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How to Quickly Get a Job? The Transition from Higher Education to French Labour Market by a Survival Model

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9 How to Quickly Get a Job? The Transition from Higher
10 Education to French Labour Market by a Survival
11 Model
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19 Carlos P. Barros*, Jean-Pascal Guironnet[†] and Nicolas Peypoch[‡]
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30 **Abstract**
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32 This article analyses how long former university students stay unemployed, when
33 searching for the new employment after leaving of the French higher education. Cox
34 duration models are used to account for the proportional hypothesis. The main result
35 of this paper is that the worker's recruitment is based more on the choice of the faculty
36 of initial training than the educational level attainment. Some policy implications are
37 derived from our results to give some recommendations for individual job search and
38 policy-makers in education.
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46 **JEL:** C41, I21, J21.
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48 **Keywords:** Education, France, survival models.
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1 Introduction

The empirical study of the unemployment of the leavers of higher education can benefit from the application of event history analysis. This technique focuses on the factor effects that determine the length of time until the occurrence of some event. This technique has been recently used in the unemployment duration topic (Grilli 2006; Collier, 2005; Haurin and Sridhar, 2003; Gonzalo, 2002), in international relations (e.g. Barros, et al. 2005), corporate finance (Leung, et al. 2003) and industry (Requena-Vicente and Walker, 2005).

This paper analyses the determinants of unemployment duration after the leaves of higher education. Although this is not the first paper applying event history analysis to the unemployment duration, our approach is unique since we look at unemployment after leaving university. Hence, professional insertion of graduates is studied with a special attention in respect to the overeducation issues. Such attention has never been studied in the works on unemployment duration whereas the extent of schooling surplus increases in the majority of developed country (Sloane, 2003). The motivation for this research is to know what the covariates explaining unemployment duration are. Unemployment duration may depend on the university course taken, and some individual characteristics. Therefore, it is important to ascertain the covariates which explain the unemployment duration of the leavers of higher education.

The paper contributes to the related literature in four ways. First, by adopting a panel data framework, it uses a hazard model, previously applied in education by Audas et al. (2005). Second, it studies unemployment among graduates of higher education, an issue that so far has not inspired much research in Europe, despite its increasing importance. Third, it analyses data from one of the major European economy which, in turn, allow some broader generalizations. Finally, it adopts the Cox model since the proportional hypothesis is accepted.¹

This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarizes the relevant literature about our topic research. Section 3 describes the contextual setting, i.e. the higher education and

¹There are two types of survival models, the Cox proportional hazard model which assumes that events evolve proportional along the period and the accelerated hazard models which assume that the events accelerated along the period.

labour market dynamics in France. Section 4 presents the research design, with details about the methodology and the tested hypothesis in our empirical specification. Section 5 presents the data and the results. Section 6 discusses the results and, finally, section 7 concludes.

2 Literature Survey

Following human capital theory, a higher level of education should increase the probability to get a job. However in the seventies, some rival theories question this initial assumption (e.g. "signal theory" of Spence, 1973). Hence, empirical studies have showed an excess of education offer which produces diminishing return of education (Freeman, 1976). Today, it seems to be attractive to search the incidences of this surplus schooling in the professional insertion of graduates. Therefore, this paper proposes to study unemployment duration of the leavers of higher education by a survival model in taking surplus schooling into account.

Studies on unemployment duration are common on the labour market, (Tribó, 2005; Cueto and Mato, 2006), but research linking education and duration is scarce (Audas, et al. 2005). The present research follows this tradition and focuses on higher education level. Two specifications of survival models are used: First, single risk model (e.g. Kirby, et al. 1999) versus competing risk models (e.g. Stinebrickner, 2002). Second, proportional hazard models (Audas et al. 2005; Imazeki, 2005) versus accelerated hazard models (e.g. Vega-Cervera and Gordillo, 2001). In this research topic, empirical literature tries mainly to identify the unobserved individual heterogeneity in duration model with the first seminal work of Lancaster (1979). Such approach has been considered by Addison and Portugal (2003). More recently, Eyal and Beenstock (2008) have found mixed results on the effect of vocational training on unemployment duration if we take - or not - self-selectivity into account.

Relative to the issues of duration models used in education, Audas, et al. (2005) analyse youth unemployment in Hungary with a Cox proportional hazard. The length to first get a job after graduation, which is directly related to the present research, was positive for female living in the capital and is negative for other covariates. Another paper on education duration models (Lassibile and Gómez, 2008) analyses the drop-out behaviour of Spanish students in

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4 higher education in comparing homogenous discrete survival model with a discrete frailty, or
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6 heterogenous survival model. They conclude that academic preparedness and age enrolment
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8 are indicators of drop-out. Imazeki (2005) analyses USA teacher's transfers and their exits
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10 with a Cox model. Vanderberghe (2000) studies the leaving teaching in Belgium with Cox
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12 and Weibull duration models.
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14 15 16 **3 The Labour Market and Higher Education in France** 17

18
19 In France, the possibility to follow higher studies has largely improved in the eighties. For
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21 example, graduates of higher education represented 36% of the leavers of educational system
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23 in 2000 whereas twenty years ago the proportion was around 15%. Hence, education supply
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25 was largely diversified² with the "orientation law on education" in 1989 which consisted in
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27 diversifying schooling courses to encourage more students to invest longer in their schooling
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29 courses. Furthermore, the new "Fillon law" forecast today to lead 50% of graduates in higher
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31 education. Over these two last decades, education offer has been largely developed but one
32
33 can wonder what has been happening with the demand side of labour market.

34
35 Since the late of eighties, GNP rates had risen and fallen in a recession due to the Gulf
36
37 war. Unemployment rates rose from 1982 to 1990. In 1996, business activities were also
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39 prosperous but the integration difficulties of young people into the job market increased:
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41 The unemployment rate of young graduates, three years after leaving of college, is esti-
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43 mated at 9.71% in 1999. This high number of unemployed graduates is especially significant
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45 since it should produce a "skill bumping effect". Consequently, an overeducation variable
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47 is introduced to take schooling surplus into account: Overeducation phenomenon influences
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49 probably the transition of higher education to the labour market (see next section for more
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51 details).

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53 To assess worker mismatches objectively, one must compare an analysis of the skills that
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55 are a priori required for a given job and the occupation-type for which initial training prepares
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57 the holder. Consequently, one must use a "matches grid" between degrees and occupations.
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59 Thus, overeducation measurement is based on a comparison between the individual level of
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²In particular in the engineering schools.

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4 education and the one that is "normally" required for the job he - or she - does. For this
5 purpose, we use a normative grid.³ This latter is constructed from an analysis expert of the
6 labour market, who establishes what the requirements should be for a range of jobs.⁴ For
7 the French case, this type of matches grid has been developed by Affichard (1981) presented
8 in the appendix. The normative approach seems to provide more reliable results and it is "a
9 very attractive source for defining job requirements, because of its explicit goal of objectivity,
10 clear definitions and detailed measurement instructions" (Hartog, 2000).
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19 4 Research Design

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22 In this study, the unemployment duration of the leavers of higher education is analysed
23 using a survival modeling approach (Cox and Oakes, 1984). The duration of an event is
24 the time elapsed until a certain event occurs or is completed. The length of unemployment
25 after leaving of higher education are analysed using survival models that are based on the
26 fact that the error distribution, in this context, must be skewed to the right. The survival
27 model regresses the duration of an activity on covariates alongside a traditional regression
28 model. The most straightforward way to describe the survival in a sample is to compute
29 the "Life Table". Multivariate models exist to analyse the survival models taking into
30 account the non-normality distribution of the month number that the respective individual
31 remains unemployed. Therefore, survival models are alternative models to ordinary least
32 squares (OLS) regression, based on the fact that OLS regression cannot accommodate skewed
33 regressions.
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45 Two issues must be addressed when analysing survival models: i) identification of the
46 data set (i.e., cross-section vs. panel data); and ii) censoring of the data. With regard
47 to the first issue, the present study adopts a panel data analysis. Therefore, time-variant
48 modeling - known as Cox's time-dependent proportional hazard models - is adopted. In
49 terms of censoring, Gokovali et al. (2006) concludes that questionnaire data is uncensored
50 because individuals are observed at the end of the event. A survival time is described as

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56 ³See Guironnet and Peypoch (2007) for a survey on overeducation measurements.

57 ⁴This method, much used in the United States, is essentially based on the "Dictionary of occupational
58 Titles".
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4 censored when there is a follow-up time but the event has not yet occurred or is not known to
5 have occurred, when the data is gathered. For example, if the student gets an employment
6 immediately after the leaves of higher education, the duration is uncensored. Furthermore,
7 if individuals obtain a job later, but they are already hired when the data is gathered, there
8 is no censorship. Censorship can appears for students who search for a job and they are not
9 hired when the data is gathered.
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15 Given these considerations, the following estimating strategy was followed. First, the
16 traditional Cox proportional hazard model for single-event data was adopted, assuming that
17 events are likely to be independent. As the theory relating education and employment is
18 mixed, we opt for the Cox model, which does not rely on any assumption concerning the
19 nature and shape of the underlying survival distribution. However, the Cox model has two
20 assumptions. First, the proportional assumption which means that the ratio of the hazard
21 function for two given observations does not depend on time. Second, there is a log-linear
22 relationship between the independent variable and the underlying hazard function. When
23 adopting a Cox model, the test for the proportional hypothesis is mandatory. In the present
24 research, we adopt the "Schoenfeld tests". Following this approach, it is concluded that
25 while the chi-square global test is statistical significant: we reject the null hypothesis and
26 we assume that the independent variable is significantly related to survival times. In this
27 case, the Cox's proportional hazard model with time-dependent covariates is adopted. For
28 this model, the hazard is specified as:
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$$42 \quad h_{ik}(t|X_{ik}) = h_{0k}(t - t_{k-1})exp(\beta_{ik}), \quad (1)$$

43 where k denotes the event number, and i is the individual, h_{0k} is the baseline hazard and
44 varies by event number, X is a vector of covariates which can be time dependent and β is a
45 vector of parameters. The parameters are estimated using partial likelihood given by:
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$$50 \quad L(\beta) = \prod_{i=1}^n \prod_{k=1}^{K_i} \left(\frac{exp(\beta X_{ik})}{\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{k=1}^{K_i} Y_{ik} exp(\beta X_{ik})} \right)^{\delta_{ik}}, \quad (2)$$

51 where δ is a censoring indicator equals to one if observed and zero if censored and Y is a
52 risk indicator which is equals to one if the individual is at risk for the current event and zero
53 otherwise. The model is estimated using maximum likelihood.
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In the Weibull model the baseline is defined by:

$$h_{0k}(t - t_{k-1}) = \alpha_k(t - t_{k-1})^{\alpha_k - 1}, \quad (3)$$

where the time dependent parameter, α_k , is estimated separately for each event. Both models are estimated through maximum likelihood.

Following this econometric model, the focus of our paper is to study French unemployment duration in 1999, in respect to the individual educational attainment. This unemployment duration of graduates of higher education depends on two critical factors: The individual's education specific skills and the characteristics of the local labour market (preferences for a certain type of skill are likely to differ between the firms). The following hypotheses are tested with the econometric model described above:

[H1] *In the beginning of the professional career, educational level is the main determinant of worker's insertion.* This hypothesis is tested with the "NAE" (number of educational years) variable in higher education, Gonzalez and Hilmer 2006). The associated coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative and therefore to decrease the unemployment duration.

[H2] *Higher starting wages should decrease unemployment duration.* This assumption is established on logarithm of the wage ("Log-Wages" variable), assumed to be negative and therefore contributing to decrease unemployment duration. However, one can expect that this link is not obvious on the French labour market (Bazen and Martin, 1991).

[H3] *Women are more exposed to unemployment.* This assumption can be explained by "Gender" variable, Prieto-Rodriguez and Rodriguez-Gutierrez (2000). This latter should be positive and statistical significant to imply that men have higher probability to get a job (Shauman, 2005).

[H4] *Overeducation phenomenon must decrease unemployment duration.* A worker that accepts to be mismatched increases this probability to get a job, increasing the choice number in the range of job available, Battu, Belfield and Sloane(1999). This hypothesis can be tested by "Over" variable and the associated coefficient should be negative.

[H5] *A public career prospect should increase unemployment duration.* The private sector can recruit more quickly - due to its more flexible nature - a worker that the public sector recruits by competitive exam (Russo, Gorter, Schettkat, 2001). This hypothesis can be tested by

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4 "Public" variable.

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6 [H6] *Job search increases the probability to find a job.* One explanation is that this behaviour
7 is an indicator of the individual motivation (Van Hoof et al. 2005). This assumption can
8 be tested by "Search" variable.

9
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11 [H7] *The historic of professional career can be interpreted as a signal (Spence, 1973) of*
12 *worker's productivity - or motivation - by employers.* This assumption can be tested with
13 the historic of previous job characterized by "Past-Job" variable. In the same sense, to
14 follow a stage ("Stage" variable) during this schooling should increase the probability to
15 quickly get a job (Heywood and Wei, 2004). Therefore, this hypothesis is tested with the
16 two following variables: Past-job and Stage.

17
18 [H8] *The training faculty is a major determinant of the individual's career (Diebolt and El*
19 *Murr, 2003).* Some specialties, needed by labour market for a given time period, increase
20 the probabilities to find a job. This phenomenon can be viewed with "ES", "NS" and "HS"
21 variables.

22
23 [H9] *If one of the parents works as an executive, children have higher probabilities to find a job*
24 *(O'Regan and Quigley, 1993).* An executive parent should favour her child's employability
25 by her connections. This latter assumption can be tested by "EF" and "EM" variables.

26
27 [H10] *Vocational training gives some advantages in the professional insertion.* These courses
28 are shorter and should be more adapted to the demand of labour market, Andr n and Andr n
29 (2006), Budria and Pereira (2007). However, this hypothesis seems to be partially accepted
30 on the Israel case (Eyal and Beenstock, 2007). In our case, this hypothesis is tested by "VD"
31 variable.

32
33 [H11] *It is easier to find a job in small firms.* Large firms can demand more specific skills
34 to do the job than smaller firms. One explanation is that large firms set more precisely skill
35 matches for the job than small firms (Dupray, 2001). We tested this assumption by "Medium
36 Firm" and "Large Firms" variables.

37
38 [H12] *Individuals that have done their national service in army have more difficulties to find*
39 *a job.* In this case, serviceman cannot immediately prospect for a job and they are set back
40 in their professional career (Anderson, Halcoussis and Tollison, 1996; Warner and Negrusa,
41 2005). This assumption is tested by "Army" variable.

5 Data and Findings

Our analysis of employment duration is based on the Céreq ("Centre d'Étude et de Recherches sur les Qualifications") data. The database of 1996 is constructed by investigating a graduate cohort, three years after students leave (i.e. in 1999). The answers of each individual surveyed are collected in this database, named "Devenir des diplômés de l'enseignement supérieur". These data are representative of the leavers of higher education in France: for example, the male number of the leavers is effectively higher -around 55% - than female (see table 1 for a presentation of the characteristics of the data used in the analysis) for the higher education. These longitudinal data provides extensive information on graduate careers. Our study is based on leavers of bachelor and master courses, technological universities, engineer graduates, business schools accredited by the government, and PhD students. Medical, paramedical, social or artistic training and graduates of foreign nationalities are not interviewed. Our research topic is to study the professional insertion of the leavers of higher education. Consequently, we excluded unemployed graduates after three years of the leaves of educational system, people of more than 35 years and part-time workers. Our objective is to study a durable professional insertion of the leavers of higher education.

Overall, we retained for 1999 a sample of 1,871 leavers of higher education. Longitudinal information for homogeneous variable is collected at three points of time of the calendar (i.e. one year, two years and third years after leaving the higher education system).

Table 1. Characteristics of the Variables

Variable	Description	Role	Min ^a	Max ^b	Mean	Std. Dev
Unemploy	Number of months unemployed after higher education graduating.	Dependent variable	0	26	1.91	3.32
NAE	Number of educational years in higher education.	Variable testing hypothesis 1	2	8	3.81	1.471
Log-Wages	Logarithm of the salary of the individual.	Variable testing hypothesis 2	8.517	10.819	8.959	0.3
Gender	Dichotomic variable which is one for males and zero for females.	Variable testing hypothesis 3	0	1	0.548	0.497
Over	Dichotomic variable coded 1 if the individual is rated overeducated.	Variable testing hypothesis 4	0	1	0.408	0.491
Public	Dichotomic variable which is one for public career and zero elsewhere.	Variable testing hypothesis 5	0	1	0.193	0.395
Search	Dichotomic variable which is one if the individual searched for a job and zero elsewhere.	Variable testing hypothesis 6	0	23	1.458	3.132
Past-Job	Dichotomic variable which is one if the individual had past jobs during this schooling.	Variable testing hypothesis 7	0	1	0.048	0.215
Stage	Coded one if the individual have follow a stage during this schooling.	Variable testing hypothesis 7	0	1	0.872	0.334
ES	Dichotomic variable coded 1 if training specialities is exact science.	Variable testing hypothesis 8	0	1	0.351	0.477
NS	Dichotomic variable coded 1 if training specialities is natural science.	Variable testing hypothesis 8	0	1	0.072	0.258
HS	Dichotomic variable coded if training specialities is human science.	Variable testing hypothesis 8	0	1	0.106	0.308
EF	Dichotomic variable coded 1 if the father's profession is executive.	Variable testing hypothesis 9	0	1	0.35	0.477
EM	Dichotomic variable coded 1 if the mother's profession is executive.	Variable testing hypothesis 9	0	1	0.144	0.351
VD	Dichotomic variable coded 1 if the individual has a vocational degree.	Variable testing hypothesis 10	0	1	0.417	0.493
Medium-Firm	Dichotomic variable coded 1 if the individual works in a firm size between 199 and 499 employees.	Variable testing hypothesis 11	0	1	0.363	0.481
Large-Firm	Dichotomic variable coded 1 if the individual works in a firm of more than 499 employees.	Variable testing hypothesis 11	0	1	0.204	0.403
Army	Coded one if the individual have do this army obligation.	Variable testing hypothesis 12	0	1	0.155	0.362

^a Min - Minimum; ^b Max - Maximum

We present a number of different duration models for comparative purposes. The dependent variable for each specification is unemployment (measured in months). The estimated coefficients are always in the proportional-hazard metric. Model 1 (M1) is the Cox proportional hazard model. Model 2 (M2) is Cox proportional model with clustering around time, to verify if there are any types of cluster around the variable gender. Model 3 (M3) is the Cox model with stratification by gender to test whether the relationship between the independent variables is different among groups. Model 4 (M4) is the Cox's proportional hazard model with time-dependent covariates, and (M5) is the Weibull model with time, that is presented for comparative purpose.

Table 2. Estimation Results

	M1		M2		M3		M4		M5	
	Coeff.	s.e.	Coeff.	s.e.(2)	Coeff.	s.e.(2)	Coeff.	s.e.(2)	Coeff.	s.e.(2)
NAE	0.010	0.023	0.010	0.017	0.005	0.020	0.012	0.024	0.018	0.001
Log-Wages	-0.115	0.099	-0.115	0.127	-0.106	0.111	-0.304	0.143	-0.026	0.076
Gender	0.032	0.059	0.032	0.051	0.028	0.037	0.014	0.059	0.022	0.043
Over	0.095	0.056	0.095	0.055	0.098	0.057	0.284	0.091	0.052	0.045
Public	-0.023	0.069	-0.023	0.045	-0.012	0.046	-0.003	0.070	-0.020	0.051
Search	-0.216	0.06	-0.216	0.012	-0.227	0.012	-0.231	0.006	-0.119	0.003
Past-Job	-0.101	0.108	-0.101	0.100	-0.100	0.100	-0.144	0.389	-0.057	0.072
Stage	-0.130	0.086	-0.130	0.044	-0.116	0.039	0.326	0.086	0.086	0.045
ES	0.198	0.057	0.198	0.068	0.207	0.071	0.210	0.057	-0.115	0.040
NS	-0.190	0.091	-0.190	0.067	-0.190	0.074	-0.115	0.166	-0.121	0.041
HS	-0.409	0.096	-0.409	0.065	-0.422	0.058	-0.398	0.097	-0.221	0.084
EF	0.018	0.054	0.018	0.082	0.013	0.083	-0.146	0.094	0.012	0.039
EM	-0.012	0.115	-0.012	0.097	-0.047	-0.115	0.104	0.123	0.033	0.050
VD	0.155	0.059	0.155	0.040	0.164	0.036	0.139	0.056	0.088	0.036
Medium-Firm	0.059	0.054	0.059	0.008	0.062	0.006	0.036	0.054	0.013	0.041
Large-Firm	0.244	0.066	0.244	0.026	0.247	0.021	0.226	0.066	0.109	0.042
Army	-0.421	0.066	-0.421	0.153	-0.407	0.150	-0.458	0.066	-0.260	0.050
<i>constant</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.731	0.661
<i>LnP</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.615	0.026
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	<i>Time dependent covariates</i>		-	-
<i>Log-Wages</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.383	0.105	-	-
<i>Over</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.317	0.065	-	-
<i>NS</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.218	0.116	-	-
<i>Stage</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.367	0.108	-	-
<i>EF</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.129	0.069	-	-
<i>EM</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.161	0.090	-	-
<i>LL</i>	-11545.31	-	-11545.31	-	-10257.60	-	-11515.41	-	-1589,9	-
<i>Nobs</i>	1871	-	1871	-	1871	-	1871	-	-	-

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4 Values in bold are statistically significant at 1% level

5 (1) - All models were estimated in Stata 9

6 (2) - Robust standard errors

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8
9 *LL* - Log Likelihood

10
11
12 Cox's proportional hazard model with time-dependent covariates is the model of reference,
13 based in the "Schoenfeld tests". On all models, results are quite similar in their main effects. Given
14 the model specification, positive values for the parameters imply that the unemployment duration
15 increases with increasing values in the respective variable. On the opposite, a negative value for
16 the parameters means a negative relationship. Results across the four models demonstrate that the
17 parameters have the same signs for all variables. On the basis of the log likelihood statistic of the
18 models and the "Schoenfeld tests",⁵ the Cox's model with time-dependent covariates is the reference
19 model. The rationale for this result is that while accepting the proportional hypothesis, time-
20 dependent proportionality exists for some variables. Weibull time-dependent model is presented for
21 comparative purpose. The signs of the variables and the significance level in the Cox model and
22 Weibull model are similar. The results of table 2 are discussed in the next section.
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33 6 Discussion

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36 In this paper, the determinants of unemployment duration among the leavers of higher education
37 are analysed using a number of different survival models. Following our econometric estimations and
38 despite a positive sign, hypothesis [H1] is rejected since the estimated coefficient of NAE variable
39 is insignificant. This unexpected result is due to the low variability of the NAE variable. Probably,
40 if we introduce lower educational level this variable will be more significant. However, one can
41 expect that the level of education attainment has a decreasing influence⁶ on employment due to an
42 excess of education offer, unlike the traditional assumption of human capital theory. Concerning
43 remunerations, as expected, higher starting wages motivate individuals to find job. This result
44 confirms hypothesis [H2].
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52 The estimated coefficient of "Gender" variable shows not significant discrimination between men
53 or women of higher education in the professional insertion. This evidence rejects hypothesis [H3].
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56 ⁵Not displayed but available under request from the authors.

57 ⁶Which questions the traditional assumption of human capital theory (see section 2).
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4 However, discrimination for lower educational attainment may appear: Unfortunately, we cannot
5 test this hypothesis with our data.
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8 Relative to the hypothesis [H4], overeducation variable is positively and statistical significant
9 on all Cox models meaning that it decreases the probability to find job. Therefore, hypothesis [H4]
10 is rejected. As evoked by Dolton and Silles (2003), overeducated workers are not randomly selected
11 and they have probably lesser academic results. In other words, overeducated people probably have
12 the lesser potential of productivity and, consequently, they have more difficulties to find a job. In
13 consequence, employers seem to pay a strong attention to the schooling results rather than the
14 educational level attainment.
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17 Additional, PS - public employment - is negative but statistical insignificant and therefore we
18 do not accept hypothesis [H5]. The prospect to become civil servant is not much longer than to be
19 employed in the private sector.
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22 Searching for a job is, obviously, a behaviour that decreases unemployment duration since the
23 correspondent estimated coefficient is negative and statistical significant, validating hypothesis [H6].
24 This result confirms that this behaviour is an indicator for the employers of the individual motiva-
25 tion. Hence, employment offices probably stimulate the individual in this job prospect (Gorter and
26 Kalb, 1996).
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29 Past jobs seem not to decrease unemployment duration since this variable is negative but insignif-
30 icant. One explanation is that this employment is, essentially, student jobs with low qualification
31 level requirement. Therefore, employers do not take into account these past jobs in their recruit-
32 ment, testifying our insignificant result. So, hypothesis seventh is not validated. Additional stage
33 decreases the unemployment duration in model (M1) to (M3), but rise the unemployment duration
34 in model (M4) and (M5), which still confirms the rejection of hypothesis [H7].
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37 ES is positive meaning that exact science increases unemployment duration. However, this vari-
38 able turns negative on model (M4). NS is negatively and statistical significant, meaning that training
39 in natural science decreases unemployment duration, like HS estimated coefficient. Therefore, the
40 faculty of training is a major determinant of the professional insertion and confirms assumption
41 [H8]. The advantage in professional insertion in the human science - in contrast to the social science
42 - can be explained by the evolution of student number by faculty. As evoked by Diebolt and El Murr
43 (2003), humanity sciences were, twenty years ago, were taught in faculties with poor perspectives
44 of professional career. Consequently, students have favoured their educational choice for social and
45 exact sciences. Finally, today, a glutting of student number in these faculties is observed. In other
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4 words, skills offered in ES (and social science) exceed the demand of the correspondent activity
5 sectors of labour market. Furthermore, there are some evidences of biased technical progress that
6 favour exact sciences in the 80's, with the computing evolution (Haskel and Heden, 1999), whereas
7 in the late 90's this demand effect is less strong (Guironnet, 2006).
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11 EF and EM variables have mixed insignificant results: executive father has a negative effect
12 on unemployment only in model (M3) and the coefficient of executive mother is negative only for
13 model (M2) and (M3). Therefore, hypothesis [H9] is rejected: professional activities of the parents
14 are insignificant; they do not influence the professional insertion of their child.⁷
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18 Vocational degrees increase unemployment duration. In France, vocational trainings are the
19 weaker degrees in higher education and employers have negative opinions about this training. Ob-
20 viously, hypothesis [H10] is rejected and confirms the result of Eyal and Beenstock (2008).
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24 Medium and large firms both increase the unemployment duration, therefore hypothesis [H11]
25 is accepted. An individual must search for a job in small firms to quickly get a job.
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28 Lastly, hypothesis [H12] is rejected. National service in army reduces the unemployment dura-
29 tion. As this status is not considered as unemployment, this variable obviously reduces the unem-
30 ployment duration statistically. However, it is not a proof that this variable favours employment.
31 It will be more realistic to think the contrary as stipulated by hypothesis [H12].
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34 35 36 7 Summary and Conclusions 37 38

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40 The main result of our study is that the choice of a faculty has more influence than the level of
41 education attainment in the professional insertion. In France, the large increase in the number of
42 students in the educational system has produced a diminishing trend in the job access for a given
43 educational level. Today, a feasible recommendation for policy-makers in education is to stress
44 the education offer to the demand of labour market, as suggested by the overeducation literature.
45 This policy should improve professional insertion of the young cohorts of graduates. Concerning
46 overeducation phenomenon, the result should be interpreted with caution: if it suggests that student
47 must choose their training only in respect of labour market requirement, others researches are
48 needed; overeducation could represent an advantage in the development of professional careers
49 (Groeneveld and Hartog, 2004). However, our study confirms the significance of overeducation
50 variable in analyse on unemployment duration.
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58 ⁷This fact not exclude that an executive parents could affect the educational choice of children.
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4 Additionally, it is more difficult to find a job after leaving a faculty with a glutting of student
5 number. Under perfect information, individuals must choose their faculty in function of the differ-
6 ential between demand of labour market and the number of students enrolled in the correspondent
7 initial training. Moreover, students must avoid have a temporary job during their courses. For
8 policy implications, government should revalorize the vocational training to improve the efficiency
9 in the allocation of human resources (Béduwé and Planas, 2004).
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Appendix

Table 3. Affichard's Matches Grid

Occupation/Degree	Business school, Master 2	Master 1, Licence	2 years in higher education
Executive, Engineer	<i>Adequately</i>	<i>Adequately</i>	Undereducated
Intermediate profession	Overeducated	<i>Adequately</i>	<i>Adequately</i>
Technician	Overeducated	Overeducated	<i>Adequately</i>
Skilled employee	Overeducated	Overeducated	Overeducated
Unskilled employee	Overeducated	Overeducated	Overeducated
Skilled worker	Overeducated	Overeducated	Overeducated
Unskilled worker	Overeducated	Overeducated	Overeducated

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