent events in Georgia had show to the world, other actors are capable in picking up a script and play the pantomime. What a coincidence that after the collapse of the iron curtain which divided two orthodox theatres a new liquid curtain is again, but less perceptible, dividing stages. The difference? Now, in this globalised liquid society, the theatres are more than two, and while the play is quite the same, the script is an open text in which all the authors copy and cheat each others. The problem is that every one of them wants to play the Pavlov's bell and have us to obey as dogs.

Conclusion: a New Intelligence Community for a Complex World

I want to go back again to the last moments of the Cold War. When the Berlin Wall fall down, and not Soviet tanks were there ready to invade Europe, I can say that the NATO defense paradigm upon which all our knowledge (supposed science) of the enemy-Soviet Union was constructed and hegemonically divulgated, and inculcated with the purpose to construct on us (We-NATO) a habitus (as developed by P. Bordieu in his "Language & Symbolic Power"), really represented a structured protocol-paradigm-grid of analysis and interpretation.

How did NATO paradigm explain the Soviet Union implosion? And if it tried, something that did not happen at all, how this paradigm was constructed and based on which, it certificated as "science"? Because this "official certification" operated at the academic level too, where "no-official-certificated" voices where labeled as heretics.

Interestingly in 2005 Prof. Edward A. Kolodziej in his "Security and International Relations" gave an answer: no one of the International Relations rival theories, such as realism, neorealism, liberal institutionalism, classical economic liberalism, and Marxism, were able alone to explain the facts that brought a "contra-revolution" and the implosion of the Soviet Union.

Then our intellectual task is not only attached to the academic world, and more precise the one dealing with International Relations and Political Science, but it is a real problem of philosophy of science on which our knowledge was based and will be based.

If the Cold War period was interpreted and reconstructed by the OSS in a mechanicist model were two entities were opposed to each other, now we have work on a paradigm which is open to a big number of variables, among which the most difficult to quantify (and to foresee its behavior) is what Tolstoy called the "spirit of the army. The unknown factor which multiplied by the mass gives the resulting force⁴³".

⁴³ Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, p. 1140.

So if the NATO paradigm and the various IR theories apparently were, as they are still now, not able to explain the 1989 events, what about the "secret service experts", the various James Bonds who apparently were brighter on the movies than into the reality?

An answer can be provided by Joseph J. Trento and his book "The Secret History of the CIA": during the cold-war at the USA embassy in Berlin no one was an expert on Russian language-culture.

And what about the more recent years, let's say the time before the terrorist attack of Sept 11, 2011? Well, "See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War Against Terrorism", the 2003 memoir by Robert Baer, a former CIA case officer in the Directorate of Operations, give us another dramatic answer: despite the fact that the world was changing and apparently not the official defense-security paradigm, as a result very few CIA operatives had high skills in Arabic language, not to talk about the total lack of Arabic and/or Muslim culture experts.

Going back to Buzan's security sectors theory, and using an anthropological approach I can say that the most important sector are the societal and the environmental ones. The societal one (identity, or according to Ulysses the culture-symbols of Troy and the Trojans), the X variable, the human factor (what Tolstoy calls the unknown "X" factor) because if there is not human society there are not the others sectors and if the environmental is not present, then we do not have the other sectors too, but society and environment influence each other. Consequently I can affirm that if we have to work on a new paradigm we have to start to concentrate by the time being on two pillars: societal and environment-al.

Because of that the big challenge now is not only to face various liquid threats but to reform and produce a paradigm which will help us to reorganize an "intelligence" approach to new global realities.

When we read the above NATO security discourses we have to remember that we-NATO are not the only human being living on this planet but other realities are present were various different relations are constructed between the societal and the environment-al:

• Other countries like China (with a population of 1.5 billion) have produced their own concept of war. "Unrestricted Warfare" is a book on military strategy written in 1999 by two colonels in the People's Liberation Army, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. The book rather than focusing on direct military confrontation examines a variety of other

means which can be summarized in the Formula: Schwartzkopf + Soros + Xiaomolisi + Bin Laden.44

- At the G20 Seoul meeting (2010) even the map of the world financial crisis was changed. Despite the western countries depicted the financial crisis as a global one, its perception from other global actors and emerging economies was completely different. According to O'Neill (Goldman Sachs), policy makers in Asia were referring to the global credit crisis as the "North Atlantic Crisis" 45 Thus, and for the first time, the "others" defined our military alliance as a financial system.
- When we look at the "Multiple Stress Zone" map presented by the NATO General Soligan in 2009, how can we not see that is the exact copy of Pentagon Map which was produced in the year 2004 46 to highlight the grand strategy for the American foreign policy? Furthermore the Pentagon Map is much more than a simple cartographic representation of the planet, it is a division of the world countries between the Functioning Core, characterized by economic interdependence, and the Non-Integrated Gap, characterized by unstable leadership and absence from international trade. The Core can be subdivided into Old Core (North America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia) and New Core (China, India). The Non-Integrated Gap includes the Middle East, South Asia (except India), most of Africa, Southeast Asia, and northwest South America. Thus using a realist terminology the Functioning Core can represent the land of order while the Non-Integrated Gap the land of anarchy and disorder and also it can be seen as a tentative to ethnicalize the world⁴⁷. And if what can happen in the Non-Integrated Gap can produce security concerns to the NATO countries (which are part of the Functioning Core) and justify a military intervention in their internal affairs then "fear is something that is actually missing in a situation of international anarchy, and because it is missing it must be invented and skilfully deployed."48


Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, "Unrestricted Warfare", Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999, at: http://cryptome.org/cuw.htm

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


- World Population Growth Rate: "By 2003, the combined population of Europe, the United States, and Canada accounted for just 17 percent of the global population. In 2050, this figure is expected to be just 12 percent. (...) Today, roughly nine out of ten children under the age of 15 live in developing countries. (...) Indeed, over 70 percent of the world's population growth between now and 2050 will take place in 24 countries, all of which are classified by the World Bank as low income or lower-middle income, with an average per capita income under \$ 3,855 in 2008."
- Consumption factor. "The estimated one billion people who live in developed countries have a relative per capita consumption rate of 32. Most of the world's other 5.5 billion people that constitute the developing world, with relative per capita consumption rates below 32, are mostly down toward 1." ⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Jack A. Goldstone, "The Four Megatrends That Will Change the World", *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2010. And the recent article of GEORGES MINOIS, "Une Planète trop peuplée?", *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Juin 2011.

Jared Diamond, "What's Your Consumption Factor?", *The New York Times*, January 2, 2008, at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2006/WPP2006_Highlights_rev.pdf

How will it be possible to "secure our future" (the estimated one billion people who live in developed countries coincidentally is the same number of NATO people, the "our") and then maintain a consumption factor of 32 when the "others" will want to consume like us? "The World Bank has predicted that by 2030 the number of middle-class people in the developing world will be 1.2 billion – a rise of 200 percent since 2005. This means that the developing world's middle class alone will be larger that the total populations of Europe, Japan, and the United States combined. From now on, therefore, the main driver of global economic expansion will be the economic growth of newly-industrialized countries, such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and Turkey."⁵¹



• Life expectancy rate. Will the people living in the "multiple stress zone" (the non- integrated gap) accept their dramatic living conditions, and live less than the people living in other parts of the globe? Will they accept the status quo that has produced their misery or will they rebel? And the peace that NATO will impose on them will be a "positive peace" or a "negative peace" which will reproduce the same "structural violence" that provoked unrest and internal conflict, and not seeing instead the "civil war as a system" 52?

⁵¹ Jack A. Goldstone, "The Four Megatrends That Will Change the World", *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2010.

D. Keen, Complex Emergencies, Cambridge, Polity, 2009, pp. 11-24.

To sum up, globally we are approaching what is called a "take-off point" in which it is necessary to recreate a community able to see at security issues through new lens, a community ready to accept a progressive approach in which not only elements which belong to the "security problem" are analysed but a community capable to understand the dynamics of these elements, and their repercussions in society, and in a global geopolitical context.

If the major accusation made against the intelligence community after the terrorist attacks of Sept 11, 2001, was their "lack of imagination", then we have to contribute to the training of a young community of researchers through a multidisciplinary approach to security concerns in which Open Sources Analysis enter in the Academic world and were the cunning Ulysses' gaze is a must.