

National identity and social inclusion

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Postprint / Postprint

Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article

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Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Bechhofer, F., & McCrone, D. (2008). National identity and social inclusion. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 31(7), 1245-1266. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870701704677>

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
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National Identity and Social Inclusion

Journal:	<i>Ethnic and Racial Studies</i>
Manuscript ID:	RERS-2006-0091.R1
Manuscript Type:	Original Manuscript
Keywords:	national identity, social exclusion, Scotland, Attitudes, cultural markers, England



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ABSTRACT

In terms of our national identity who we are and are judged to be in a particular context depends on how well our claims are regarded by those around us. Being considered not 'one of us' means being an outsider whether one wants to be or not. National identity may lead ultimately to social inclusion or exclusion. Using mainly 2005 survey data, this paper explores cultural markers such as ethnicity, birthplace, residence, accent and ancestry regarding claims to be 'Scottish'. It shows that being born in Scotland enables people to make claims and to have them accepted. Claims to be Scottish by a white and a non-white person on the basis of various markers are received in much the same way. The cultural markers which people use to judge claims represent the raw materials of identity differences with the potential to become the basis of social exclusion under appropriate conditions.

KEYWORDS

National identity; social inclusion; cultural markers; Scotland; England

NATIONAL IDENTITY AND SOCIAL INCLUSION

Background

‘Social identity is a game of ‘playing the vis-à-vis’. Social identity is our understanding of who we are and of who other people are, and, reciprocally, other people’s understanding of themselves and of others (which includes us). Social identity is, therefore, no more essential than meaning; it too is the product of agreement and disagreement; it too is negotiable.’ (Jenkins, 1996:5)

Our interest is in a specific aspect of identity, ‘national’ identity, by which we mean the political-cultural identification with territoryⁱ. Often ‘national’ is taken to be equivalent to ‘state’ but we take a wider view than that here. Thus, one can speak not just of Britishⁱⁱ identity but also of Scottish or Welsh identity as ‘national’ in these terms; they are not necessarily competing or mutually exclusive in the minds of the citizens of the United Kingdom. Terms such as ‘regional’ identity, which clearly carry territorial implications, can have ‘sub-national’ meanings, as well as the capacity to cross over, under the right cultural and political conditions, into ‘national’ identities. It is the negotiability of national identity which interests us, and in this paper our particular focus is the extent to which people can claim an identity and have that claim accepted, even if on the face of it the claim could be questioned.

Let us be quite clear in stating that both our conceptual approach to national identity and the data we have gathered over many years lead us to reject the idea, as discussed for instance by Bauman (1996) that there are no limits to this negotiability

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3 and to argue that it is indeed structured. In this respect national identity clearly differs
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5 from many forms of social identity as some social scientists see it.
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10 Who we are, who we are judged to be, and under what circumstances, depends
11 on how well or badly our claims are judged by those around us, especially significant
12 others who manage national identity. In short, being considered beyond the pale
13 means being an outsider whether one wants to be or not. National identity may then
14 lead to social inclusion or exclusion.
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24 National identity can affect life chances insofar as being considered 'one of us'ⁱⁱⁱ
25 matters as regards our social, political and cultural participation in wider society. This
26 is complex because interest in exclusion and inclusion is generally very much an issue
27 about access to and denial of certain advantages and even rights; in that sense it is a
28 matter of politics and social policy. Who is defined as 'one of us' by the state bears
29 directly on that and is usually a matter of nationality, that is citizenship, rather than
30 national identity *per se*. Nevertheless certain groups, especially ethnic or immigrant
31 groups, may or may not be *entitled* to certain benefits but whether this is widely
32 *accepted* by others may be influenced by how those others see the person's national
33 identity.
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51 **Studying national identity**

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55 Our work is informed by the writings of Erving Goffman (1959) and his interest in
56 'presentation' and 'performance'. Identity, to Goffman, was in large part a tactical
57 construction designed to maximise player advantage in social settings rather than
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3 being something in essence, and we have tried to apply that idea to our studies of
4
5 national identities over the past decade or so. We have written about this as follows:
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10 'There is a complex matrix involving how actors define themselves, how they
11 attribute identity to others, and how, in turn, they think others attribute identity
12 to them. Such an approach helps us to move beyond the more commonly held
13 view that national identity is handed down in the form of a relatively fixed
14 repertoire by power systems, and enables us to focus on how actors negotiate
15 and mobilise identities which are open to them.' (McCrone, 2001:153).
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27 For most people, most of the time, national identity is not seen as having direct
28 and immediate relevance. As the Scottish novelist William McIlvanney nicely
29 observed:
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36 'Having a national identity is a bit like having an old insurance policy. You
37 know you've got one somewhere but often you're not sure where it is. And if
38 you're honest, you would have to admit you're pretty vague about what the
39 small print means' (The Herald, 6th March 1999).
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50 A heightened awareness of national identity may be evident, during wars, or
51 even at sporting occasions, for example, but most of the time, most people take their
52 national identity for granted, as implicit and unproblematic. A previous paper (Kiely
53 et al., 2001) spells out the basis of our approach. People make national identity
54 claims more or less overtly, as well as receiving and assessing those of others. They
55 may also make judgements about others, attributing national identity to them, again
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3 more or less overtly. How claims or attributions are received, assessed, challenged or
4
5 upheld depends crucially upon how identity markers are interpreted. By identity
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7 markers we mean such things as birthplace, ancestry, accent, appearance and dress,
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9 indeed, anything which might be read as an indicator of national identity.
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15 By no means all markers are easily read or indeed accessible to others. For
16
17 example, where you are born is not something which others can read off external
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19 signs, though they might interpret language and accent as indicative of where you
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21 were born and, crucially, brought up. They might be quite wrong in their
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23 interpretation although the error may have real consequences. Having an 'English'
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25 accent may or may not indicate that you were born and brought up in England.
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27 Wearing a kilt may or may not be a claim to be Scottish. Furthermore, some markers
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29 can be changed (how you speak, what you wear), while others can not (such as where
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31 you were born), although it is open to people to tell it otherwise at the risk of being
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33 found out.
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42 As well as identity markers, there are also identity rules, probabilistic rules of
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44 thumb whereby under certain conditions and in particular contexts, identity markers
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46 are 'read', interpreted, combined, or given precedence over others. Identity rules are
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48 rough guidelines which are not necessarily definitive or unambiguous, but which offer
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50 rules of thumb in making judgements about others, on the assumption that others play
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52 more or less by the same shared understandings of the same set of rules. Rules will
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54 operate according to different social situations and according to who is making
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56 judgements and for which purposes. Not all rules, nor judges of rules, are equal.
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60 Nevertheless, if social life is to be possible and predictable, people have to make

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3 claims, attributions and judgements on the rough assumption that others share their
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5 understanding.
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10 Over the last decade and more, we have explored, mainly through in-depth
11 interviews but also surveys, what sense people make of markers and rules of national
12 identity. Because of its usually implicit nature it is difficult to study how people
13 construct, for themselves and others, a sense of national identity. Accordingly we
14 have chosen to do research in contexts where national identity is seen to matter, or
15 where it is ambiguous, or problematic, accepting that these contexts are not typical,
16 but that they help to highlight what is normally taken for granted. We have found it
17 useful to move between interviews and survey-type questions to get additional
18 purchase on the question of who does or does not count as 'one of us'. While it is
19 fairly straightforward to see how people stack up individual identity markers (for
20 example, in our different studies using different methodologies birth seems to be a
21 key marker, followed by ancestry, residence, accent and so on), important issues
22 emerge about how these interact. If, for example, someone is born in a place but has
23 parents who were not, or speaks with the 'wrong' accent, do they count as 'one of
24 us'? Are markers cumulative so that the more you have the better your claim, or will
25 one marker trump all, and if so, which?
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50 **The aim of this paper**

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55 These studies have given us a fairly firm grasp on the processes involved in the
56 claiming and attributing of national identity and the acceptance of these claims in
57 various contexts. In this paper we address a more tightly focused question. Using
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3 mainly survey data we explore the boundaries to the acceptance or rejection of posited
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5 claims by two rather different groups, the English in Scotland, and the Scots in
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8 England, that is, the boundaries to social inclusion and exclusion of these two groups
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10 in the two contexts. We shall necessarily focus more on the former group because our
11
12 data come primarily from the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2005 which carried a
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14 module, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, which we specially
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16 designed for the purpose although we also refer to the British Social Attitudes Survey,
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20 2003.

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25 These data break new ground in two ways. Although our previous work has
26
27 permitted us to infer what these boundaries are, we have never before asked
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29 respondents direct, tailor-made questions addressing the issue. Secondly, while we
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31 remain of the view that qualitative approaches are best for teasing out the subtleties of
32
33 the *processes* involved, we wish to assess the proportions of a sample holding various
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35 views and their social characteristics. Knowing these quantitative parameters enables
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37 us to move forward with greater confidence even while we acknowledge the
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39 limitations of survey methodology in this area.
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47 There is one obvious disadvantage in using these survey data. The studies
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49 reveal how people respond in principle, rather than how they *actually* behave in real
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51 life situations. Only fieldwork over an extended period can observe processes of
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53 inclusion and exclusion in practice. We are then concerned with who is and who is
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55 not taken to be 'one of us' in terms of national identity, but in principle not in practice
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57 because we have no data on social action as such. No-one is advantaged or
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60 disadvantaged by being thought 'one of us' or not in a survey, but it does give us an

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3 indication as to where the boundaries lie. These are in a sense the boundaries created
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5 by 'prejudice', and 'prejudice' must always be distinguished from discrimination, but
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7 it is significant because under some conditions these 'prejudices' create boundaries
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9 which can be translated into action, and we shall return to how this might occur in the
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11 conclusion to the paper.
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17 One factor clearly related, at least in principle, to these 'prejudices' is 'race', and
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19 whether or not non-white persons are seen as 'one of us' is of great practical
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21 significance as well as being conceptually important. In Scotland, while racism is
22
23 undoubtedly present, the much smaller proportions of ethnic minorities gives salience
24
25 to national identity. Issues of 'race' and ethnicity interact with those of nationality,
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27 put crudely with anti-Englishness, characterised by The Economist as 'the growth of
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29 an unattractive, albeit mild, Anglophobia' (20th May 2006). Some argue that, perhaps
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31 in the absence of sufficient non-white persons, Scots take it out on the English
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33 especially in the context of sport, for instance in the heightened atmosphere
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35 surrounding the World Cup. Thus the acting director of the Commission for Racial
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37 Equality commented:
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45 'The Tartan Army pride themselves on their lack of xenophobia and their
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47 relationships with fans from other nations. However, there's an all too
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49 common misperception that racism only occurs where people are visibly
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51 different. In fact, racism occurs when any person is stereotyped, harassed or
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53 discriminated against on the basis of their colour, race, ethnic or national
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55 identity.' (CRE, 2nd June, 2006)
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4 To what extent is it correct to conflate anti-Englishness and racism? Hussain
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6 and Miller have done valuable survey work on what they term ‘anglophobia’ and
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8 islamophobia’, on the grounds that the former is targeted at the largest ‘invisible’
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10 minority in Scotland (more than 400,000) and the latter at the largest ‘visible’
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12 minority (over 40,000 Muslims, of whom three-quarters are ethnic Pakistanis [2001
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14 census data]). They concluded that among native-born Scots 49 per cent are
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16 islamophobic^{iv}, a marginally greater proportion than anglophobic (38 per cent)^v.
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18 Valuable though this work is, it does not tease out the interactions between ‘race’ and
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20 nationality. If, for example, someone is a non-white incomer born in England and
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22 living in Scotland, are they more or less likely to be accepted if they claim to be
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24 ‘Scottish’ than a similar person who is white?
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32 **The present study**

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36 What then is the basis on which the host population would make such decisions of
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38 inclusion and exclusion; in other words, what are the markers they might use, such as
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40 skin colour, accent, birthplace – both of the person and/or their parents?^{vi} We have
41
42 begun to examine these issues in the Scottish and British Social Attitudes Surveys.
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44 The SSA and BSA 2003 surveys carried broadly equivalent questions of a very
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46 straightforward sort asking people to make judgements about those living
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48 permanently in a country who had not been born there, Scots living in England, and
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50 the English in Scotland. The SSA 2005 carried the more extensive module referred to
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52 above^{vii}. In what follows we analyse the data from these questions, which to the best
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54 of our knowledge are unique and have never been asked before anywhere.
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3 The sample sizes involved in the tables are very large, and as a result it is very easy
4 for the comparisons discussed in the text to achieve statistical significance (indeed
5 almost any comparison will do this even if it has no substantive significance). We
6 have tested significance using chi-squared tests in all the Tables which follow. Given
7 the sample sizes, what is highly significant substantively is that, as we shall show, in a
8 few places where we emphasise the lack of difference, the statistical analysis supports
9 this.

10 We start with the straightforward issue of whether permanent residence, which
11 perhaps implies a certain commitment, can support a national identity claim if the
12 person cannot appeal to place of birth, which we know from previous work is the
13 most important single identity marker. The question is as follows (the version for
14 Scottish respondents is first):

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34 'I'd like you to think of someone who was born in England [Scotland] but now lives
35 permanently in Scotland [England] and said they were Scottish [English].

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41 - Do you think most people would consider them to be Scottish [English]?

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46 - And do you think you would consider them to be Scottish [English]?'
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51 TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE
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55 It is clear that the responses in England and Scotland are broadly similar. For
56 English and Scottish respondents alike, it seems that nationality is indeed conferred
57 by place of birth above all.
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6 Only around a third of respondents believe most people are willing to accept
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8 such a claim. Respondents in England take the same position on the second question,
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10 albeit respondents in Scotland are rather more willing to accept such claims when
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12 asked about their own views.
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17 We know from previous work that accent is an important marker. Having an
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19 English or Scottish accent suggests that a person has at least been brought up in the
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21 country, and may indeed have been born there although we shall present below some
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23 qualitative evidence that being non-white plays strongly against this. Accent is a
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25 readily discernible marker in interaction; birth and upbringing are not. Accordingly
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27 we moved on to ask about individuals with a particular accent and also introduced
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29 'race' into the question in the form of a dichotomy between white and non-white.
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36 Respondents living in Scotland were asked:
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41 'And now think of a non-white person living in Scotland who spoke with a Scottish
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43 accent and said they were Scottish.
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48 - Do you think most people would consider them to be Scottish?
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53 - And do you think you would consider them to be Scottish?
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57 Respondents living in England were asked analogous questions as follows:
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3 'And now think of a non-white person living in England who spoke with a English
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6 accent and said they were English.
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10 - Do you think most people would consider them to be English?
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15 - And do you think you would consider them to be English?'
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22 TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE
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27 Once more, the similarities between the two countries are striking. Scotland is
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29 neither a more liberal nor a less liberal place than England on the basis of these
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31 responses. When questions assessing liberal or less liberal views are asked, people
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33 frequently regard themselves as more open and tolerant than 'most people' and so it is
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35 here^{viii}. Whereas less than half thought 'most people' would accept the nationality
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37 claim of non-white persons, over two-thirds say they would do so themselves.
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41 Whichever question one takes, however, 'race' has a clear bearing on inclusion and
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43 exclusion with half to one-third of the respondents taking what might be seen as an
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45 'exclusionary' position^{ix}. Clearly, respondents are unwilling to infer from the accent
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47 that such persons possessed the stronger marker of having been born or at least
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49 brought up in the country.
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55 We can draw on our previous intensive interviews^x in Scotland to assess
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57 whether people in Scotland think 'race' is an important marker of being Scottish.
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3 Consider this comment from an 'outsider', an English-born migrant living in
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5 Glasgow:
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10 I: Do you think that being white is a very prominent marker of being Scottish?
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12 GM32: Yeah, I think it is and I think it shouldn't be. I'm not happy that it's that way.
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14 But again it's not something that you notice until you are faced with someone who
15 isn't white. Meeting someone who is ethnically Chinese with a Scottish accent was
16 like a revelation, because he didn't look like he sounded. And I found it quite hard, he
17 called himself Scottish and he wore kilts and he did Scottish things and he looked
18 Chinese. And it took a bit to adjust to it. Whereas if he'd said I'm British I would
19 have said 'yeah, fine'. But he said 'I'm Scottish' and I thought 'Oh no you're not'.
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29 I: Almost that, I don't know, the colour of skin would be seen as contradictory to
30 that.
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33 GM32: Yeah, but the accent was what really threw me and the kilt, that was too
34 much... If I see a white person who says that they are Scottish I don't think about it all
35 I just accept it. If I see someone with a different colour who says that they are
36 Scottish I do think about it.
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46 Do Scottish 'nationals', people born in Scotland, agree with this incomer? Here are
47 three brief examples by way of illustration:
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52 I: Do you think that being white is still seen as a very strong indicator of being
53 Scottish?
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56 GN16/2: well, yeah, I mean the chances are, in Glasgow, if you see a white guy,
57 he's going to be Scottish. And the chances are, in Glasgow, if you see an Asian guy,
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3 he's going to be Scottish, probably born here, etc., ... But that doesn't mean to say
4
5 that he feels Scottish.
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10 And another:

11 I: So bound up within a sense of being Scottish is almost implicitly being white?

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13 CN09: I was trying to avoid the word, coloured, but that is possibly true. But I've
14
15 been in Indian restaurants and the waitress has a good strong Glasgow accent but it's
16
17 obvious what her origins are. I'm quite sure she considers herself Scottish. I've seen
18
19 people like that interviewed on television saying that 'I'm British', 'I'm English',
20
21 'I'm Scottish', they might see themselves but a third person might say different.
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29 And a third:

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31 CN10: I would say that it probably, second, third, fourth generation Asians, with
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33 broad Glasgow accents would find it much more difficult to be considered Scottish
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35 although I personally would not consider them un-Scottish but just the very fact that
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37 they have different skin colour would actually identify them as having non-Scottish
38
39 roots and I think that would carry on. Whereas white Nordic settlers or white English
40
41 settlers would probably be integrated by the time their dialect changed.
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45 I: So in the case of English people coming into Scotland, over time ...?

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47 CN10: Their children would certainly be integrated through their language
48
49 whereas...because they don't have that discernible difference in skin colour.
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55 So, what are the views of someone born in Scotland who is not white, the
56
57 subject of these remarks?
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3 I: It's sort of taken for granted that if you're not white, you can't possibly be
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6 Scottish?

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8 GN48 (respondent's father from West Africa): Yeah, even though I've got the accent,
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10 they just assume that I've not been here for long and for some reason that irritates me
11
12 too but then it's like if I was to meet someone who was Italian, I would probably do
13
14 the exact same thing. So I'd say, but I wouldn't presume, I wouldn't say 'how long
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16 have you been here for?' I'd probably ask them questions to find out but then, in a
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18 way, you sort of presume that they weren't born and bred here.
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25 It is clear that respondents in a non-formal, qualitative interview are well able
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27 to distinguish between their own personal views and those they attribute to 'most
28
29 people'; what their motivations are for so doing is another matter. The views of the
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31 non-white person about being Scottish are in line with the survey results. There are
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33 also important questions of ancestry ('...second, third, fourth generation Asians...');
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35 of speech (... 'good strong Glasgow accent ...'); and of forms of dress and
36
37 deportment ('... he wore kilts and did Scottish things ...'). They also, by and large,
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39 provide further evidence that it is harder for non-white people to claim to be Scottish
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41 than white people. 'Race' is something of a barrier to inclusion.
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50 Are these views borne out by more detailed and systematic survey work?
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52 What happens when we ask people to make judgements about other people's claims
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54 to be Scottish, based not only on birthplace and residence said to be known to the
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56 respondent, but also on accent and 'race'? We designed a more extensive suite of
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58 questions which was included in the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey for 2005, but
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3 not in the British Social Attitudes Survey, so we cannot make comparisons between
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5 Scotland and England.
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10 When asked about a non-white person possessing all the relevant markers, that
11 is, someone who lives in Scotland, was born there, and speaks with a Scottish accent,
12 nine out of ten people would accept such a non-white person's claim to be Scottish.
13 Introducing certainty about place of birth raises the proportion considerably from
14 seven out of ten (see above). This leaves one in ten who would not accept such a
15 claim. The question has never been asked, but it is safe to assume that close to 100 per
16 cent would accept the claim if the person were white so there is some slight
17 exclusionary bias against the non-white 'Scot'.
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31 We then asked a sequence of questions about persons all living in Scotland but
32 born in England. We varied their 'race' (white or non-white) and their accent
33 (Scottish or English) to produce data on the degree of acceptance of their claim to be
34 Scottish. The data are as follows:
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TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

Are people in Scotland generally less inclined to accept a non-white person's claim compared with that of a white person? Comparing Person A with person B suggests that in aggregate people in Scotland make very little difference between white and non-white persons' claims to be Scottish, holding birth, residence and accent constant. In fact, a majority (55 per cent and 57 per cent respectively) would reject such claims, but a substantial minority would accept them. If we compare these

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3 figures with those which came from a different survey in Table 2 we see that the
4
5 accent makes little difference; birth trumps all.
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10 How consistent are respondents in the relative weight they give to birth or
11 accent? We have here collapsed the four categories into two, combining the first two
12 rows and the third and fourth rows. The largest proportion (45 per cent) would accept
13 the claim of neither the white nor the non-white respondent (for them the criterion of
14 birth is crucial) although a third (32 per cent) would accept both; 12 per cent would
15 accept the claim of the white person but not that of the non-white person; and
16
17 virtually the same proportion (11 per cent) would do the reverse. Overall, then, the
18 association is strong; the decision to rank birth above accent or vice-versa is largely
19 independent of 'race'^{xi}.
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34 What happens if we remove the countervailing pressure of a Scottish accent?
35 Looking at the figures for Person C in Table 5 compared with person D we find once
36 more that there is little difference in judgements about white and non-white persons,
37 but as one would expect, the claim which, at least explicitly, now has no marker to
38 support it, is more strongly rejected in both cases^{xii}. We can only guess that the small
39 proportion of people accepting the claim make the assumption that the person has
40 some valid reason to make it, such as Scottish ancestry. Cross-tabulating these
41 responses we find that over 80 per cent would reject the claims of both white and non-
42 white persons to be Scottish on these criteria. Seven per cent would accept the claim
43 of a white person but not that of a non-white person; three per cent accept the non-
44 white claim but not the white one; eight per cent accept both. Once more, we cannot
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3 conclude that 'race' makes an appreciable difference as to whether one is accepted or
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5 not as Scottish^{xiii}.
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10 It is possible to isolate the effect on a claim of accent as a marker of
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12 Scottishness, holding 'race', birthplace and residence constant by comparing first
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14 Person A with person C and then Person B with Person D in Table 5. The claim of a
15
16 non-white person having a Scottish accent would be accepted by 42 per cent as
17
18 opposed to 11 per cent if they had an English accent. The corresponding figures for
19
20 the equivalent white persons are 44 per cent and 15 per cent. Having a Scottish
21
22 accent makes a significant contribution to having one's claim to be a Scot accepted. In
23
24 each case, the differential is around 30 percentage points, suggesting that, notionally,
25
26 accent matters independently of 'race', birth and residence. It is possible that
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28 respondents are treating accent as some sort of proxy for being brought up in a
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30 country other than that in which the person was born. In other words, respondents
31
32 may be assuming that despite being born in England, having a Scottish accent
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34 suggests the person has lived in Scotland from an early age. If they further surmise
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36 that their parents were temporarily in England and returned, they may be reading even
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38 more into the accent, to wit ancestry.
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48 We can test the relative strengths of Scottish birthplace, accent and ancestry
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50 by a further set of questions. None of these hypothetical persons presented to the
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52 respondents have lived for any length of time in Scotland so cannot claim to be
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54 Scottish on grounds of residence. The first relies purely on accent to establish the
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56 claim; the second lacks the accent and relies purely on the marker of place of birth;
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3 the third lacks the accent and the marker of place of birth and relies purely on
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5 ancestry.
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10 (a) Thinking of someone who you knew had never lived for any length of time in
11 Scotland and claimed to be Scottish, would you accept that they were Scottish if they
12 had a Scottish accent?
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16 (b) And would you accept that they were Scottish if they did not have a Scottish
17 accent but told you they had been born in Scotland?
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20 (c) And would you accept that they were Scottish if they did not have a Scottish
21 accent and were not born in Scotland but told you they had Scottish parents?
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29 TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
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31 Birthplace is a much more important marker than either accent or ancestry.
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33 While 39 per cent are willing to validate a claim made on accent alone, and 38 per
34 cent on ancestry, almost double that (75 per cent) would do so if it were made on the
35 basis of birthplace alone.
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43 Let us now summarise these findings before continuing.
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48 Finding 1: In both England and Scotland, someone living there but born in the ‘other
49 country’ and claiming to be English / Scottish will have their claim rejected by two
50 thirds of our respondents. Birth outweighs residence, other things being equal. Indeed
51 it is perhaps surprising that one third would accept the claim.
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3 Finding 2: A non-white person living in England / Scotland with an English / Scottish
4 accent and claiming an appropriate identity will, in the absence of other markers, have
5 the claim rejected by one third of our respondents and they believe around half of
6 people in general would do this. Residence and accent together do not ensure
7 acceptance. It is likely that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a substantial
8 number of people assume such a person was not born in Scotland and probably are
9 more likely to assume this in the case of non-whites. This is a more likely explanation
10 than racism in the light of Finding 4.
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24 Finding 3: If this non-white person was born in Scotland however, 90 per cent of
25 respondents would accept the claim. Birth, residence and accent combine to make a
26 claim generally acceptable even for a non-white person. We say 'even' because it is
27 pretty safe to assume that a claim to be Scottish by a white person with these markers
28 would be accepted by virtually everyone.
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39 Finding 4: Living in Scotland and speaking with a Scottish accent but being born in
40 England renders the claim unacceptable to over 55 per cent of respondents whether
41 the person is white or non-white. The weight accorded to residence and accent is thus
42 considerably reduced if it is certain the person was born in the 'other' country.
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51 Finding 5: Should these persons, be they white or non-white, have an English accent
52 the credibility of their claim declines further sharply and becomes unacceptable to
53 close on 90 per cent of our respondents. Residence alone is then the basis for a very
54 weak claim.
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3 Finding 6: Introducing parents' nationality shows that birthplace as ever is a much
4 more important marker than accent but also than ancestry which carries no greater
5 weight than accent.
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12 Put briefly, to be born in Scotland enables people, both white and non-white,
13 to claim to be Scottish with little fear that the person receiving this claim will not
14 accept it. Qualitative interviews in our earlier work suggest that in practice identity
15 claims are seldom challenged openly^{xiv}. Many people say something to the effect that
16 'if that's what they want to say, fine, and I wouldn't argue about it but I don't accept
17 it'. Residence and accent play their part, and in the absence of any evidence of
18 birthplace, together ensure that a majority will accept a claim to be Scottish. A claim
19 based solely on residence, however, is unlikely to be accepted especially if the person
20 was born in England; if they have an English accent and thus were probably not
21 brought up in Scotland the claim is not sustainable.
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39 **The New Scots**

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43 This last finding raises a nice political issue. The Scottish Executive is keen to
44 encourage people from other countries, especially in the EU, to come to live and work
45 in Scotland, and over time, if they stay, become fully integrated into Scottish society.
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48 The Scottish National Party is hopeful that, especially if they achieve Independence, a
49 more civic definition of Scottishness will become widely accepted. Both the Scottish
50 Executive (2004) and the SNP have tried to promote such claims, with the SNP
51 actively pressing their 'New Scots' strategy (<http://www.snp.org/independence>). The
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3 evidence of the reception of claims made by people born in England or with an
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5 English accent should then give pause for thought.
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10 We asked: 'If people from other countries come to Scotland to live and work, and
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12 choose to live here, then they are entitled to describe themselves as Scottish if they
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14 want to'. The results are shown in Table 7
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18 TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
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20 As many as one-third agree that such people are entitled to call themselves Scottish if
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22 they want to, and only just over 1 in 10 strongly disagree. This is at first glance a
23
24 somewhat surprising result in the light of many of our findings, but it is broadly in
25
26 line with the results reported in Table 1 where similar figures were given when it was
27
28 stated the person had been born in England but no reference was made to accent. It
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30 may also be influenced by the tendency for people to be willing to allow folk to say
31
32 what they like even if they don't accept it if asked directly. Nevertheless, one third
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34 agreeing with the statement cannot be said to constitute resounding support for the
35
36 'New Scots' policy. The overwhelming importance of place of birth suggests that
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38 being Scottish still has a strong 'ethnic' rather than a 'civic' basis^{xv}. Who, then, is
39
40 more likely to accept the idea of the 'New Scots', as illustrated by this question? Men
41
42 are more likely to agree than women (38 per cent to 28 per cent), middle class people
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44 marginally more than working class people (38 per cent to 33 per cent), but there is
45
46 little age differential. Unsurprisingly, the more educated you are, the more likely you
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48 are to accept 'new Scots' (43 per cent of those with HE qualifications compared with
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50 31 per cent of people with no school qualifications). Party identification makes a
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52 difference, with Liberal Democrats (40 per cent) and Labour identifiers (37 per cent)
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54 slightly more willing to agree than either Conservatives (29 per cent) or SNP
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3 identifiers (30 per cent)^{xvi}. How does the national identity of respondents affect their
4
5 view of ‘New Scots’? Again unsurprisingly, only a quarter of those identifying
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7 themselves as ‘Scottish not British’ would accept such claims, compared with around
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9 one-third of those saying they think of themselves as more Scottish than British, or
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11 equally Scottish and British and 41 per cent of those prioritising their Britishness. On
12
13 the other hand, such a differential is absent as regards constitutional preferences, with
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15 33 per cent of people supporting Independence agreeing, compared with 34 per cent
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17 of those supporting Devolution, but only 26 per cent of those preferring the ‘no
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19 parliament’ option.
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27 **Conclusion**

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32 We said earlier in this paper that we would explore the boundaries to social inclusion
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34 and exclusion of the English in Scotland, and the Scots in England, with the emphasis
35
36 on the former group; examine the relative weight given to various markers of national
37
38 identity; and see whether ‘race’ in the form of being white or non-white was an
39
40 important marker. Most of the data we have presented come from questions we placed
41
42 in the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2005, and are by far the most extensive and
43
44 systematic survey material addressing these questions to have been collected in
45
46 Britain albeit referring only to Scotland^{xvii}. Qualitative work suggests that people in
47
48 Scotland, as well as Scots-born living in England, have more practised and explicit
49
50 ways of talking about being Scottish, compared with people south of the border. On
51
52 the other hand, we know that people in England are not indifferent to questions of
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54 national identity albeit they have somewhat different ways of talking about it (Condor
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56 et al., 2006). One is not ‘better’ than the other, merely different. Identity talk in
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3 England may be unusually implicit compared with other 'national' identities, and
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5 more likely to make use of locality tropes, but we are here concerned with responses
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7 to questions outlining fairly simple and explicit scenarios.
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12 The data presented strongly reinforce our extensive qualitative work over
13
14 more than decade on the markers and rules of national identity (Kiely et al., 2001;
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16 2005a; 2005b; 2006). Place of birth is overwhelmingly the marker which convinces
17
18 those to whom a claim is made and leads to its acceptance. In every day social
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20 interaction, however, place of birth is frequently not known, and claims are assessed
21
22 using markers such as accent, and place of residence. The former permits a fairly
23
24 strong claim which ranks with having Scottish parents in situations where that is
25
26 known. Residence is a weak marker on which to make a claim and adds little to
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28 accent where both are known, although we know from our qualitative work that
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30 residence over a fairly lengthy period, coupled with an expressed commitment to
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32 Scotland, can make for a strong claim to be 'considered' Scottish, to be an adopted
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34 Scot.
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44 What of the impact of 'race'? In Scotland, the claims to be Scottish on the
45
46 basis of the various markers by a white and non-white person are received in much
47
48 the same way. This finding puts the comments by the Commission for Racial Equality
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50 cited earlier in an interesting light. It seems that not to be born in Scotland, and
51
52 especially to be born in England is a greater barrier to inclusion than to be non-white.
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54 How are we to interpret this? To be considered Scottish is a special form of inclusion,
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56 and we have no evidence that those excluded in these terms would be denied access to
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58 public services or would be significantly discriminated against. Exclusion of those
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3 from England generally takes the form of casual and often joking prejudice,
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5 experienced, for instance, at times of sporting events. Their civic rights seem unlikely
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7 to be affected, at least for the moment. In the light of grave and realistic concerns
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9 about racism in Britain generally, it might even be regarded as encouraging that to be
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11 non-white rather than white has so little effect on acceptance as Scottish, the aspect of
12
13 life where one might expect prejudice to be most apparent^{xviii}. Yet, in the light of
14
15 constitutional change, and the emphasis on the 'New Scots' referred to earlier, this
16
17 fairly low level of prejudice is not without significance. Does any of this really
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19 matter? Yes, because the issue of territorial identity is not simply a word game with
20
21 little connection to social life. Who we think 'we' are, and who 'we' are not, may
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23 matter, or may come to matter, not in terms of casual and often unthinking prejudice,
24
25 but in terms of social and political action. Markers like the sort we have discussed
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27 here represent something of the raw materials which are available to people to make
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29 sense of social life. History tells us that simply to think that others are different on
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31 the basis of some putative physical or social characteristics can make a difference in
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33 practice, and sometimes with cataclysmic consequences.
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43 We take issue with the view that identity is mere talk, or in the jargon, a
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45 discourse, if by that we mean it has little or no connection to social action. Talk is a
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47 prelude to action, without automatically generating it. On the one hand, people may
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49 act and only then, if at all, make sense of what they have done, in other words,
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51 construct or adopt a narrative to make sense of their actions. On the other hand, one
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53 can get people to try to articulate identity and the process of identification in the
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55 abstract, as we have done here using fairly straightforward survey questions. We are
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57 confident that what we have found is robust, and that we have not put identity words
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3 in people's mouths if only because we have derived questions and understandings
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5 from in-depth interview material prior to this, and sought to relate one to the other.
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10 The key issue, however, is not so much the raw, combustible, materials, but the
11 spark which sets them alight. In other words, cultural and social differences per se are
12 not enough to create a conflagration. What really matters is how they are mobilised,
13 by whom and for what purposes; in short, the conditions for social and political
14 action. There are gatekeepers, most obviously the state, who decide who is or is not a
15 'national', whether they are entitled to benefits and opportunities as befits 'one of us'.
16 There are cultural entrepreneurs, such as political parties and ethnic organisations,
17 who help to give shape to identity: in other words, a repertoire with action in mind.
18 This is by no means pre-ordained. Identity groups, like social movements, do not lie
19 around waiting to be discovered, and to spring fully formed into action. As Thomas
20 Eriksen, commenting on relations in the former Yugoslavia, observed:
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39 'Ethnic boundaries, dormant for decades, were activated; presumed cultural
40 differences which had been irrelevant for two generations were suddenly
41 'remembered' and invoked as proof that it was impossible for the two groups
42 to live side by side. It is only when they *make a difference* in interaction that
43 cultural differences are important in the creation of ethnic boundaries.'
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50 (1993:39)
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55 What is key to this activation process is that these differences must be socially
56 relevant. In other words, 'it must have some goods to deliver – material, political or
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3 symbolic – and these goods must be perceived as valuable by the target group’ (ibid:
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5 76).
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11 What are the implications for what we have been writing about here, namely, the
12 cultural markers of being Scottish? We have been exploring a number of such
13 markers which people have used to make sense of being Scottish and to assess the
14 claims of others to be ‘one of them’; largely abstract devices which they articulate in
15 matter-of-fact ways as they explore some of the boundaries of national identity. They
16 are probably sustained in the day-to-day dialogues people have with each other, in the
17 course of which they make judgements about people, who they are, what kind of
18 person they are and whether they belong or not. They represent the raw materials of
19 identity differences which are, by and large, not politically or emotionally charged.
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32 What are the implications of our findings for the relationship between Scottish
33 nationalism, national identity and racism? We reiterate that we are dealing with
34 expressed attitudes and not with people’s actual behaviour, and as such we would not
35 deny that acts of racial discrimination in Scotland exist. Birthplace is the key identity
36 marker in terms of whether or not someone is thought to be Scottish, and that includes
37 non-whites as well as whites. Scottish nationalism does not imply a racial criterion
38 for social acceptance, and it is striking that there is an absence of political
39 mobilisation on issues of ‘race’ in Scotland, reflected in the fact that the British
40 National Party consistently loses its deposits at elections. There is party political
41 consensus that there is a perceived demographic deficit north of the border, and that
42 encouraging immigration is necessary for the future economic health of Scotland.
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58 More generally, our work shows that the connections between national identity,
59 party political preferences, and views about how Scotland should be governed
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3 constitutionally, are surprisingly weak. For them to begin to align, let alone become a
4
5 basis for action, would require a process of mobilisation and politicisation in the
6
7 widest sense. If, for example, political parties and the media, within Scotland but
8
9 crucially in England, play up identity differences as both the cause and effect of
10
11 competition for resources - does Scotland have more than its share of identifiable
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13 public expenditure, should Scottish MPs vote on what are perceived purely 'English'
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15 matters - then we might begin to see the politicisation of 'national' differences on a
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17 scale not yet seen in the history of the British Union.
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25 Notes

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28 ⁱ We use the term 'territory' here as a neutral signifier that 'nations' normally are
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30 bounded in space. The concept of 'nation' is for us then imbued with boundaries,
31
32 imputed cultural distinctiveness and the (political) right of self-determination.
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35 ⁱⁱ Strictly there should also be some phrase such as UK identity but many people
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37 in Britain would regard this as irrelevant.
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40 ⁱⁱⁱ The phrase 'one of us' entered the British political lexicon with Mrs Thatcher. In
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42 his book of the same name, the political journalist Hugo Young observed: 'Is he one
43
44 of us?' The question, posed by Mrs Thatcher herself, became one of the emblematic
45
46 themes of the Thatcher years. (Young, 1989 p.vii)
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48

49 ^{iv} Sociologists might raise an eyebrow at the quasi-psychiatric or social-psychological
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51 concept of anglophobia or islamophobia but the data are striking.
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54 ^v Hussain and Miller constructed indexes of Islamophobia and Anglophobia by taking
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56 the averages across five questions of the percentages holding negative views of
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58 Muslims and English immigrants respectively. (Hussain and Miller, 2006 p.172)
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vi We must stress again that we cannot rigorously infer from these attitudinal data how people will behave in practice .

vii The Scottish Social Attitudes survey for 2003 and the English equivalent in British Social Attitudes 2003 had achieved sample sizes of 1508 and 1929 respectively. The fieldwork for Scottish Social Attitudes 2005 (achieved sample 1549) ran between July and December 2005. The surveys involve a face-to-face interview with each respondent and a self-completion questionnaire. The half-module of questions carried by Scottish Social Attitudes survey 2005 was funded by ESRC to whom we are grateful. Questions on national identity in SSA 2003 and BSA 2003 were funded jointly by ESRC and The Leverhulme Trust. The survey is carried out by the National Centre for Social Research and its associated body the Scottish Centre for Social Research.

viii Comparing the results within each country, rather than between them, gives a statistically significant ch-square at the .001 level.

ix One might expect that white and non-white respondents might give different responses to these questions. Unfortunately, in nationally representative samples, the numbers of non-white persons (as self-assessed by respondents in BSA) are inevitably small, and only in England does one get a manageable sample (N=306 for people living in England in BSA 2003). Non-whites over-estimate the prejudice by 'most people' against 'non-whites living in England with English accents' (chi-squared of 12.5 is significant at the .001 level), but are indeed themselves more likely to accept non-white claims than are whites (chi-squared is significant at the .05 level).

x We are grateful to Richard Kiely for suggesting these observations drawn from the interviews he carried out for the research programme on National Identity and Constitutional Change, funded by The Leverhulme Trust between 2000 and 2005.

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^{xi} Chi-squared with 1 d.f. is 414; significant at the .001 level.

^{xii} This is a classic example of how, if the sample size is large enough, statistical significance may be achieved with little substantive significance. To be sure there is a slightly greater tendency to accept the claims of the hypothetical white as against the non-white person, but what is sociologically significant is that the claims of both are rejected.

^{xiii} Chi-squared with 1 d.f. is 498; significant at the .001 level.

^{xiv} The following quote suggests that although a Scottish national may not conceive of Scottishness in a belonging sense, some would not, by and large, publicly challenge it. C17: “Become Scots? I would say no, myself, but there are certain people I’ve met, from other countries, that they just seem to fall in love with Scotland and they’ve been here for quite a few years and they like to sort of think thersel’ as Scots and I wouldnae knock that. I would accept it but I think deep down, I would accept it to their face but I think deep down I would say to masel’ ‘well he wants to be Scots, he loves it up here’ and I wouldnae knock but he’ll never be Scots.”

^{xv} We are using ‘ethnic’ here to refer to what Anthony Smith has called ‘myths of ancestry and kinship’ in juxtaposition to ‘civic’ which evokes the nation as a ‘territorially bounded, sovereign legal-political community’, and hence is based on residence (Smith, 2006). We are aware that this distinction is contested in the literature on nationalism.

^{xvi} If we collapse the responses into agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree, suitably categorise the independent variables and apply a chi-squared test, all these comparisons are significant at the .001 level except age ($p < .01$).

^{xvii} We have obtained a large grant from the Leverhulme Trust to commission extensive comparative survey work in three locales: the Scottish Highlands & Islands,

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5 Scotland and Britain as a whole. A module on national identity, which develops
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7 further the approach reported here, is to be included in both the Scottish and the
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9 British Social Attitudes Surveys in 2006 and 2008.
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11 ^{xviii} It would be naïve on the basis of these findings to downplay such racism as
12
13 undoubtedly exists in Scotland but it does reinforce a popular view that it figures less
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15 prominently than in England. It is worth observing that Hussain and Miller's findings
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17 on Islamophobia relate to perceptions of Islam and of Muslims rather than non-
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19 whiteness.
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TABLES

Table 1: Acceptance of Claim to be English/Scottish by person born in
Scotland/England & living in England/Scotland (most people)

(‘most people’)	England %	Scotland %	England %)	Scotland %
Definitely would	6	5) 32	30
Probably would	26	25)	
Probably would not	42	50) 64	68
Definitely would not	22	18)	
Don’t know	3	2	3	2
N	1929	1508		

Source: British Social Attitudes survey 2003 and Scottish Social Attitudes survey

2003 [chi-squared = 1.97; 1d.f.; not significant at .01 level; test carried out on the data
in bold]

Table 2: Acceptance of Claim to be English/Scottish by person born in
Scotland/England & living in England/Scotland (self)

(‘self’)	England %	Scotland %	England %)	Scotland %
Definitely would	10	11%) 35	44
Probably would	25	33)	
Probably would not	34	34) 62	54
Definitely would not	28	20)	
Don’t know	3	2	3	2
N	1929	1508		

Source: British Social Attitudes survey 2003 and Scottish Social Attitudes survey

2003 [chi-squared = 27.52; 1 d.f.; significant at .01 level; test carried out on the data
in bold]

Table 3: Acceptance of Claim to be English/Scottish by non-white person living in
England/Scotland (most people)

(‘most people’)	England %	Scotland %	England %)	Scotland %
Definitely would	9	5	43	42
Probably would	34	37)	
Probably would not	39	42	54	54
Definitely would not	16	12)	
Don’t know	3	3	3	3
N	1929	1508		

Source: British Social Attitudes survey 2003 and Scottish Social Attitudes survey

2003 [chi-squared = 0.215; 1 d.f.; not significant; test carried out on the data in bold]

Table 4: Acceptance of Claim to be English/Scottish by non-white person living in
England/Scotland (self)

(‘self’)	England %	Scotland %	England %)	Scotland %)
Definitely would	28	23	68	70
Probably would	40	47))
Probably would not	19	19	30	28
Definitely would not	11	9))
Don’t know	2	2	2	2
N	1929	1508		

Source: British Social Attitudes survey 2003 and Scottish Social Attitudes survey
2003 [chi-squared = 2.78; 1 d.f.; not significant at .01 level; test carried out on the
data in bold]

Table 5: Percentages accepting a claim to be Scottish by various people all living in Scotland and born in England:

	Person A: Non-white with Scottish accent	Person B: White with Scottish accent	Person C: Non-white with English accent	Person D: White with English accent
	%	%	%	%
Definitely would	14	15	2	4
Probably would	28	29	9	11
Probably would not	29	22	31	32
Definitely would not	28	33	56	51
Don't know	1	1	1	1

Source: Scottish Social Attitudes 2005 (N=1549)

[Chi-squared tests were carried out on 2 by 2 tables formed by combining Definitely would and Probably would; Probably would not and Definitely would not. Chi-squared values are as follows with 1 degree of freedom in each case:

$A \times B = 0.92$ (not significant)

$A \times C = 382$ (significant at the .001 level)

$B \times D = 298$ (significant at the .001 level)

$C \times D = 13.11$ (significant at the .001 level)]

Table 6: Percentages accepting claim to be Scottish on the basis of accent, birthplace
or ancestry

	(a) accent %		(b) birthplace, no Scottish accent %		(c) parents, not born in Scotland, no Scottish accent %	
definitely would	4	39	20	75	5	38
probably would	35		55		33	
probably would not	29	58	15	22	35	59
definitely would not	29		7		24	
Don't know	3	3	2	2	3	3

Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2005 (N=1549)

[Chi-squared tests were carried out on 2 by 2 tables formed by combining Definitely would and Probably would; Probably would not and Definitely would not. Chi-squared values are as follows with 1 degree of freedom in each case: birthplace x accent=17.7; and birthplace x parentage=50.2; both significant at .01 level]

Table 7: Percentage agreeing that people from other countries are entitled to call themselves Scottish if they choose to live and work in Scotland

	%
Strongly agree	4
Agree	29
Neither agree nor disagree	13
Disagree	41
Strongly disagree	12
Don't know	1

Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2005 (N=1549)