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Austrian Refugee Social Scientists

Christian Fleck

One of the frequently reproduced photographs of Sigmund Freud shows him looking out of a train's window, obviously to say goodbye to someone on the platform. Very often this photo has been used without explaining the circumstances of its shooting. The train was taking Freud into exile early in June of 1938, and his departure encouraged at least one photographer to document it for future usage. The majority of those forced to leave their country of origin at the same time, however, went abroad without leaving similar traces not only because they were less prominent than the founder of psychoanalysis but also because they had to flee secretly, hiding themselves in a mass, or using paths where picture taking was not recommended. Our historical knowledge about the fate of Nazi refugee intellectuals was for a very long time similar to the photographic documentation of Freud's going into exile, incomplete: We knew that some very prominent figures had to leave Austria around the *Anschluss*, but we did not know the details and, at least for the first half century after the tragedy, we lacked a comprehensive picture of this mass exodus. Serious research only started during the last quarter of a century but much uncharted territory remains. This paper presents an overview on one sub-group of the Nazi refugees, those whom we recognize today as social scientists whose roots can be traced back to Austria, and to Vienna in particular. In so doing, I aim to portray the characteristics of the entire cohort of refugees at least with regard to some of their characteristics rather than to concentrate on the prominent figures. Thus I hope to identify the social conditions, constraints and opportunity structures they faced at three levels, from the macro-level of social structure via middle-level of organizations and occupations down to differences at the individual level. Thus when individuals are named they are only intended as illustrative examples and as a way of assisting readers to relate my sociological analysis to the more historical accounts.

1.

At the outset it is necessary to recognize the complexity of such an analysis. The first difficulty is connected to the distinction between the 'stars' and more ordinary folk; for obvious reasons there is much more data on the first than on the second group. Secondly, as in 1933 when some Austrians living in Germany became victims of the Nazi purge against Jews and political opponents, not all individuals fleeing from Austria around 1938 were Austrians, either by residence or citizenship. To complicate the case further émigré Austrians were taken as Germans by some of their hosts abroad, and several historians have followed suit. In some respects, it is true, distinguishing between Austrians and Germans may be irrelevant, but from a sociological point of view the different political and social contexts in Germany and Austria were substantial.

A third issue stems from one of these contextual particularities: even before the *Anschluss* in March 1938, Austria had already been political a dictatorship, in which political opponents were victimized, persecuted, and forced into exile. The exiles included scholars and others who became prominent in the social sciences later on.

Moreover, Austria's labor market for educated people had been shrinking since 1931 when, after the collapse of the Austrian bank, Credit-Anstalt, the conservative government adopted an austerity policy that resulted in dismissals of civil servants, university professors and faculty. The repression of the authoritarian regime in Austria is not comparable with what happened in Nazi-Germany or in Austria after the *Anschluss*, but the cultural climate was nevertheless unpromising and the mood was dark. As a consequence many people, especially young university graduates, were contemplating migration, mostly for professional reasons, but also for political ones. Some of those regarded today as refugees went abroad to find work, while some only learned during their search for a job that the institutions they approached were not ordinary labor market agencies but refugee assistance organizations, such as the Academic Assistance Council (A.A.C.)/ SPSL. The widely used *Biographisches Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration nach 1933/ International Biographical Dictionary of Central European Emigrés 1933–1945*¹ lists several of these job-seekers or ordinary academic migrants: thus, to mention the most telling instances, Friedrich A. Hayek and Joseph A. Schumpeter both accepted offers from universities in London and Cambridge, Massachusetts *before* 1933, when the Nazis took power.

Besides the political realities in the 1930s, other issues also deserve recognition if the focus of the analysis is on the development of the social sciences during the second third of the twentieth century. One in particular brings us to the core of the present paper. Quite simply, the social sciences as we know them today did not exist in Austria during the 1920s and 1930s. University curricula did not include sociology or political science, while economics and psychology were part of the traditional disciplines of law and philosophy respectively. Research sites outside the university system were rare, and in most cases could not offer a regular income.

Finally an account of the refugee scholars should be accompanied by an examination of those whom one could call “homeguards”², meaning all those who remained in Nazi Germany for a variety of reasons, not all out of their tacit support for or even affiliation to the Nazi-movement. Some, for example, delayed their decision to flee

¹ Werner Röder and Herbert A. Strauss (eds.), *Biographisches Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration nach 1933* (= *International Biographical Dictionary of Central European Emigrés 1933–1945*), 3 vol., München: Saur 1980–1983.

² I have adopted this term from the Chicago sociologist Everett Ch. Hughes, who used this term in a review of Lazarsfeld & Thielens, *Academic Mind*, ‘to distinguish the people of small, particular orbits from those of larger identifications and connections’; he calls the latter ‘itinerants’. See Hughes, Everett C., ‘The Academic Mind’ Two Views,’ in: *American Sociological Review* 24, (4)1959 p. 572.

until it was too late, or lacked the means for a successful escape and ended up in concentration camps. The number of social scientists who became victims of the Holocaust is surprising small, but even this small number reveals some of the distinctiveness of the impact of the Nazis on the social sciences. Thus, we should remember that while some of those who later on became prominent figures in the social sciences narrowly escaped their pursuers, it is equally probable that others who might have become eminent were caught by the Gestapo when they were students or young graduates lacking the high profile which might have helped them escape the Nazi extermination camps.

2.

A first step in analyzing refugee scholars as a group has to take account of their social roots, and, in comparing the Austrians and Germans, the different composition of the populations from which they were drawn. This has two aspects: on the one hand, the size of the Jewish population in the two areas, and on the other the size of the *Bildungsbürgertum*, or educated people. The two societies differed in both, but whereas it is relatively easy to compare the number of Jews in Austria and Germany, it is more difficult to estimate their *Bildungsbürgertum*. While the census data on Jews only indicate what can be labeled the core of the potential victims of the Nazi regime, there is no reason to assume that the difference between the Jewish population and the larger number of the targets of the racist Nuremberg Laws varied in Germany and Austria. Culturally both societies showed the same patterns of intermarriage and conversion, and it is fair to take the number of Jews reported in the censuses as a valid for purposes of comparison. In Germany, about 1 per cent of the population was of Jewish whereas nearly 10 per cent of the Viennese were Jews. However, nine out of ten Austrian Jews lived in the capital city, so the figures are proportionately roughly comparable.

Identifying the size of the *Bildungsbürgertum* is more complicated since we do not have a list of all people belonging to the population of which the refugee scholars are a subset. We therefore have to use crude estimates to specify the proportions. Official statistics, like census data, do not provide what a sociologist wants to get in detail, but approximations are feasible. Table 1 gives the data for those professions which formed the core of the educated classes in Germany in the 1930s. Table 2 offers data for only three occupational groups for Austria, but shows in addition their decline between the census of 1934 and the census of 1939.³ The composition of the *Bildungsbürgertum* in the Weimar Republic and Austria's First Republic is striking in itself. Given that Germany's total population outnumbered the total in Austria by 10:1 (table 3), the size

³ The Nazi regime arranged for 1939 a census also in the then incorporated Austria. Hughes analyzed the official German handling of census data with regard to the Jewish population's decline in his seminal paper "The *Gleichschaltung* of the German Statistical Yearbook", reprinted in: Hughes, Everett Ch., *On Work, Race, and the Sociological Imagination*, ed. Lewis A. Coser, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994, 200-207 (originally 1955).

of the German *Bildungsbürgertum* seems to be much smaller than its Austrian counterpart. The German social historian Hans Ulrich Wehler⁴ estimates the German *Bildungsbürgertum* as 0.2 per cent of the overall population, but the data in table 2 indicate that the Austrian *Bildungsbürgertum* may have been double the size of its German counterpart. This is astonishing first because in the German case Protestant clergymen counted for one in four of the educated class, whereas Protestant clergymen (and their families) did not play any significant role in Austria, while Catholic priests, despite their influence in Austria's politics and cultural life, are not present in these data. The three so called free occupations of doctors, lawyers and writers-journalists (professional occupations in American sociological vernacular) alone represent a share of the Austrian population similar in size to the entire educated class in Germany.

If we bear in mind that the population of Jews was proportionately larger in Vienna than in Germany, and consider that the *Bildungsbürgertum* was in particular prone to over-represent Jews, one has to conclude that the numbers of potential Jewish victims was larger in Vienna than in Germany. Historically there are a couple of reasons for these disproportions in two otherwise similar societies. On the one hand the Austrian Republic was the heir of the much larger Habsburg Empire and inherited the more educated strata of the old Empire's population, most of who lived in the imperial metropolis, Vienna, and inclined towards German culture. On the other hand, during the last decade of the old Empire and the early years of the Republic, Vienna received many more Jewish immigrants from the Eastern Europe than Germany did. Like the educated class, and in particular the civil servants, Jewish immigrants were concentrated in Vienna, and this fueled anti-Semitism in the city. Austrian anti-Semitism was at least partly rooted in conflicts over resources, particularly employment. To call it group conflict does not minimize the racism of its proponents but points towards the social mechanism triggering such conflicts. If there are real things as jobs at stake prejudices are much more easily roused than if divergent groups live side by side without interfering each other.

One of the most prominent consequences of the anti-Semitism of Vienna's petty bourgeoisie was the ban on Jews entering the ranks of civil servants, which included university professors at this time. During the declining years of the Habsburg Empire but also during the early years of the Republic – and we should remember that the Social Democrats regarded the transition to democracy a revolution, and even had some influence over the hiring policies of the universities in the early 1920s – Jews who abandoned their faith and converted to Christianity could get entry to particular jobs, professorship included. Discrimination and exclusion of Jewish students, graduates, and also *Privatdozenten* were still severe, but some individuals could enter university faculties. From the mid-1920s onwards, the rise of the extremist right

⁴ Wehler, Hans Ulrich, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*. Bd. 4: *Vom Beginn des Ersten Weltkriegs bis zur Gründung der beiden deutschen Staaten 1914-1949*, München: C.H. Beck 2003, 726f.

affected the hiring policies of the University of Vienna, but it is also true that from then on few positions were opened up and far fewer professorships were replaced. Paradoxically, the more anti-Semitism increased, the less discrimination was needed, for sheer lack of opportunities. As we have already noted, Jews were concentrated both regionally and in the *Bildungsbürgertum* in Austria. Jews lived overwhelmingly in Vienna, and the same is true for the social strata in which Jews were overrepresented.⁵ It may therefore be historically appropriate to say that the more virulent anti-Semitism in Vienna reported by eye witnesses was very often the unintended consequence of the higher density of Jews there. This is not an excuse for the behavior of the Viennese, but does provide some explanation for its occurrence.

Given this rough comparison between the *Bildungsbürgertum* in Germany and Austria, it is not surprising that all the historical sources and accounts of refugee scholars record a disproportionately large group of former Austrians.

3.

Given all these considerations, it is still puzzling that the proportion of professors dismissed was higher in Austria around 1938 than it was in Germany around 1933 (see table 3).⁶ Either there were more potential victims around in Austria, or Nazis in the University of Vienna, where most of the dismissals took place, acted more vigorously. The data in table 4 support the first view. The higher proportion of dismissals in the higher ranks (of *ordentliche* and *außerordentliche Professor*) supports such an interpretation by showing that in these two groups of regularly employed professors the number of those close to the political regime of the *Ständestaat* was higher. The former regime had dismissed some of the most ardent Nazis, and the Ministry of Education had a strong influence in the selection process of professors. Both mechanisms contributed to an overrepresentation of men close to the ruling Conservatives. After the *Anschluss* nearly all who had some connections to the authoritarian government or the Catholic Church lost their jobs, but they seldom emigrated because they received official retirement pensions and for the most part were not of Jewish origin. This interpretation is further sustained by looking at the number of dismissed *Dozenten*, that is persons who were permitted to teach at the universities but no regular employment or salary from the university (they received small fees from his students). In addition to the fact that only *Dozenten* could ascend to the professoriate, the barrier for outsiders and nonconformists was lower so that more Jews could be found there. Since the proportion of dismissed Austrian *Dozenten* was the same as those reported dismissed by German universities, it seems that more opponents of the Nazis were persecuted in the higher ranks.

⁵ One can see this by looking at the shrinking of the free professions in Austria between 1934 and 1939 which happened primarily in Vienna but not in the provinces.

⁶ All estimations with regard to numbers of dismissed people are problematic. To minimize biases I used here very similar sources for the comparison; comp. table 4 for ranges of estimates.

About 400 faculty members lost their jobs in Austrian universities as a consequence of the *Anschluss*. The exact numbers of Jews in the broad meaning of the racial laws are unknown but traditionally there have been few Jews at the universities of Graz and Innsbruck. One can therefore estimate that the different dismissal rates between Vienna and the other Austrian universities are a fair approximation for the number of Jewish victims. The far higher dismissal rates in Vienna reflect the higher proportion of Jews in the faculty there. Social scientists, broadly defined, were a tiny minority within this group because, as mentioned before, the social sciences played only a marginal role in Austrian universities.

To estimate the approximate numbers of refugee social scientists one has to go the other way, with all its shortcomings. In previous research, I tried to sample German speakers in the social sciences between the mid-1920s and the mid-1950s as rigorously as possible. This list included anyone who published at least two reviews in any of the contemporary social science journals, all scholars listed in biographical dictionaries and encyclopedias, and all who received fellowships from the Rockefeller Foundation and had lived for some years in Austria or Germany were included.⁷ The sample consists of 823 social scientists. Of these, 29 per cent lived in Austria, another 9 per cent lived in both Germany and Austria) and only 7 per cent were female. 58 per cent had emigrated at some time between 1920 and 1955. The 58 per cent includes both people who left their country of origin before the rise of Nazism or after the end of the Third Reich, but the vast majority left Central Europe during the years when the Nazis were in power.⁸ We can therefore consider them as the social sciences refugee population, with special emphasis on sociologists and political scientists, and an unsystematic sampling of economists, historians, social philosophers, statisticians, psychologists, and pedagogues, etc.⁹

Comparing Germany with Austria also makes it possible to calculate different rates of emigration for the social sciences: over the whole period, 72 per cent of the Austrian social scientists, and 68 per cent of those with dual citizenship emigrated, but only 49 per cent of the German social scientists left. The median age of the refugees at the time of their escape was 35 years for social scientists from Austria, 38 years for the Germans and 42 years for the double citizens. While on average both Austrian and the German refugee cohorts received their doctorates about ten years before they went into exile, the double citizens graduated seventeen years before they left. Those who took a

⁷ See for details: Fleck, Christian, *Transatlantische Bereicherungen. Zur Erfindung empirischer Sozialforschung*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 2007, chapter 4.

⁸ From the 347 social scientists 97 per cent of the German refugees left Germany between 1932 and 1940; 27 per cent of the Austrians left between 1933 and 1937 and additional 65 per cent left in 1938 and the following years.

⁹ The aim of the study was on the history of sociology but since sociology did not exist at this time, a wider net had to be used to end up with a satisfying sample. In addition the disciplinary identity was not as strong as in later decades.

Habilitation with them into exile went through this *rite de passage* almost immediately before they left, at the age of 34.¹⁰

Before illustrating the intellectual milieu of the refugee scholars we should remember that most of those who became social scientists after their escape were earning their living by working in different occupations, sometimes obscure ones, before they left central Europe, as some of the better documented cases show. Thus, Hans Zeisel, collaborator in the now famous study of the unemployed, *Marienthal*, worked as a lawyer and sports reporter for the Viennese daily *Arbeiter Zeitung*; Alexander Gerschenkron, who was born in Odessa and came as a adolescent to Vienna around 1920, finished his university studies some time in the 1930s and seems to have earned money by playing chess in coffeehouses; Edgar Zilsel taught in a gymnasium after he was fired by the *Ständestaat* from his post as a teacher at the *Volkshochschule*; Bruno Bettelheim who submitted his dissertation after fourteen years studying philosophy in Vienna just weeks before the *Anschluss*, earned his living as a manager in his father's firm; Karl Popper held a minor job as a teacher at an elementary school; Gustav Ichheiser lost his job as an occupational psychologist in the Vienna municipality around 1934, and over the following years commuted between his native Poland and Austria; and Karl Polanyi worked as a member of the Viennese weekly *Der österreichische Volkswirt* until his employment ended when his editor, Gustav Stolper, could no longer support him.

To put the same story in another perspective: in the mid 1950s, when some one hundred former Austrians held teaching positions in sociology at U.S. higher education institutions there was only one professor of sociology in Austria. Counterfactually, if the Nazis had not achieved power, it is at least arguable that 90 per cent or more of those who had become sociologists would have had to choose different occupational paths back in Austria.

Historians and others very often refer to circles, discussion groups, schools, and similar micro-environments when they portrait Austria's intellectual history. Some of these groups were destroyed completely during the late 1930s, others lost most of their members. Practically all Freudians and their rivals from other schools of psychoanalysis, such as the followers of Alfred Adler, went into exile during the 1930s. The university-based psychologists, Karl and Charlotte Bühler, formed another grouping to which some later on prominent social scientists belonged. One such was Else Frenkel-Brunswik, who collaborated with the exiled Frankfurt School in their study of the *Authoritarian Personality* and Ernest Dichter, who reinvented himself as the "father of motivational research" after his emigration to the United States. Closely connected with the Böhlers was the group led by Paul F. Lazarsfeld who founded the

¹⁰ At this time the number of years between graduation and *Habilitation*, meaning becoming a Dozent with the right to teach at the university, was much lower than later.

Wirtschaftspsychologische Forschungsstelle in 1931, which produced a seminal study on the socio-psychological consequences of unemployment, *Marienthal: The Sociography of an Unemployed Community* (1933). His collaborators in this and subsequent studies were, besides Hans Zeisel mentioned above, Lazarsfeld's first and second wives, Marie Jahoda and Hertha Herzog. Another bridge connected this group of young social researchers with the Austro-Marxists, who formed one of the intellectually richest circles in interwar Vienna. Indeed Jahoda lost her Austrian citizenship as a consequence of her political activities in the underground resistance movement of the Revolutionary Socialists against the *Ständestaat* in 1937 and was forced to leave Vienna the day after a six-month jail sentence. She went to London and lived there through the war years.

The Social Democratic movement provided a fertile environment for other scholarly endeavors as well. The group of philosophers forming the Vienna Circle of Logical Positivism had a left wing, to which Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, Edgar Zilsel, Gustav Bergmann, Herbert Feigl, and Philipp Frank belonged. Although he was never a loyal opponent of neo-positivism, Karl R. Popper was nevertheless part of the same socio-political context. Nearly all the members of the Vienna Circle went into exile, most ending up finally in the U.S., although Neurath came to England after four years in the Netherlands. After going into exile, these left wing neo-positivists contributed to the debate on the methodology of the social sciences, and strengthened the inclination of social scientists to adopt the success model of the sciences.

Felix Kaufmann who participated in the debates of the neo-positivists was at the same time a close collaborator of Alfred Schütz who, after his migration to New York, became famous as a phenomenological sociologist at the New School for Social Research where both Kaufmann and Schütz finally became professors. In Vienna, Schütz had worked as a banker, and Kaufmann as a manager of an oil company; both were part of another famous group of thinkers, Ludwig Mises' *Privatseminar* and the adjunct *Geist-Kreis*. Mises earned his living as a leading officer of the Viennese Chamber of Commerce, and taught as a *Privatdozent* economics at the University of Vienna. Because of his Jewish origin he could not get a regular professorship, but he assembled a group of younger economists around himself which met once a week in his office for discussions. Almost the entire third and fourth generation of the Austrian School of Economics migrated but not for reasons of racist victimization. Only few were of Jewish origin – Mises, Fritz Machlup, and Abraham Wald – the majority was Gentile but against Nazism. The Austrian School's reputation made it easy for its followers to find places abroad. Friedrich A. Hayek was the first to attain a post at the LSE in 1931, Machlup moved to Buffalo in 1935 and Gottfried Haberler to Harvard in 1936, while Oskar Morgenstern remained in Princeton where he was on a lecture tour during the *Anschluss*. Political science did not exist as a formal discipline in Austria at that time but people who later held professorships in political science were around:

Eric Voegelin, Erich Hula and, the most prominent, Hans Kelsen, who left Vienna for Cologne in 1930. After his dismissal from Cologne in 1933, Kelsen spent time in Geneva and Prague before escaping to the U.S. just before the war.

Catholics did not play a major role in the evolving social sciences but some of those who were dismissed went into exile: Johannes Messner, Ernst Karl Winter, and Johann Mokre. Very few scholars of history, especially art history, ethnology, and some parts of law, international and constitutional law in particular, emigrated: the exceptions who were later to become well-known were the art historians Ernst Gombrich and Hans Tietze; the Arabist Gustav E. Grünebaum; the social anthropologist S. F. Nadel; and William Ebenstein who became a political scientist.

As one can see from this short overview, most of the intellectually fertile groups were only loosely connected with the formal university system; most were sidelined or even excluded from academia. It does not come as a surprise therefore that all political leftists were only able to finish their university studies but had to look for other sources of income later on. In a shrinking system of higher education, with no new jobs and few replacements, outsiders did not have much chance.

As already mentioned, the émigrés were overwhelmingly young, and lived through years of underemployment, despite their university degrees. When they left Austria, they came to realize that they did not fit well into the schemes of those refugee help organizations which had been established to resettle well-known scholars abroad.

5.

Both the London- and the New York-based refugee help organizations, the Academic Assistance Council, later renamed to Society for the Protection of Science and Learning, and the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced German (later: Foreign) Scholars, restricted their financial support to recognized scholars. It is true that both organizations and their officers in particular, offered a helping hand to all who approached them, but actual grants or any other material help remained restricted to prominent figures. To illustrate this I compared both organizations' files of individuals with the names of the 412 refugees in my sample of sociologists/social scientists. In 1936 the A.A.C. published a directory of refugee scholars, and added a supplementary list one year later.¹¹ In both lists I found the names of six Austrian social scientists and sixteen scholars who had spent time in both Germany and Austria (double citizens), compared with a hundred Germans. The archive of A.A.C. / S.P.S.L. at the Bodleian Library, Oxford, contains files for 28 Austrian social scientists and 5 double citizens.¹² Only six Austrian or double citizen social scientists actually received financial aid

¹¹ Reprinted in: Strauss, Herbert A., Tilmann Buddensieg & Kurt Düwell (eds.), *Emigration. Deutsche Wissenschaftler nach 1933. Entlassung und Vertreibung*. Berlin: TU Berlin 1987.

¹² I did not search for Germans then.

from the S.P.S.L.: Gustav E. Grünebaum, Karl F. Helleiner, Friedrich O. Hertz, Erich Hula, Gustav Ichheiser, Marie Jahoda. Grünebaum had been an assistant at the University of Vienna, the historian Helleiner was a collaborator of the *Monumenta Germaniae Historia*, the sociologist Hertz and the political scientist Hula both held posts in German universities before 1933, but returned to Vienna before finally going into exile. The social psychologist Jahoda arrived in London in the summer of 1937 and the psychologist Ichheiser escaped from Central Europe around the time of the *Anschluss*. As table 5 shows the New York-based Emergency Committee supported more Austrian refugees, and even more approached this organization for help but did not succeed. Eight Austrians and five double citizens became grantees of the Emergency Committee, compared with 26 Germans. Nearly the same number of Austrians (and double citizens) as Germans approached the American philanthropists but were refused assistance, in most cases because of inadequate academic credentials.¹³ The last line in table 3 indicate the lower rate of received financial help by one of the refugee help organizations if one relates the numbers to the German help seekers. The most astonishing finding is however that a much higher number of émigrés did not even approach the A.A.C. or E.C.

How should one explain these patterns? One part of the story is that the British academic system was not much more favourably inclined to the social sciences than its Austrian counterparts at this time. Few British universities had social science posts even for British citizens, and research units outside the university system were scarce, so that migrants may not have considered looking to Great Britain for employment. Of the 40 Austrian refugee scholars in all disciplines supported by A.A.C. / S.P.S.L. half had left the U.K. for other places, the U.S. in particular, within a year. Those who remained in Britain received only modest financial support (see table 6).

With regard to the social scientists fleeing Austria around the time of *Anschluss* the United Kingdom functioned mostly as a stopover. About twenty former Austrians (including double citizens) remained in the U.K., but 190 migrated to the U.S. (in many cases without even setting their feet on the British Isles), seven ended up in Canada, six remained in Switzerland, and others across the globe.

Nevertheless the moral support given by the officers of the Society, and especially Esther (Tess) Simpson, probably played a crucial role in the decision- making process of refugee scholars. Karl Popper, for example, would not have got his post in New Zealand without her help.

All in all, only 83 of the 412 German-speaking émigré social scientists I studied in detail received help from any of the organizations or schemes established for refugee scholars. The negligible organizational help for the majority of the émigrés from

¹³There is one exemption: Hans Kelsen did not get financial support because he asked for a too high sum.

Austria calls for an explanation. How did the 162 Austrian and double citizens who did not leave any trace in the files of the New York Committee succeed in resettling themselves abroad?

6.

The fate of the émigrés was shaped by several factors. Some were rooted in their earlier lives; others were socio-structural characteristics beyond their individual agency. In trying to understand these, certain features stand out. First of all, one has to take into account the age at which someone had to leave. The younger the individual, the more easily he or she could hope to begin a new life abroad. The average age of the Austrians émigrés was modestly low. Older refugees who had already established their reputation experienced more or less serious difficulties in exile. Otto Neurath, despite his wide networks as organizer of the neo-positivist movement and competences in more than one occupational field lived a very modest life in Oxford. Edgar Zilsel who escaped to New York experienced a second spring as a scholarly writer – he published more papers in exile in a shorter period of time than in two decades in Vienna – but real settlement in the American system was beyond his reach.¹⁴

A second trait that one could label personal openness may have been similar to age in determining the prospects of refugees. What sociologists later on named cosmopolitan orientation – an openness towards new experiences, a willingness to learn something from new surroundings, a cultural pluralism which accepted values and norms from a foreign culture as at least equal – enabled an individual to become the quintessential marginal man: someone capable of seeing both sides of a question. The opposite of cosmopolitanism is localism. That's what émigrés called `beiusniks' [by us –niks] – people who always compared their new environment with the old, and invariably valued the familiar one more highly. A cosmopolitan world view was probably more easily adopted by those who had experienced migrancy before, either personally or via their parents.

Closely related to this world view was the role *Kultur* played for the self-consciousness of refugees. The overwhelming majority of the exiled German and Austrians held classical German literature, music, and the other arts in high esteem. The more they valued their European culture, and in particular the more they thought it superior to the culture of others, the less they could be open to culturally new and different experiences. Yet unless they regarded something in the new cultural environment as intrinsically precious they could not assimilate.¹⁵ Of comparable

¹⁴ Some authors relate his suicide in 1944 to his difficulties in finding an appropriate place in the U.S. but it is always very difficult to attribute a suicide to a single cause.

¹⁵ Telling examples of the opposite attitudes are Alfred Schütz and Theodor W. Adorno. Very early after his coming to New York Schütz wrote to his friend Eric Voegelin that “*unser Europäerhochmut (ist) ganz und gar unangebracht*” (our European arrogance is completely inappropriate) whereas thirty years after his arrival in New York Adorno remembered with disdain his encounters with

relevance to the strength of an individual's ties to his or her former society and its culture was his or her political orientation. It is well known that individuals with strong political beliefs experienced of expulsion with less trauma than those who could not make sense of what had happened. Political convictions change during lifetime, however, and sometimes such a change is followed by a re-interpretation of one's political past. Very often the history remembered in later years had very little to do with the reality. Memories are seldom simply a reflection of the past. Although this makes it difficult for those who want to write history or analyze the experiences of particular groups of individuals, living through turbulent times may encourage modes of reframing and reinterpretation;. For the Jewish refugees of the 1930s and 40s, this feature was counterbalanced by the strength of their Jewish identity and national identity. Those who had not been observant before the rise of Nazism may have continued non-observance after their flight, but if so they had despairingly to accept that their stigmatization and victimization had happened without any chance for agency.

The degree of trauma experienced by individuals may have had an influence on their acculturation after escape but it is not easy to estimate the strength of this as a causal factor. Refugees who experienced persecution personally may have lost all their attachment to their former society and culture, and this may also have happened if their family or friends had been persecuted or killed in the Holocaust. There are many individual memories to support this but we do not have the evidence to generalise this to all cases. Often, the impact of the traumatic experience was counterbalanced by political conviction. Those who opposed the Nazis on political grounds may have been able to come to terms with their personal suffering more easily than those who were deeply committed to German culture; those without political understanding may have experienced the terror more severely than the politically informed. If we consider further that traumatizing experiences change their meaning over time, we must conclude that while trauma played a role we cannot generalise from this in a comparative group analysis because we lack the data needed. Personal degradation and the victimization of people close to one may be connected to other, more readily analyzable life experiences. The loss of a job, differences in income between former occupations and in exile are more readily observable by a historical sociologist than changes in psychology.

As early as 1947 a group of researchers conducted a survey on the assimilation of the immigrants in the U.S.¹⁶ The "Committee for the Study of Recent Immigration from

the American mass culture and conformist academics; see: Alfred Schütz and Eric Voegelin, *Eine Freundschaft, die ein Leben ausgehalten hat. Briefwechsel 1938-1959*, Konstanz: UVK 2004, 58 (letter dated from 23 November 1939) and Theodor W. Adorno, Wissenschaftliche Erfahrungen in Amerika, reprinted in: *Geschichte der Soziologie. Studien zur kognitiven, sozialen und historischen Identität einer Disziplin*, ed. Wolf Lepenies, Vol. 1, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1981, 299-336 (originally 1969).

¹⁶ Davie, Maurice R., *Refugees in America. Report of the Committee for the Study of Recent Immigration from Europe*, New York, London: Harper & Brothers 1947.

Europe” worked closely with the follow-up group of the U.S. Emergency Committee and the published results deserve serious consideration. Their findings about social mobility are astonishing: only 0.8 per cent of the refugees experienced downward mobility, but 36 per cent were reported to be better off in the U.S. than back in Europe (63 per cent reported no occupational changes at all). 67 per cent of male refugee scholars from professional backgrounds of and 52 of the female from the same occupational strata remained in the same occupational category after coming to the U.S.

A more recent survey of the so-called second-wave generation (i.e. individuals who came to the U.S. as children or young adults) reported very similar results. Whereas the 1947 survey investigated the whole refugee population the second focused on the elite refugees, those who made their way up into *Who's Who* and *American Men and Women of Science*.¹⁷ Looked at from the receiving end one has to mention the fact that the United States has always been an immigrant society and finding a place in it depended mostly on individual's effort to assimilate. Table 7 tries to offer a scheme for analyzing the characteristics which may have contributed to this adaptation. One should be able to locate each individual in the “property space”, at least in principle. For simplification I decided to classify each dimension in three ways-: Assimilation is highly probable if one is located in the far right column and it is least probable if one ends up in the right one. Unfortunately lack of data for many of the refugee scholars stopped my analysis before entering the more interesting stage of building a typology that would have offered an opportunity to compare the differing sub-groups of sociologists or social scientists further.

Even without such a typology, however, it is possible to conclude that, within the larger group of German- speaking refugee scholars, the Austrians who finally became sociologists had characteristics that enabled them to succeed after incomparable traumatic experiences. Help from natives in the U.K. and in the U.S. played no minor role but the astonishing achievement stems from the émigrés themselves.

¹⁷ Gerhard Sonnert and Gerald Holton, *What Happened to the Children Who Fled Nazi Persecution*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2006.

Appendix

<See separate file>

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Table 1: Educated classes in Germany, approximate number of victims of the Nazi purge

Profession	overall number	percentage of victims
High School Teachers	37 500	
Protestant Clergymen	37 000	
Doctors	35 000	16%
Higher Civil Servants and Judges	28 000	7%
Lawyers	19 000	21%
University Professors	12 000	25%
Journalists, Writers, Artists	8 000	
Totale	175 500	

or approx. 0,3% of the population

Source: Wehler 2003, 726f.

Table 2: Change in professional groups in Austria 1934 to 1939

Profession	1934	1939	Difference
Doctors	7 368	6 244	-15%
Lawyers, solicitors	5 890	2 263	-61%
Writers, Journalists, etc.	3 103	1 457	-53%
Totale	16 361		

or approx. about 0,2% of the population

Source: Fleck 2004, 235-7.

Table 3: Ratio between Austria and Germany*

For every 100 Germans account for ... Austrians	
Population (1930's)	10
Universities (1930's)	13
Students (1930's)	15
Teaching staff (1930's)	30
Dismissed Professors (1933 and 1938, resp.)	34
Grantees of Emergency Committee (1933 – 1944)	20

Sources: Population: Brian R. Mitchell, *International historical statistics: Europe, 1750-1988*, New York: Stockton Press, 1992;

Universities, students and teaching staff: Hartmut Titze (ed.), *Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte, Bd. 1 Hochschulen*, Teil 1, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1987;

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Grantees of the Emergency Committee: Stephen Duggan and Betty Drury, *The Rescue of Science and Learning. The Story of the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars*, New York: Macmillan 1948, appendix iii, p. 195.

Table 4: Dismissals of Professors in Austria 1938 and Germany after 1933 (approximation, in per cent of each status group)

Status	Vienna	Graz	Innsbruck	Austria, totale	Germany
o. Prof. (full professor)	}37	30	22	}~42	}28
ao. Prof. (associate professor)		25	26		
Dozent	49	13	13	37	37
Others			28		54
All faculty	45	23	19		
N	322	33	32	387	1500
Published approximations for all faculty				~ 37 - 66	20 - 39

Source: my calculation according to: for Vienna Mühlberger (1990); for Graz: Fleck (1985), and for Innsbruck: Oberkofler (1981)

Table 5: Comparison of the book-keeping of refugee social scientists in London and New York

S.P.S.L.	Emergency Committee				Emergency Committee		
	Austrians	Germans	Double Citizens		Austrians	Germans	Double Citizens
List 1936	8	98	16	Grantees	8	26	5
List 1937	0	5	0	Contact	22	49	20
Files	28	?	5	None	188	291	49

Table 6: Amount and length of financial support for Austrian S.P.S.L. grantees (all disciplines) compared with their residency

	Remained in U.K.		Left U.K.	
	≤ £182	> £182	≤ £182	> £182
≤ 1 year	4	0	8	9
> 1 year	12	4	1	1

Table 7: Dimensions influencing the adaptation of refugee scholars towards new environments

DIMENSION: AND OPERATIONALIZATION	PROPERTY SPACE		
Age	old (> 40)	middle (26 – 39)	young (< 25)
Openness: <i>as a personality trait</i>	local		cosmopolitan
Previous migration experience: <i>e.g. leaving Eastern parts of empire</i>	none	parents	oneself
Role of <i>Kultur</i>	deeply rooted		dismissing
Degradation experience, Trauma	prisoner, camp survivor		“voluntary” exiled
Victimization: <i>loss of relatives</i>	high		lower
Jewish identity	achieved after migration	Jewish community	irreligious
Political orientation	exile		break with one’s past
National self: <i>Near the end of one’s life</i>	German	German + X	X (as e.g. American)
Use of German language after emigration	regularly	privately	never
Acculturation: <i>enclave vs. assimilation</i>	living in the “Fourth Reich”		marriage with a native person
Occupation before migration	culturally bounded		none, e.g. students
Income before migration	high	medium	low
Occupational status after emigration	downward mobile	static	upward mobile