

### ISSP Data Report: Religious Attitudes and Religious Change

Bechert, Insa (Ed.); Quandt, Markus (Ed.)

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# ISSP Data Report

Religious Attitudes and Religious Change

*Insa Bechert and Markus Quandt (eds.)*



## ISSP Data Report: Religious Attitudes and Religious Change

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**ISSP Data Report**

**Religious Attitudes and Religious Change**

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# ISSP Data Report

Religious Attitudes and Religious Change

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# Introduction

The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) is a coordinated effort encompassing research institutes from currently 48 countries around the world. ISSP annual surveys are designed to cover a variety of topics highly relevant to social science research and the data obtained is in high demand among the social sciences research community. The ISSP Data Report series represents an attempt to reach out to an audience beyond this traditional group of ISSP data users. Data Reports are designed to establish an understanding of the research value of ISSP data among social scientists at large, as well as among external users from other research areas, including students. The first ISSP Data Report – *Attitudes towards the Role of Government* was published in 2010 in the *GESIS Schriftenreihe (GESIS Scientific Series)* and was based on data obtained from the four ISSP modules 1985, 1990, 1996, and 2006.

This second volume of the ISSP Data Report focusing on *Religious Attitudes and Religious Change* is based on the three modules on Religion dating from 1991, 1998, and 2008. Six authors, all closely connected to the ISSP, wrote chapters on religion-related topics for this volume, with most of them based on ISSP data covering a time span of almost 20 years. Tom W. Smith authored the first chapter in which he depicts and explains general trends of personal belief in God. As belief in God is one of the most general measures of religiosity available, Smith's analyses draw a good basic picture of the overall 'religious landscape' across ISSP member countries. The second chapter offers Jonas Edlund's examination of the extent to which cross-national variation in religious faith can be explained by a country's level of social inequality. In Chapter 3 Franz Höllinger presents and interprets the development of church attendance from the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to the present. He provides a look at trends in church attendance in Christian societies against the background of decreasing church attendance among many Western societies; usually read as an indication of the decreasing relevance of religion in everyday life. Insa Bechert's contribution in Chapter 4 aims to shed light on the issue of whether religious people are happier than non-religious people. In the fifth chapter Wolfgang Jagodzinski addresses the question to what extent the societal processes of modernisation or of religious competition can explain the different trends in religiosity that the data display for different countries. These five chapters are followed by a methodological note by the editors that examines a different set of cumulated data: the ISSP standard background variable "church attendance" in a timeline covering the 25 years between 1985 and 2010 across the six countries participating in the ISSP from the very beginning: Australia, Austria, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and the USA.<sup>1</sup>

In the five chapters of this report for all of the analyses that compare points in time, a cumulated dataset was used (GESIS Data Archive identification number: ZA5070, doi:10.4232/1.10860). This dataset joins the individual datasets of the ISSP modules

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1 The editors would like to thank Thomas Rahlf from the GESIS Data Archive for the Social Sciences for his great help with the graphical illustrations.

from 1991, 1998, and 2008; and allows for very convenient comparisons across these three modules. It contains only those country samples, and only those variables of the original datasets, which occur in at least two of the three individual modules, and which could be sufficiently harmonised to make valid comparisons. Thus, it collects data from 28 different countries.<sup>2</sup> The list of cumulated variables can be found in Appendix A.I; further information on the cumulated data file is offered by a guideline document in Appendix A.II. The individual datasets of ISSP 1991 (ZA2150), ISSP 1998 (ZA3190) and 2008 (ZA4950) have been used in different chapters as well, reporting results from up to 42 countries surveyed on this module topic. The countries' participation in the Religion modules is illustrated in the map on the following page. For a comprehensive overview of ISSP member countries and module participation see Appendix A.VI. The full list of topical modules is given in Appendix A.V.

There is a basic ISSP rule which has been followed over the series of all ISSP modules that at least two thirds of the module questions are repeated from the previous instance of the same topical module, while the remaining questions may be replaced or changed. Such changes can either be methodological adjustments, or they can address entirely new topical areas under the respective module heading. Also for 2008 several new items were included, focusing on issues such as tolerance towards other religions and members of other religions. The complete basic questionnaire for ISSP 2008 is published in Appendix A.III.


Access to the data and methodological information on all the data used here is available free of charge through the GESIS website at <http://www.gesis.org/issp>. The online portal of the GESIS Data Archive, ZACAT, allows for online analysis and downloading of the data, at <http://zocat.gesis.org>. More information on using ZACAT can be found in Appendix A.IV.

Further related materials, including a comprehensive bibliography of research work using ISSP data, can be found on the official ISSP website, at <http://www.issp.org>.

*Insa Bechert and Markus Quandt*

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2 Germany is counted as one country, although the authors usually distinguish separate samples for East and West Germany in the Data Report.





# Authors

## Insa Bechert

Insa Bechert works as a research assistant at the GESIS Data Archive for the Social Sciences in Cologne for the ISSP. She studied Sociology, English Philology and Anglo-American History in Cologne (Germany). Her main field of research is the comparability of sociological measurement instruments in international research.

## Jonas Edlund

Jonas Edlund is Professor of Sociology at the University of Umeå in Sweden. Since 2004 he is the head of the Swedish ISSP. His field of research is the comparative study of socio-political belief systems revolving around taxation, redistribution, and social justice in relation to social stratification.

## Franz X. Höllinger

Franz X. Höllinger is Professor of Sociology at the University of Graz (Austria) and takes part in the ISSP since 1986. His main teaching and research foci are methods of empirical research, sociology of religion, sociology of family and inter-ethnic relations.

## Wolfgang Jagodzinski

Wolfgang Jagodzinski is Professor of Sociology at the University of Cologne and Ambassador of his University to Japan. As the Director of the Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA) in Cologne (now GESIS Data Archive for the Social Sciences) from 1994 to 2007 and the President of GESIS from 2007 to 2008 he was a member of the ISSP. His main research interest is comparative sociology with a particular focus on culture and religion.

## Markus Quandt

Markus Quandt is head of the Research Data Center “International Survey Programmes” at GESIS and is in charge of data integration for several large comparative surveys at the GESIS Data Archive. He has worked in the areas of attitude measurement, measurement equivalence in international surveys, data harmonisation processes, and political participation and electoral behaviour. He has been involved with the ISSP since 2004.

## Tom W. Smith

Tom W. Smith is Senior Fellow and director of NORC’s Center for the Study of Politics and Society at the University of Chicago. Since 1980 he has been Director of the General Social Survey (GSS) in the USA. Tom W. Smith is one of the founders of the ISSP and was Secretary General from 1997 to 2003. His research interests include the sociology of religion, societal change, and survey methodology.



# Beliefs about God across Time and Countries

*Tom W. Smith*

## Introduction

In 1966 the cover of *Time* magazine (April 8) asked the provocative question, “Is God Dead?” Three years later *Time*’s cover (December 26, 1969) raised a new query, “Is God Coming Back to Life?” Social scientists have also waivered back and forth about the global state of religion and its likely future (Gorski and Altinordu, 2008). Standard secularization theory has argued that societies become less religious as they develop with education and the rise of science undermining both religious belief and religious practices (Kay, 1997; Voas, 2009). Others, while still finding a shift to secularization with development, have modified standard secularization theory. Norris and Inglehart (2011) argue that development reduces “existential insecurity” and this in turn lessens the demand for (or need for) religion. Others have argued that religion has been undergoing and will continue to undergo a transformation (such as a rise in spirituality alongside a weakening of organized religion, Smith, 2009), but not a clear decline. Still others see little secularizing trends (Greeley, 2003). The so-called supply-side school emphasizes the enduring demand for religion (Stark, 1999; Stark and Finke, 2000).

This paper focuses on one central, but relatively neglected, aspect of secularization and religious change, belief in God (Kay, 1997; Norris and Inglehart, 2012; Smith, 2009; Ziebertz, 2002). The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) has asked three questions focusing on belief in God (Appendix). The first covers six levels of belief which can be characterized as 1) atheists, 2) agnostics, 3) deists, 4) waivers, 5) weak believers, and 6) strong believers. The second question asks about changes in belief in God over the life course and consists of consistent atheists, current atheists – but former believers, current believers – but former atheists, and consistent believers. The third question is an agree/disagree item asking about belief in a personal God (i.e. “a God who concerns himself with every human being personally”).

The ISSP Religion studies covered 18 countries in 1991 (counting East and West Germany and Northern Ireland and Great Britain separately), 33 countries in 1998, and 42 countries in 2008. This paper analyses the 30 countries that were in at least two of the three ISSP rounds and appear in the 1991-2008 merged ISSP Religion file created by GESIS. The data for the analyses is weighted.



## Cross-national rankings of belief in God

Figure 1 shows the rank in 2008 on atheism (listed from high to low) and strong belief in God. Atheism ranges from 52% in the former East Germany to less than 1% in the Philippines. Strong belief shows largely the reverse pattern falling from 84% in the Philippines to 4% in Japan (and second lowest at 8% in East Germany). Countries with high atheism (and low strong belief) tend to be ex-Socialist states and countries in northwest Europe. Countries with low atheism and high strong belief tend to be Catholic societies, especially in the developing world, plus the United States, Israel, and Orthodox Cyprus. In the case of Poland, it appears that its strong Catholicism trumps the secularizing influence of Socialism. There is also evidence that religious competition and/or religious conflict may stimulate higher belief. Belief is high in Israel which of course has a sharp conflict between Judaism and Islam, in Cyprus which is divided along religious and ethnic lines into Greek/Orthodox and Turkish/Muslim entities, and in Northern Ireland which is split between Protestant and Catholic communities and shows much higher belief levels than the rest of the United Kingdom. In the United States there is relatively little overt religious conflict, but intense religious competition across both major religions and denominations within Christianity. The one country that shows a low association between the level of atheism and strong belief is Japan. Japan ranked lowest on strong belief, but also in the lower half on atheism. Japan is distinctive among countries in having the largest number of people (32%) in the middle categories of believing sometimes and the agnostic, not knowing response. This pattern is consistent with a general Japanese response pattern of avoiding strong, extreme response options (Smith, 2004).




Figure 1: Atheism and strong belief in God 2008

Figure 2 shows attitudes in 2008 about changes in belief in God over time. The yellow dots show consistent atheists running from a high of 59% in East Germany down to 2% in Poland. The blue crosses show consistent believers ranging from 13% in East Germany to 94% in the Philippines. The reversed rankings are quite similar across almost all countries and closely match the pattern shown about belief in God in Figure 1.




Figure 2: Belief in God over time 2008

Figure 3 shows that the percent of respondents believing in a personal God (“who concerns himself with every human being personally”) rises from 8% in East Germany to 92% in the Philippines. Once again the rankings closely follow those in Figures 1 and 2.



Figure 3: Believing in a personal God (% agreeing)

Figure 4 combines the three measures of beliefs about God in one index. The blue crosses indicate strong, traditionalist believers on all three questions - those certain that God exists who have always believed in God and who strongly agree that there is a personal God. The yellow dots indicate the opposite group, strong atheists - those who don't believe in God, who have never believed in God, and who strongly disagree that there is a personal God. Strong believers range from 60% in the Philippines down to 2.5% in East Germany, while strong atheists run from almost none (0.1%) in the Philippines to 46% in East Germany.




Figure 4: Strong believers in God and strong atheists 2008

## Changes in belief in God over time

Changes in belief in God have generally been modest in magnitude, but belief has tended to diminish over time. As Table 1A shows, the percentage of those saying they were atheists increased in 15 of 18 countries from 1991 to 2008 with an average increase of 1.7 percentage points. For 1998 to 2008, the number of atheists grew in 23 of 30 countries for an average gain of 2.3 points. Conversely, as Table 1B indicates, certain belief in God declined in 15 of 18 countries from 1991 to 2008 with an average decrease of 2.4 points and from 1998 to 2008 losses occurred in 23 of 30 countries for a similar average decline of 2.3 points. Likewise, Table 1C shows that never believing in God rose in 14 of 17 countries from 1991 to 2008 for an average increase of 1.6 points and increased in 19 of 29 countries from 1998 to 2008 by an average gain of 2.2 points. As Table 1D indicates, the decline in belief in a personal God was somewhat weaker. From 1991 to 2008 it fell in 10 of 18 countries for an average drop of 0.7 points. For 1998 to 2008 belief in a personal God declined in 19 of 30 countries by an average of 1.9 points.

From 1991 to 2008, Israel, Russia, and Slovenia showed consistent movement towards greater belief (i.e. less atheists, less people never having believed in God, and more agreeing that there is a personal God). Five countries had a mixed pattern with some measures moving towards and some away from belief (West Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Philippines, and the United States). Ten countries showed consistent decline in belief (Australia, Austria, East Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, Norway, and Poland). For 1998 to 2008 five countries (West Germany, Israel, Japan, Russia, and Slovenia) showed consistent growth in belief. Nine countries (Denmark, East Germany, Hungary, the Philippines, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States) had a mixed pattern with movement (mostly small) in opposite directions. Sixteen countries showed decreases in belief on all measures.

While Russia and Slovenia showed consistent movement towards greater belief, counter to some other evidence of a general religious “revival” among ex-Socialist states (Norris and Inglehart, 2011; Smith, 2009), there is no general increase in belief in the former Soviet bloc. Across the four measures of change and eight countries, 12 showed movement in the religious direction and 20 away from belief. Most of the changes in either direction were small.

For Israel the religious shift may reflect the growing size of the orthodox Jewish and right-wing population and the relative decline of the more secular and leftist segment in Israeli society (Rebhun and Waxman, 2004). The original Zionist movement that re-established Israel was of course “religious” since it was a “Jewish” movement, but the movement had a strong secular and Socialist component to it. That orientation seems to have diminished in recent decades and been supplanted by a more overtly religious perspective.

Table 1: Changes in belief in God over time

	A		B		C		D	
	% Atheist		% Certain that God exists		% Never believed in God		Agrees that God personally concerned with people	
	1991-2008	1998-2008	1991-2008	1998-2008	1991-2008	1998-2008	1991-2008	1998-2008
Australia	+ 7.3	+ 6.4	- 5.1	- 1.6	+ 10.3	+ 8.9	- 9.1	- 7.7
Austria	+ 5.1	+ 2.0	- 6.5	-10.6	----	----	- 9.3	- 4.7
Chile	----	+ 0.1	----	- 1.0	----	+ 0.0	----	- 1.6
Cyprus	----	+ 0.3	----	- 6.0	----	+ 1.5	----	-11.5
Czech Republic	----	+18.4	----	- 6.8	----	+18.6	----	- 5.0
Denmark	----	+ 3.4	----	- 0.4	----	- 1.6	----	- 8.3
France	----	+ 5.6	----	- 5.8	----	+ 3.3	----	- 7.8
Germany-East	+ 3.4	- 1.7	- 1.4	- 1.5	+ 9.9	+ 3.1	- 2.6	- 4.0
Germany-West	+ 0.1	- 1.9	- 0.6	+ 3.3	+ 0.1	- 3.5	+ 0.7	+ 0.9
Great Britain	+ 7.8	+ 8.1	- 6.4	- 4.7	+ 8.4	+ 6.8	- 5.5	- 2.2
Hungary	+ 2.9	+ 1.0	- 7.0	- 2.9	+ 2.7	+ 1.4	+ 3.7	+ 4.0
Ireland	+ 3.0	+ 2.4	- 15.4	- 0.7	+ 2.7	+ 2.1	- 7.4	- 7.7
Israel	- 9.6	- 1.8	+23.0	+ 6.7	- 9.7	- 3.8	+20.4	+ 2.8
Italy	+ 3.2	+ 1.7	-10.5	- 6.7	+ 3.5	+ 3.5	+ 0.8	- 1.3
Japan	----	- 1.8	----	+ 0.4	----	- 1.5	----	+ 2.7
Latvia	----	+ 9.1	----	- 1.1	----	+10.6	----	- 2.7
Netherlands	+ 3.7	+ 2.6	- 3.3	- 5.0	+ 4.2	+ 3.8	- 3.4	- 4.4
New Zealand	+ 4.9	+ 4.8	- 2.5	- 4.0	+ 8.8	+ 8.5	- 4.1	- 2.5
Northern Ireland	+ 5.1	+ 3.0	-15.2	- 4.9	+ 3.3	+ 0.6	-14.2	- 2.1
Norway	+ 7.9	+ 5.8	- 4.7	- 3.5	+ 8.3	+ 5.9	- 5.8	- 1.1
Philippines	+ 0.3	+ 0.1	- 2.2	+ 5.5	+ 0.2	- 0.8	+ 2.9	+ 3.7
Poland	+ 1.3	+ 1.0	- 5.0	- 5.5	+ 1.1	+ 0.4	- 3.7	+ 0.5
Portugal	----	+ 2.7	----	- 9.4	----	+ 2.0	----	-16.2
Russia	-11.7	-11.7	+17.3	+ 6.9	-25.5	-16.7	+19.1	+ 9.3
Slovakia	----	+ 0.7	----	- 1.3	----	- 0.1	----	+ 0.1
Slovenia	- 5.2	- 0.3	+ 2.7	+ 1.7	- 3.1	- 0.7	+ 3.6	+ 3.0
Spain	----	+ 1.2	----	- 7.0	----	- 0.1	----	- 0.7
Sweden	----	+ 2.6	----	- 2.0	----	+ 4.2	----	- 1.3
Switzerland	----	+ 5.2	----	- 1.6	----	+ 4.9	----	+ 8.0
United States	+ 0.7	- 0.1	- 0.8	+ 0.2	+ 2.6	+ 1.8	+ 2.0	+ 2.3

Another way of looking at change over time is to look at the item on consistency in beliefs about God over one's lifetime. Figure 5 compares those shifting towards faith ("I believe in God now, but I didn't use to.") with those moving away from belief ("I don't believe in God now, but I used to."). In 2008 there was a net gain in belief across the life course in 10 countries and a decline in 19 countries. The gains averaged 4.0 points and the losses -6.8 points for an overall change of -2.8 points.




Figure 5: Changes in belief in God 2008 (% agreeing. Right column: difference A-B)



## Cross-national differences across age groups

Table 2a shows that in 2008 in 29 of 30 countries certain belief in God increased with age. The average increase from those 27 and younger to those 68+ was 20.0 points. Similarly, Table 2b indicates that in 2008 in 27 of 30 countries never believing in God fell with age. The average decrease was 13.7 points. Likewise, agreeing that there is a personal God (Table 2c) increased with age in 2008 in 28 of 30 countries by an average of 15.8 points. Overall, belief increased with age in 83 of 89 comparisons (93%) and averaged +16.5 across the three measures. Only one country, Israel, showed a consistent reversed pattern with belief declining with age by an average of -13.1 points. The Philippines, Russia, and Japan each had a single negative association with age, but all three countries measured showed increased belief with age.

Table 2a: Differences by age by country in 2008: % certain God exists

Country	Younger than 28	28-37	38-47	48-57	58-67	68 and older	Difference 68 and older - younger than 28
Australia	14.7	21.1	27.9	23.0	29.7	36.7	22.0
Austria	7.7	22.8	16.4	22.2	33.3	31.9	24.2
Chile	66.1	77.6	80.7	85.7	85.3	92.8	26.7
Cyprus	47.8	47.8	58.2	69.0	74.3	89.4	41.6
Czech Republic	6.0	6.5	7.2	11.4	12.7	26.4	20.4
Denmark	8.1	11.1	10.7	11.5	14.6	22.3	14.2
France	7.9	12.2	12.4	14.7	19.8	25.7	17.8
Germany-East	0.0	6.8	6.8	8.9	8.3	12.7	12.7
Germany-West	17.8	25.2	29.2	27.0	26.2	36.4	18.6
Great Britain	9.2	19.5	16.7	14.5	17.9	22.3	13.1
Hungary	15.9	17.2	16.3	22.4	30.7	40.4	24.5
Ireland	29.5	31.1	42.1	42.7	65.2	70.1	40.6
Israel	69.1	66.1	66.0	68.0	64.9	52.7	-16.4
Italy	35.8	29.0	35.7	37.1	42.5	63.5	27.7
Japan	2.0	2.7	3.2	4.8	4.1	7.8	5.8
Latvia	11.7	20.7	14.4	23.8	29.4	38.9	27.2
Netherlands	20.8	16.4	18.2	14.8	23.0	34.3	13.5
New Zealand	18.8	23.3	27.7	29.9	31.6	30.2	11.4
Northern Ireland	35.3	33.5	40.2	41.5	57.2	70.6	35.3
Norway	8.5	12.6	15.9	13.3	21.1	18.3	9.8
Philippines	76.4	85.8	85.0	85.1	85.2	85.9	9.5
Poland	48.4	58.4	62.6	66.4	66.3	79.3	30.9
Portugal	41.4	38.8	41.8	56.9	55.5	75.4	34.0
Russia	28.2	29.0	31.4	23.8	26.8	41.8	13.6
Slovakia	34.5	33.8	31.1	37.3	48.9	60.7	26.2
Slovenia	17.6	22.8	20.9	20.3	23.1	39.1	21.5
Spain	21.8	28.9	30.0	36.1	48.3	65.4	43.6
Sweden	8.4	9.3	10.0	11.5	8.2	14.9	6.5
Switzerland	15.6	23.3	21.1	27.4	19.9	42.2	26.6
United States	53.8	59.4	55.0	63.8	69.0	66.0	12.2

0-10 %	20.1-30 %	40.1-50 %	60.1-70 %	80.1-90 %
10.1-20 %	30.1-40 %	50.1-60 %	70.1-80 %	90.1-100 %

Table 2b: Differences by age by country in 2008: % never believed

Country	Younger than 28	28-37	38-47	48-57	58-67	68 and older	Difference younger than 28 - 68 and older
Australia	26.8	35.4	20.3	19.3	8.8	8.1	18.7
Chile	4.3	1.7	0.9	0.9	2.1	0.6	3.7
Cyprus	3.9	3.6	3.2	0.6	0.0	0.0	3.9
Czech Republic	68.1	60.6	54.4	55.5	40.5	21.2	46.9
Denmark	29.2	27.9	25.4	24.1	23.9	15.5	13.7
France	34.6	34.9	25.0	22.3	15.7	12.1	22.5
Germany-East	71.6	63.6	72.6	62.2	49.0	42.7	28.9
Germany-West	15.3	15.3	7.5	9.8	4.4	5.8	9.5
Great Britain	33.0	23.9	25.6	16.1	8.4	11.5	21.5
Hungary	28.5	31.8	26.7	25.0	15.3	8.3	20.2
Ireland	4.9	5.5	3.2	2.0	1.6	0.4	4.5
Israel	8.0	8.2	7.3	5.4	9.5	16.8	-8.8
Italy	12.0	14.1	4.7	10.6	4.6	0.5	11.5
Japan	31.4	28.8	35.4	26.3	27.5	17.2	14.2
Latvia	42.6	24.0	32.1	29.1	23.5	17.6	25.0
Netherlands	34.2	36.1	29.5	24.9	16.7	11.3	22.9
New Zealand	28.7	26.2	21.2	19.8	15.4	11.4	17.3
Northern Ireland	5.8	8.3	3.5	4.5	5.4	0.0	5.8
Norway	41.1	30.5	26.0	25.1	17.6	9.6	31.5
Philippines	3.2	1.4	1.2	1.9	3.1	1.3	-1.9
Poland	3.5	2.4	2.5	1.3	1.0	0.0	3.5
Portugal	13.1	5.3	5.6	4.4	1.5	2.9	10.2
Russia	5.9	9.3	12.2	12.0	17.7	14.3	-8.4
Slovakia	19.0	18.3	19.4	11.3	8.7	3.5	15.5
Slovenia	27.5	21.7	13.9	18.3	21.0	11.2	16.3
Spain	17.5	10.2	10.9	5.5	5.0	1.4	16.1
Sweden	42.1	37.6	38.1	31.3	24.6	17.4	24.7
Switzerland	21.1	13.8	14.9	10.4	11.0	4.3	16.8
United States	6.7	5.5	6.8	1.7	2.9	1.2	5.5




Table 2c: Differences by age by country in 2008: % agree God personally concerned

Country	Younger than 28	28-37	38-47	48-57	58-67	68 and older	Difference 68 and older - younger than 28
Australia	22.8	25.8	28.7	28.6	30.7	35.8	13.0
Austria	23.1	26.1	24.4	30.6	23.8	36.3	13.2
Chile	59.5	71.0	76.5	72.4	79.6	81.4	21.9
Cyprus	48.8	48.2	51.9	60.7	70.0	83.0	34.2
Czech Republic	10.4	11.0	11.2	14.0	17.4	36.6	26.2
Denmark	22.0	28.2	27.7	27.6	28.1	35.0	13.0
France	10.9	18.9	17.6	18.8	21.8	24.2	13.3
Germany-East	6.0	6.8	9.4	11.1	7.3	7.3	1.3
Germany-West	26.8	31.3	36.3	26.3	30.6	38.2	11.4
Great Britain	20.9	27.5	28.4	21.5	30.7	32.2	11.3
Hungary	27.8	28.6	23.5	26.8	30.1	51.7	23.9
Ireland	49.3	55.4	65.0	65.6	78.7	88.5	39.2
Israel	70.5	69.4	69.6	66.5	58.8	56.5	-14.0
Italy	50.7	38.0	56.3	42.4	62.1	72.4	21.7
Japan	25.5	26.1	21.7	25.3	22.5	23.8	-1.7
Latvia	26.5	35.2	29.9	37.0	48.4	63.4	36.9
Netherlands	25.0	20.2	22.0	18.1	25.1	36.4	11.4
New Zealand	27.1	35.6	35.5	35.1	36.5	35.3	8.2
Northern Ireland	51.3	46.1	58.3	56.4	69.2	79.0	27.7
Norway	18.4	25.8	21.6	26.5	32.2	29.8	11.4
Philippines	90.4	92.6	92.1	93.8	89.1	92.3	1.9
Poland	51.6	57.8	64.1	57.1	59.7	75.7	24.1
Portugal	46.7	45.5	58.2	52.6	73.0	77.8	31.1
Russia	39.1	37.7	45.7	35.2	42.7	48.1	9.0
Slovakia	45.5	47.4	44.4	48.8	58.0	71.9	26.4
Slovenia	21.8	27.7	23.5	27.9	29.4	32.9	11.1
Spain	29.4	31.8	29.8	36.5	47.0	61.2	31.8
Sweden	18.5	16.5	18.6	22.0	16.4	23.6	5.1
Switzerland	42.7	44.3	49.7	47.1	36.5	46.5	3.8
United States	65.6	64.6	66.4	75.2	74.3	72.5	6.9

0-10 %	20.1-30 %	40.1-50 %	60.1-70 %	80.1-90 %
10.1-20 %	30.1-40 %	50.1-60 %	70.1-80 %	90.1-100 %

Looking at the differences across adjoining age groups shows that the largest increases were most often between the 58–67 year olds and those 68+ (Having biggest difference: younger than 28 to 28–37 18.5%; 28–37 to 38–47 9.0%; 38–47 to 58–67 20.2%, and 57–68 to 68+ 42.7%). This suggests that belief in God is especially likely to increase among the oldest groups, perhaps in response to the increasing anticipation of mortality occurring.

A comparison was also carried out of changes across time with cohort. It showed little clear indication overall of either aging or cohort effects. Across the five cohorts that could be tracked from 1998 to 2008 certain belief in God decreased in 64 instances and increased in 86 cases. Decreases and increases were exactly balanced (50% each) for the three cohorts under age 48 in 1998. Increases then grew to 63% for the 48–57 cohort in 1998, to 73% for the 58–67 cohort in 1998. This interaction further supports the idea that

there is an aging effect in which belief increases as the anticipation of mortality rises. But there is also some evidence of a cohort effect. Comparison of the entering cohorts (younger than 28) in 1998 and 2008 indicates lower belief in 2008 than in 1998 in 77% of the countries; an average decline of 2.5 points. This suggests that new cohorts are starting adulthood with lower belief than earlier entering cohorts, perhaps due to growing secularization over time.

It is noteworthy that of the only three countries that had increases in overall belief on all three measures (Israel, Russia, and Slovenia), they were also the only countries that had increases in belief across all cohorts.

## Conclusion

Belief in God has decreased in most countries, but the declines are quite modest especially when calculated on a per annum basis. It is only the repetition of the modest declines across measures and countries that makes the case for a general diminution in belief in God. This is further illustrated by the situation in the United States. Belief in God remains high, but has slowly eroded from the 1950s to the present (Chaves, 2011; Smith, 2009 & 2012). If the modest, general trend away from belief in God continues uninterrupted, it will accumulate to larger proportions and the atheism that is now prominent mainly in northwest Europe and some ex-Socialist states may spread more widely. But it is also possible that the pro-belief “exceptions” (Russia, Slovenia, and Israel) may become more widespread and belief may make more of a general rebound perhaps in response to a growth in “existential insecurity,” from a nationalistic, in-group growth in religious identity (e.g. Arab, Islamic movements, Hindu nationalism, etc.), or from some other societal impetus.

While the age-group differences suggest the possibility of changes across cohorts that represent larger, more widespread, and longer-term declines in belief in God, these figures confound cohort and aging effects and the analysis suggests that a substantial component of the age-group differences results from aging effects rather than from changes across cohorts. This is supported by earlier analysis of church attendance and religious identification that indicates aging/life-cycle effects (Smith, 2009).

While there is a modest, general shift away from belief in God, there is enormous variation across countries in the level of believers, atheists, and intermediate groups. Certitude that God exists ranges from 84% in the Philippines to 4% in Japan and conversely atheism rises from less than 1% in the Philippines to 52% in East Germany. Similarly, strong believers run from 60% in the Philippines down to 2.5% in East Germany, while strong atheists rise from nearly zero in the Philippines to 46% in East Germany. Even within the former Socialist states, the range is enormous with East Germany of course anchoring the secular pole and Poland near the top for believers.

Thus, while there is a drift towards lesser belief in God consistent with secularization theory the changes are modest in magnitude and mixed in scope. Countries have shown

and are likely to continue to show huge differences in levels and trends about belief in God and a homogenization of belief (or disbelief) is unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future.

## Data

ISSP Research Group (2011): International Social Survey Programme: Religion I-III - ISSP 1991-1998-2008. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5070 Data file Version 1.0.0, [doi:10.4232/1.10860](https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10860).

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## Appendix: Question wordings

A. Please indicate which statement below comes closest to expressing what you believe about God.

I don't believe in God.

I don't know whether there is a God and I don't believe there is any way to find out.

I don't believe in a personal God, but do believe in a Higher Power of some kind.

I find myself believing in God some of the time, but not at others.

While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in God.

I know that God really exists and I have no doubts about it.

Can't Choose

No Answer

B. Which best describes your beliefs about God?

I don't believe in God now, and I never have.

I don't believe in God now, but I used to.

I believe in God now, but I didn't used to.

I believe in God now and I always have.

Can't Choose

No Answer

C. Do you agree or disagree with the following...

There is a God who concerns himself with every human being personally.

Strongly Agree/Agree/Neither Agree nor Disagree/Disagree/Strongly Agree/Can't Choose/No Answer



# Understanding Variation in Religious Beliefs 1991–2008

## The Impact of Modernization and Social Inequality<sup>1</sup>

*Jonas Edlund*

### Introduction

In a historical perspective, few would deny that religion, in its various forms and structures, has had a major impact on contemporary societies. Even in Europe, where organized religion has gradually lost power over the last centuries, we can still observe religious influences institutionalized in contemporary societies' systems of law, social policy, and political party structures.

Focusing primarily on the declining impact of organized religion in Europe, some scholars predicted that religion would be an increasingly marginalized phenomenon which would gradually lose its societal impact. This idea, known as the secularization thesis – a theoretical approach that dominated the field up to the 1980s, whose ideas also influenced mass opinion – forms the backdrop of this chapter.

Religion and secularization are multifaceted concepts which can be approached from a variety of angles.<sup>2</sup> In this chapter, the focus is exclusively on religious faith among ordinary citizens, not on religious practices or organizational aspects of religion. By using trend data covering twenty-nine countries, we will first look at country specific patterns of religious faith over time. Here, we will be able to answer whether a general, more or less linear trend of secularization can be detected. Thereafter, we will examine a related issue: the extent to which cross-national variation in religious faith can be

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- 1 I wish to thank Insa Bechert, Arvid Bäckström, Ingemar Johansson-Sevä, Annette Schnabel, Rune Åberg and Ida Öun for giving valuable comments on a previous version of the paper. The research was financed by the Umeå University's Young Researcher Award research grant. I would like to give special thanks to Rune Åberg. In 1993, Sweden attended the annual meeting of the International Social Survey Programme for the first time. This year it was organized by the American colleagues at NORC, University of Chicago. On the flight to Chicago, Rune and I were reading a paper based on the first ISSP survey on religion. Rune carefully studied the tables and discussed possible causal explanations underlying the substantial variation in religiosity across countries. His theoretical insights and thoughts made a lasting impression on me and provided great inspiration when writing this chapter nearly twenty years later.
  - 2 I am aware of the various meanings that have been attached to the concept of secularization and the associated critique (Shiner, 1967; Dobbelaere, 1981; Johnstone, 2007). However, the concept is difficult to avoid, as it has been rather popular, having been used by both rank-and-file citizens as well as scholars. In its most general meaning, secularization essentially means that "religion is less important now than it was in the past" (Johnstone, 2007: 408). For a clarification of the concept of religion and the critical differences between religion and magic, see Johnstone (2007).



explained by the level of modernization/industrialization. Finally, we will test an alternative explanatory approach, emphasizing that cross-country variation in religiousness may have more to do with the level of social distress/inequality in a country than with its level of modernization. Both theoretical approaches are described below.

## Modernization theory

The idea that religion has gradually lost its legitimacy and status in Western societies is known as the *secularization* thesis and has been quite popular both among social scientists and the general public (Berger, 1967; Wilson, 1982; Bruce, 1992). Formulated during the Enlightenment and subsequently refined and developed within classical sociology, the theory suggests that there is a fundamental conflict between modern society and religion. Greeley (2003: ix), highly critical of the whole approach, writes: “Most sociologists of religion (...) describe a general decline in religious faith and practice in Europe. The destruction of the “sacred canopy” by religious pluralism, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the discoveries of science, the rise of socialism, urbanization, industrialization, modernization, the influence of Marx and Freud, the increase in educational attainment – all have tended to diminish the power of the churches and to demystify the human condition.”

In Greeley’s view, scholars have focused their intentions with single-minded enthusiasm on the decline of religion, and have paid little attention to alternative developments of religion, such as empirically documented cases of increased sacralisation, or religious transformation from traditional forms of religious beliefs into more privatized, individually constructed belief systems (Greeley, 2003; Greeley, 2007; Davie, 1990; Inglehart, 1997; Berger, 1999; Finke and Stark, 1988). Greeley (2003: ix) criticizes secularization theory for being too deterministic, and its proponents for being insensitive to alternative explanations. Somewhat sarcastically he portrays the main idea of the tradition as: “Religion must decline, you see, because it *ought* to decline. Secularization has become a dogma.”

While the type of secularization/modernization theory that Greeley (2007: 158) criticizes as “a one-dimensional, unidirectional model of inevitable change” does predict a general decline of religion as time passes, it is possible to formulate a somewhat more specific variant: that the level of religiosity tends to be lower in highly modernized compared to less modernized countries. In this chapter we will examine these two theses of secularization; the first by examining trends within countries and the second by examining the relationship between modernization (as measured by the level of industrialization) and religiousness on the country level.

## The social distress/inequality approach

Rather than focusing on the overall level of socio-economic development, the second approach puts more emphasis on the internal distribution of risks and resources within a society (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010; Marmot, 2004). As argued by Wilkinson and Pickett (2010: 25): “The problems in rich countries are not caused by the society not being rich enough (or even by being too rich) but by the scale of material differences between people within each society being too big. What matters is where we stand in relation to others in our own society.” Great inequalities in resources and risks between different social strata in the population are assumed to increase social stress, anxiety, and lack of social trust, not only among those worst-off, but in the population at large.

Although this approach has focused primarily on health issues, the argument can be applied to the subject in this chapter also. A specific and significant aspect of religion that sets it apart from most other belief-systems is the emphasis on providing comfort, meaning, and guidelines during hard times of life. This aspect is assumed to be of utmost importance for explaining why people are attracted to religion (Goodenough, 1965; Spinks, 1963; Yinger, 1970). In societies characterized by high levels of social inequality the need for comfort, guidance, and explanation during life’s hard times – needs that are met by religion – is supposed to be stronger compared to societies with low levels of social inequality.

Theoretical approaches in other social science fields which predict a similar outcome are easily found, in fact, Höllinger and Haller (2009), Norris and Inglehart (2004), as well as Inglehart (1997) all offer a similar argument as that raised in this chapter, however with a focus more on the risk-reducing components of an ambitious welfare state. Among scholars dealing with social cohesion, believed to be an important prerequisite for a well-functioning and healthy society, we find works claiming both religion and social policy as important for societal social cohesion (Schnabel and Grötsch, 2012; Taylor-Gooby, 2007). However, considering the societies and historical period covered by the references, the core of the argument seems to suggest that in unequal and insecure societies – having no or only a small welfare state, religion provides social cohesion. In ambitious welfare states, where risks and resources are equalized to a large extent, social policy has overtaken the role of providing social cohesion.

The summarized general idea is thus that cross-national differences in religiosity may be explained by the level of social inequality. In countries where material resources and risks are highly unequally distributed, the general level of religiosity should be higher compared to societies characterized by social and economic equality.

The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: First, the variables and data are described. This is followed by an analysis of country-internal trends of religious faith. Next comes the country level part which analyzes the extent to which cross-national differences in religiosity are associated with levels of modernization and social inequality. A concluding section closes out the chapter.

## Variables, data, and the religious beliefs model characteristics

Beginning with the country level data, two indicators of modernization – both measuring the wealth of a country – are applied: [A] the GNI/capita and [B] the PPP GNI/capita (both in US\$). The GNI/capita is developed by the World Bank and is a refined measure of the well-known GDP/capita measure. The PPP (Purchasing Power Parities) variant is adjusted for national differences in purchasing power.<sup>3</sup>

The indicators measuring the degree of social distress/inequality in a country are as follows: [C] the income distribution in the country, measured with the Gini coefficient, which can vary between 0 (maximum income equality, all citizens have the same income) and 1 (maximum income inequality, one citizen receives all income); and [D] the overall tax revenue as percentage of GDP. The latter measure is an indicator of welfare state ambition, and correlates very strongly with other relevant indicators of welfare state size and effort, such as social spending levels and redistributive capacity (Edlund, 2007). Regarding the quality of these indicators, it bears mentioning that various sources have been employed to find data on income distribution, and the same definition of income was not always used. The tax/GDP indicator, in contrast, seems to be a more harmonized and standardized measure.<sup>4</sup>

It should be stressed that the two types of macro-economic indicators – wealth and inequality – are relatively independent of each other. Among the relatively equal countries we find both wealthy and less wealthy countries, and the same is true for the group of highly unequal countries.<sup>5</sup>

The survey data comes from the cumulative weighted ISSP file on religion fielded in 1991, 1998, and 2008. Only countries that fielded at least two of these surveys are included in the data set. The guiding idea when selecting indicators of religiosity is that they should not refer specifically to organized forms of religion, such as church attendance or church affiliation, as it is important not to exclude those having more individualistic and privatized religious beliefs – those “believing without belonging” (Davie, 1990). In a similar vein, items that are only relevant for certain religious groups have also been avoided. The three chosen indicators are: *Do you believe in... 1. Life after Death; 2. Heaven; 3. Hell.* Answer categories: *Yes, definitely; Yes, probably; No, probably not; No, definitely not.*

3 In theory, the driving force behind modernization is industrialization which is defined as the increasing and widespread use of: (a) tools that multiply the effects of their initial applications of energy and, (b) inanimate sources of energy (Wilensky, 2002: 3). Against this backdrop, the chosen indicators are not ideal. However, the wealth of a country correlates strongly with other technical indicators of industrialization (Marsh 2007), and it has been used in previous research (Wilensky, 2002). Moreover, the measures are available for all countries and for all years.

4 The Gini coefficient has been collected from the following sources: The World Bank database; The World Factbook (CIA); The Quality of Government database. Data on taxes come mainly from the OECD database. For some countries data were obtained from the following: Eurostat; The Heritage Foundation; IMF.

5 Although a correlation matrix shows positive relationships between wealth and inequality, the magnitude of these coefficients is rather small (see Appendix, Table A1).

Although the large majority of the countries in the data set are Christian, it may be noted that the three concepts – Life after Death, Heaven, and Hell – are important in all of the major religions. Before analysing country trends in religiosity, we will first study how these three indicators are associated with one another. Is it simply a difference between believers (responding “yes” on all three items) and non-believers (responding “no” on all three items) or are there other common combinations of religious faith among citizens? While those believing in all three phenomena may be regarded as believers in the traditional sense of religion, those believing in none of them can be understood as non-believers or non-religious. The extent to which people tend to believe in only one or two of these phenomena may be understood as expressions of religious beliefs that deviate more or less from the traditional understanding of religiosity.

The statistical tool known as Latent Class Analysis enables cross-national delineation of the most dominant forms of religious faith present among citizens. An analysis of the data reveals that there are four common types of religiosity. Grouping respondents according to their religious faith reveals four clusters of respondents.<sup>6</sup> The type of religious faith that distinguishes each cluster is indicated by the response probabilities on each indicator by cluster membership. These are shown in Figure 1.

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6 After running a series of Latent Class Models (LCA), it was apparent that the data was more complex than a simple dichotomy between believers and non-believers. In fact, a 4-cluster model provided the best fit to the data structure. In the analysis, the three items were dichotomized (1=yes, definitely/yes, probably; 0=no probably not/no, definitely not). Furthermore, in the LCA model, “country” and “year” were entered as covariates, which means that the response probabilities by cluster membership reported in Table 1 are identical across countries and over time. Religious change is therefore indicated by a change in the size of a cluster. In other words, while the quality of each cluster, respectively, is the same across time and space, the size of each cluster is allowed to vary across time and space. Individual level covariates included in the model: age, sex, and education. Model fit statistics of the 4-cluster model:  $L^2 = 17041.87$ ;  $df = 12190$ . Reduction of  $L^2$  compared to the 1-cluster baseline model = 87.4 percent.




Figure 1: Item response probabilities by cluster membership (in %, n= 79615)

Cluster 1 in Figure 1 shows us a group of citizens who can be labelled “non-believers.” These respondents show a very low probability for believing in Life after Death (1.5 percent), Heaven (2.1 percent), and Hell (0.8 percent). Cluster 2 represents those only believing in Life after Death who deny the existence of both Heaven and Hell. Cluster 3 includes those who believe in Life after Death and Heaven, but not in Hell. Together, these clusters can be described as being “alternative believers”. Cluster 4 groups together those strongly believing in all three phenomena; hereafter labelled “traditional believers”.

On average across all twenty-nine countries, the share of non-believers (39.0 percent) is about the same as the share of traditional believers (36.9 percent). The shares of alternative believers are substantially smaller, 11.2 percent (Alternative believers I) and 12.9 percent (Alternative believers II). In the next section we will study trends and country differences in religiosity by analysing how these cluster sizes vary across countries and over time.

## Trends in religious beliefs in twenty-nine countries<sup>7</sup>

In an attempt to summarize the different, observable trends of religiosity, the countries that share common paths have been grouped together. For fourteen countries, roughly following three different paths, it is difficult to find any signs of declining religious faith.




Figure 2: Countries experiencing decreasing shares of non-believers (religious beliefs in %)

The first path, as depicted in Figure 2, illustrates an evident decline over time of non-believers, in tandem with an increase of traditional believers among five of six countries. This pattern is particularly significant in Israel – where the share of non-believers decreased from 55 percent to 35 percent between 1991 and 2008, and the proportion of

<sup>7</sup> West and East Germany are treated as separate countries.

traditional believers increased from 38 percent in 1991 to 58 percent in 2008 – but it is also a pronounced pattern in Russia, Slovenia, and Hungary.<sup>8</sup> The Netherlands deviates somewhat, as the increased level of religiosity is primarily among those having alternative beliefs.




Figure 3: Countries experiencing increasing shares of traditional believers (religious beliefs in %)

Figure 3 portrays four countries where traditional religious beliefs grow stronger over time. However, this trend is not accompanied by a systematic decline of non-believers. Rather, it seems that the share of traditional believers has expanded at the expense of those holding alternative beliefs. Italy is a telling example, where the share of traditional believers (Cluster 4) increased from 47 percent in 1991 to 59 percent in 2008, while the proportion of alternative believers (Clusters 2 and 3) decreased from 24 percent to 12 percent between 1991 and 2008.

<sup>8</sup> Data on Israel does not include the Arab sector.




Figure 4: Strongly religious and overtime stable countries (religious beliefs in %)

Figure 4 presents four countries as primarily distinguished by their strong religious beliefs. In the Philippines and the USA, traditional believers form an overwhelming majority; about 75 percent of the respondents on average. In Chile and Ireland, traditional believers constitute about half of the citizenry. The share of non-believers is rather small in all of these four countries, ranging from 14 percent in Ireland down to less than 5 percent in the Philippines.

Figures 2-4 detail the results for fourteen countries where the main conclusion to be drawn is that it is hard to find signs suggesting religious decline. Moving on to the remaining fifteen countries, the data suggests that five of them, depicted in Figure 5, may perhaps best be described as experiencing some stability in religious faith over time, although the mean level differs considerably across the various countries. Also worth noting is that the large differences in religious faith between the Western and Eastern parts of Germany show no sign of convergence over time.






Figure 5: Countries experiencing overtime stability in religiosity (religious beliefs in %)

Figure 6 shows the ten countries that more or less fit the predictions of the secularization thesis; in these countries, the share of non-believers has generally increased over time. In Cyprus, Norway, France, Spain, and Portugal, in particular, the decline is most pronounced among those holding traditional religious beliefs. In Sweden and Great Britain, the observed decline between 1998 and 2008 relates primarily to alternative believers; in Switzerland, the Czech Republic, and Denmark, the decline in religiosity seems to appear both among those having traditional and alternative beliefs. It may be noted that the decline of religious faith appears exclusively in Europe. Out of the twenty-one European countries covered in this chapter, the secularization thesis is valid in about half of them. It is also worth noting that the Netherlands is absent from among these countries, as this is a country regularly cited as fitting the secularization thesis (see Greeley, 2003; Greeley, 2007 and references cited therein).




Figure 6: Countries experiencing increasing shares of non-believers (religious beliefs in %)

So far, the focus has been on trends in religious faith within countries, and the main conclusion is that no general systematic pattern of secularization can be found. However, by mainly focusing on trends within countries, proper attention has not been given to the variation in religious faith that exists in contemporary societies; a cross-country variation that, with a few exceptions, seems rather persistent over time.




Figure 7: Non-believers in twenty-nine countries (in %)

Figure 7 illustrates the proportion of non-believers in 2008 across all twenty-nine countries. In nine countries, non-believers constitute the majority. Nevertheless, the share of non-believers comprises 60 percent or more of the population in only four countries: Germany-East, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Denmark. In nineteen countries, non-believers are in the minority, and in thirteen of these countries, the share of non-believers is 40 percent or less. In the Philippines, Chile, USA, Ireland, and Poland, the share of non-believers is especially small, ranging from 22 percent in Poland down to 3 percent in the Philippines. While the least religious countries are situated within Europe, the most religious countries are scattered across several continents: Asia, Latin America, North America, and Europe.

## Cross-national variation in religious faith – the impact of modernization and social distress/inequality

The next step is to test the extent to which modernization theory and social distress/inequality theory may explain cross-national variation in religious faith. The first objective is to examine whether the level of religious faith tends to be lower in relatively rich societies compared to relatively poor societies, as predicted by modernization theory. The unit of analysis is “country-year” ( $n=71$ ).<sup>9</sup>

Table 1 presents the correlation coefficients.<sup>10</sup> The coefficient can vary between 1 and -1, where 0 indicates no relationship between the variables and 1 (-1) indicates a perfect linear positive (negative) relationship. A strong and significant positive correlation between the share of non-believers (Cluster 1) and the wealth indicators [A] and [B] would provide empirical support for the modernization thesis. However, the correlation coefficients are quite weak (.14 and .15) and non-significant, indicating that the level of modernization in a country does not tell us much about the prevalence of non-believers in the citizenry.

9 In this analysis, Germany-East and Germany-West have been collapsed into a single category using a population weight.

10 Analyses of the correlations per year (1991:  $n=16$ ; 1998:  $n=27$ ; 2008:  $n=28$ ) show similar results to those reported in Table 1. In other words, although the countries included differ across survey-waves, the correlation coefficients are remarkably stable across the waves, although a greater variation seems to pertain to the weaker correlations. For example, while the correlations between [A] and cluster 1 vary between  $-.08$  and  $.20$ , the correlations between [D] and cluster 1 vary between  $.63$  and  $.69$ . The table is available on request.

Table 1: Associations between religious beliefs and country-level indicators of modernization [A] [B] and social inequality [C] [D]. Pearson's  $r$  (n=71)

		Cluster 1 <i>Non-believers</i>	Cluster 2 <i>Alternative believers I</i>	Cluster 3 <i>Alternative believers II</i>	Cluster 4 <i>Traditional believers</i>
[A]	GNI/capita	.14	.39***	.20	-.35** <sup>a</sup>
[B]	PPP GNI/capita	.15	.34**	.09	-.30*
[C]	Gini <sup>b</sup>	.63***	.55***	-.25*	-.64***
[D]	Tax/GDP	.65***	.53***	-.23	-.66***
[A+C]			.60***		
[A+D]			.57***		
[C+D]		.70***	.59***	-.26*	-.70***

<sup>a</sup> Significance levels: \*\*\*= $p < .001$ ; \*\*= $p < .01$ ; \*= $p < .05$

<sup>b</sup> The Gini coefficient is reversed

The small impact of modernization is further illustrated in Table 2, where the average share of non-believers is shown for two groups: Q1 – the poorest quintile of the “country-year” cases (n=14), and Q5 – the richest quintile of the “country-year” cases (n=14). Here, Table 2 reveals that Q1 has an average GNI/capita equivalent to US\$ 3 446, and the average share of non-believers is 37 percent. Q5, having an average GNI/capita of US\$ 49 847, has an average share of non-believers constituting 41 percent of the respondents; a difference of only 4 percentage units.

Table 2: Religious beliefs by GNI/capita [A]. Quintiles 1 & 5. Percent

	GNI/capita [A]	Cluster 1 <i>Non-believers</i>	Cluster 2 <i>Alternative believers I</i>	Cluster 3 <i>Alternative believers II</i>	Cluster 4 <i>Traditional believers</i>
Q 1	3 446	37	8	10	45
Q 5	49 847	41	15	16	28

Quintiles ordered by [A] (GNI/capita)

Moving on to the second approach – regarding the role of social inequality for the prevalence of religious beliefs – we return to Table 1. As indicated by the correlation coefficients for Gini [C] and tax/GDP [D], strong positive relationships exist between the share of non-believers and the level of inequality (.63 and .65). Note that the Gini coefficient is reversed, the higher the value, the more equal the income distribution. In more equal welfare state societies the prevalence of non-believers is more common compared to

societies characterized by social inequality.<sup>11</sup> This is further illustrated in Table 3. Quintile 1 contains the fourteen most unequal “country-year” samples, having an average Gini coefficient of 42.8 and an average tax rate corresponding to 25.9 percent of GDP. The corresponding figures for quintile 5 (the fourteen most equal “country-year” samples) are 25.7 (Gini) and 44.1 (tax/GDP). The share of non-believers differs substantially between Q1 and Q5, 21 percent and 51 percent, respectively.

Table 3: Religious beliefs by Gini [C] and tax/GDP [D]. Quintiles 1 & 5. Percent

	Gini [C]	Tax/GDP [D]	Cluster 1 <i>Non-believers</i>	Cluster 2 <i>Alternative believers I</i>	Cluster 3 <i>Alternative believers II</i>	Cluster 4 <i>Traditional believers</i>
Q 1	42.8	25.9	21	7	14	58
Q 5	25.7	44.1	51	18	12	19

Quintiles ordered by [C+D] (composite standardized measure of the Gini and tax/GDP indicators)

Let us again return to Table 1 and examine the correlations between the macro-level indicators and the three types of religious beliefs. With respect to Cluster 4, we find that the share of traditional believers is much larger in unequal societies compared to relatively equal societies. A similar tendency, but substantially weaker, can be observed with respect to the modernization indicators. The different magnitude of the effects can clearly be seen by comparing the share of traditional believers in the Q1 and Q5 “country-year” groupings in Tables 2 and 3. As shown in Table 2, the share of traditional believers varies between 45 percent (Q1) and 28 percent (Q5), indicating a difference of 17 percentage units between the poorest and the richest quintiles. In Table 3, the share of traditional believers is 58 percent and 19 percent, for Q1 and Q5, respectively, indicating a difference of 39 percentage units. The results suggest that country differences in the prevalence of non-religious citizens as well as traditional religious citizens have more to do with the level of social inequality than with the level of modernization.

A final noteworthy point is the association between the share of people holding alternative religious beliefs (believing in Life after Death only, Cluster 2) and the two sets of macro-level indicators. As shown by the correlation coefficients in Table 1, the share of alternative believers tends to be larger in more equal and rich societies, compared to more unequal and poor societies. Again, however, we find that correlations are stronger for the social inequality indicators than for the wealth-based measures.

11 In addition, a number of composite standardized measures based on indicators [A, B, C, D] were constructed and tested. Most of these failed to improve correlations except for those reported in Table 1. Of special interest is the composite measure of indicators [C+D] which tends to improve the correlation coefficients across all four clusters. The [A+C] and [A+D] composite measures improved the correlation coefficients for cluster 2.

## Conclusions

Among the twenty-nine countries studied in this chapter, trends fitting the secularization thesis can be observed in ten countries, all located in Europe. No sign of declining religious faith can be detected in nineteen countries. In some of these countries rising levels in religious faith can be observed, while in other countries, the data suggests stability in religious faith over time. However, the level of religiousness across such “faith stable” countries differs considerably. Some are strongly religious: the Philippines, Chile, USA, and Ireland. In stark contrast, there is Germany-East, distinguished by its exceptionally large and persistent share of non-believers. The Czech Republic, Denmark, and Hungary are the other relatively secular countries.

When explaining national differences in religiosity, the effects of modernization are of limited significance. While it is true that the share of traditional believers tends to be smaller in more modernized than in less modernized societies, the prevalence of non-believers seems unrelated to the level of modernization. In contrast to the overall weak empirical evidence in favour of the modernization thesis, the social distress/ inequality thesis receives substantial empirical support.<sup>12</sup> Traditional religious beliefs are more common in societies characterized by high levels of social inequality compared to societies where risks and resources are distributed more equally among citizens. A similarly strong, but reverse pattern is true with respect to the prevalence of non-religious citizens. It should, however, be recognized that in relatively rich and equal societies, the decline of traditional religious beliefs is to some extent compensated by an increase in alternative religious beliefs. Modernization, as well as the equalization of risks and resources in a society, does not necessarily mean the disappearance of religion, but rather a change in its form, practice, and content.

## Data

ISSP Research Group (2011): International Social Survey Programme: Religion I-III - ISSP 1991-1998-2008. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5070 Data file Version 1.0.0, [doi:10.4232/1.10860](https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10860).

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12 It is not common in the literature to test the impact of factors related to social inequality. I have found three cross-national comparative works, two using ISSP data from the 1990s (Smith, 2009; Höllinger and Haller, 2009) and one using the World Values Survey data base 1981-2002 (Norris and Inglehart, 2004). All of them apply different indicators of religiosity compared to those used in this chapter. All three report significant and strong relationships between the level of religiosity and the level of social inequality. The similarity of the findings despite using different indicators of religiosity, as well as different data, may indicate the robustness of the finding.

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## Appendix

Table A1: Associations between country-level indicators of modernization [A] [B] and social inequality [C] [D]. Pearson's r (n=71)

	[A]	[B]	[C]
[A] GNI/capita			
[B] PPP GNI/capita	.96*** <sup>a</sup>		
[C] Gini <sup>b</sup>	.26*	.24*	
[D] Tax/GDP	.29*	.28*	.69***

<sup>a</sup> Significance levels: \*\*\*=p<.001; \*\*=p<.01; \*=p<.05

<sup>b</sup> The Gini coefficient is reversed

# Trends in Church Attendance Among Christian Societies in the Second Half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century

*Franz Höllinger*

## Introduction

Social scientists have given, and continue to give highly different evaluations and predictions concerning the role of religion in modern societies. The classical thesis of secularization – as formulated for example in Auguste Comte’s ‘law of three stages’ or in Max Weber’s ‘thesis of the disenchantment of the world’ – assumes that religion will become less important the more societies are able to control and to improve the living-conditions of their members through scientific knowledge. According to this thesis, higher levels of technological and socio-economic development should go hand in hand with a decline of religion. A second line of argumentation, the thesis of the privatization of religion, holds that living-conditions in modern societies do not entail a general decline in religiosity, but a shift from universal religious institutions to religious pluralism, and to more private and “invisible” forms of religion (Luckmann, 1967). Exponents of the market-model of religion expect that in modern, pluralist religious societies the level of religious activities will be even higher than in traditional societies, because competition among the suppliers of religious goods forces them to make their products more attractive (Finke and Stark, 1998). While these approaches refer to universal tendencies of religious development in modern societies, some sociologists of religion emphasize that the role of religion in a given society is influenced by a complex set of social and cultural factors; and thus, in highly developed modern societies the importance of specific forms of religion may therefore vary significantly between countries and culture-areas (e.g. Martin, 1978; Casanova, 1994; Höllinger, 1996; Höllinger and Haller, 2009). Notably, it has been suggested that the religious developments in Europe may not be the model that other parts of the world would follow in the course of their socioeconomic development, but that the strong decline of religious beliefs and practices in Europe might rather be an exception to the international trends (Davie, 1999).

This contribution focuses on a specific aspect of religious development: changes in church attendance. To help reduce the complexity of the subject, only Christian countries will be considered. Although sociologists of religion have rightly pointed out that the frequency of a person’s church attendance is not necessarily an indicator of the intensity of his/her religiosity, empirical studies demonstrate that in the subjective evaluation of the majority of the people in modern societies these two dimensions are closely connected: persons who attend church regularly usually consider themselves as religious, and vice versa; the less frequently somebody goes to church the more likely he/she will

consider him/herself a non-religious person. (The close association between church-attendance and religiosity in common-sense perception is also reflected by the fact that people who practice alternative forms of spirituality, such as yoga or meditation, preferentially consider themselves as spiritual, but not as religious persons; see Höllinger and Tripold, 2012). The level of church attendance does seem to be a good indicator for the importance of communitarian religion in different societies. The following presents findings from 34 Christian countries which have participated in ISSP- 2008 “Religion,” and interprets the results against the background of the theoretical approaches mentioned above.<sup>1</sup>

Denominational structure clearly represents an important factor for explaining country differences with regard to church attendance. During the last decades, church membership has dropped drastically in some Western countries. Thus, to determine the impact of denominational structure on the intensity of religious community life, it is better to refer to the denomination of the respondent’s parents. More useful would be to go further back into the past, when almost the entire population maintained a church affiliation. Table 1 presents an overview of the denominations of respondents’ mothers for the countries in comparison. The spectrum of denominations divides into four groups: (a) Catholic; (b) Orthodox; (c) Protestant State Church i.e. a church which has/had historically a politically privileged position and/or which was the numerically dominant church in a given country or in certain political subunits of this country, as was the case for example in Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands and Latvia; and (d) other Christian denominations, i.e. churches which are usually rather small in terms of the number of members and which approximate sect-types of religions such as Methodists, Baptists, Mormons, etc.

Table 1: Denominational structure and regular church attendance in the countries

Country	Country Code for Figure 1	Denomination						Church attendance 2-3 times. p. month	
		Mother of respondent					Respondent: none	Parents of resp. 60y +	Respondent 18-39y
		Catholic	Orthodox	Protest State Church	other Christ. Denom	none			
Sweden	SWE	3	2	83	2	5	30	14	2
Denmark	DK	2		84		9	16	14	3
Finland	FI		2	92	2	3	17	10	4
Norway	NO	1		85	6	6	16	15	6
Russia	RU	1	73			21	16	12	4
E-Germany	E-G	8		49	5	36	73	27	2
France	FR	87			3	8	45	33	4
Hungary	HU	68			25	7	16	44	5
Czech Rep.	CZ	58			10	32	60	40	6
Latvia	LV	26	24	26	3	21	39	31	7


1 The statistical analyses were carried out with the unweighted country datasets.

Country	Country Code for Figure 1	Denomination					Respondent: none	Church attendance 2-3 times, p. month	
		Mother of respondent						Parents of resp. 60y +	Respondent 18-39y
		Catholic	Orthodox	Protest State Church	other Christ. Denom	none			
Australia	AUS	28	2	40	17	9	37	30	9
Uruguay	URU	72			12	15	22	23	10
Ukraine	UKR	8	77		1	14	8	22	12
Great Britain	GB	14		51	19	11	40	28	13
New Zealand	NZ	20	2	40	20	17	33	34	13
Flanders	FLA	91			1	7	22	71	3
Netherlands	NL	44		33	6	14	41	64	10
Austria	A	85			8	4	17	59	10
Switzerland	CH	47	1	42	4	2	25	52	13
Cyprus	CY	1	98				0	68	13
Spain	ES	93	1		1	3	21	61	15
W-Germany	W-G	44		41	5	6	16	51	16
Slovenia	SLO	87	3		2	6	20	64	16
Portugal	PT	96	1		2	1	8	71	20
Chile	CHL	81			17	1	7	53	24
Croatia	HR	91	4		0	3	6	59	27
Italy	ITA	96			1	3	10	67	30
USA	USA	29	1		61	5	10	58	30
Slovakia	SK	79	1		14	6	17	72	32
N-Ireland	NIRL	40		47	12	1	11	69	37
South Africa	ZA	14			66	9	12	74	46
Mexico	MEX	88	1		7	3	8	73	54
Dominican R.	DOM	83			12	5	3	64	56
Philippines	PHIL	86			8		0	69	71
Ireland	IRL	93	1			1	7	96	38
Poland	PL	98	1			1	12	90	45

Note: Numbers of less than one percent as well as the percentage of nonresponse to the question of the denomination of respondent's mother were omitted from the table.

## The development of church attendance from the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to the present

Two methods are generally employed to measure changes in church attendance over time. The first compares the results of different survey waves. The relevant cross-national comparative surveys (European Values Survey, World Values Survey and International Social Survey Programme) were carried out for the first time between 1981 and 1990; thus, the comparison now extends over a 20 to 30 year time span. This comparison, however, can be carried out only for those countries which have participated in the programme from the beginning. The second approach is to interpret differences between age cohorts as indicators for intergenerational change. The ISSP modules on religion offer a third possibility for the investigation of trends in church attendance over time. These modules queried respondents about how often their father and their mother attended church when they (the respondents) were children. A look at the answers of respondents above the age of 60 (in the case of ISSP 2008 these are persons born before 1948) offers an estimate of the frequency of church attendance of adults (= respondents' parents) in the period between approximately 1940 and 1960. This retrospective data allows us to extend the time span for the comparison across a much longer period.



Notes:

Regular church-attendance = at least 2-3 times per month; Respondents = church attendance of respondents 18 to 39 years old; Parents = church attendance of mother and father when respondent was a child; subgroup: respondents 60 years and older (= born before 1948)

Figure 1: Regular church attendance ca. 1940-1960 and among young adults today

Figure 1 compares the rate of persons attending church at least 2-3 times per month in this age cohort (i.e. among the parents of respondents aged 60 years or older) with the level of church attendance among the younger age cohort of respondents (persons aged 18 to 39 years) for all countries. In Table 2 the countries have been merged into six clusters<sup>2</sup> to reduce the complexity of the results. This table also shows the average rate<sup>3</sup> of persons who never attended church or attended less than once a year.

Table 2: Development of church attendance, from ca. 1940-1960 to the present

Country	At least 2-3 times per month (%)			Less than once a year, never (%)		
	1940-1960	Young adults today	Change	1940-1960	Young adults today	Change
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Russia, Sweden	12	4	-8	35	62	+27
Australia, Czech Rep., Eastern- Germany, France, GB, Hungary, Latvia, New Zealand, Ukraine, Uruguay	31	8	-23	34	66	+32
Austria, Cyprus, Flanders, Nether- lands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, West-Germany	62	14	-48	14	40	+26
Chile, Italy, Croatia, Northern- Ireland, Slovakia, USA	65	31	-34	12	30	+18
Ireland, Poland	93	41	-52	1	16	+15
Dominican Rep., Mexico, Philippines, South-Africa	70	57	-13	10	13	+3

Notes:

1. Table shows average percentages of church attendance across the different groups of countries and age cohorts.
2. 1940-1960 = church attendance of parents of respondents aged 60 years and older; Young adults today = respondents 18 to 39 years.

The first cluster is composed of the four Protestant, Scandinavian countries and Orthodox Russia. Here, the level of regular church attendance was very low (around 12%) already in the middle of the 20th century. Today, less than 4% of respondents below the

2 This classification is based on a hierarchical cluster analysis of the countries according to the two indicators presented in Figure 1.

3 The average proportion of persons who attend church regularly (who never attend church) corresponds to the arithmetic mean of the respective percent values in all countries of a given group (regardless of the size of the population and of the sample size of these countries).

age of 40 attend church regularly. The second and the third cluster of countries are quite heterogeneous in terms of geographical location and denominational structure. These countries comprise the German-speaking states as well as a number of ex-communist Eastern European countries. France, Great Britain, the two Iberian countries Portugal and Spain, along with Cyprus, Australia, New Zealand and Uruguay all belong to one of these clusters. In most of these countries there is one dominant church which has had the position of a (Catholic, Protestant or Orthodox) state church for long historical periods, while in some countries, such as in Germany and Switzerland, both the Catholic and a Protestant Church had the position of a state church in specific parts of the country. In the second cluster, the level of regular church attendance was around 30% in the middle of the 20th century and has, in the meantime, declined almost to the level of the countries included in the first cluster. In the third cluster of countries, regular church attendance was at a rather high level (over 60%) until the middle of the 20th century and since then it has decreased rapidly to the present level of around 15%. The convergence between the first three clusters of countries can also be seen from the proportion of persons who do not attend church at all. In the first two clusters around one third of the mid-20th century young adult population never attended church; while around two thirds of younger and middle-aged people have practically no contact with a Christian church. In the third cluster this rate was much lower in the period from 1940-1960, reaching now a level of around 40%.

The fourth and fifth cluster are composed of five countries where the Catholic Church has had, and, to a certain extent, continues to have the position of a popular church, which fosters feelings of national identity and strengthens the cohesion of the nation in times of external political oppression. This applies particularly to Ireland and Poland and to a minor degree also to Croatia, Slovakia and even Italy. Northern Ireland (where both the Catholic and the Anglican Church are strongly involved in the issue of nationalism), Chile and the multid denominational USA belong to this cluster as well. In all these countries, church attendance was above 60% and in some cases even much higher in the period from 1940 to 1960. During the last decades numbers have dropped significantly, but still remain at a relatively high level.

The final cluster includes four non-European Countries: Mexico, Dominican Republic, South Africa and the Philippines. The common denominator among these countries is that a high percentage of the population in all of them has indigenous roots. In these countries the level of regular church attendance was around 70% in the period from 1940-1960, and has only slightly decreased since that time. In the Philippines, even today, it still remains at the same high level. Correspondingly, the percentage of persons who report that they never attend church is rather low (around 10%) in these countries. From the results of the World Values Survey 2005, which includes a much larger number of non-European countries, we can deduce that most Christian (and/or Muslim) African countries and also most Latin American countries have similarly high levels of church attendance as the four countries in this last cluster. Thus, considering the entire Christian World, in the majority of countries the vitality of religious life remains at a very high level.

For those 15 countries which already participated in the first wave of ISSP religion in 1991, we can trace the level of church attendance further back, to the period between 1920 and 1940 (Höllinger, 1996). In most cases, the data of this study remain consistent with the national trends described so far: In the Scandinavian countries the rate of church attendance was not much higher in this period than it was twenty years later; in the Philippines it was almost on the same level in 1920-1940 as from 1940 to 1960; in those countries, where there was a strong decline in church attendance from 1940-1960 until today, the rate of attendees was even higher in the 1920-1940 period than in the 1940-1960 period.

## Explaining cross-national differences

The limited length of this paper does not permit offering detailed sociological explanations for the observed cross-national differences; I can only briefly sketch some arguments.

It can easily be shown with our ISSP dataset or with the World Values Survey data that a considerable part of the cross-national differences in church-attendance can be explained within the framework of secularization theory. The higher a country's level of socioeconomic development (measured with indicators such as GDP per capita or the Human Development Index) the lower the level of regular church attendance (Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Höllinger, 2009). We can also see that church attendance has declined in almost all the countries compared over the last half century (with the only exception being the Philippines). According to Max Weber's Protestantism-thesis, the correlation between material well-being and religiosity on the macro level of the societies can also be interpreted the other way around: As a consequence of the Protestant 'disenchantment of the world' (i.e. the rejection of the belief that our fate depends on supernatural forces), the individual's sense of self-responsibility for his/her own fate has been strengthened. The new Protestant world view and ethics, in turn, have stimulated scientific development and economic productivity (Höllinger and Haller, 2009).

This leads us to the second set of central factors for the explanation of the national patterns of church attendance: the impact of the religious denomination one belongs to, one's religious socialization, and the religious culture one lives in on individual religious behaviour. Table 3 shows the association between the denomination of the respondent's mother and the frequency of church attendance of his/her parents as well as of the respondent him/herself (it would have been too complicated to consider the religious affiliation of both parents in those cases where the father and the mother have a different denomination). Denomination was classified in the same way as in Table 1.

Table 3 illustrates that in families where the mother was/is a member of a Protestant state church the level of church attendance was quite low already among the parents of respondents aged 60 years and older. This does not apply only to the Scandinavian countries, as we have seen already above, but to an attenuated degree also to the mem-



bers of Protestant state churches in other countries. As the level of church attendance was low already in the middle of the 20th century, there was only a moderate decrease during the last half century. The low level of church attendance in these countries is apparently a consequence of the combination of two factors: First, the disenchantment of religious world views in the (European) Protestant Churches, which has favoured the intellectualisation of religion at the expense of communitarian religious practice, and which, in the long run, has also led to a decline of private religious practice. The second factor is that the organizational structures of a bureaucratic state church do not encourage individual religious zeal and commitment.

Table 3: Regular church attendance by religious affiliation and country

Religious affiliation	Country	a) Parents 1940-60	Respondents		Change a-c
			b) 60 y +	c) 18-39 y	
Catholic	Ireland, Poland	95	75	41	-54
	Dominican Rep., Mexico, Philippines, South Africa	72	66	58	-14
	Italy, Slovakia, Croatia, USA	64	53	32	-37
	Countries with Catholic State Church history <sup>2</sup>	57	32	12	-45
Protestant State Church <sup>3</sup>	Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland	12	8	3	-9
	Other countries	37	22	12	-25
Orthodox	Cyprus	67	63	13	-54
	Latvia, Russia, Ukraine	19	13	9	-10
Other Christian Denomination	All ISSP-countries	58	42	43	-15

Notes:

1. Table shows average percentages of regular church attendance (= at least 2-3 times per month) across the different groups of countries and age cohorts
2. Countries with Catholic State Church History: Austria, Czech Rep., Germany, Flanders, France, Hungary, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland
3. Protestant State Church: Lutheran Church in the Scandinavian countries, Germany and Latvia; Anglican Church in GB, N-Ireland, Australia and New Zealand; Reformed Church in the Netherlands and in Switzerland

The pattern of religious behaviour of members of smaller Christian denominations, which are, in fact, mostly Protestant denominations, differs fundamentally from that of state-church-Protestants. In all countries, members of small denominations had a rather high level of regular church attendance in the middle of the 20th century (averaging around

60%); this level has somewhat declined in the meantime, but remains rather high at over 40%. A crucial factor here is the higher degree of religious motivation and zeal among members of small sect-like religious communities. In the multi-denominational United States of America and maybe also in other countries with a high level of religious pluralism, the market structure of religion, i.e. the competition between different churches, is an additional factor for the vitality of religious life. The high level of religious commitment among Protestants and Pentecostals in the USA and in other Non-European countries in comparison to European Protestants, however, cannot be explained only with the market theory of religion, it is also related to differences in religious worldviews: Evangelical Protestants and Pentecostals outside Europe have a much more enchanted worldview and emphasize the importance of enthusiastic communitarian religious rituals much more than European Protestants.

Among the Orthodox populations of Cyprus, Ukraine, Russia and Latvia the rate of regular church attendance today is almost as low as in the Protestant countries of Europe. In Cyprus it was much higher in the period from 1940 to 1960 while in the three ex-communist countries it was already relatively low during this period. According to the results of the World Values Survey, other ex-communist Orthodox countries in Eastern Europe have similar rates of church attendance as Russia and the Ukraine; however, only in Romania is this rate somewhat higher. The relatively low level of church attendance in Orthodox countries may be partly an effect of the anti-religious Communist politics and/or possibly also related to the historical heritage of the Orthodox state church system. A third factor might also be important here: Orthodoxy puts more emphasis on ceremonial religious rituals at specific festive days (Christmas, Easter, commemoration of saints, etc.) than Protestantism and Catholicism. Thus, it could be assumed that many Orthodox Christians attend Church (only) on specific holidays. Our data confirm this assumption: occasional church attendance (several times per year) is much more frequent among Orthodox Christians than among members of Protestant state churches.

The rate of church attendance among Catholics varies markedly among different countries and culture areas. One determinant for these differences is the historical role of Catholicism in a given society. We have already seen before that church attendance is particularly high in those countries where the Catholic Church was an important factor for the maintenance of national identity and national independence. The high level of church attendance here reflects the positive esteem the population holds for the church. On the other hand, there are a number of European countries where the Catholic Church has had the position of a state church for a long period of their history. Following the same logic as before one can argue that the low level of church attendance in these countries is an expression of the alienation of large parts of the population from the Church. This alienation is not only the result of the bureaucratization of religion in state church systems, it may be also a long-term impact of the problematical alliance between Church and Crown and the manner in which the Church has enforced its interests against parts of the population many times throughout history (as, for example, during the Catholic inquisition, or in the Religion Wars in the Early Modern Times).

The level of church attendance in Catholic countries is also related to differences in regard to the religious belief system and the relationship between popular and official religion. In those countries located close to the Protestant core of Europe (e.g. Germany, France, Belgium, Austria, Czech Republic) the Catholic Church has partly adopted the disenchanted world view of Protestantism - during the Catholic Counter-Reformation magical, popular religious beliefs and practices were suppressed in a similar way as in Protestant countries. In those Christian countries which were less affected by Reformation and Counter-Reformation, popular religion remained much more incorporated into the official religion (Höllinger, 1996; Sharot, 2001). This applies to Italy, the Iberian countries, Ireland and parts of Eastern Europe and it applies even far more strongly to countries with a predominantly indigenous population in Latin America, Africa and South East Asia.

## Concluding remarks

This cross-national comparison of more than 30 Christian countries around the world has shown that country differences regarding the level of church attendance were larger in the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century than they are today. These differences are connected with the timing of the process of socio-economic development as well as with the denominational structure and the historical role of the church(es) in the respective society. During the last 50 years, regular participation in religious community life has strongly declined in Europe as well as in new world countries with a predominantly white population. This applies not only to those societies in which religious life is affected by the historical heritage of a state church, but also to those countries which are considered to be exceptions to the general trend of secularization in Western societies, such as Ireland, Poland and the USA. In Christian countries with a predominantly non-white population, however, church attendance has remained almost at the same high level as 50 years ago. From today's perspective it is difficult to predict whether the Non-European Christian societies will maintain this pattern of religiosity also into the future, or whether religious community life will also decline once these societies reach similar levels of socio-economic development as the European nations.

## Data

ISSP Research Group (2012): International Social Survey Programme: Religion III - ISSP 2008. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4950 Data file Version 2.2.0, [doi:10.4232/1.11334](https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11334).

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# Are Religious People Happier than Non-Religious People?

*Insa Bechert*

“Every nation and each person seeks happiness  
and wants to be happy”  
*Jeremy Bentham 1789*

## Introduction

As the English philosopher and social reformer Jeremy Bentham stated already back in 1789, what makes us happy varies, across individuals as well as at a societal level across nations. Numerous works and studies deal with the question of what makes people happy. On the societal level, Folklore-theory “sees happiness as the reflection of a body of widely held notions about life, that is part of the national character,” while the Livability theory says “the better the living conditions in the country the happier the inhabitants” (Veenhoven, 1995: 34). Of course, such factors play a role for the general level of happiness in a society, which in turn has an impact on the individual living in this society.

On the direct individual level various factors have been tested as determinants for happiness. Important issues, which were examined frequently over decades, often in combination with each other, include physical as well as mental health and religiosity (see for example: Abdel-Khalek, 2006; Gökce, Bastida and Gonzalez, 2004). In line with the topic of this Data Report, this chapter will focus on the relation of religiosity and happiness. To be precise, in which countries are religious people happier than non-religious people? Preceding research on this topic comes to divergent results. Some studies have found religiosity strongly associated with happiness while others have found no association at all (see Lewis and Cruise, 2006: 214 for an overview of these studies). The aim of this paper is to examine the question on the basis of the most recent ISSP data.

There is no classical theory offering guidance in what direction the relation between religiosity and happiness is to be expected. While it does seem plausible that religiosity and happiness should be positively associated, i.e. it should make people happy to find security and confirmation in their religious community and in their faith, some studies found religiosity associated with negative feelings, such as anxiety and fear of death (Pressman et al., 1992). Thus, association in both directions may be possible.

There are different indicators of religiosity which are particularly important with regard to a possible association with happiness. One classical indicator for measuring levels of religiosity is to simply ask the respondent where they would position themselves on a scale (self-reporting). Another indicator is based on the argument that churches provide a secure environment and a community that socially integrates and supports the

individual. The conclusion drawn from these considerations is that it is maybe not the being religious, but the being involved that makes people happy. Some studies therefore focus on church attendance or involvement in church activities instead of self-assessed religiosity to examine associations with happiness (see for example Gökce, Bastida and Gonzalez, 2004).

ISSP data covers a wide range of countries, and an accordingly high variety of denominations and cultural particularities. The importance of church attendance varies across denominations in general, and beyond this across countries due to national-specific reasons. But even if church attendance does not play a role in a society, religious involvement might nevertheless be relevant for the individual, and might then become visible in the form of involvement in church activities. For these reasons, one approach of the following analysis will be to test both indicators, self-assessed religiosity and religious involvement, the latter covering church attendance as well as involvement in church activities, in order to find out which one is more strongly related with happiness.

The first part of this chapter will provide a general overview of self-rated religiosity, religious involvement and happiness levels across the 43 country samples participating in the ISSP 2008 module on religion. The following analyses will show whether, and if so, in which countries, both issues are associated. The last part of the chapter will focus on religious, respectively non-religious minority groups in societies. It could be argued that religious people might feel more comfortable and therefore happier, living among like-minded people. Therefore, being part of a minority group, which might not be highly respected by the society could create feelings of unhappiness. Based on these ideas, the last step of the analysis will be to examine if, on the one hand, in predominantly religious societies those who are religious might be happier than the non-religious minority group. And if, on the other hand, in secular societies, very religious people might be unhappier than the non-religious majority.

Taking into account the scope of this chapter, the analysis will concentrate on the pure association of personal religiosity, respectively, religious involvement and happiness, consciously ignoring the fact, that, of course, a variety of other factors may interactively determine an individual's level of happiness.<sup>1</sup>

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1 Regression analysis with classical socioeconomic indicators of the ISSP data set have shown that the respondents' marital status has the strongest impact on happiness across almost all countries, closely followed by age and income. Married people tend to be happier than unmarried people, younger people tend to be happier than older people and those with high incomes tend to be happier than those with lower incomes. Multivariate analyses have shown, however, that in 67% of the countries also the effects for at least one of the two religious indicators remains significant. In Venezuela religious involvement even has the strongest impact of all indicators on respondents' happiness.

## Data

Different, complex measurement tools for religiosity<sup>2</sup> and happiness<sup>3</sup> have been used in studies on this research topic. Some argue that finding associations (or not) depends on the scales used for analysis (Lewis and Cruise, 2006). The ISSP data of the modules on religion do not provide such complex indicators for happiness, since this is not the main focus of the module. There is only one item measuring happiness<sup>4</sup> which directly asks the respondents: “If you were to consider your life in general these days, how happy or unhappy would you say you are, on the whole...” The answer scale ranges from 1 “very happy” to 4 “not at all happy”. This happiness item will be analysed in combination with three indicators classically utilized for measuring religiosity. The question measuring self-assessed religiosity<sup>5</sup>, asks the respondent: “Would you describe yourself as...” and the answer scale ranges from 1 “extremely religious” to 7 “extremely non-religious”. For measuring religious involvement an index has been generated from two indicators measuring church attendance and participation in church activities. The answer scales on the questions how often the respondent attends church<sup>6</sup> or takes part in church activities<sup>7</sup> range from 1 “never” to 9 “several times a week”. All analyses are based on the weighted data of the ISSP 2008 module.

Figure 1 offers a general overview of the levels of self-assessed religiosity, religious involvement and happiness in societies, by presenting the mean values of all three indicators on a country level. All variables are scaled from 0 (not religious, not happy) to 100 (very religious, very happy). It is important to keep in mind when looking at the data outcomes of self-assessed religiosity and happiness that both indicators are self-rating scales and therefore highly subjective measures, which always means a challenge for cross-population comparability. Respondents who are asked to self-rate personal levels of religiosity or happiness will always be indirectly influenced by their reference group. If the respondent lives in a very religious society, the individual self-rating might not be that high, because it is compared against a highly religious environment. In turn, the same person living in a predominantly secular society might rate her-/himself as much more religious, since the general level of religiosity is that much lower. Thus, respondents’ level of self-assessed religiosity as well as happiness depends on various factors. What respondents definitely do not do is to place themselves within an appropriate cross-national context. The following results are not a clear objective ranking of the level of the societies’ religiosity and happiness. They do, however, give a valid idea of respondents’ self-estimations. Moreover, although too detailed direct comparisons across countries should be made with caution, the measures still give a picture of whether a

2 The Francis Scale of Attitude towards Christianity consists of 24 items of self-reported attitudes towards the Bible, prayer, church, God and Jesus.

3 The Oxford Happiness Inventory and The Depression-Happiness Scale are 29-item, respectively 25-item scales measuring the respondents’ feelings over the past week.

4 V6 in data set ZA4950.

5 V63 in data set ZA4950.

6 V60 in data set ZA4950.

7 ATTEND\_EXT in data set ZA4950.



society is rather religious or secular and whether the prevailing societal mood is more happy or unhappy.

The index on religious involvement is a less subjective measure, since it is based on respondents' behaviour. However, it is not to be used as an equivalent indicator for religiosity, as is commonly done with church attendance. In some countries values for church attendance are higher than in others, while in some taking part in church activities is more relevant. The index presents a mean value and therefore has different, and in some countries, certainly lower values as only church attendance.

## Results on the aggregate level

Figure 1 shows that Turkey is the country where people report being most religious, while in the Eastern part of Germany, with a huge gap to the other countries, respondents report being least religious.

Turkey and the Arab sample of Israel are the only Muslim societies that took part in the 2008 ISSP survey. But it is not simply the denomination which seems to be the determinant for the high level of reported religiosity. While the Turkish report being very religious, Israeli Arabs are far behind, but nevertheless, they still report being much more religious than the Jewish part of the Israeli society.

The low levels of religiosity reported in East Germany are the result of a strongly atheistic policy of education that propagated a non-religious world view in the times of the German Democratic Republic. Furthermore, repression directed at believers and the churches themselves led to an extreme decline in church membership, and over the generations a decline of religiosity (Maser, 1992).

Other former socialist countries were subject to similar historical and ideological influences. However, the decline of religiosity in society did not necessarily take place to the same extent. While the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Latvia also show rather low levels of self-rated religiosity, respondents in Russia and Slovakia consider themselves as averagely neither religious nor non-religious. Poland is the outlier in this group of former socialist states. Here, religiosity has survived the years of atheistic policies. One reason for this is that the Catholic Church supported the opposition against the communist regime twenty years ago. It contributed to its breakdown and thereby strengthened its position as being part of Poland's national identity (Curtis, 1994), as reflected by the high levels of self-reported religiosity seen in Figure 1.

Not surprisingly, the Western and Northern European countries known to be secular appear more at the less religious end of the Figure. The prominent outlier here is the USA, displaying comparatively high levels of religiosity. One generally accepted explanation for this is the great diversity of religious denominations creating a vivid competition with high levels of adherence among the churches (see for example Iannaccone, Finke and Stark, 1997).




Figure 1: Religious Involvement, Self-assessed Religiosity, and Happiness 2008 (Mean values scaled from 0 to 100)

Uruguay is another outlier, falling in among those countries with the lowest levels. While other Catholic societies in the developing world, such as Venezuela, the Dominican Republic and Mexico show pretty high levels of self-assessed religiosity, Uruguay has, in fact, long been known to be less strongly Catholic than any other country in Latin America (Fitzgibbon, 1953:21). The crucial factors for this development are the comparably small role the church played during the colonization, followed by an early separation of church and state in 1917.

The three Asian countries participating in the 2008 ISSP show completely divergent outcomes. While the average Taiwanese respondent claims to be “somewhat religious,” South Korean respondents on average report being “neither religious nor non-religious,” while the Japanese tend to be “somewhat non-religious”.

Although the scales for both religious indicators cannot be compared directly, the levels of self-assessed religiosity suggest more dominant religious behaviour in the form of church attendance and participation in church activities than actually reported. Especially in the predominantly Orthodox countries of Cyprus, Latvia, Russia and the Ukraine the differences between the levels of the two indicators appear large. This might be due to the fact that Orthodoxy puts special emphasis on ceremonial religious rituals on specific festive days (see Höllinger in this book: 56), which in turn keeps up the general church attendance rate and general religious involvement rather low. Also Protestantism does not emphasize church attendance as much as Catholicism does.

The appearance of happiness levels across countries could probably be explained to some degree by means of the Folklore or Livability-theory, but that would go beyond the scope of this chapter. However, here is a look at the most noteworthy results:

Mexico and Ireland are the countries where people report being most happy, while respondents in the Ukraine and, interestingly, in Turkey report being most unhappy. This is interesting because Turkey is the country with the highest level of reported religiosity, so, therefore, one might already think of a negative association between the two issues.

Another notable outcome from this data is that almost all former socialist Eastern European countries tend to show very low levels on the happiness scale. While the mean value for self-reported happiness over all ISSP countries is 68, the former socialist Eastern European countries<sup>8</sup> (East Germany, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Russia and the Ukraine) together report a mean happiness value of 58. Only the Polish are comparably happy, with a mean value of 71.

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8 The term “Eastern European” might not be absolutely appropriate for Russia and East Germany. Nevertheless, in terms of cultural history, these countries have strong similarities and therefore belong together in this group.

## Association between the two concepts

In general, the overview of the aggregate level reveals that the countries with high levels of reported religiosity are not necessarily those with high levels of happiness and vice versa. Therefore, the next step of the analysis, to find out if religious people are actually happier than non-religious people, will be to look at the correlations between these two concepts.

Table 1 shows the Pearson Correlation coefficients of the two different aspects of religiosity and the happiness item. All indicators are scaled in the same direction, which means positive correlations indicate the more religious respondents are, the happier they are, while negative correlations indicate lower levels of happiness among more religious people. The table lists only those countries showing significant correlations.

An initial look at the table quickly reveals some general findings. The first is that, over all countries, the associations between religiosity and happiness are not exceedingly high. Second, with Portugal being the only exception, all correlations point in the same direction: if there is any association, religious, or religiously involved people in all countries tend to be happier than non-religious people. The third interesting finding is that there are considerably more countries displaying substantial correlations for religious involvement and happiness than for self-assessed religiosity and happiness.

A comparison of both columns reveals that apart from the Israeli Jewish sample, with the highest correlation of all countries (.21), only in the Dominican Republic, Portugal, Poland, Uruguay, Turkey and Denmark is self-assessed religiosity more highly associated with happiness than religious involvement. Also South Africa, Croatia, South Korea and the USA show some substantial correlations between these items, however, the associations with religious involvement are stronger. What does stand out is that for the majority of the countries ranking high on the involvement index, the correlations with self-assessed religiosity are hardly noteworthy. These data outcomes are particularly surprising since we have seen in Figure 1 that generally levels of religious involvement are not very high.

The analysis shows that in 27 out of 43 ISSP countries or country samples religious or religiously involved people are happier than non-religious people. Portugal is the only exception in terms of the direction of this association. Here we find a significant negative correlation for both indicators, meaning the more religious the Portuguese respondents are; the unhappier they report being. In the remaining 16 countries, however, no significant associations between any of the tested indicators on religiosity, and happiness can be observed.

Table 1: Pearson Correlations of two indicators of religiosity and happiness

Countries	Correlations self-assessed religiosity and happiness	Correlations religious involvement index and happiness
Israel, Jews	.21 ***	.12 ***
Northern Ireland	.07 **	.18 ***
Australia	.06 **	.14 ***
South Korea	.08 ***	.13 ***
Switzerland	.06 **	.12 ***
Portugal	-.12 ***	-.08 **
Netherlands		.11 ***
South Africa	.09 ***	.11 ***
United States	.08 ***	.11 ***
Dominican Republic	.11 ***	.06 ***
New Zealand		.11 ***
Croatia	.09 ***	.10 ***
Venezuela		.10 ***
Germany-East		.09 **
Japan		.09 ***
Ireland		.09 ***
Finland		.08 ***
Germany-West		.08 ***
Flanders		.08 ***
Latvia		.07 **
Poland	.09 ***	.07 **
Ukraine		.07 ***
Uruguay	.06 **	
Turkey	.06 **	
France	.05 **	.05 **
Denmark	.05 **	.05 **
Great Britain		.05 **

Significant levels \*\*\* < .010; \*\* < .050

## Denominations

One important question that comes to mind is whether the prevailing denomination plays a role for the strength of association between religiosity and happiness in the different countries. Perhaps belonging to one denomination is more satisfying than belonging to another denomination. The data reveals particularly strong correlations among the Jewish Israeli. Unfortunately, no other country has as many Jewish respondents in the sample as would be necessary to examine whether this is due to the denomination. However, a study by Francis and Katz, examining a sample of female Israeli Hebrew speaking undergraduate students, also found that those who held a positive attitude towards Judaism tend to be happier people (Francis and Katz, 2002).

The country with the largest sample of Muslims is Turkey. Turkey does not show any substantial correlation between religiosity and happiness and neither does the Muslim sample of Israel. Taking into account the fact that the Turks report being very religious and at the same time very unhappy, one would expect a strong negative association. It seems that there must be other crucial factors for the reported unhappiness. Studies among Muslims of other nationalities, however, attest Muslims a positive association of religiosity and happiness (see for example Abdel-Khalek, 2006).

Most ISSP member countries are predominantly Christian. But a look at Christian societies also does not provide much insight as to whether or not a denomination is the determinant of association between religiosity and happiness. Nor can a clear pattern be discovered among the Protestant, Catholic or Orthodox countries. Among the Protestant Scandinavian countries only Finland shows substantial correlations. Of the other predominantly European Protestant countries it is only the Netherlands. And also the group of South American, predominantly Roman Catholic countries do not appear homogeneously. While neither Mexico, nor Chile or Uruguay shows any relevant correlations between religiosity and happiness, Venezuela does. Furthermore, the highly Catholic European countries of Spain and Italy do not show any noteworthy correlations, while Portugal is the only country where negative correlations can be observed.

Looking at the Asian countries, South Korea and Japan show significant associations, while Taiwan does not. But here the denominational landscape does not allow for a general statement on a specific denomination anyway, since the population is too heterogeneous. The only denomination that has a considerable membership rate in all Asian ISSP countries is Buddhism. However, a check on only the Asian Buddhist respondents reveals that the associations of religiosity and happiness stay at the same level as when looking at the whole society in South Korea and Taiwan, while it disappears in Japan.

## Religious and non-religious minorities

The last part of the analysis will offer a look at the minority groups in societies; religious or non-religious. The thesis is that very religious people are happier than non-religious minority groups in predominantly religious societies. Conversely, the expectation is to find people who are very religious in predominantly secular societies to be less happy than those belonging to the non-religious majority.

The thesis is examined on the basis of the eight countries with the lowest and the eight countries with the highest levels of self-assessed religiosity as presented in Figure 1. For each country, the indicator of religiosity which turned out to be more relevant in that particular country is used. According to the previous results this is predominantly religious involvement. To allow comparability with the outcomes in Figure 1, happiness ranges from 0 “not at all happy” to 100 “very happy.” Table 2 presents in columns A and B the mean values of happiness among very religious, and respectively, non-religious groups in the sixteen societies. Column C shows the differences between these happiness values.

The table clearly illustrates that the levels of happiness do not vary a lot, even between the distinguished groups. Nevertheless, for the religious countries the thesis seems to hold. In all eight religious countries very religious people tend to be happier than the non-religious minorities. On average, religious groups, with 8.6% points, are happier than the non-religious groups, while the most substantial differences occur in Cyprus and Croatia with 14.8%, and 11.4% points, respectively.

However, a look at the secular societies reveals that the reverse argument does not hold for the majority of countries. According to the theory, very religious people should tend to be unhappier in the more secular countries, which is the case only in the Czech Republic and East Germany. Here religious people report being slightly less happy than the non-religious majority. In the other secular countries religious people tend to be happier (averaging 4.8% points) than their non-religious neighbours, similar to the religious societies. Especially in Japan and France these differences are with 12.8% and 8.8% points, respectively, quite substantial and even on the same level as in some highly religious societies.

There is no easy, general explanation for these outcomes. National-specific reasons, such as levels of religious tolerance might be crucial factors here. It could indeed be the fact that the societies of Cyprus, Croatia, the Philippines and South Africa are highly religious that makes religious people feel happier than the non-religious minority. In the same vein it could be high levels of religious tolerance in secular countries, such as Japan or France that keep religious minorities happy despite the secular environment.

Table 2: Levels of happiness among the religious and non-religious groups in religious, respectively, secular societies

	A	B	C
	Very religious people <sup>9</sup>	Non-religious people <sup>10</sup>	A-B
<i>Religious societies</i>			
Poland*	73.5	67.2	6.3
Turkey*	53.6	49.5	4.1
Philippines	72.0	60.9	11.1
South Africa	66.5	57.2	9.3
Cyprus	75.1	60.3	14.8
Croatia	74.0	62.6	11.4
Taiwan	73.4	68.1	5.3
United States	83.5	77.4	6.1
<i>Secular societies</i>			
Great Britain	79.2	73.1	6.1
Denmark*	76.6	69.2	7.4
Japan	79.0 **	66.2	12.8
Sweden	76.3	71.4	4.9
Uruguay	72.8	70.4	2.4
France	72.8 **	64.0	8.8
Czech Republic*	59.6	61.3	-1.7
East Germany	60.2 ***	62.6	-2.4

\*self-assessed religiosity; \*\*N<20; \*\*\*N<10

9 Very religious people are those who reported being extremely or very religious, or who attend church or participate in church activities several times a week or every week.

10 Non-religious groups contain those who consider themselves to be extremely non-religious or very non-religious or are never involved, or involved less than once a year in church activities or attend religious services.



## Conclusion

The analyses show that in the majority of ISSP member countries religiosity is not very strongly related with happiness. However, if there are noteworthy associations they are almost always positive: Religious people tend to be happier than non-religious people. The only exception to this rule is Portugal. The question why the Portuguese tend to be unhappier the more religious they are, remains open. Representative of the society as a whole, 86% of the respondents in the Portuguese ISSP sample are Roman Catholic. The second largest group contains those who report having no religion. Other denominations taken together account for only 4% of the sample. A closer look at the data reveals that none of the denominational minority groups bias the correlation of religiosity and happiness. For whatever reason, it is the group of very religious Portuguese Roman Catholics which is substantially unhappier than the rest of the society.

Another interesting result revealed by the analysis is that in the majority of countries, it is rather religious involvement that is associated with happiness than pure, self-assessed religiosity. Being part of a religious community and taking part in their activities, be it religious services or other events, seems to be a more important factor for happiness than the existence or non-existence of pure faith.

The last question examined in this chapter was regarding how happy very religious or non-religious minority groups are in predominantly secular or religious societies. The data outcomes support the thesis that very religious people are happier than non-religious people in predominantly religious societies. However, in six out of eight secular countries, the religious minorities are happier as well. This investigation, once more, makes clear that generalizations over a wide range of heterogeneous countries can hardly reveal homogenous patterns. Further investigation will be necessary to find the country specific reasons behind the national data outcomes.

## Data

ISSP Research Group (2012): International Social Survey Programme: Religion III - ISSP 2008. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4950 Data file Version 2.2.0, [doi:10.4232/1.11334](https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11334).

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# Do Modernization and Religious Competition Affect Religious Change?

An Exploratory Analysis of the ISSP Modules 1991, 1998 and 2008

*Wolfgang Jagodzinski*

## Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Religious change has become a key issue in comparative cultural research (Bruce 2011; Chaves 2011; Inglehart and Norris, 2011; Pollack and Olson 2008; Stark and Finke 2005). The data outcomes in Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere's (1995) investigation of religious change in the last century in Western Europe clearly indicated a decline in religiosity. Long-term sequences of national surveys could only be generated for church attendance or religious participation for a small number of Western European countries, but these time series delivered the same clear and unequivocal message: Church integration, a variable derived from church attendance, is declining.

Is the observed religious change confined to postwar Western Europe, or is this a general, long-term trend occurring in other advanced societies as well?<sup>2</sup> It is only since the 1980s that large international survey programmes started to regularly investigate religiosity. ISSP data can offer some valuable insights into the structure of religious change. The following study will not investigate the full spectrum of ISSP-countries but only focus on a few religious economies which have played a major role in the recent controversy on religious change: Norway as a Scandinavian Lutheran monopoly; Ireland and Italy as Catholic monopolies; the Netherlands as a religiously mixed country; the United States as a society with a highly competitive religious market; and finally Japan, a country with non-congregational religions. Is the pattern of religious change in these countries more compatible with the secularization thesis or with the economic theory of religion? A brief elaboration of the type of change expected in both frameworks will precede an empirical look at this question.

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1 I would like to thank André Schaffrin for his help on the data sets and literature research.

2 See Gorki and Altinordu (2008) for an overview of historical research on religious change in Europe and the United States.

## Expected religious participation levels and expected religious change

### Economic theories of religion

Stark (1999) has convincingly called into question the thesis of a centuries-long religious decline since the Middle Ages (see also Gorki and Altinordu 2008). Iannaccone (1988; 1991) has inferred from a supply-side theory of religious markets that religious monopolies like the former state churches in Scandinavia or state-subsidized churches, like in Germany, are detrimental to religious participation because they prevent or hinder religious competition. Religious decline is not a consequence of the modernization process but may be the result of imperfect religious markets. For empirical support Iannaccone, Stark and Finke (1997) contrasted Western Europe with three countries in which the religious markets had been liberalized before or after World War II: United States, Japan and South Korea. While religious activity in Sweden is rather low, religion seemed to flourish in the latter three countries. The economic approach considers religious competition<sup>3</sup> as the driving motor behind religious change.

The present study accepts the countries' ranking order as derived by Stark and his colleagues from their assessment of religious competition: high in the United States and low in Protestant European countries. Accordingly, religious participation, the core dependent variable of the economic approach, should display a similar pattern: high in the United States and low in North-Western Europe. Catholic monopolies are provisionally accepted as exceptions to the rule that religious participation is low in religious monopolies. The internal competition among Catholic orders (Iannaccone, 1991); the strong dependency of Catholic priests on the laity (Stark and Finke, 2000: 243); or the capability of the Catholic Church to serve religious niches (Stark and Finke, 2000: 215) may keep religious participation at high levels in Catholic societies. It is also accepted that religious participation may not strongly covary with the regulation of the religious markets in Asia because Asian religions are "un-churched," i.e. they lack a congregational life and a specific religious creed (Stark, Hamberg, and Miller 2005: 7; Lu, Johnson and Stark, 2008).<sup>4</sup> We therefore do not expect high levels of religious participation in Japan despite the fact that the Japanese religious market has been liberalized after World War II.

Thus, religious participation should be high in Catholic countries and in competitive religious economies like the United States, but low in Protestant monopolies and Asian countries. As far as change over time is concerned, the market theory allows for increases

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3 The more easily information on such pre-conditions of competition is obtained, the less it reflects competition. The German constitution, for instance, guarantees religious freedom as a fundamental right. Nevertheless Germany has no free and open religious market because the churches are state subsidized.

4 Whether this is due to different preferences or portfolios of religious believers, different strategies of the religious firms (Iannaccone, 1995) or different cultural traditions remains open for now.

and decreases in religiousness. However, "... its usual prediction is for relatively stable levels of religious commitment in societies" (Stark and Finke, 2000: 68). Changes in religious competition, if they occur, should produce gradual and long-term change. The effects of religious regulations, in particular, are long-lived: "Even after a state church is disestablished and the religious market is legally opened, it may take generations for the situation to approach that of a perfectly competitive market." And furthermore: "... the tendency to remain within an inefficient church can persist over generations" (Iannaccone, 1991: 163). What is true for an increase in competition and efficiency should also hold true for a gradual decline and deterioration of religious products – except it is caused by political suppression of religions which can also prevent lay people from further participation. Thus, short-term changes are difficult to explain within the theory of religious markets. The same holds for generational differences which are not caused by changes in religious competition. Differences between older and younger people do not necessarily falsify the theory because they can often be explained as life-cycle effects (cf., for instance, Iannaccone, 1991; 1988). As confidence in religious explanations increases with religious participation (Stark and Finke, 2000: 107, proposition 23); the core beliefs of a religion should by and large be affected by the same factors as religious participation (see Iannaccone, 1991) and also display a similar stability over time.

### The secularization thesis

Most secularization theses relate religious change to master trends like modernization, functional differentiation, privatization, individualization or rationalization. They have, however, been no more successful in measuring the underlying concepts than their rivals in measuring religious competition.<sup>5</sup> Typical modernization indicators do not vary very much in the countries included in this study. Accordingly, higher levels of religious participation may be expected in Ireland and Italy, and lower levels in the Netherlands and Norway. The United States is recognized as an exceptional case for which several explanations have been offered (cf. Bruce 1997; 2004). Japan is largely a white spot in secularization literature so that little can be said about its religious ranking.

Further decline in religious participation can be expected for at least as long as processes of functional differentiation and rationalization continue. Ireland's progress and amazing economic and human development through 2008 leads to the expectation of a somewhat faster religious decline in Ireland. Religious trends and generational differences should be somewhat more pronounced. A sudden religious decline is a lesser problem for the secularization thesis because religious doubts can accumulate over long periods and remain invisible until suddenly spilling over in manifest behaviour.

To what extent other religious activities or religious beliefs share the same fate as church attendance is not completely settled in the secularization approach. Adherents of the privatization theses first expect to observe decay in public practices like church

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5 Indicators of economic development like GNP or GDP per capita do not reflect rationalization, for instance, because they are also dependent on the natural resources of a country such as oil.

attendance, but not necessarily a similar change in private practices like praying. Some religious beliefs may also persist – people, in other words, may believe without belonging to a public visible religion (see Davies, 1994). Others observe the rise of a new spirituality which places higher emphasis on personal religious experiences and goes hand in hand with a profound value change (see Siegers, 2012 with further references). If new beliefs and practices emerge, the old ones have to be abolished or transformed and decline accordingly. The main stream nevertheless assures that all traditional religious practices and beliefs are affected in the same way as church attendance in the secularization process.

### A third perspective

Thus far it has been argued that religious practices and beliefs should display similar patterns over time – stability according to the economic approach or decline according to the theory of secularization. Yet, it is at least equally plausible that some religious practices undergo profound changes in a globalizing world, while others remain fairly stable. Schwadel (2011) has recently detected traces of generational change in religious participation and the frequency of prayer in the United States: As older generations practice more often than younger, generational replacement will lead to a decline of both practices in the United States. The belief in a life after death, by contrast, reveals a different pattern: This belief is high among both very old and very young cohorts so that there is no indication of a long-term decline. And while the author cannot offer an explanation for the differential developments it should be kept in mind as a third possibility.

### Empirical analysis

Which of the three alternatives is supported by the ISSP data? Unfortunately the joint ISSP reference scale for religious participation has been changed: While in the first two modules it did not differentiate between once a week and more, the category “more than once a week” was added in 2008 in a number of countries. In order to improve comparability over time, the joint reference scale is dichotomized by distinguishing between respondents who attended religious services less than once a month and those who attended more often.<sup>6</sup> The cut-off point “once a month” is relatively precisely defined and probably not affected by changes in neighbouring categories. It also indicates a certain amount of religious commitment, while people who attend religious services less often, say, on major holidays only, may do it as a custom or habit or for other non-religious reasons. Let us therefore refer to respondents above the cut-off points as religiously committed people for the sake of brevity.

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6 Alternatively, a scale with four categories may be considered: never; rarely (less than once a month), once a month or more; weekly (or more).

### Religious participation

Figure 1 displays the proportion of religiously committed respondents for the countries and time points. The countries' order on the horizontal axis corresponds to the theoretically expected order: The two Catholic monopolies, Ireland and Italy as well as the United States, should display higher levels of religious participation than the Netherlands, Norway and Japan<sup>7</sup>. The vertical axis represents the proportions of religiously committed persons. For each country and time point this proportion is depicted as a small circle. The whiskers of each circle indicate the 95% confidence interval for a random sample. In Ireland 80% of the respondents were religiously committed in 1991. The figure dropped to 61% in 2008. Nevertheless, Ireland in 2008 still remains the most religious among the six countries. Japan at the top of the figure, by contrast, never reaches the ten percent level of religious commitment.




Figure 1: Religious Participation in Japan, the United States, and four West European Countries Results from the ISSP Modules 1991, 1998, and 2008

As far as the country levels are concerned, the rank order is consistent with the theoretical expectations derived from the economic theory of religion: The two Catholic

7 Since Japan participated in the ISSP first in 1993 there is no data for 1991.



monopolies, Ireland and Italy, display relatively high proportions of religiously committed persons; the United States follows more or less on the same level as Italy; with the Netherlands fourth; and Japan and Norway coming up last with percentages of about 10% and less. The only surprise is that Ireland, as one of the Catholic monopolies, displays an even higher level of religious participation than the United States. Apparently, the conflict between Ireland and Great Britain has generated more religious commitment than religious competition on an unregulated market (see also below!). The rank order of countries is also compatible with the secularization thesis because the economically and technically more advanced societies also have lower levels of religious participation, with one exception: only the United States seems to disconfirm the secularization thesis. Yet, Bruce (1997; 2011) and others can offer a range of arguments as to why the United States is actually compatible with the thesis.

As for religious change within countries, with the exception of Japan where religious commitment has marginally increased between 1998 and 2008, the pattern is the same everywhere: Religious commitment has declined by more than 25% in Ireland (from 88% to 61%), between 7% and 9% in the Netherlands, Italy and the United States, and by less than 5% in Norway. It is true, the economic approach does not exclude a religious decline but it is hard to believe that the observed change is a consequence of reduced religious competition.

Figure 2 illustrates the proportions of religiously committed persons of different generations. In each country only two groups of generations, the war-/ prewar and the postwar generation, have been distinguished to keep the distorting effect of sampling and measurement errors as small as possible.<sup>8</sup> While there are other meaningful cut-off points which differ from country to country, the end of World War II was a watershed for almost all of them. The proportions of religiously committed people are displayed as grey triangles for the postwar generations, born after 1945, and as black circles for the war-/ prewar generations.

Five out of six countries show fairly large generational differences. The exception, Norway, is consistent with the economic theory in so far as religious participation is low among all generations. The Japanese pattern is consistent with the theory which includes age as an important determinant: Age effects may result in an intra-cohort increase of religious participation and lower religiousness of the postwar generations. It is more difficult to explain the huge generational differences in Ireland using the economic approach. Stark and Finke argue that intra- and international religious conflicts can be conducive to religious participation and has worked in this way in Ireland: “The celebrated Irish piety ... arose subsequent to the Potato Famine [1845-51, WJ] when the Catholic Church became the primary organizational vehicle for Irish nationalism resisting external domination” (Stark and Finke, 2000: 241).<sup>9</sup> This function of the Catholic

8 Note that the war-/ pre-war generations are not strictly comparable across countries because some countries have introduced age limits: In the first Italian wave only respondents of age 70 and below have been included, the Norwegian population consisted of people between 18 and 80, and in the United States people above 90 were excluded.

9 Irish religiousness was quite low up to the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

Church, it might be argued, has been in decline since the so-called Good Friday agreement of 1998. Yet, Stark and Finke have observed that conflicts with England continued and therefore did "... not expect the onset of a very substantial decline" (2000: 240-241). The decline, however, is substantial!




Figure 2: Religious Participation in Pre- and Postwar Generations  
Results from the ISSP Modules 1991, 1998, and 2008

Internal conflicts between the religious pillars have kept religious participation at high levels in the pre-World War II Netherlands (Stark and Finke, 2000: 241-3). With the breakdown of the pillars seen around 1970, religion lost its function as a source of identification. Ireland and the Netherlands may be viewed as borderline cases which still fit the economic theory, but the patterns of religious change in Italy and the United States pose insoluble problems for the economic theory of religion. Even though Italy has a partly regulated religious market, religious participation in the war-/ prewar generations is still higher than in the United States. Is the internal organization of the Catholic Church more effective than the market competition? And why, above all, do we not only observe fairly large intergenerational differences in Italy and the United States, but also declining pro-

portions of religiously committed persons in the postwar generations between 1991 and 2008? Neither religious competition nor religious conflicts have changed that much during the last decades in these two countries! So the economic approach lacks a convincing explanation. To be sure, cohort differences could also be a result of age differences. Even if there are large cohort differences in the sense that later born cohorts display lower levels of religious commitment, and even if these cohort levels remain perfectly stable over time, this could be the result of age and period effects. Yet if we resorted to a life-cycle explanation in this particular case we would have to identify period effects so strong that they not only conceal the life-cycle change towards more religious participation in each generation but even induce a religious decline in younger generations. And these so-called short-term period effects would work for nearly two decades already in the same direction. It is inconceivable how this pattern can be explained by the economic theory.


The secularization thesis obviously has lesser problems with the observed generational change which by and large seems to confirm the thesis that modernization erodes religiosity and religious participation. There are indeed good reasons to assume that increasing mobility as well as modern forms of communication via the internet may undermine regular church attendance. Increased mobility makes it more difficult to meet regularly at places of worship. Whether this also implies a loss of community and social capital remains to be seen. It does not necessarily imply, in any case, a loss of religiosity. In the future, part of religious communication will take place in the virtual world, and face to face meetings may become more sporadic.

## Frequency of prayer

It is a short step to infer from the previous considerations that prayer should display a pattern of change different from that shown by religious practice. The latter is public and restricted to particular places while prayers can be spoken anywhere – in private or in public; at home; one's workplace; out in nature; or in a holy place. Prayer as an expression should therefore be affected by processes of post-modernization and globalization to a lesser extent than religious participation. Is this true?

Frequency of prayer is measured in the ISSP using an 11-point scale running from 1 “never” to 11 “several times a day”. Figure 3 reports the averages for each time point in each country. No figure is displayed for the second ISSP module in Ireland because the 1998 Irish survey used a slightly different scale. Contrary to expectations differences between war-/ prewar and postwar generations are to be seen in all countries. In the four West European countries the frequency of prayer seems to decline in the postwar generations, while it is rather stable in Japan. The classification of Japan as an un-churched religion (Stark, Hamberg and Miller, 2005) is confirmed in so far as Japan now appears, compared to the other countries, somewhat more religious. Yet, extremely large differences can be observed between postwar and older generations. This comes as a surprise since the liberalization of the religious market after World War II should have had its strongest impact on the postwar generations. In fact, they pray, but on average much less frequently than the war-/ prewar generations.

The pattern seen for the United States deviates most from the previous pattern. While there are clear signs of a decline in religious participation among the American postwar generations, we observe exactly the opposite in Figure 3: Younger American cohorts seem to pray more frequently as they age! This pattern is consistent with the results of Schwadel (2011: 186, Table 1, and 188, Fig. 3) whose study shows strong age effects in the early stages of life. The cohort effects of the prewar generations differ markedly from those generations born after World War II, but there is little variation of these effects in the postwar generations. Those born after World War II pray less often than those born earlier, but Schwadel’s Table 1 does not show a substantial further decline among the postwar generations. Life cycle effects can really be seen only in the United States and considerably weaker, in Japan. They may exist elsewhere too, but are then completely concealed by period effects working in the opposite direction.



Notes:  
 Praying is a labelled 11-point scales, running from 1 (=never) to 11 (=several times a day);  
 Data are missing in 1998 in Ireland because a different scale was used.  
 Grey, dotted bars: Postwar generations born after 1945; black, solid bars: War and prewar generations

Figure 3: Frequency of Prayer in Pre- and Postwar Generations  
 Results from the ISSP Modules 1991, 1998, and 2008

## Belief in life after death

Religious practices differ largely between cultures and many religious beliefs do so to an even larger degree. The God of monotheistic religions has little in common with the Gods in Asian folk religions (Stark, 2000) and Jesus Christ may not even be known to Asian lay people. Most religions however entail the concept of a life after death even though an *afterlife* may not be the ultimate and most desirable state. The question whether people believe in a life after death seems therefore better suited to cross-cultural comparisons than many other belief questions. It is one of the advantages of the ISSP question (Do you believe in life after death) that it takes religious doubts of people about the transcendent world into account, offering four rank-ordered response alternatives: (1) Yes, definitely; (2) Yes, probably; (3) No, probably not; (4) No, definitely not. The further alternative “Can’t choose” is mentioned quite often and usually coded as a missing value. In this particular case, however, it can also be interpreted as a middle category where people assign a probability of about 50% to the afterlife. In the following analysis such a 5-point scale has been created running from 0 “no, definitely not” to 4 “yes, definitely”. 2 is the midpoint of the scale corresponding to the assignment of a 50:50 probability.

There is a striking difference between Figure 4 and the previous figures. First, we find virtually no differences between postwar and older generations with the exception of Ireland and Japan. In Ireland postwar generations believe somewhat less strongly in afterlife yet compared to the gaps we have previously found, the distances to the older generations remain relatively small. Furthermore, there is no continuous decline over time and the averages remain quite stable on a fairly high level. Japanese averages are where quite a few researchers would expect them to be, i.e. close to the midpoint of the scale. It is nevertheless remarkable that the averages move upward between 1998 and 2008 in war-/ prewar and postwar generations. Furthermore, the belief in an afterlife is more wide-spread in the younger than in older Japanese generations. There are no signs of a continuous religious decline in Japan.

The Norwegian pattern is consistent with the secularization thesis in so far as Figure 3 displays a continuous decline between 1991 and 2008. However, it is mainly a movement to the midpoint of maximal doubt, not towards the rejection of religious beliefs. Furthermore, the belief seems to change in younger and older generations with the same speed, which is very untypical for a long-term religious change. The remaining countries perfectly correspond to the expectations of the economic approach whereby differences between generations seem fairly small if they exist at all.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, the averages remain fairly stable over time. And finally the rank order among the three countries is consistent with the theoretical expectations. The Catholic monopoly Ireland, where Catholicism served for a long-time as a source of national identification, and the highly

10 Schwadel (2011: 189, Table 2, and 190, Fig. 4) estimates stronger cohort effects for the youngest and oldest generations in the United States which may remain concealed in this study because we have only distinguished two generations. Future analyses have to show whether the very strong effects for the generations born between 1977 and 1982 found by Schwadel really are persistent generational differences.

competitive religious market in the United States display higher levels of religious belief than Italy where the religious market is still restricted to some extent.




Figure 4: Belief in a Life after Death in Pre- and Postwar Generations  
Results from the ISSP Modules 1991, 1998, and 2008

## Summary and conclusions

This paper has explored religious change in a selected number of countries. The investigation is framed by two competing theses. The first, which has been called the secularization thesis, asserts a decline of all traditional forms of religious behaviour like church attendance or prayer as well as the corresponding religious beliefs in the process of modernization or post-modernization. This is only one out of many secularization theses, all of which maintain a decline of religion – be it on the macro-, the meso-, or micro-level.

Both frameworks, the secularization thesis and the supply side theory of religion, still lack adequate operationalization of their key concepts. Neither the concepts of functional differentiation and rationalization in the first, nor the concept of religious competition in the latter approach have been validly measured. As a consequence researchers usually stay with the assumption that rationalization changes parallel with economic or human development, and that religious competition remains on the same level as long as there are no major changes in the religious regulations or in the number of religious competitors. As the latter have not occurred in the countries under investigation, the lack of long-term differences between generations and a constant level of religious activities is predicted by the economic theory. Similar empirical evidence has been presented in the preceding analysis not only for the United States but also for most of the remaining countries, particularly also for Ireland and Italy. Religious participation was never very high in so-called un-churched societies like Japan but it appears to now be in decline in a larger number of advanced Christian societies too. This change cannot be explained by the endogenous variables of the supply side theory of religion. It is detrimental to this theory as long as religious participation is kept as the key dependent variable. A reformulation of the theory for a broader spectrum of religious activities and orientations should therefore be considered.

To be sure, the changes in religious participation and the frequency of prayer fit the secularization thesis better than the economic theory of religion in the six countries under investigation. However, this is not empirical evidence that religiousness in general will disappear with modernization. Beliefs in afterlife show decline only in Norway, remaining amazingly stable in half of the countries. In Ireland we find generational differences but the averages are still very high in the postwar generations. And in Japan, younger generations on average believe more strongly in a life after death than the war-/prewar generations. There is no doubt that a social transformation of religiousness is under way, but it is certainly not a unidirectional change towards unbelief. What can be clearly stated is that so far none of the existing theories of religion allows a prediction about the future fate of religion.

## Data

ISSP Research Group (2011): International Social Survey Programme: Religion I-III - ISSP 1991-1998-2008. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5070 Data file Version 1.0.0, [doi:10.4232/1.10860](https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10860).

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## Appendix: Variables

Variable	Name	Description	Range
Year of birth	Birthyear	Recoded from V4 (age)	1897-1992
Postwar generation	CohD1	0=born 1945 or earlier; 1=born 1946 or later	0-1
Believe in afterlife?	afterlife	Recoded from v30 0=no, definitely not; 1=no, probably not; 2=don't know; 3=yes, probably; 4=yes, definitely	0-4
Religious participation	chatt	1=once a month or more; 0=less than once a month; Recoded of attend	0-1
How often Resp. prays	pray	V49; 1=Never; 2=Less than once a year; 3>About once or twice a year; 4=Several times a year; 5=About once a month; 6=2-3 times a month; 7=Nearly every week; 8=Every week; 9=Several times a week; 10=Once a day; 11=Several times a day; Not available 1998 in Ireland	1-11



# Assessing Trends in Religiosity with ISSP Data

## An Addendum<sup>1</sup>

*Markus Quandt and Insa Bechert*

### Introduction

The first of the two main objectives of this brief concluding chapter is to describe the development of church-related religiosity over the longest time span possible with the available ISSP data, beginning from 1985/86 to 2010. This information is offered in an effort to complement some of the statements on trends made in the remaining chapters of this volume by embedding them into an even longer time horizon. A second, related, objective is to discuss some of the methodological and practical challenges confronted in that type of analysis, with that type of data.

All preceding chapters rely on a particular study series within the ISSP programme: surveys from the years 1991, 1998, and 2008. These datasets were specifically collected (and later cumulated) with the purpose of describing and understanding religious attitudes, religious behaviours and religious change in the ISSP member countries. Consequently, they offer rich material for assessing both the nature and degree of religiosity displayed by societies and their individual citizens, enabling our authors, in turn, to examine specific aspects of religiosity. For example, authors Franz Höllinger and Wolfgang Jagodzinski, look at, among other things, the behavioural side of church attendance as an active, and somewhat public act representing a certain degree of commitment to one's religion and denomination. Whereas Tom W. Smith focuses on the personal or 'spiritual' side of beliefs in God – which can also be held silently and privately. Jonas Edlund's contribution draws on rather generic metaphysical beliefs to tap into subjective religiosity in a way not specific to particular religions. That relative wealth of measures on religiosity, however, speaks not only to a variety of related, but distinguishable theoretical questions. Using different indicators for the same theoretical concept can also be seen as insurance against the pitfalls that come with measuring a concept of interest by only one single indicator. One of the common methodological concerns about single indicator measurements is that a single indicator may not be consistently valid or reliable across points in time, and in particular, across different cultures (or religions and denominations).

To analyse denser time series and longer time spans, we cannot, however, easily use the information-rich ISSP Religion modules, as these have been conducted just three

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1 Much of the inspiration and a significant part of the data used in this chapter originate from a project initiated by Ferruccio Biolcati (University of Milan) and Christiano Vezconi (University of Trento). We are also indebted to Urs Fichtner for his help in cleaning the data we added, a process which was not always as easy as it should have been.

times in two decades. In such situations researchers most commonly fall back on non-specialised sources (see Höllinger in this volume for another approach: retrospective reports across generations). The non-specialised source for the ISSP survey programme comes in the form of the standard ‘background variables’ collected with each ISSP sample, independently of the topic of the ISSP module. The frequency of personal church attendance is a mandatory item among these background variables. Thus, it will become the base for the following analysis.

## Data and Methodological Problems

Respondents’ reports on the frequency of church attendance, aggregated to one single value per country and point in time, were utilised to assess the level of religiosity characterising a given country at a given time. The chapters by Höllinger, Bechert, and Jagodzinski included in this volume make the case for using church attendance in this way. Starting from their reasoning, we arrive at the following – probably still incomplete – list of arguments:

- Church attendance is an activity demanding both time and energy which could also be invested into other activities. Thus, it has a noticeable cost and incurring of costs is usually taken as indicating a commitment to something. So it can reasonably be said that the more often one attends church, the higher the personal commitment to that church.
- Frequent church attendance implies that an individual frequently receives religious messages or makes religious and spiritual experiences. Thus, the more often one attends church, the more exposure to religious content and experience one should have.
- Attending church is also a social activity. This fact increases the likelihood that a person will meet other religious people, and this is particularly valid for frequent church goers, who convey their – probably religious – views and confirm one’s own – probably religious – views. Frequent church attendance should stabilise religious beliefs.

There are, of course, other ways to look at and to measure religiosity, and as demonstrated particularly by Edlund in this volume, these other ways may lead to different and even contrasting inferences. Furthermore, church attendance is a meaningful concept only for religions that actually have churches. It is in fact a rather Christian concept.

The extended time horizon achieved by using the generic ISSP data comes at the price of limiting the number of countries covered, as the maximal time horizon is confined to those countries contributing data to the ISSP since the initial 1985/86 data collection. These countries are Australia, Austria, Italy, Germany (West), Great Britain, and the USA – all of them Western, predominantly Christian societies. Therefore, we can assume that church attendance is a meaningful concept for respondents in these countries, if we also assume that religiosity in these countries retains its Christian character even as declining levels of church attendance can be observed.

Before discussing the results of the seemingly simple procedure of constructing a time series of the church attendance data, a few peculiarities of our database need be mentioned. The first issue is that ISSP members are basically free to use different question formats in the data collection for standard background variables (as ISSP often “piggy-backs” on large national surveys that already have a national-specific standard set of demographics variables). Thus, for background variables the ISSP standard output is established only when national data collected with slightly different question texts and response categories is transferred into the common ISSP coding scheme. As a result there may be limits to the cross-national comparability of our church attendance data, since there is no strictly harmonised measurement instrument behind it.

Although church attendance is a standard ISSP background variable, the common coding scheme just explained has undergone some development over its 25 years in use.<sup>2</sup> The current ISSP standard now prescribes a coding scheme with seven categories, an increase over the initial five categories of 1985, as illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1: Church attendance target scales from 1985 to the present

Codes	1985	1986	1987	1988 - 2000	2001 -
1	Once a week	Once a week	Once a week or more	Once a week or more	Several times a week or more often
2	One to three times a month	One to three times a month	One to three times a month	Two to three times a month	Once a week
3	Several times per year	Several times per year	Several times per year	Once a month	Two or three times a month
4	Less frequently	Twice per year, once per year	Twice per year, once per year	Several times per year	Once a month
5	Never	Less frequently	Less frequently	Less frequently, but at least once per year	Several times per year
6		Never	Never	Never or less than once per year	Once per year
7					Less frequently than once per year
8					Never

2 The current ISSP standard also suggests that a question text like the following be used in the data collection, if countries are not bound by strong national requirements for an alternative text: “*Apart from such special occasions as weddings, funerals, etc., how often do you attend religious services?*”

In an effort to exclude comparability problems, responses were collapsed for our analysis into just two classes which were uniquely identifiable across all years: frequent and regular church attendance is displayed by those respondents reporting that they attended church at least once a week; all others are classified together as non-frequent participants or non-participants (including those who reported not being religious or not belonging to a denomination, who were not asked about their attendance in some countries).<sup>3</sup>

Another ISSP-specific problem is rooted in the organisational structure of the survey programme itself. As mentioned above, the ISSP questionnaires often are carried “piggy-back” with larger, regular, general social surveys. While ISSP modules are meant to be carried out annually, general social surveys often follow a biannual schedule. A direct result is that in certain countries two ISSP modules having nominally different ‘ISSP years’ in their title are not infrequently surveyed simultaneously when the national general survey to which they are attached is administered only every other year. For example, in Germany, ISSP data will be collected along with the German general social survey “ALLBUS”, which follows a biannual schedule. This results in ISSP data from, for example, 2007 and 2008 having been collected in the same fieldwork campaign (but on different sub-samples), in this case in 2008. Similar cases occur in all countries of our small sample used. Correct fieldwork times were identified and assigned, and any samples where the background variables of adjacent ISSP modules had been surveyed on the same respondents were dropped. For the countries in our analysis, 101 independent samples remain. No country offers data for every single year from 1985 - 2010, but almost the full time span can be covered for all countries in our selection - give or take one year at the beginning or end of the period.

## Results and Discussion

Figure 1 illustrates the proportion of respondents who report attending church ‘at least weekly’ in the six countries participating in ISSP surveys from the programme’s very beginning in 1985/86, up to the latest finalised module of 2010. Data were weighted when weights are available.

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, embedding the results of the other chapters into the longer trend information obtained here can be understood to mean that finding compatible results between our way of treating the data and the various ways chosen in the other chapters would support the substantive results presented there. Just the addition of more data points creates an impression of the reliability of the type of measures that were used throughout this book.

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3 An alternative cutting point between frequent attenders and less frequent/non-attenders is above the category “once a month or more” (vs. all those with less frequent, or no attendance) as chosen by Höllinger and Jagodzinski (this volume). This does not change the structure of the results, but in our denser time series it produces more ambiguous classification decisions and fewer valid data points.




Figure 1: Mean percentage of respondents attending church at least weekly between 1985 and 2010.

The first question to ask is whether the national samples of 1991, 1998, and 2008 used in the other chapters appear as ‘outliers’ from the general national trends that our denser time series show better than the previous chapters could. Simple visual inspection of the individual trend lines in Figure 1 will provide an answer. Among our six countries, only Australia displays a moderate outlier value for weekly church attendance in that sense; for 1998. Looking at all time-points, we find two additional – and more striking – outliers: Great Britain in 1993 and Austria in 2003. No straightforward explanations are available for these outliers. Theoretically, one factor behind such outliers could be singular events that affect the actual attendance behaviour, for example a national crisis that drives people to churches in their search for orientation and mental support (to apply Edlund’s argument on a short-term basis). Other, unfortunately more likely, factors could be of a methodological nature, for example deviating measurement instruments for these specific samples, sampling problems, or even undetected coding errors made during the integration of the national samples into the international ISSP data file. All of the latter factors would more or less forbid using these particular data points. But for the present purpose, two reassuring conclusions can be drawn: First, the specific observations of church attendance means for the countries overlapping with Jagodzinski’s (Italy, USA) or Höllinger’s trend analyses (all six countries for ISSP 2008) are not visible outliers, therefore it seems unlikely that their analyses are biased by strong undesirable effects. Second, with the three exceptions named out of our 101 data points, the overall picture of the trend data is one of no or of small and rather continuous change from year



to year, increasing our confidence in the general usefulness of these data for describing change or stability on the societal level.

After having obtained some reassurance on the basic methodological side, we turn to a slightly more substantive question. Are the trend statements made for individual countries in the previous chapters confirmed? This is to be expected at least for the church attendances measures of Jagodzinski and Höllinger, even if these used a different classification of the responses than we did. In Höllinger's case, a much longer time span is addressed (with an entirely different approach and only a subset of the data). The 1985–2010 or 1991–2008 periods covered in the other analyses comprise only the most recent part of the longer trends that Höllinger tries to capture. Starting with our six countries, we find their observed trajectories between 1985/86 and 2010 remarkably similar to one another despite vastly different levels between Italy and the USA on the one hand, and Australia, Austria, Great Britain, and West Germany on the other. The important common feature is a moderate downward trend up to the late 1990s (increasing only for Australia), which then flattens out into near stability towards the end of the period (except for Australia, where the intermittent increase turns into a rather steep decrease again). Further, the ranking of our six countries with regard to mean attendance levels remains relatively stable over time. When countries do change ranks, it is mostly only over modest absolute distances. This lends some credibility to the rankings displayed in the chapters by Edlund, Smith, and Bechert.

The most direct comparison with Jagodzinski's data on Italy and the USA displays no contradictions. For these countries, the long-term data confirm conclusions drawn previously on only three time-points. If we revert the perspective and look at how our data over 25 years fit into Höllinger's estimates spanning approximately 60 years, it appears that the declining trends demonstrated by our data are the continuation of a process that – as theory claims – began much earlier. In all six cases, according to Höllinger's analyses the attendance levels between 1940 and 1960 must have been markedly higher than around 1985.

In conclusion, it appears that the church attendance trend data that was presented in the preceding chapters matches nicely with our more detailed trend data, even if the overlap of countries in the analyses is small. This indicates that further thought should be given to those trend statements that were based on alternative indicators of religiosity. If the robustness of the church attendance estimates from the 1991, 1998, and 2008 instances of the ISSP can be confirmed, there is, *prima facie*, little reason to assume that the measures for alternative indicators are less robust. Certain observations become even more interesting which – in contrast to church attendance behaviour – do not universally find relevant decreases in, for example, religious belief systems (Edlund) or sometimes even for alternative religious behaviours such as praying (Jagodzinski). Declining church attendance is a fact in most Western countries, most definitely for those we have examined in detail in the present chapter. Taking into account specific alternative aspects however, it is less clear what this means for religiosity at large.

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# Appendix



## A.I Correspondence List of Cumulated Variables and Replications

Cumulated dataset		Other modules			
Variable Number	Variable Label	1991	1998	2008	
V8	How happy or unhappy	V4	V4	V6	Family and Changing Gender Roles 2002: V52
V9	Gov. responsibility: if want job, provide job	V5	V5		Role of Government 1985: V101 1990: V49 1996: V36 2006: V25
V10	Gov. responsibility: reduce income difference rich + poor	V6	V6		Role of Government 1985: V107 1990: V55 1996: V42 2006: V31
V11	Sexual relations before marriage	V9	V7	V7	Family and Changing Gender Roles 1994: V45
V12	Sexual relations with someone other than spouse	V10	V8	V8	Family and Changing Gender Roles 1994: V47
V13	Sexual relations between adults of the same sex	V11	V9	V9	Family and Changing Gender Roles 1994: V48
V14	Opinion: Abortion if defect in the baby	V14	V10	V10	
V15	Abortion if family has very low income	V15	V11	V11	
					Social Inequality 1987: V51 1992: V59
					Work Orientations: 1989: V44
					Social Inequality 1987: V49 1992: V57 2009: V33
					Environment 1993: V6 2000: V6

Cumulated dataset ZA5070	Religion Variable Label	Other modules			
		1991	1998	2008	
V16	Husband earn money, wife's job is family	V16	V12	V12	Family and Changing Gender Roles 1988: V12 1994: V12 2002: V11
V17	Family life suffers if woman works fulltime	V17	V13		Family and Changing Gender Roles 1988: V6 1994: V6 2002: V6
V18	Taxpayer not report income less tax	V18	V16		
V19	Incorrect information to get govt benefits	V19	V17		
V20	Confidence in parliament	V20	V20	V14	Role of Government* 1996: V54 2006: V50 Citizenship* 2004: V43
V21	Confidence in business and industry	V21	V21	V15	
V22	Confidence in business and religious organizations	V23	V22	V16	
V23	Confidence in courts and legal system	V24	V23	V17	Role of Government* 1996: V54 2006: V50
V24	Confidence in schools and educational system	V25	V24	V18	Role of Government* 1996: V54 2006: V50

Cumulated dataset ZA5070		Religion		Other modules			
Variable Number	Variable Label	1991	1998	2008			
V25	Religious leaders should not influence vote	V27	V25	V20			
V26	Religious leaders should not influence government	V29	V26	V21			
V27	Power of churches and religious organizations	V30	V36	V26			
V28	Closest to R's beliefs about God	V31	V37	V33			
V29	Best describes beliefs about God	V33	V38	V34	Environment 1993: V64		
V30	Belief in life after death	V34	V39	V35			
V31	Belief in heaven	V36	V40	V36			
V32	Belief in hell	V37	V41	V37			
V33	Belief in religious miracles	V38	V42	V38			
V34	Feelings about Bible	V39	V43	V71			
V35	God concerns Himself with human beings	V40	V44	V42			
V36	People can do little to change life	V41	V45	V43			
V37	Life meaningful because God exists	V42	V46	V44			
V38	Life does not serve any purpose	V43	V47	V45			
V39	Life meaningful, provide meaning for yourself	V45	V48	V46			
V40	We each make our own fate	V46	V49				
V41	Turning point new commitment to religion	V49	V50	V72			



Cumulated dataset		Religion				Other modules			
Variable Number	Variable Label	1991	1998	2008					
V42	Mothers religion (group)	V50	V51	V49					
V43	Fathers religion (group)	V51	V52	V51					
V44	Spouse religion (group)	V52	V54	V55					
V45	Religion respondent raised in (group)	V53	V53	V53					
V46	R child, mother attend church	V54	V55	V56					
V47	R child, father attend church	V55	V56	V57					
V48	R age 11-12, R attend church	V56	V57	V58					
V49	How often R pray	V57	V58	V59					
V50	Take part in church activities	V58	V59	V60					
V51	R describes self as religious	V59	V60	V63					
V52	Good luck charms to bring good luck	V66	V69	V78					
V53	Fortune tellers can see future	V67	V70	V79					
V54	Faith healers have god-given healing powers	V68	V71	V80					
V55	Horoscope affects course of future	V69	V72	V81					
V56	Born again experience	V70	V64	V70					
V57	Picture of God: Mother-Father	V71	V65	V74					
V58	Picture of God: Master - Spouse	V72	V66	V75					

Cumulated dataset	Religion	Other modules			
ZA5070		1991	1998	2008	
Variable Number	Variable Label	V73	V67	V76	
V59	Picture of God: Judge - Lover	V74	V68	V77	
V60	Picture of God: Friend - King	V75	V73		
V61	World image: Much evil vs. much good	V76	V74		
V62	World image: Human nature is good vs. Corrupt	V19	V13		Leisure Time and Sports 2007: V57
V63	People can be trusted	V27	V22		Citizenship 2004: V46
V64	Modern science does more harm than good	V28	V23		Environment 1993: V10 2000: V9
V65	Too much trust in science	V29	V24		Environment 1993: V9 2000: V8
V66	Religions bring conflict	V30	V25		
V67	Religious people too intolerant	V61	V65		
V68	Closest to R's own views	V75	V82		
V69	Law conflicts with religious principles				

Background Variables		Religion			
Cumulated dataset		1991	1998	2008	
Variable Number	Variable Label				
SEX	R: Sex	V77	V200	SEX	
AGE	R: Age	V78	V201	AGE	
MARITAL	R: Marital status	V79	V202	MARITAL	
COHAB	R: Steady life-partner	V80	V203	COHAB	
EDUCYRS	R: Education I: years of schooling	V98	V204	WRKST	
DEGREE	R: Education II: highest education level	V99	V205	WRKHRS	
WRKST	R: Current employment status	V81	V206	V206	
WRKHRS	R: Hours worked weekly	V82	V213	V215	
ISCO88	R: Occupation 1988 ISCO/ILO occupation code	ISCO88	V208	ISCO88	
WRKSUP	R: Supervises others at work	V92	V214	WRKSUP	
WRKTYPE	R: Working for private, public sector, self-employed	V89	V210	WRKTYPE	
SELFEMP	R: Self-employed	V90	V211		
NEMPLOY	R: Self-employed - number of employees	V91	V212	NEMPLOY	
UNION	R: Trade union membership	V95	V220	UNION	
SPWRKST	S-P: Current employment status	V112	V207	SPWRKST	
SPISCO88	SP: Occupation 1988 ISCO/ILO occupation code	V114	V209	SPISCO88	
HOMPOP	How many persons in household	V116	V252	HOMPOP	

Background Variables		Religion	
Cumulated dataset		1991	1998 2008
Variable Number	Variable Label	1991	1998 2008
Variable Number	Variable Label	1991	1998 2008
PARTY_LR	R: Party affiliation: left-right (derived)	V100	V221 PARTY_LR
VOTE_LE	R: Vote last election: yes, no	V104	VOTE_LE
ATTEND	R: Attendance of religious services	V107	V218 ATTEND
ATTD_EXT	R: Attendance of religious services: extended 9 pt answer scale	V65	ATTD_EXT
RELIGGRP	R: Religious main groups (derived)	V106	V217 RELIGGRP
CLASS	R: Subjective social class	V108	V219
nat_REG	Region	V121	V285-314 nat_REG
WEIGHT	Weighting factor	V131	V316 WEIGHT

\*related variables with deviating wording and scales



## A.II Guide for the ISSP “Religion” Cumulation of the Years 1991, 1998 and 2008 (ZA5070 and ZA5071)

This guideline is intended to give an overview on the contents, the structure and basic coding rules of the ISSP “Religion I-III” cumulation. Further, variable-related information is available through the study documentation on ZACAT<sup>1</sup>.

The data release consists of two separate data files. The main file, ZA5070 “ISSP Cumulation Religion I-III”, contains only cumulated variables. That means it includes:

- all topic-related variables of the master questionnaires, so called module variables, which appear in at least two “Religion” modules and
- most of the so called background variables, mostly covering demographics, which appear in at least two “Religion” modules collected by
- all those ISSP member countries that participated in at least two “Religion” modules (28 countries).

However, there are other, mainly national-specific background variables, which belong to the current ISSP standard, but cannot be cumulated for various reasons. Although not being comparative over time, these variables might still be useful for many analyses. Therefore they are integrated in a second data file with the study number ZA5071 “ISSP Cumulation Religion Add On”. ZA5071 is a separate data file going along with separate documentation on ZACAT. The contained variables, however, can be matched easily to the cumulated file if necessary.

The cumulation and its “Add On” file are based on the data of the integrated data files of the modules 1991 (ZA2150), 1998 (ZA3190) and 2008 (ZA4950). It does not go back to the individual country files of each module. A general rule is that the cumulated data follow the coding of the 2008 module as closely as possible, because this module represents the most updated ISSP standard. In terms of the background variables that means that whenever the module data allows it, the coding of the “The ISSP Background Variable Standard” set in 2001 (bv2001\_20060425.pdf), is realized, again, as closely as possible.

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1 ZACAT (<http://zacat.gesis.org>) offers direct and comprehensive access to a variety of social science survey data with a focus on international comparative studies and election studies. It enables users to locate and search for appropriate studies, to analyse data online and to download data sets or subsets of them in different formats (among others SPSS, SAS, Stata). Access to ZACAT is free of charge, analysis and download requires registration.

## 1 Countries

Over the three years the "Religion" surveys have been conducted, the following countries participated at least twice:

	1991	1998	2008
Australia	X	X	X
Austria	X	X	X
Chile		X	X
Cyprus		X	X
Czech Republic		X	X
Denmark		X	X
France		X	X
Germany	X	X	X
Hungary	X	X	X
Ireland	X	X	X
Israel	X	X	X
Italy	X	X	X
Japan		X	X
Latvia		X	X
Netherlands	X	X	X
New Zealand	X	X	X
Norway	X	X	X
Philippines	X	X	X
Poland	X	X	X
Portugal		X	X
Russia	X	X	X
Slovakia		X	X
Slovenia	X	X	X
Spain		X	X
Sweden		X	X
Switzerland		X	X
United Kingdom	X	X	X
USA	X	X	X

For Germany as well as for the United Kingdom there are two subsamples available in the data for each year. In case of Germany one sample contains the West German respondents and the other one the East German respondents. In case of the United Kingdom, the

two subsamples contain Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Eastern Germany as well as Northern Ireland are overrepresented in the integrated data files, which should be taken into account if either Germany or the United Kingdom are analysed as a separate unit.

## 2 Variables

Both data files contain a number of administrative variables:

The “Study number” (V1) and the “GESIS Archive Version” (V2) exactly indicate the data file at hand. The respondents’ ID-numbers (V3) are those of the integrated data files and have not been changed for better comparability of the cumulated with the integrated data of each individual module. However, the ID numbers are only unique within their respective country and year of the module. To provide a unique identification across the data files it is necessary to combine V3 and V7.

While V4 “Year” allows the splitting of the data by modules, variables V5 and V6 indicate the countries. The “Country” variable (V6) offers codes for the country as a whole, whereas the “Country\_Sample” variable (V5) specifies also the subsamples within certain countries. As a “cumulation specific” variable, V7 “Country\_Sample\_Year” combines the information of V5 and V4, prepared as a supporting tool for analysis. According to the current ISSP standard, the codes for all three variables which deal with country identification make use of international three-digit “ISO 3166 Codes”.

To match both datasets it is necessary to use the “ID” variable V3 as well as the “Country\_Sample\_Year” variable V7 as key variables.

*Example for SPSS:*

```
SORT CASES by V3 V7. /** use this on BOTH input files.
MATCH FILES
/FILE='put path of your data file here\ZA5070.sav'
/FILE='put path of your data file here\ZA5071.sav'
/BY V3 V7.
EXECUTE.
```

### 2.1 Variables of the cumulated data file ZA5070 “ISSP Cumulation Religion I-III”

All module variables, which have been asked in at least two “Religion” modules, are included in the cumulated data file ZA5070. For a detailed overview on these variables see the correspondence list at Appendix I of this document.

Besides the module variables, ZA5070 contains the following background variables: SEX, AGE, MARITAL, COHAB, EDUCYRS, DEGREE, WRKST, WRKHRS, ISCO88, WRKSUP, WRKTYPE, SELFEMP, NEMPLOY, UNION, SPWRKST, SPISCO88, HOMPOP, HHCYCLE, PARTY\_LR, VOTE\_LE, ATTEND, ATTEND\_EXT, RELIGGRP, CLASS, nat\_REG and WEIGHT

The “Region” variable (nat\_REG) is the only national-specific variable that can be cumulated over time, because the administrative divisions of regions did not change too much



over the years. According to the current ISSP standard it is split by country, but cumulated over the module years.

## 2.2 Variables of the supplementary data file ZA5071 "ISSP Cumulation Religion Add On"

The "ISSP Cumulation ROG Add On" data file ZA5071 contains all those background variables which cannot be cumulated for various reasons. The national-specific variables are all split by country as well as by module. A prefix of two ISO code letters indicates the country and a two-digit suffix the module year.

- **nat\_DEG** for the years 1991 and 2008

The national-specific DEGREE variables for 1998 do not appear in the data file, because in 1998 the countries were supposed to hand in a standardized DEGREE variable, which is not national-specific at all. For DEGREE 1998 see the cumulated variable in the cumulated data file.

- **National occupation variables (nat\_OCC and nat\_SOC)** for 1991, when the ISCO scheme had not been established as a standard yet. Only Australia provided an ISCO code in 1991 that could be cumulated in the main file.
- **Respondent's income and Family income** for the years 1991, 1998 and 2008 (**nat\_RIN and nat\_INC**)

The income variables have been brought to the current ISSP standard. That means that for the earlier modules, original enumerated value codes for income categories are recoded into the midpoints of the classes for which they stand. These variables could now technically be cumulated. However, in some countries variables have been surveyed quite differently. Information varies widely, for example, whether the survey asked for income per month or year, before or after tax and in what currency. Last but not least, it is hardly useful to cumulate income data in a range of twenty years, without accounting for inflation. These are the reasons why we decided against cumulating these variables.

Germany is a special case. In 1991 information about the respondent's and the family's income was collected in an open question (DE\_RI91a/DE\_IN91a). Since nonresponse on this question was very high it was additionally asked for income classes (DE\_RI91b/DE\_IN91b).

- **nat\_PRT** for the years 1991, 1998 and 2008
- **nat\_SIZ** for the years 1991, 1998 and 2008
- **nat\_ETH** for the years 1991, 1998 and 2008

In addition to those national-specific variables, there are some variables that cannot be cumulated, because there is too much coding variation. These variables are available as well in the "ZA5071" file:

- **URBRUR91, URBRUR98, URBRUR08**

As in the integrated data file, URBRUR91 remains unlabeled, because the information asked for within these variables differs too much across the countries. The country-specific labels, however, are available through the documentation on ZACAT.

Other variables appear in their current form the first time in 2008 and therefore cannot be cumulated:

- TOPBOT08, MODE08, SUBSCA08, SPWRKT08

### 3 Missing Values

The “Religion” cumulation introduces three codes for missing values which do not appear in the integrated data files in this form. These codes specify certain missing cases in the cumulation explicitly:

#### -1 'Variable not available for this country in this module'

This missing value is coded in the event that a country did not provide the variable in question.

#### -2 'Country specific variable not applicable for this country'

This missing value is coded for national-specific variables, indicating the cases of the other countries.

#### -3 'Variable not available in this module'

This missing value is cumulation-specific and is coded in the case of variables that are not part of a certain module at all. It is also coded, however, in the event that a variable cannot be cumulated and is therefore not available for this module in the cumulation file, but does appear in the “ZA5071” additional data file.

For reasons of consistency all missing values are coded into the negative range. So, those values which appear in the integrated data files as, for example, “8 Can’t choose” and “9 No answer” appear in the cumulated file as “-8 Can’t choose” and “-9 No answer”.

### 4 ISCO88/SPISCO88

With the exception of Australia, where ISCO88 and SPISCO88 are already available in 1991, these variables appear in the cumulated data file only for the years 1998 and 2008. The mostly national-specific occupation codes and ISCO68 3-digit codes, which are available in the 1991 data for the other countries, cannot be cumulated. However, these variables are available in the additional data file “ZA5071”.

Occupation codes 1991:

ISCO	1991
Austria	ISCO68 (3-digit)*
Germany	ISCO68 (3-digit)*
Great Britain	Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) 1991
Hungary	ISCO68 (3-digit)
Ireland	List of occupations and the socio-economic group assigned to them
Israel	Unspecified 1-digit code
Italy	Unspecified 2-digit code
Netherlands	No occupation code available
New Zealand	ISCO68 (3-digit)
Northern Ireland	Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) 1991
Norway <sup>2</sup>	ISCO68 (3-digit)* and Nordic Standard Classification of Occupation
Philippines	Unspecified 2-digit code
Poland	ISCO68 (3-digit)
Russia	Unspecified 2-digit code
Slovenia <sup>3</sup>	ISCO88 (3-digit)
USA	Census Occupation Code (1980)

\*plus additional country specific codes

## 5 Additional information

On ZACAT, under the option "Metadata" in the sidebars for the individual modules ZA2150, ZA3190 and ZA4950, there are links to different types of documents: the Study Descriptions for each national sample, provided by the individual countries, the original national questionnaires, and the master questionnaire. Besides, for 2008 information documents on the original coding of the background variables are available. The national-specific question texts for the cumulated background variables are available for ZA4950 (2008) through these documents, and for all variables through the individual module documentations on ZACAT.

2 The Norwegian occupation variable for the spouse is only available as "Nordic Standard Classification of Occupation".

3 The Slovenian occupation variable for the spouse is available as unspecified 2-digit code.

# A.III 2008 Religion Questionnaire

June, 2007

1. If you were to consider your life in general these days, how happy or unhappy would you say you are, on the whole...

Very happy.....	1
Fairly happy.....	2
Not very happy.....	3
Not at all happy....	4
Can't choose.....	8

2. Do you think it is wrong or not wrong if a man and a woman have sexual relations before marriage?

Always wrong.....	1
Almost always wrong.....	2
Wrong only sometimes....	3
Not wrong at all.....	4
Can't choose.....	8

3. What about a married person having sexual relations with someone other than his or her husband or wife, is it...

Always wrong.....	1
Almost always wrong.....	2
Wrong only sometimes....	3
Not wrong at all.....	4
Can't choose.....	8

4. And what about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex, is it...

Always wrong.....	1
Almost always wrong.....	2
Wrong only sometimes....	3
Not wrong at all.....	4
Can't choose.....	8

5. Do you personally think it is wrong or not wrong for a woman to have an abortion ...

	Always Wrong	Almost Always Wrong	Wrong Only Sometimes	Not Wrong at All	Can't Choose
a. If there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby...	1	2	3	4	8
b. If the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children...	1	2	3	4	8

6. Do you agree or disagree...

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Can't Choose
A husband's job is to earn money; a wife's job is to look after the home and family ....	1	2	3	4	5	8

7. Generally speaking, would you say that people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

People can almost always be trusted	1
People can usually be trusted	2
You usually can't be too careful in dealing with people	3
You almost always can't be too careful in dealing with people	4
Can't choose.....	8

8. How much confidence do you have in ...

- 1. Complete confidence
- 2. A great deal of confidence
- 3. Some confidence
- 4. Very little confidence
- 5. No confidence at all
- 8. Can't choose

PLEASE CIRCLE A NUMBER

- a. [Parliament]..... 1 2 3 4 5 8  
 <use national legislature, e.g. U.S. Congress>
- b. Business and industry.... 1 2 3 4 5 8
- c. Churches and religious organizations..... 1 2 3 4 5 8
- d. Courts and the legal system..... 1 2 3 4 5 8
- e. Schools and the educational system.... 1 2 3 4 5 8

9. We are interested in the extent to which you have moved from one kind of place to another. Which do you think is most like your experience of life?

- I have lived in different countries 1
- I have lived in different places in the same country 2
- I have lived in different neighborhoods in the same place 3
- I have always lived in the same neighborhood 4

10. How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following...

- Strongly agree..... 1
- Agree..... 2
- Neither agree nor disagree... 3
- Disagree..... 4
- Strongly disagree..... 5
- Can't choose..... 8

PLEASE CIRCLE A NUMBER

- a. Religious leaders should not try to influence how people vote in elections... 1 2 3 4 5 8
- b. Religious leaders should not try to influence government decisions. 1 2 3 4 5 8

11. Please consider the following statements and tell me whether you agree or disagree..

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Can't Choose
a. Overall, modern science does more harm than good.....	1	2	3	4	5	8
b. We trust too much in science and not enough in religious faith.....	1	2	3	4	5	8
c. Looking around the world, religions bring more conflict than peace.....	1	2	3	4	5	8
d. People with very strong religious beliefs are often too intolerant of others.....	1	2	3	4	5	8

12. Do you think that churches and religious organizations in this country have too much power or too little power?

- Far too much power..... 1
- Too much power..... 2
- About the right amount of power.... 3
- Too little power..... 4
- Far too little power..... 5
- Can't choose..... 8

13. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Can't choose
a. All religious groups in [country] should have equal rights.	1	2	3	4	5	8
b. We must respect all religions.	1	2	3	4	5	8

14. People have different religions and different religious views. Would you accept a person from a different religion or with a very different religious view from yours..

- 1. Definitely accept,
- 2. Probably accept,
- 3. Probably not accept,
- 4. Definitely not accept,
- 8. Can't Choose

a. marrying a relative of yours	1	2	3	4	8
b. being a candidate of the political party you prefer?	1	2	3	4	8

15. There are some people whose views are considered extreme by the majority. Consider religious extremists, that is people who believe that their religion is the only true faith and all other religions should be considered as enemies. Do you think such people should be allowed to...

PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ON EACH LINE.

	Definitely	Probably	Probably	Definitely	Can't
			Not	Not	Choose
a. Hold public meetings to express their views?	1	2	3	4	8
b. Publish books expressing their views?	1	2	3	4	8



16. Please indicate which statement below comes closest to expressing what you believe about God.

- I don't believe in God..... 1
- I don't know whether there is a God and I don't believe there is any way to find out..... 2
- I don't believe in a personal God, but I do believe in a Higher Power of some kind..... 3
- I find myself believing in God some of the time, but not at others..... 4
- While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in God..... 5
- I know God really exists and I have no doubts about it..... 6

17. Which best describes your beliefs about God?

- I don't believe in God now and I never have..... 1
- I don't believe in God now, but I used to..... 2
- I believe in God now, but I didn't used to..... 3
- I believe in God now and I always have..... 4
- Can't choose..... 8

18. Do you believe in

.....	Yes, Definitely	Yes, Probably	No, Probably Not	No, Definitely Not	Can't Choose
a. Life after death.	1	2	3	4	8
b. Heaven.....	1	2	3	4	8
c. Hell.....	1	2	3	4	8
d. Religious miracles	1	2	3	4	8
e. Reincarnation - being reborn in this world again and again.....	1	2	3	4	8
f. Nirvana.....	1	2	3	4	8
g. The supernatural powers of deceased ancestors	1	2	3	4	8

19. Do you agree or disagree with the following...

- 1. Strongly agree
- 2. Agree
- 3. Neither agree nor disagree
- 4. Disagree
- 5. Strongly disagree
- 8. Can't choose

PLEASE CIRCLE A NUMBER

a. There is a God who concerns Himself with every human being personally.....	1	2	3	4	5	8
b. There is little that people can do to change the course of their lives.....	1	2	3	4	5	8
c. To me, life is meaningful only because God exists.....	1	2	3	4	5	8
d. In my opinion, life does not serve any purpose.....	1	2	3	4	5	8
e. Life is only meaningful if you provide the meaning yourself.....	1	2	3	4	5	8
f. I have my own way of connecting with God without churches or religious services.	1	2	3	4	5	8

20. What was your mother's religious preference when you were a child? Was it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?

- Protestant..... 1
  - Catholic..... 2
  - Jewish..... 3
  - Orthodox (such as Greek  
or Russian Orthodox)... 4
  - Muslim..... 5
  - Other (Please Specify)
- 
- ..... 6
  - No religion..... 7
  - Don't know..... 8

If Protestant:

What specific denomination was that?

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

<List in Qs. 20-23 may be modified to include all major religions in each country.>

21. What was your father's religious preference when you were a child? Was it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?

- Protestant..... 1
  - Catholic..... 2
  - Jewish..... 3
  - Orthodox (such as Greek  
or Russian Orthodox)... 4
  - Muslim..... 5
  - Other (Please Specify)
- 
- ..... 6
  - No religion..... 7
  - Don't know..... 8

If Protestant:

What specific denomination was that?

\_\_\_\_\_

22. What religion, if any, were you raised in? Was it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?

- Protestant..... 1
- Catholic..... 2
- Jewish..... 3
- Orthodox (such as Greek  
or Russian Orthodox)... 4
- Muslim..... 5
- Other (Please Specify)..... 6
- No religion..... 7
- Don't know..... 8

If Protestant:

What specific denomination was that?

---

If you are currently married or living as married, answer Q. 23:  
If you are not currently married or living as married,  
go to Q. 24:

23. What is your husband's/wife's religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?

- Protestant..... 1
- Catholic..... 2
- Jewish..... 3
- Orthodox (such as Greek  
or Russian Orthodox)... 4
- Muslim..... 5
- Other (Please Specify)..... 6
- No religion..... 7
- Don't know..... 8

If Protestant:

What specific denomination is that?

-----

**<It is strongly recommended that the item on respondent's religion in the demographics use response categories fully compatible with those above.>**

24. When you were a child, how often did your mother attend .religious services?

Never.....	1
Less than once a year.....	2
About once or twice a year....	3
Several times a year.....	4
About once a month.....	5
2-3 times a month.....	6
Nearly every week.....	7
Every week.....	8
Several times a week.....	9
No mother/mother not present..	10
Can't say/Can't remember.....	98

25. When you were a child, how often did your father attend .religious services?

Never.....	1
Less than once a year.....	2
About once or twice a year....	3
Several times a year.....	4
About once a month.....	5
2-3 times a month.....	6
Nearly every week.....	7
Every week.....	8
Several times a week.....	9
No father/father not present..	10
Can't say/Can't remember.....	98

26. And what about when you were around 11 or 12, how often did you attend religious services then?

Never.....	1
Less than once a year.....	2
About once or twice a year....	3
Several times a year.....	4
About once a month.....	5
2-3 times a month.....	6
Nearly every week.....	7
Every week.....	8
Several times a week.....	9
Can't say/Can't remember.....	98

**<It is strongly recommended that the item on respondent's church attendance in the demographics use the same response categories as above.>**

Now thinking about the present...

27. About how often do you pray?

Never.....	1
Less than once a year.....	2
About once or twice a year....	3
Several times a year.....	4
About once a month.....	5
2-3 times a month.....	6
Nearly every week.....	7
Every week.....	8
Several times a week.....	9
Once a day.....	10
Several times a day.....	11

28. How often do you take part in the activities or organizations of a church or place of worship other than attending services?

Never.....	1
Less than once a year.....	2
About once or twice a year....	3
Several times a year.....	4
About once a month.....	5
2-3 times a month.....	6
Nearly every week.....	7
Every week.....	8
Several times a week.....	9

29. For religious reasons do you have in your home a shrine, altar, or a religious object on display such as a (COUNTRY-SPECIFIC LIST icon, retablos, mezuzah, menorah, or crucifix)?

Yes	1
No	2

30. How often do you visit a holy place for religious reasons such as going to [shrine/temple/church/mosque]? Please do not count attending regular religious services at your usual place of worship, if you have one.

Never	1
Less than once a year	2
About once or twice a year	3
Several times a year	4
About once a month or more	5

31. Would you describe yourself as ...

- Extremely religious..... 1
- Very religious..... 2
- Somewhat religious..... 3
- Neither religious nor  
non-religious..... 4
- Somewhat non-religious..... 5
- Very non-religious..... 6
- Extremely non-religious..... 7
- Can't choose..... 8

32. What best describes you:

- I follow a religion and consider myself to be a spiritual person interested in the sacred or the supernatural. 1
- I follow a religion, but don't consider myself to be a spiritual person interested in the sacred or the supernatural. 2
- I don't follow a religion, but consider myself to be a spiritual person interested in the sacred or the supernatural. 3
- I don't follow a religion and don't consider myself to be a spiritual person interested in the sacred or the supernatural. 4
- Can't choose 8

33. Which of the following statements come closest to your own views:

- There is very little truth in any religion. 1
- There are basic truths in many religions. 2
- There is truth only in one religion. 3
- Can't choose..... 8

34. Do you agree or disagree that practicing a religion helps people to...

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Dis- agree	Strongly Disagree	Can't Choose
a. find inner peace						
and happiness	1	2	3	4	5	8
b. make friends	1	2	3	4	5	8
c. gain comfort in times of						
trouble or sorrow	1	2	3	4	5	8
d. meet the right kind						
of people	1	2	3	4	5	8



**Optionals**

1. Would you say that you have been "born again" or have had a "born again" experience -- that is, a turning point in your life when you committed yourself to Christ?

**O-18**

Yes.....1

No.....2

2. Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible?

**O-18**

a. The Bible is the actual word of God and it is to be taken literally, word for word..... 1

b. The Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything should be taken literally, word for word 2

c. The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and moral precepts recorded by man..... 3

d. This does not apply to me 4

e. Can't choose..... 8

3 Has there ever been a turning point in your life when you made a new and personal commitment to religion?

**O-18 Previously a required item**

Yes.....1

No.....2

4. During the last year, did you make some personal sacrifice as an expression of your faith such as by fasting, following a special diet, or giving up some activity during a holy season such as (Lent or Ramadan) <use examples that are appropriate for religions in your country>?

**New**

Yes 1

No 2

5. There are many different ways of picturing God. We'd like to know the kinds of images you are most likely to associate with God.

**O-18**

Below are sets of contrasting images. On a scale of 1-7 where would you place your images of God between the two contrasting images?

The first set of contrasting images shows Mother at 1 on the scale and Father at 7. If you imagine God as a Mother, you would place yourself at 1. If you imagine God as a Father, you would place yourself at 7. If you imagine God as somewhere between Mother and Father, you would place yourself at 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6.

Where would you place your image of God on the scale for each set of images?

A. Mother							Father
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	
B. Master							Spouse
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	
C. Judge							Lover
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	
D. Friend							King
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	

6. Now please think about something different. Please check one box on each line below to show whether you think each statement is true or false.

**O-18**

	Definitely True	Probably True	Probably False	Definitely False	Can't Choose
a. Good luck charms sometimes do bring good luck.	1	2	3	4	8
b. Some fortune tel- lers really can fore- see the future.....	1	2	3	4	8
c. Some faithhealers do have God-given healing powers.....	1	2	3	4	8
d. A person's star sign at birth, or horoscope, can af- fect the course of their future.....	1	2	3	4	8

7. Suppose a law was passed which conflicted with your religious principles and teachings. Would you...

**O-8**

Definitely follow the law.....	1
Probably follow the law.....	2
Probably follow your religious principles.....	3
Definitely follow your religious principles...	4
I have no religious principles.....	5
Can't choose.....	8

8. What is your personal attitude towards members of the following religious groups?

**New**

1. Very positive,
2. Somewhat positive,
3. Neither positive nor negative,
4. Somewhat negative,
5. Very negative,
8. Can't Choose

a. Christians	1	2	3	4	5	8
b. Muslims	1	2	3	4	5	8
c. Hindus	1	2	3	4	5	8
d. Buddhists	1	2	3	4	5	8
e. Jews	1	2	3	4	5	8
f. Atheists or non-believers	1	2	3	4	5	8

### Notes on Question Wordings

In the above text "( )" are parenthetical statements that will appear in the version administered to respondents. "[ ]" are used to show where appropriate, country-specific words will be inserted and the punctuations will be removed from the final text. "< >" are special notes or instructions to follow. The punctuations and the statements themselves will be removed from the final text.

Qs. 2-4 - "sexual relations" means "sexual intercourse".

Q. 8 - "confidence" takes on several meanings, but having trust in is the main dimension.

Q 8B - "Business and industry" - refers to large-scale businesses, but don't use an adjective like "big" in the translation.

Q. 9 - By "neighborhood we mean the part of the town/city one lives in. If one lives in a village, we take this as your "neighborhood". "Place" is a very flexible term, it can refer to anything from a rural locale to a large city. It generally means the smallest governing unit one resides in, such as a city, organized suburb, town, or rural district.

Q. 12 - "churches and religious organizations" refers to the power of organized or institutional religions collectively. The question is whether overall religious organizations (e.g. the Catholic and Lutheran churches) have too much/too little power.

Q. 14B - "prefer" refers to the political party that you favor or usually support or vote for

Qs. Required: 16, 17, 19a, 19c, 19f and Optionals: 2, 5A-D, 6C: "God" refers to a supreme being. The term should refer to an entity rather than a non-sentient force. An encompassing, non-sectarian term is desirable if possible.

Q. 16, response 3 - a "personal God" - a supreme being who cares about and is involved with individuals. This is a view of God in contrast to a deistic outlook.

Q. 18F - "Nirvana" is a Buddhist concept that refers to the ultimate state transcending pain and desire in which individual consciousness ends.

Q 18G, 32 - "supernatural" refers to beyond the physical world, should conote things of a divine or transcendental nature. Avoid if possible, terms that refer mostly to entities like ghosts, poldergeists, elves, gremlins, etc. not associated with religion.

Qs 20-23 - "preference" refers to the religion that a person favors or identifies with. If a person was born a member of one religion,

but then preferred or identified with another religion, this question asks about the latter.

"religions" refers to major faiths or organized theological systems as opposed to "denominations" which are sub-divisions within a religion. What is important is that these questions distinguish all relevant faiths, religions, denominations, sects, etc. that exist in each country.

Qs. 24-26 - "religious services" generally refers to organized, group worship activities like Muslims going to the mosque on Fridays, Catholic mass, attending church on Sundays for Protestants, etc. Private prayers at home would not normally count.

Q. 29 - In general, list two or three examples that would be appropriate for the two or three largest religions in your country. If the country is religiously homogenous and only one type of religious object would be typical for that religion, a single example would suffice. However, we want to avoid creating the impression that we are referring only to religious objects relating to one particular religion.

Q. 30 Note that this refers to a religious visit, thus sightseeing at a shrine, temple, church, tomb, etc. without a religious purpose would not count. In general, list two or three examples of holy places that would be appropriate for the two or three largest religions in your country. If the country is religiously homogenous and only one type of holy place would be typical for that religion, a single example would suffice. However, we want to avoid creating the impression that we are referring only to holy places relating to one particular religion.

Q. 31 "extremely non-religious" - this does not mean anti-religious or attacking religion, but being without any religious feelings, beliefs, or behaviors.

Q. 32 - see Q. 18G above.

Q. 34A - "inner peace" - refers to a state of mental and spiritual serenity. One is calm and content and avoids or overcomes discord and anxiousness.

Q. 34D - "right kind of people" - this would generally refer to good people, solid members of the community, people who would be good examples and potentially in a position of give assistance

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#### Optionals

Qs. 1 and 2 should be asked in countries with an appreciable number of Evangelical Protestants. They are not general questions to be asked in all countries.

Qs. 3-8 are generally applicable for all countries.

Notes in **Bold** have been left in that describe the past history of the optionals. **O-18**, for example, means the item was included in the 1991 and 1998 studies.

Optional Q. 1 - "born-again" - this refers to a specific type of spiritual experience in which people accept Christ as their personal Savior and are "born-again" as a Christian on the path to salvation. If your country has Baptist or Pentecostal sects, find what they use in your language(s) for this. It does not refer to "rebirth" in the sense of reincarnation.

Optional Q. 2 - "Bible" should be used in all countries with predominantly Judeo-Christian heritage. Countries with adherents mostly from other religious traditions might either omit this item or replace "Bible" with the appropriate holy book. For example, a predominately Muslim country could rephrase the item in terms of the Koran.

"This does not apply to me." This code is largely for members of religions outside the Judeo-Christian tradition, but we want it to be flexible enough for other respondents to use it, if it seems appropriate to them.

Optional Q. 3 - Q. 20 - "turning point" - a time or event in one's life when a change occurred resulting in a gaining of faith, becoming a believer, a rededication to one's religion or similar.

Optional Q. 5 - "Master" is technically masculine in English, but is probably not seen in a highly gendered sense in this comparison. Carries the ideas of "master and servants" or an overlord. Someone who is in a position of social, economic, and political superiority. This item does assume a single Supreme Being and may not be appropriate in countries with polytheistic faiths.

Optional Q. 8A - "Christians" collectively refers to followers of all churches associated with Christianity: Eastern Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, Baptist, Seventh Day Adventist, etc. Similarly the other terms cover all sects or divisions within each of the listed major religions.



## A.IV ZACAT

ZACAT is an online data portal which allows searching for, browsing, analysing and downloading social science survey data, including all ISSP modules. The data which can be accessed is a selection of the complete data available at GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences.


ZACAT uses NESSTAR® technology and offers all the services of that technical platform to its users: Apart from a direct download of datasets, it offers detailed documentation on study as well as variable level and provides a direct access to further studies' background material. Furthermore, it is possible to search for keywords that are either contained in the questions and answers of the questionnaires or in the variable or value labels of the datasets. This search is not limited to only one defined data file, but covers all survey data retrievable at ZACAT. Besides, ZACAT enables the user to execute first analyses on a limited basis, as for example frequencies distribution, cross tabulations and regressions. It is also possible to generate diverse charts for these analyses, such as pie or bar charts. A few examples are depicted below. Detailed usage instructions are available online via the ZACAT page and the NESSTAR help system.

The use of ZACAT and the data download is free of charge. For the analysis and download of data, a registration is required. However, the only prerequisite is that the usage of the data is for scientific purposes; therefore a short description of the project is requested.

URL: <http://zacat.gesis.org>

### Examples for analyses on ZACAT

#### (1) Frequencies: Attendance of religious services in Andalusia, Spain



Dataset: International Social Survey Programme: Religion I-III (ISSP 1991 - 1998 - 2008)

R: Attendance of religious services: Categories    Region: Spain: Andalusia

	Code	Frequency	% of all	% of valid
R: Attendance of religious services				
Several times a week	1	15	2.1	2.1
Once a week	2	125	17.9	17.9
2 or 3 times a month	3	58	8.3	8.3
Once a month	4	56	8.0	8.0
Several times a year	5	165	23.6	23.6
Once a year	6	19	2.7	2.7
Less frequently	7	71	10.2	10.2
Never	8	190	27.2	27.2
Total		699	100.0	100.0



(2) Split file: Best description of one's beliefs about God, listed by country, sample and year


DESCRIPTION TABULATION ANALYSIS

Dataset: International Social Survey Programme: Religion I-III (ISSP 1991 - 1998 - 2008)

Country\_Sample\_Year: Categories ▾ Best describes beliefs about God: Categories ▾ Type: Row percentage ▾

Best describes beliefs about God	I don't believe in God now and I never have	I don't believe in God now, but I used to	I believe in God now, but I didn't use to	I believe in God now and I always have	Total	N=
Country_Sample_Year						
AU_2008	21.4	22.4	5.5	50.7	100.0	1,376
AU_1991	12.4	19.2	7.5	61.0	100.0	1,836
AU_1998	13.3	21.3	7.1	58.2	100.0	1,147
AT_2008	-	-	-	-	100.0	0
AT_1991	6.1	15.4	7.8	70.6	100.0	855
AT_1998	6.6	12.8	6.1	74.6	100.0	838
CL_2008	1.8	3.7	3.8	90.8	100.0	1,479
CL_1998	1.8	2.0	5.4	90.7	100.0	1,436
CY_2008	2.8	4.1	4.3	88.9	100.0	861
CY_1998	1.0	2.4	3.6	92.9	100.0	877
CZ_2008	57.1	11.1	5.3	26.5	100.0	1,282
CZ_1998	40.7	13.3	10.8	35.1	100.0	945
DK_2008	31.4	14.7	6.8	47.1	100.0	1,553
DK_1998	28.3	15.1	11.6	45.0	100.0	1,022
FR_2008	26.3	24.8	9.7	39.2	100.0	1,998
FR_1998	27.5	20.7	11.4	40.4	100.0	938
HU_2008	27.4	13.6	14.8	44.2	100.0	859
HU_1991	22.3	13.4	7.8	56.6	100.0	921
HU_1998	20.9	12.8	8.0	58.2	100.0	895
IE_2008	3.5	7.2	8.1	81.2	100.0	1,816
IE_1991	0.6	4.0	3.7	91.7	100.0	948
IE_1998	0.9	5.5	5.0	88.6	100.0	924
IL_2008	9.3	4.8	7.5	78.4	100.0	1,113
IL_1991	21.1	7.6	6.3	65.0	100.0	856
IL_1998	13.3	5.4	5.1	76.2	100.0	1,126
IT_2008	6.3	7.7	5.9	80.1	100.0	1,031

(3) Cumulated bar chart: Association between the political party affiliation on a left-right spectrum and the religious main groups





## A.V ISSP Modules

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Year	Module
1985	Role of Government I
1986	Social Networks I
1987	Social Inequality I
1988	Family and Changing Gender Roles I
1989	Work Orientations I
1990	Role of Government II
1991	Religion I
1992	Social Inequality II
1993	Environment I
1994	Family and Changing Gender Roles II
1995	National Identity I
1996	Role of Government III
1997	Work Orientations II
1998	Religion II
1999	Social Inequality III
2000	Environment II
2001	Social Networks II
2002	Family and Changing Gender Roles III
2003	National Identity II
2004	Citizenship I
2005	Work Orientations III
2006	Role of Government IV
2007	Leisure and Sports
2008	Religion III
2009	Social Inequality IV
2010	Environment III
2011	Health
2012	Family and Changing Gender Roles IV
2013	National Identity III ( <i>in the field at the time of printing</i> )
2014	Citizenship II ( <i>planned</i> )
2015	Work Orientations IV ( <i>planned</i> )

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## A.VI ISSP Members and Participation

Country Year	'85	'86	'87	'88	'89	'90	'91	'92	'93	'94	'95	'96	'97	'98	'99	'00	'01	'02	'03	'04	'05	'06	'07	'08
Australia	■	■	■		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Austria	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Germany	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Great Britain	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
United States	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Italy	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Hungary		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Netherlands		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Ireland		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Israel		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Norway		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Philippines		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
New Zealand		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Russia		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Bulgaria		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Canada		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Czech Republic		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Japan		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Poland		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Slovenia		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Sweden		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Spain		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Cyprus		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
France		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Portugal		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Slovakia		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Bangladesh		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Chile		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Latvia		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Denmark		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Brazil		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Switzerland		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Venezuela		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Finland		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Flanders		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Mexico		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
South Africa		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Taiwan		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
South Korea		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Uruguay		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Croatia		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Dominican Republic		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Korea		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Argentina		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Turkey		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■

Das *International Social Survey Programme* (ISSP) erhebt jährlich Umfragedaten zu sozialwissenschaftlich relevanten Themen. Der vorliegende ISSP Data Report – *Religious Attitudes and Religious Change* beruht auf ISSP-Daten, die zu drei verschiedenen Zeitpunkten innerhalb von 17 Jahren in bis zu 42 Mitgliedsländern zu Einstellungen gegenüber Kirche und Religion im weitesten Sinne gesammelt wurden. Jedes Kapitel wurde von unterschiedlichen Autoren der ISSP-Gemeinschaft geschrieben und beleuchtet mit Hilfe der ISSP-Daten spezielle Aspekte religiöser Einstellungen und religiösen Wandels im internationalen Vergleich. In der Gesamtschau ergeben sich sowohl Einblicke in das religiöse Leben verschiedener Länder, als auch insbesondere Erkenntnisse zu den Einflussfaktoren religiösen Wandels innerhalb von fast zwei Dekaden.

The annual survey of the *International Social Survey Programme* (ISSP) provides data on topics relevant in social research. This current ISSP Data Report – *Religious Attitudes and Religious Change* examines data collected at three different points over 17 years, from up to 42 ISSP member countries, covering various facets of respondents' attitudes towards Church and Religion. Individual chapters were written by different members of the ISSP community thereby offering a cross-national, comparative perspective on particular aspects of religious attitudes and religious change via ISSP data. Overall, this report offers insights into the religious landscapes of various countries and in particular information about the factors influencing the process of religious change over the past two decades.



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