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Dynamics of Attitudinal Dimensions of National Populism in Europe, 2008-2017*

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Abstract

This article is dedicated to examining the changes in the political attitudes related to national populism in the European public opinion. The research hypothesis is that the “revival of nationalism” over the last years is due to the rise not in nationalist attitudes as such but in the strength of their intercorrelations with the political attitudes national populism is frequently attributed to – the growing disappointment with democratic ideal, its country-specific implementations, a country’s political system, and the government. The hypothesis is tested by means of a quantitative comparative analysis of the data of the two most recent waves of the European Values Study collected in 2008 and in 2017. The results show the relevance of these correlations by revealing the countries with national populist governments, contrary to other post-Socialist countries, to showcase increased positive correlations between national pride and satisfaction with a country’s political system and confidence in government. These findings support the notion that in Europe, national populism is largely due to the East-West divide not in ideals and aspirations, but in the relative success in their fulfillment.

Keywords: national populism, nationalism, Europe, democracy, political attitudes.

Introduction

The upsurge of national populism became a major issue in the global political sphere over the last few years.¹ Initially marked with the success of Donald Trump’s “Make America Great Again” campaign and Brexit, it was later continued with the electoral successes of Boris Johnson in the UK and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. In many EU countries, right-wing populist parties, as well

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¹ Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin, *National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy* (London: Penguin UK, 2018).

as moderate conservatives with an emphasis on national identity issues in their agenda, enjoyed an increase in their public support. Despite the proliferation of research on nations and national identity over the last decades,² this revival of nationalism came as a surprise. While the initial notion of globalization erasing nationality in the near future was abandoned quite some time ago, it gave way to expectations of more sophisticated, hybrid post nationalist identities.³ This contrast raises a question of whether what we are witnessing in the public political life directly mirrors individual attitudes at the microlevel. Or is the relation between the two more complicated?

The research presented in this paper aims at addressing this question by means of a quantitative comparative analysis of the political attitudes substantively related to national populism and operationalized by means of the survey data from the two waves of the European Values Study collected in 2008 and 2017 – before and during the revival of nationalism. The added value of the research is that it reveals the dynamics of attitudes related to national populism in Europe to be not a net increase in nationalism as such but a shift in its relation to the general satisfaction with a country's political system and the state of affairs with democracy. The research findings shed new light on the attitudinal dimension of Europe's East-West divide and its policy implications.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides theoretical grounds for the research by addressing the literature on the varieties of nationalism and the available explanations of the current brand of national populism and then presenting the research rationale and hypothesis. The data and methods section contains a detailed description of the survey items used to operationalize the relevant political attitudes and the procedure of data analysis. The subsequent section presents the obtained results reflecting dynamics in the political attitudes and their intercorrelations. The final section presents a discussion of the research findings, their main theoretical takeaways, and conceptual and policy implications.

National Populism as a Variety of “Bad” Nationalism

The current debate on national populism echoes much of what was written about nationalism in various times and places in the past. While the reappearance of nationalism at present came unexpectedly, the properties of this particular kind of nationalism appear ready-made in multiple theories and

² Bart Bonikowski, “Nationalism in Settled Times,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 42 (2016): 427-449.

³ Keith Breen and Shane O'Neill, eds., *After the Nation?: Critical Reflections on Nationalism and Postnationalism* (NYC: Springer, 2010).

sharing a strong normative stance. Many academic works on the subject share a marked evaluative emphasis, which, at least in the works published after the Second World War, is almost universally negative for a variety of reasons. In this article, this normatively negative notion of nationalism as a problem to be solved or avoided is referred to as “bad” nationalism to be distinguished from a value-neutral approach toward nationalism attempted in this research. The contemporary explanations of the ongoing revival of nationalism rely on those earlier theories of “bad” nationalism, and especially on their descriptions of its internal structure.

What makes nationalism “bad”? To begin with, there are two uses of the term. In nations and nationalism studies, nationalism stands for an essentialist belief in nation-states and national identities as necessary, natural, and unquestionably important.⁴ Nationalism thus defined comprises not so much specific political attitudes as a general vision of the world,⁵ perceptions of social ties beyond small communities,⁶ and discursive structures deeply entrenched in everyday parlance.⁷ Conversely, the other way of defining nationalism, widespread in dictionary definitions beyond the academia⁸ but also in some areas of academic research beyond nations and nationalism studies,⁹ treats it as a specific attitude, namely exclusion, rejection, and general hostility as a default treatment of the ethnonational other. The others may be external (citizens of other nation-states), internal (ethnic minority members), or willing to move from one category to the other (immigrants or expats and, especially of late, elites accused of cosmopolitanism causing them to abandon their duty to the nation). This definition of nationalism, unlike the first one, has obvious embedded normative implications – first, because of its destructive consequences amply supported by historical evidence and second, because of its alleged irrationality, understood as its supporters’ disregard of these consequences. Thus, “bad” nationalism is a kind of outgroup favoritism different from its other kinds only by its object, not by its essence.

This duality of neutral and “bad” shapes much of the research on nationalism. The question about the origins of “bad” nationalism, such as the current national populism, is ultimately a question as to whether nationalism neutrally defined contains inherent and inevitable seeds of exclusion and if so,

⁴ Yael Tamir, “The enigma of nationalism,” *World Politics* 47, no. 3 (1995): 418-440.

⁵ Anthony D Smith, “Gastronomy or Geology? The Role of Nationalism in the Reconstruction of Nations,” *Nations and Nationalism* 1, no. 1 (1995): 3-23.

⁶ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso Books, 2006).

⁷ Michael Billig, *Banal nationalism* (London: Sage, 1995).

⁸ Merriam-Webster, *Nationalism*, 2019, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationalism>.

⁹ Eldad Davidov, “Nationalism and Constructive Patriotism: A Longitudinal Test of Comparability in 22 Countries with the ISSP,” *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 23, no 1 (2010): 88-103.

under what conditions these seeds sprout. The available answers are as follows. First, the ascribed irrationality leads to a notion of nationalism as a flexible and near-universal instrument with a potential of lending some of its emotional attraction to more cerebral and therefore at the same time better grounded and “colder” political ideologies. The literature ranges from Hobsbawm’s classic¹⁰ on the appropriation of the initially romantic revolutionary nationalism by the conservative elites in the mid-nineteenth century to the recent suggestions that liberals would do well to appropriate some kind of “mild” nationalism to counter national populists.¹¹ The weak spot of this approach is that it fails to explain why not all attempts to instrumentalize nationalism were equally successful. Second, as follows from the social identity theory,¹² national identification, same as any other division of society into us and them, inevitably leads to outgroup discrimination however flimsy the grounds of this division. This approach’s recipe against “bad” nationalism is to supplement nationality with other, partly but not wholly overlapping and/or overarching identities. This kind of post-nationalist, if not downright cosmopolitan and multicultural identities is what globalization was expected to bring about naturally; instead of this remedy against nationalism, we got a reinstatement of national populism itself. Third, a considerable body of theorizing and, especially of late, quantitative empirical research rests on the statement that nationalism can be not only “bad” or neutral but “good” – conducive to or inspired by positively evaluated phenomena such as social solidarity, democracy, or economic growth (via mass mobilization). Contrary to the instrumentalist approach, this view ascribes the emergence of “bad” or “good” nationalism not to contingent choices made by political agents but to structural features of societies and their political systems. Although massively criticized for oversimplification, this approach, probably more than the other two, inspired the existing explanations of national populism, not least many of their limitations and drawbacks, as unpacked in the next section of the paper.

National Populism: Why Now?

The lack of predictions prior to the revival of nationalism contrasts a panoply of post-hoc explanations, especially after the 2016 US presidential elections when the extent of national populism, its global spread, and the

¹⁰ Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

¹¹ Erica Benner, “Can Nationalism Save Democracy?,” *Nations and Nationalism* 26, no. 3 (2020): 534-537.

¹² Rupert Brown, “The Social Identity Approach: Appraising the Tajfellian Legacy,” *British Journal of Social Psychology* 59, no. 1 (2020): 5-25.

gravity of its impact became apparent. This recognition of the revival of nationalism and its negative evaluation come to the forefront in the literature on the issue and overshadow the less obvious and more subtle varieties in the suggested causes. The key differences in the approaches to national populism become visible when viewed via the previously outlined differentiation between the three notions of “bad” nationalism.

The instrumentalist approach found its application in the idea that national populism expresses not so much nationalist attitudes as dissatisfaction with the mainstream political elites.¹³ According to this version, the secondary, instrumental role of nationalism is twofold. On the one hand, populist political actors made use of nationalist rhetoric to attract and mobilize those dissatisfied with the ruling elites.¹⁴ On the other hand, those who answered this call granted their support to nationalist forces not because they wanted a nationalist shift in policy but because nationalism being “bad” and supposedly especially hateful to the mainstream elites provides a highly efficient way of signaling the request for elites not to step down but to reconsider their mode of operation. The question within this line of reasoning is whether the alliance of nationalism and populism is wholly contingent or whether, according to some of the most acclaimed theorists of nationality, Rogers Brubaker, populism is inherently nationalist, as expressed in its framing of the ruling elites as the internal “other” akin to foreigners proper.¹⁵ Either way, this version ultimately suggests that the current revival of nationalism is due to dissatisfaction with the government and more broadly with the current relations of power.

The second explanation of national populism reflects the notion of nationalism as essentially “bad”, potentially or actually, depending on the circumstances. In a book with the self-explaining title “Cultural Backlash”,¹⁶ Inglehart and Norris attribute the rise of national populism to the general conservative reaction against the modernization of values occurring too rapidly for some of the more traditionalist parts of the population. In line with Inglehart’s modernization theory, nationalism is viewed as a part of the traditional value set and follows the same general dynamics.¹⁷ Most importantly, this approach suggests that national populism is not solely about negative correlates of nationalism such as xenophobia but also about

¹³ Ryan James Girdusky and Harlan Hill, *They’re Not Listening: How the Elites Created the National Populist Revolution* (NYC: Bombardier Books, 2020).

¹⁴ José Rama and Andrés Santana, “In the Name of the People: Left Populists versus Right Populists,” *European Politics and Society* 21, no. 1 (2020): 17-35.

¹⁵ Rogers Brubaker, “Populism and Nationalism,” *Nations and Nationalism* 26, no. 1 (2020): 44-66.

¹⁶ Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

¹⁷ Ronald Inglehart, *Cultural Evolution: People’s Motivations are Changing, and Reshaping the World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

nationalism proper including its core normatively approved components such as national pride. These data suggest that the recent success of national populists is to some extent due to expanding their agenda beyond mere nativism – the belief that each country should be inhabited exclusively by its own “natives” indigenous to the area¹⁸ (how exactly this indigeneity is to be defined, and by whom, remains unclear) and not migrants – to embrace a broader range of nationalist views. In particular, the nationalist bank of ideas offers an attractive view of national identity as valuable not solely for the sake of being “native”, and thus not better than national identities “native” to other countries,¹⁹ but because of its allegedly unique positive traits able to inspire pride. Higher levels of national pride reflect not merely a neutral approval of the country’s current state of affairs but adherence to a value set that in time of backlash comes in a particularly sharp and conscious contrast to its liberal alternative. The data show this polarization to be particularly strong in the authors’ own country, the US,²⁰ but in Europe, too, national populists seek to combine the anti-migrant agenda with the more moderate and ostensibly more neutral national identity attributes providing grounds for national pride (e.g. the framing of the migration issue as a tradeoff between open borders and welfare state in Sweden). Thus, this approach suggests nationalism in the public opinion to be related not just to the dissatisfaction with the way things are but also and primarily with certain value statements on how things should be.

The third kind of explanation of national populism relies on uncovering not its general causes but internal contradictions in specific countries and regions. In a recent widely discussed work, the prototypical region for the current wave of “bad” nationalism, if not downright its birthplace, is located in Eastern Europe.²¹ The authors claim that for eastern European societies, liberal democratic reforms failed to raise the living standards to the level of the western European countries and therefore proved a disappointment. In consequence, many eastern Europeans decided to abandon aspirations for improving the living conditions in their home countries and opted instead for improving the living standards for themselves by migration westwards. Faced with the massive migration, as the argument goes, those who stay, which may be due to a variety of reasons, face a certain cognitive dissonance and need to somehow justify their choice. Ethnic nationalism provides a ready-made justification that fits

¹⁸ Eirikur Bergmann, *Neo-Nationalism: The Rise of Nativist Populism* (NYC: Springer Nature, 2020).

¹⁹ Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

²⁰ Daniel DellaPosta, “Pluralistic Collapse: The ‘Oil Spill’ Model of Mass Opinion Polarization,” *American Sociological Review* 85, no. 3 (2020): 207-536.

²¹ Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes. *The Light That Failed: A Reckoning* (London: Penguin UK, 2019).

well into the pattern of disappointed expectations with its future-oriented and visionary civic counterpart. For this reason, unlike in Western Europe, in some eastern European countries nationalist political actors not only increased their electoral support but also gained or consolidated power, the two most widely mentioned cases in this regard being Poland and Hungary respectively.²² Interestingly, within this logic, national populists coming to power in other parts of the world, such as the US, owe their success to the same dynamics and unexpectedly emulate Eastern Europe. Thus, national populism appears out of resentment of the gap between expectations and reality. Importantly, unlike in the modernization theory, the object of this disappointment is not the democratic ideal itself but the perceived deficiency of its implementation in a given time and place.

Taken together, all these approaches relate the revival of nationalism not necessarily to the growth of national sentiments as such but primarily to their coming to the forefront due to an association with certain political attitudes. The latter include satisfaction with the government and a country's political system in general, the ascribed positive value of democracy, and the approval of the state of affairs with democracy in one's own country. If so, the rise of national populism would be likely to increase satisfaction in the political system in those who share traditional nationalist attitudes such as strong national pride. On the other hand, national populism as an alternative to liberal democracy may further reinforce the disappointment with democracy, both as an ideal and its implementation. These corollaries of the main theoretical approaches to national populism are summarized in the following *research hypothesis*: the change in the political attitudes related to national populism lies not in the net growth or decline in national pride, but in the increase in the correlation between national pride and satisfaction with the government and the political system and the decrease in the correlation between national pride and approval of democracy and its country-specific implementations. Empirical testing of this hypothesis was conducted by means of the data and methods described in the next section.

Data and Methods

The research is based on the data of the two last waves of the European Values Study. The European Values Study (further referred to as the EVS for short) is a major social survey conducted every 10 years in European countries both within and outside the European Union and covering public opinion on a variety of issues including a large set of items dedicated to political attitudes.

²² Jakub Szabó, "First As Tragedy, Then As Farce: a Comparative Study of Right-wing Populism in Hungary and Poland," *Journal of Comparative Politics* 13, no. 2 (2020): 24-42.

The most recent, fifth round of data collection was started in 2017 (this wave of the EVS and the dataset containing its results are further referred to as the EVS-2017)²³ and currently covers 33 countries: *Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Belarus, Switzerland, Czechia / Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Georgia, Croatia, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Montenegro, the Netherlands, North Macedonia / Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Russia, Sweden, Slovenia, and Slovakia*. The previous, fourth wave of the European Values Study was conducted in 2008–2009 (further referred to as the EVS-2008)²⁴ and covers the following 47 countries: *Albania, Armenia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia / Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, the Netherlands, North Macedonia / Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, Northern Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine (the names of the 32 countries represented in both the EVS 2008 and EVS-2017 are highlighted in italics)*. The sample sizes for each country vary from 1000 to 1200 respondents depending on the population size.

The political attitudes pertinent to the present research are operationalized in the EVS by means of the following survey items. National pride corresponds in both EVS-2017 and EVS-2008 to the direct question: “How proud are you to be a [given respondent’s country] citizen?” with the answer options of “very proud”, “quite proud”, “not very proud”, and “not at all proud”. The question about the general attitude towards democracy is formulated in the EVS-2017 as follows: “How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is ‘not at all important’ and 10 means ‘absolutely important’ what position would you choose?” with the answer options presented as a 10-point ordered scale. The corresponding question in the EVS-2008, albeit substantively probing into the same attitudinal domain, is stated differently: “I’m going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each of them? ... Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government”. This formulation reflects a preference for democracy, and the

²³ EVS (2020): *European Values Study 2017: Integrated Dataset (EVS 2017)*. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA7500 Data file Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.13511.

²⁴ EVS (2016): *European Values Study 2008, 4th wave, Integrated Dataset*. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne, Germany, ZA4800 Data File Version 4.0.0 (2016-04-15), doi:10.4232/1.12458.

corresponding item from the EVS-2017 measures the importance of democracy, which also by definition implies the positive attitude towards democracy and its preference to other options a country could have instead. Ultimately, both items measure the extent of approval of democracy in general irrespective of its specific implementations in a respondent's country or elsewhere.

The questions about attitudes towards the current state of affairs with democracy and the political system of a specific country are as follows. First, both waves of the EVS contain a question about the opinion on the situation with democracy in a country of a respondent's residence. In the EVS-2017, this question is represented with a 10-point ordered scale: "And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is 'not at all democratic' and 10 means that it is 'completely democratic', what position would you choose?" In the EVS-2008, the prompt to evaluate the state of affairs with democracy is captured in the following way: "On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?". The question about satisfaction with the political system in general in the EVS-2017 is worded similarly to the question about the state of affairs with democracy and similarly has the 10-point ordered scale of responses ranging from 1 – "not satisfied at all" to 10 – "completely satisfied". The EVS-2008 also offers the 10-point scale for this survey item, but with a different wording: "people have different views about the system for governing this country. Here is a scale for rating how well things are going: 1 means very bad; 10 means very good." Finally, the EVS -2017 and EVS-2008 both have a set of questions about confidence in various institutions including the government with the same wording: "Please indicate how much confidence you have in... government" and the same answer options: "a great deal", "quite a lot", "not very much", and "none at all".

The data were analyzed as follows. First, descriptive statistics were computed for each of the five survey items separately for the EVS-2017 and EVS-2008. Mean scores for each country were computed on the 10-point scales, and within-country frequency distributions, on the questions with four answer options. Then the shift in attitudes in each country between 2008 and 2017 was quantified. For national pride, the level of national pride was estimated as the ratio of those either "very proud" or "quite proud", and the shift in the level of national pride was computed simply by subtracting this ratio on the EVS-2008 data from the ratio of the EVS-2017 for each country represented in both waves of the survey. A similar procedure was employed for another item represented in the same way in both survey waves, confidence in government, with the extent of confidence measured as the ratio of the respondents who reported having "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence. The other three items included in this research – approval of democracy, evaluation of the state of

affairs with democracy in a respondent's country, and satisfaction with a country's political system – have different sets of responses in the EVS-2017 and the EVS-2008. This difference makes it impossible to measure the shift in opinions directly, because the country scores have to be aggregated as ratios for the EVS-2008 and as means for the EVS-2017. To overcome this obstacle, the country ranks within each survey wave were derived from the sorted initial scores (e.g. the rank of 1 indicates that the country has the highest score on a respective attitude in a given survey wave, the rank of 2, the second-highest score etc.). These ranks could then be compared across the survey waves. To make these results more intuitively accessible, and since the smaller number corresponds to the higher rank, the country ranks for the earlier wave, the EVS-2017, were subtracted from those for the EVS-2008, and not vice versa. As a result, the positive scores on this rank shift indicate an increase in a given parameter in relation to the other countries (e.g. an increase in satisfaction with a country's political system), and negative scores, a decrease. To make these results compatible across all the variables, the ranks were also computed for national pride and confidence in government in addition to the shifts in absolute scores.

At the second stage of the research, the shift in correlations between national pride and each of the other four attitudes was estimated. Spearman's nonparametric correlation coefficients were computed for the whole dataset and within each country separately for the EVS-2017 and the EVS-2008. Then the shifts in each of the four correlations were estimated by subtracting the within-country correlation coefficients computed on the EVS-2008 data from those on the EVS-2017 data. The obtained research results are presented in the next section of the paper.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

The initial question of this research is whether national pride in Europe over the last decade has been on the increase. Tables 1 and 2 present the within-country distributions of the national pride variable in 2008 and 2017 respectively. These results show that in all the countries without exception in both waves of the survey the distributions are heavily skewed, with the vast majority displaying strong national pride. The ratio of those "very proud" or "quite proud" (as opposed to "not very proud" or "not proud at all") falls under 3/4 of the sample in only two countries in 2008 (Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia) and only for one country in 2017 (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and sometimes rises above 95%. Table 3, containing the data on the countries covered by both survey waves and allowing comparison across time, shows on average only a very slight increase of a little under 2 percent points in national

pride between 2008 and 2017: the mean percentage of those “very proud” or “quite proud” was 87.05% in 2008 and 88.90% in 2017. This change in the mean score for the whole sample, however, shows a somewhat different picture when disentangled. As can be seen in figure 1, the number of countries with the net increase in national pride between 2008 and 2017 is over two times higher than the number of countries where national pride decreased. The size of these changes is considerable and ranges from about -13 to about 13 percent points. Interestingly, the most marked change in both directions, in absolute scores as well as in the ranks relative to the scores of other countries (figure 2) is observed mainly in the Western Balkans. They are disproportionately strongly represented on both extremes with a curious exception of Serbia, which until recently was considered the hotbed of nationalism in the region.

The attitudes towards democracy in general irrespective of the situation in a given country demonstrate the same skewness with an even stronger preference for higher degrees of approval. In 2008, the ratio of respondents who either “agree strongly” or merely “agree” that democracy is preferable to all other forms of government is over 3/4 of the sample in each country and averages 90.25% (table 3). In 2017, the mean score of the ascribed importance of having a democratic political system ranges between 7.27 and 9.67 on a 10-point scale (table 4). The countries with the highest importance of democracy are mostly Nordic, and as many as the lowest 15 positions on the ascribed importance of democracy belong to post-Socialist countries. Same as for national pride, the results on approval of democracy show a slight overall change in the average high scores in both waves concealing substantial shifts in many countries. As seen in figure 3, the decrease in the importance of democracy compared to other European countries is observed primarily in some post-Socialist countries, while the most marked relative increase appears in Hungary – the country widely criticized precisely as an epitome of national populism within the EU, with Poland, viewed similarly, not far behind.

The evaluation of the state of affairs with democracy in one’s own country scores considerably lower on average and varies much more strongly than the general attitude towards democracy as such. In 2008, the ratio of roughly 3/4 of the sample either “strongly satisfied” or “rather satisfied” with democracy in their country is not the lowest, as for those expressing approval of democracy, but the highest ratio, with the lowest one as small as 9.5% (table 5). Similarly, in 2017, the mean score on evaluation of the level of democracy in a respondent’s country is 5.95 out of 10 within a wide range between 3.65 and 8.54 (table 6). Same as for approval of democracy, the countries with the highest scores are Nordic and the lowest, post-Socialist. The changes in the country ranks show an even stronger shift than for the importance of democracy, ranging from -21 to 17. These changes are quite large when evaluated against the highest possible absolute score of 31 (a difference between the highest rank of 1 and the lowest rank of 32). As seen in figure 4, the most pronounced relative decrease in the evaluation of the state of affairs

with democracy in one's own country is observed in post-Socialist countries, which means that the initial relatively low scores got even lower.

Satisfaction with the political system, in general, is slightly lower in its mean, minimum and maximum scores than the evaluation of democracy and, as can be seen in tables 7 and 8, does not demonstrate a statistically significant shift between the two survey waves in either direction. The average level of satisfaction with the political system is a little under 5 on a 10-point scale, which, considering that the scale begins at 1 and not 0, is below the midpoint. The country-specific shifts in this score are also rather small and range between -1.35 and 1.77 (figure 5). As can be seen in figure 6, however, these relatively small changes in absolute values reflect rather significant relocation of the countries' relative ranking positions. The countries appearing on the two extremes are quite similar to those for the evaluation with democracy, with the most pronounced decrease in post-Socialist countries and the second strongest increase, in both absolute and relative scores, in Hungary. Unlike for national pride, the number of countries with growth in the average satisfaction with the country's political system only slightly exceeds that of countries where the satisfaction with the political system declined.

Confidence in government is on average lower than satisfaction with the political system as a whole. In 2008, the ratio of respondents with either "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence ranges from 13.4% to 67.7% with a mean score of 37.47% (table 9), and in 2017, between 8.74% and 68.62 (with 92.62% in Azerbaijan making this country case a marked outlier) and the mean of 34.52% (with Azerbaijan included, 36.28%) (table 10). Same as for the other variables, the minute change in the mean scores between the two survey waves hides a number of considerable shifts in certain countries. In absolute terms, these changes range from -26.64 to 22.29 percentage points (figure 7) and in relative terms, from -17 to 17 rank points (figure 8). The distribution of countries is very similar to the previously observed patterns, with the prevailing decline in some of the post-Socialist countries and the strongest growth in confidence in government, in both relative and absolute terms, in Hungary. Taken together, these results demonstrate considerable consistency across countries at the aggregate level. To find out whether the same consistency is observed at the individual level within countries, let us now examine the correlations.

Correlations

Correlations between national pride and the other political attitudes covered in this research demonstrate to what extent a simultaneous shift in the same direction (e.g. an increase in national pride and satisfaction with a country's political system) reflects the change of attitudes in same people and thus shows that the two dynamics are part of the same process. Table 11 presents an intercorrelation matrix of all the five variables for the whole dataset without differentiation between countries. As predicted, all the correlations are

positive and, unsurprisingly given the large sample size, statistically significant. The correlations between national pride and each of the other attitudes are rather weak, which is again to be expected given the large and diverse sample. The difference between the correlation coefficients for the EVS-2008 and EVS-2017 is not very pronounced and so should be interpreted with caution. The direction of the shift matches the research hypothesis for one variable out of four: in 2017, national pride is slightly weaker correlated with the evaluation of the state of things with democracy. Contrary to what was expected, the correlation between national pride and satisfaction with the political system and confidence in government also slightly weakened. Interestingly, no decrease and even a very slight growth are observed for the correlation between national pride and the importance of democracy. Of all the other intercorrelations, those between the substantively close measurements of approval of the country's political sphere are the most strongly intercorrelated. This consistency provides additional evidence of the validity of the data.

Correlations between national pride and approval of democracy within each country range from -0.100 to 0.223 in the EVS-2008 (table 12) and from 0.013 to 0.218 in EVS-2017. (table 13) It is worth noting that the two countries with a statistically significant and negative correlation in the EVS-2008, North Macedonia and Norway, are also presented in the wave of 2017, but with positive correlations. Thus, an important takeaway from the results appears to be that national pride is positively correlated with the importance of democracy in nearly all countries where the correlation is statistically significant, even though the correlation is not that strong. The shifts in these correlations between the two waves of the survey are, as shown in figure 9, considerable when compared to the absolute values of the correlation coefficients themselves. In the majority of the countries covered by the survey, this shift is in the positive direction signifying that in most countries the correlation between national pride and importance of democracy between 2008 and 2017 grew stronger, especially in the countries where it used to be negative. Interestingly, a strong positive shift is observed in Russia, where the correlation between national pride and the importance of democracy in 2017 is stronger than in any other country in the sample.

The correlations between national pride and the evaluation of the state of affairs with democracy vary within a larger range than the correlations with approval of democracy in general in both survey waves (tables 14 and 15). The similarity between the two sets of correlations lies in the fact that all the statistically significant within-country correlations are positive. Again similarly, the changes in both directions are considerable when evaluated against the absolute values of the correlation coefficients. The numbers of the countries with positive and negative changes, unlike for the correlations between national pride and the importance of democracy, are compatible (figure 10). Differently from the changes in evaluation of democracy per se, changes in its correlations

with national pride reflect no obvious pattern of distinction between the countries with the net increase and decrease: both post-Socialist and the western European countries are rather evenly represented among those with the largest increase and the largest decrease in the strength of the correlation.

The correlations between national pride and satisfaction with the political system are positive in all the countries covered by both waves of the survey and for the most part statistically significant (tables 16 and 17). The range within which the correlation coefficients vary is considerable, especially in 2008. The changes in the strength of correlation are also quite pronounced (figure 11). Same as for the correlations between the national pride and the evaluation of the state of affairs with democracy, the numbers of countries with the positive and the negative directions of these changes are roughly equal. Unlike for the correlations between national pride and each of the two democracy related attitudes, it is interesting that here the countries with the largest net positive change are Hungary and Poland – the two EU members most strongly criticized for their governments' lapsing into national populism.

The within-country correlations between national pride and confidence in government follow more or less the same pattern (tables 18 and 19). The near-lacking average change in the strength of positive within-country correlations conceals the substantial changes in specific countries, with the near-equal breakup of the sample of countries into those with the net growth and the net decline in the strength of correlation (figure 12). Most importantly, the largest shifts in the correlation between national pride and confidence in government in both directions occur mostly in the same countries that the largest shifts in the correlations between national pride and satisfaction with a country's political system in general.

Taken together, the research results create a comprehensive picture of changes in political attitudes operationalizing nationalism populism and their interrelations. The patterns visible in the research findings and their implications are discussed in the next section.

Discussion

The research findings demonstrate several regularities in the extent and direction of change in national pride, approval of democracy, and satisfaction with the government and their intercorrelations. These regularities do not wholly match the research hypothesis and even less so, the contrary and simpler notion about a direct projection of the populist nationalism onto the microlevel.

First, there is no visible pan-European growth, nor a decline, in national pride or any of the other political attitudes covered by the research. National pride was quite strong in Europe already in 2008, and the wave of national populism in the public political discourse neither resulted from nor led to its upsurge. Similarly, the survey data give no evidence of a massive falling out of

love with democracy, be it the democratic ideal or its implementation in a given country, or a disappointment with a country's political system in general irrespective of its level of democracy. Nor was there a significant all-European change in the degree of relevance of a country's political system as grounds of pride in belonging to the country. Finally, the lack of any significant shift in the strength of correlation between national pride and importance of democracy contradicts the theoretical assumption that ongoing wave of national populism marks a disappointment with the national-democratic ideal of the "velvet revolutions" of the late 1980s. Instead, the pan-European data, with no differentiation between countries, demonstrate consistency and temporal stability in the views on the significance of the state of things with the country's political system and specifically its democracy as grounds of national pride. The fact that all the correlations are positive shows that, unlike for some more mundane issues more closely related to everyday life, such as socioeconomic development, a relative underperformance in democracy compared to other countries does not create a feeling of *ressentiment* described by Greenfeld²⁵ and a resulting compensatory upsurge in national pride. This consistency may be at least partly due to the variability in the popular notions of democracy. According to a research by Welzel and Moreno,²⁶ democracy, again unlike more down-to-earth values directly related to material wellbeing, because of its general normative acceptance may mean to laypeople anything regarded as good and desirable up to the notions not directly implied by the definition of democracy, such as order and stability, or even at odds with it, such as strong leadership. The positive correlation between national pride and approval of democracy clearly demonstrates that, at least in the contemporary Europe if not in other parts of the world, the choice in favor of granting support to national populists is not a choice between nationalism and democracy.

This general picture of consistency and stability presented by the data not only contradicts some of the simpler explanations of the upsurge in national populism but also gives no evidence that any such surge took place. Nevertheless, it does not mean that an increase in popularity of the national populist political parties and leaders should be attributed exclusively to superficial and transient reasons such as more efficient techniques of their political campaigns with little effect of or impact on the mass political attitudes. The evidence of the attitudinal shifts substantively relevant to the increase in

²⁵ Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).

²⁶ Christian Welzel and Alejandro Moreno, "Enlightening People: The Spark of Emancipative Values," in *The Civic Culture Transformed: From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens*, eds. Russell J. Dalton and Christian Welzel (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015): 59-89.

popularity of nationalist political actors shows itself in the differences between countries.

The research findings show that the small and hardly changing pan-European correlations conceal a panoply of country-specific shifts in separately taken attitudes and their intercorrelations, which are mutually levelled out when regarded as a whole. To begin with the most striking pieces of evidence, the two countries with the strongest increase in the correlations between national pride and satisfaction with the political system, and also the second and third strongest increase in the strength of correlation between national pride and confidence in the government, are Hungary and Poland, both frequently treated as the major cases of national populism within the EU. These two countries also demonstrate a significant albeit slightly less spectacular increase in the correlation between national pride and approval of democracy. These dynamics provides further evidence of the representations of democracy in the mass consciousness as something vaguely defined yet certainly positive. Accordingly, at least in some cases, the ascribed characteristic of a political system as democratic in a survey may amount to a general approval, probably with some specific features associated with democracy (again not necessarily those encompassed by its accepted definitions) coming to the forefront in a respondent's mind. In addition to this increase in correlations, the research findings also show a considerable growth in the level of satisfaction with the political system in general and the state of affairs with democracy and confidence in the government in Hungary – albeit a very slight growth in Poland. Importantly, despite the increased correlations, the level of national pride per se did not grow in either of these countries to any compatible extent. Taken together, these findings suggest that, at the very least in the most widely debated country cases, national populism has less to do with nationalism than the general attitude towards the country's political sphere.

This country-specific dynamic gains additional significance when the two country cases are juxtaposed not just with the rest of the sample, but specifically with other post-Socialist states. The research findings show that post-Socialist countries, both within and outside the EU, score lower on all the three estimates of satisfaction with the country's political sphere. This observation applies to both waves of the survey and is further strengthened by the changes between the two. As shown by the research findings, post-Socialist countries are disproportionately highly represented among those where the satisfaction with the political system and confidence in the government decreased, between 2008 and 2017. Against this gap in the level of satisfaction with all things political grown wider in the last decade, Poland and Hungary with their net growth present an exceptional case. The accompanying growth in the strength of correlations between approval of the state of things in the political sphere with

national pride shows that this exception has something to do with national populism.

In a nutshell, these takeaways from the research findings lead to a rather pessimistic conclusion that national populism has lately appeared the only efficient way out of the dissatisfaction with the political sphere in post-Socialist countries. This evidence corroborates the theoretical assumption about Eastern Europe as the region overwhelmed with disappointment. Needless to say, this way of coping is efficient solely in alleviating the mass dissatisfaction with a country's political system, not in addressing any objective grounds of this dissatisfaction, so the effect on the public opinion is unlikely to last for long.

What might come to replace national populism once its effect is over? A probable scenario seems to be an oscillation between attempts to return to the way things were before the upsurge of nationalism, thus reproducing the initial situation of dissatisfaction, and the new bouts of national populism. A possible alternative, stems from the fact that, as the research results demonstrate, post-Socialist countries do not differ from the rest of Europe in the popular notions on the relevance of democracy as grounds for national pride or approval of a country's political system (as operationalized by the correlations). Hence, the rise in national populism in post-Socialist countries does not reflect a disappointment in westernization. The grounds of disappointment are not the Western ideals of democracy but what is perceived as the intermediary results of their implementation. Accordingly, a debate about countering national populism might be reframed as debate not about goals and the essential east-west divide but about means of implementing the shared ideals under varying circumstances and in the changing global environment.

Annexes

Table 1. Within-country distribution of Responses on National Pride, European Values Study-2008 (sorted in the descending order of the ratio of those “very proud” or “quite proud”)

Country	very proud	quite proud	not very proud	not at all proud
Ireland	77.45	21.28	0.85	0.43
Kosovo	88.38	10.23	0.98	0.41
Malta	72.71	23.94	2.87	0.48
Northern Ireland	54.60	41.54	2.14	1.71
Georgia	65.43	30.60	3.76	0.21
Poland	50.32	45.42	3.82	0.43
Turkey	73.98	20.99	3.66	1.38
Cyprus	70.54	24.39	4.33	0.74
Portugal	65.20	29.67	3.80	1.33
Greece	66.93	27.75	4.24	1.08
Slovenia	62.83	30.70	5.49	0.98
Finland	56.20	37.04	6.30	0.46
Iceland	61.58	31.17	6.36	0.89
Spain	57.21	35.44	4.41	2.94
Luxembourg	51.56	40.05	5.55	2.84
Russian Federation	48.46	43.02	6.98	1.54
Norway	59.92	31.42	7.39	1.26
Great Britain	54.11	37.04	6.98	1.87
Slovak Republic	40.66	50.35	7.65	1.33
France	37.04	53.84	7.12	2.00
Denmark	49.20	41.61	8.35	0.84
Croatia	41.82	48.35	8.46	1.38
Northern Cyprus	51.59	38.26	6.96	3.19
Armenia	64.74	24.95	7.08	3.23
Austria	47.67	41.60	6.85	3.88
Macedonia	53.34	35.23	5.97	5.47
Belgium	29.43	58.23	10.14	2.20
Belarus	34.87	52.74	8.75	3.65
Sweden	45.49	41.94	11.52	1.06
Albania	42.47	44.93	11.58	1.03
Italy	45.91	41.47	9.92	2.70
Switzerland	44.70	42.50	11.30	1.50
Romania	38.45	47.86	11.13	2.57
Netherlands	28.28	57.78	11.31	2.63
Serbia	42.51	42.94	11.47	3.08
Hungary	36.08	49.13	12.38	2.41
Czech Republic	32.85	51.19	14.21	1.75
Moldova	25.97	56.79	14.85	2.39
Montenegro	33.97	48.65	11.89	5.48
Estonia	37.68	43.76	13.63	4.93
Bulgaria	34.31	46.22	16.18	3.29
Latvia	32.35	46.23	17.44	3.98

Germany	20.38	55.40	17.92	6.30
Ukraine	37.39	36.96	19.47	6.18
Lithuania	22.65	49.66	20.58	7.12
Bosnia and Herzegovina	29.08	31.55	28.17	11.20

Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2008.

Table 2. Within-country distribution of Responses on National Pride, European Values Study-2017 (sorted in the descending order of the ratio of those “very proud” or “quite proud”)

Country	very proud	quite proud	not very proud	not at all proud
Poland	66.29	30.99	2.42	0.30
Azerbaijan	67.55	29.61	2.66	0.17
Finland	68.59	27.93	3.06	0.42
Norway	67.78	27.59	4.33	0.30
Iceland	62.32	33.01	3.83	0.83
Albania	79.06	15.88	4.29	0.77
Estonia	47.57	46.22	5.32	0.90
Georgia	68.17	25.31	5.79	0.73
Montenegro	33.51	59.38	5.83	1.27
Austria	54.53	38.16	5.16	2.15
France	51.36	41.19	4.72	2.73
Denmark	49.61	42.79	6.78	0.81
Sweden	56.38	35.71	6.77	1.14
Russia	49.91	42.08	6.02	1.99
Slovenia	55.68	36.30	6.85	1.17
Slovakia	35.08	56.31	7.82	0.79
Belarus	37.02	53.60	7.33	2.05
Romania	51.16	39.10	7.93	1.81
Armenia	50.34	39.91	7.13	2.62
Great Britain	52.47	37.07	8.22	2.25
Switzerland	44.76	43.28	9.26	2.70
Hungary	49.25	38.32	10.73	1.70
Italy	40.23	46.67	11.31	1.79
Netherlands	33.13	53.50	10.75	2.62
Spain	43.10	42.39	9.56	4.96
Serbia	32.04	53.05	12.21	2.70
Czechia	35.16	49.17	13.46	2.21
Bulgaria	47.73	36.38	13.62	2.27
Lithuania	28.66	53.64	15.53	2.18
Croatia	38.36	42.71	13.88	5.05
Germany	30.71	47.77	14.13	7.39
North Macedonia	36.10	39.24	15.14	9.52
Bosnia and Herzegovina	28.46	45.60	20.19	5.75

Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2017.




Figure 1. Changes in the level of national pride (ratio of those “very proud” or “quite proud”) between 2008 and 2017

Source: This figure was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017.




Figure 2. Changes in the relative country ranks on national pride between 2008 and 2017

Source: This figure was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017.

Table 3. Within-country distributions of responses on the preference for democracy, European Values Study-2008 (sorted in the descending order of the ratio of those who either “agree strongly” or “agree” that democracy is the best option)

Country	agree strongly	Agree	disagree	disagree strongly
Denmark	76.90	22.35	0.75	0.00
Cyprus	68.93	27.94	2.59	0.54
Greece	61.71	34.91	3.25	0.14
Switzerland	54.64	41.92	3.26	0.17
Georgia	53.57	42.71	3.57	0.16
Malta	41.95	54.32	2.93	0.79
Austria	59.18	37.08	2.95	0.79
Italy	50.93	45.20	3.65	0.21
Spain	51.46	44.42	3.55	0.57
Iceland	40.51	55.29	3.69	0.51
Finland	40.53	55.19	3.67	0.61
Sweden	59.75	35.79	3.59	0.87
Norway	73.54	21.82	3.99	0.65
Northern Cyprus	44.37	49.23	6.18	0.22
Germany	45.56	48.00	5.75	0.69

Luxembourg	55.08	38.47	5.05	1.40
France	51.66	41.69	5.69	0.95
Portugal	28.33	64.94	6.35	0.39
Netherlands	41.37	51.78	6.18	0.67
Albania	39.75	53.39	6.15	0.71
Turkey	44.23	48.73	6.04	1.00
Northern Ireland	36.41	56.41	6.92	0.26
Lithuania	21.33	69.21	8.30	1.16
Slovenia	17.93	72.56	8.65	0.86
Poland	23.45	66.86	8.73	0.96
Belgium	41.59	48.41	8.44	1.55
Slovak Republic	28.13	61.77	8.26	1.83
Kosovo	61.58	27.92	6.08	4.42
Belarus	27.68	61.44	9.70	1.18
Great Britain	36.47	52.25	10.42	0.86
Estonia	23.17	65.35	10.16	1.32
Macedonia	37.91	50.60	10.36	1.13
Armenia	40.06	47.57	10.46	1.91
Croatia	26.46	61.07	10.96	1.51
Romania	29.82	57.65	9.92	2.61
Latvia	19.40	66.24	12.41	1.95
Montenegro	41.29	44.26	11.79	2.66
Ireland	34.68	49.82	12.33	3.17
Serbia	31.37	53.10	12.85	2.69
Czech Republic	31.65	52.44	13.56	2.35
Bosnia Herzegovina	32.00	51.42	13.82	2.76
Bulgaria	28,40	54,30	13,93	3,36
Hungary	23,82	57,22	16,98	1,97
Russian Federation	20,71	60,19	16,33	2,78
Ukraine	24,77	52,04	20,02	3,17
Moldova	24,96	47,45	21,95	5,64

Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2008.

Table 4. Mean scores on the ascribed importance of democracy (1 – “not at all important” to 10 – “very important”), European Values Study-2017 (sorted in the descending order)

Country	Mean
Albania	9.67
Denmark	9.60
Norway	9.55
Iceland	9.49
Germany	9.40
Sweden	9.30
Switzerland	9.26
Finland	9.22
Italy	9.20
Poland	9.15
Austria	9.11
Hungary	8.95
Spain	8.94
Netherlands	8.92
North Macedonia	8.9
Georgia	8.87
Great Britain	8.83
France	8.74
Azerbaijan	8.73
Estonia	8.7
Lithuania	8.59
Croatia	8.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina	8.39
Romania	8.27
Bulgaria	8.16
Czechia	8.16
Slovenia	8.12
Montenegro	8.05
Belarus	8.00
Armenia	7.84
Slovakia	7.76
Russia	7.37
Serbia	7.27

Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2017.




Figure 3. Changes in the relative country ranks on approval of democracy between 2008 and 2017

Source: This figure was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017.

Table 5. Within-country distributions of responses on evaluation of democracy in one's own country, European Values Study-2008 (sorted in the descending order of the combined ratio of those "very satisfied or "rather satisfied")

Country	very satisfied	rather satisfied	not very satisfied	not at all satisfied
Switzerland	10.61	67.14	19.21	3.03
Denmark	20.31	55.96	21.20	2.52
Cyprus	24.04	52.03	19.56	4.37
Luxembourg	11.44	63.69	20.24	4.63
Norway	6.33	64.74	27.16	1.77
Kosovo	29.21	40.86	21.91	8.03
Malta	12.80	56.58	22.49	8.13
Sweden	5.31	63.90	25.39	5.41
Ireland	10.08	53.19	30.48	6.26
Belarus	12.36	49.92	30.03	7.69
Belgium	2.81	57.13	32.89	7.17
Turkey	10.43	47.04	24.74	17.79
Spain	11.52	45.75	35.25	7.48
Northern Cyprus	2.74	53.16	31.65	12.45
Germany	4.84	50.98	36.87	7.31
Netherlands	3.65	51.33	41.25	3.78

Northern Ireland	3.77	51.18	32.55	12.50
Poland	3.35	50.67	38.24	7.74
Austria	4.19	49.28	35.60	10.93
Finland	2.52	50.55	37.16	9.77
Slovenia	1.88	47.37	44.29	6.47
Armenia	2.43	45.70	28.99	22.88
Iceland	2.33	43.52	41.58	12.56
Estonia	3.36	41.18	42.86	12.61
Slovak Republic	1.93	41.54	46.54	9.99
Greece	8.00	35.44	36.92	19.64
Macedonia	6.18	36.18	36.93	20.71
Romania	2.36	38.60	46.57	12.47
Georgia	4.30	35.95	50.04	9.71
Czech Republic	2.50	37.63	45.18	14.69
France	2.08	37.63	42.61	17.67
Portugal	2.57	36.04	41.26	20.12
Russian Federation	3.97	34.40	47.94	13.70
Montenegro	5.99	31.31	46.83	15.87
Italy	2.03	29.86	49.02	19.09
Lithuania	0.96	30.71	49.63	18.70
Great Britain	2.73	28.93	52.27	16.07
Latvia	0.49	28.67	59.39	11.44
Moldova	1.26	26.30	55.89	16.55
Croatia	1.03	24.66	55.49	18.82
Bosnia Herzegovina	2.80	22.59	47.24	27.37
Hungary	0.81	19.76	57.65	21.79
Serbia	1.41	18.34	56.22	24.03
Albania	1.62	17.60	54.50	26.27
Ukraine	2.40	14.03	47.60	35.97
Bulgaria	0.76	8.75	53.79	36.71

Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2008.

Table 6. Country mean scores on evaluation of democracy in one's own country (from 1 – “not at all democratic” to 10 – “completely democratic”, sorted in the descending order), European Values Study-2017

Country	Mean
Denmark	8.54
Norway	7.93
Sweden	7.90
Switzerland	7.83
Austria	7.42
Azerbaijan	7.33
Netherlands	7.32
Finland	7.25
Germany	7.13
Spain	6.69
Iceland	6.63
Great Britain	6.62
France	6.47
Estonia	6.33
Italy	6.04
Lithuania	5.83
Slovakia	5.83
Czechia	5.80
Poland	5.63
Russia	5.53
Slovenia	5.38
Hungary	5.35
Belarus	5.31
Montenegro	5.18
Romania	5.11
Georgia	4.82
Bulgaria	4.74
Serbia	4.70
Croatia	4.19
North Macedonia	4.05
Albania	3.97
Armenia	3.80
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.65

Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2017.




Figure 4. Changes in the relative country ranks on evaluation of democracy in one's own country between 2008 and 2017

Source: This figure was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017.

Table 7. Country mean scores on rating a country's political system in one's own country (from 1 – “very bad” to 10 – “very good”, sorted in the descending order), European Values Study-2008

Country	Mean
Switzerland	6.44
Kosovo	6.24
Luxembourg	6.17
Malta	5.98
Norway	5.94
Sweden	5.92
Belarus	5.91
Cyprus	5.85
Denmark	5.81
Ireland	5.66
Netherlands	5.65
Finland	5.59
Slovak Republic	5.47

Georgia	5.35
Germany	5.35
Montenegro	5.25
Russian Federation	5.22
Northern Ireland	4.92
Spain	4.90
Turkey	4.83
Macedonia	4.74
Slovenia	4.73
Armenia	4.71
Iceland	4.68
Czech Republic	4.65
Estonia	4.64
Austria	4.63
Romania	4.63
Belgium	4.52
Poland	4.45
Latvia	4.28
Northern Cyprus	4.24
Great Britain	4.24
Albania	4.22
Moldova	4.16
Serbia	4.05
France	4.03
Croatia	3.97
Italy	3.92
Greece	3.88
Lithuania	3.69
Portugal	3.65
Bosnia Herzegovina	3.49
Bulgaria	3.22
Hungary	3.20
Ukraine	3.16

Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2008.

Table 8. Country mean scores on satisfaction with a country's political system (from 1 – “not satisfied at all” to 10 – “completely satisfied”, sorted in the descending order), European Values Study-2017

Country	Mean
Denmark	7.30
Azerbaijan	7.21
Switzerland	7.06
Norway	6.84
Sweden	6.43
Austria	6.40
Finland	6.06
Netherlands	5.93
Germany	5.56

Estonia	5.28
Russia	5.22
Belarus	5.20
Great Britain	5.18
Montenegro	5.05
Spain	4.98
Slovakia	4.95
France	4.80
Czechia	4.73
Lithuania	4.73
Hungary	4.72
Poland	4.70
Italy	4.69
Iceland	4.66
Serbia	4.55
Slovenia	4.13
Georgia	4.10
Bulgaria	3.94
Romania	3.80
Armenia	3.77
North Macedonia	3.39
Albania	3.26
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.19
Croatia	2.87

Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2017.




Figure 5. Changes in the country level of satisfaction with a country's political system between 2008 and 2017

Source: This figure was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017.




Figure 6. Changes in the relative country ranks on satisfaction with a country's political system between 2008 and 2017

Source: This figure was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017.

Table 9. Within-country distributions of responses on confidence in the government, European Values Study-2008 (sorted in the descending order of the combined ratio of those with "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence)

Country	a great deal	quite a lot	not very much	none at all
Luxembourg	11.76	55.91	23.92	8.40
Belarus	11.79	53.23	24.85	10.14
Kosovo	27.07	37.82	24.94	10.17
Cyprus	18.66	43.26	26.00	12.08
Russian Federation	15.55	46.09	25.64	12.71
Switzerland	8.50	52.36	33.48	5.67
Denmark	7.20	47.83	36.75	8.22
Sweden	7.53	46.00	32.81	13.66
Turkey	20.86	32.10	21.67	25.37
Armenia	10.26	42.61	24.97	22.16
Malta	16.16	36.58	26.33	20.93
Slovak Republic	5.78	46.76	33.29	14.17
Macedonia	12.84	39.00	26.71	21.45
Norway	3.99	46.15	38.92	10.94
Georgia	13.16	35.94	34.42	16.49

Northern Cyprus	11.43	36.59	22.25	29.73
Netherlands	1.91	45.62	44.44	8.03
Finland	3.53	37.77	41.67	17.02
Slovenia	1.76	39.42	45.55	13.27
Montenegro	9.84	29.04	35.13	25.99
Ireland	5.18	32.44	42.49	19.90
Estonia	4.53	31.78	42.66	21.03
Spain	5.00	29.84	44.69	20.48
France	2.09	32.57	38.49	26.85
Moldova	3.82	30.61	44.44	21.13
Iceland	5.22	28.03	45.10	21.66
Belgium	1.67	29.84	48.20	20.29
Portugal	3.24	26.20	36.46	34.10
Italy	3.98	23.54	41.73	30.75
Germany	1.51	25.64	51.13	21.72
Albania	4.58	21.89	39.40	34.13
Lithuania	0.29	24.44	55.00	20.27
Romania	5.60	19.07	40.84	34.49
Ukraine	3.39	21.12	28.74	46.75
Greece	4.79	18.26	36.11	40.83
Northern Ireland	2.80	19.83	53.88	23.49
Poland	1.67	20.19	46.73	31.41
Czech Republic	3.57	17.63	45.33	33.47
Latvia	1.84	19.33	45.63	33.20
Bosnia Herzegovina	4.70	16.09	45.33	33.88
Great Britain	2.26	16.99	45.92	34.84
Austria	1.95	16.32	53.21	28.52
Hungary	1.84	14.97	41.70	41.50
Serbia	1.45	13.01	49.20	36.33
Croatia	1.62	12.22	51.59	34.57
Bulgaria	2.23	11.17	37.40	49.20

Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2008.

Table 10. Within-country distributions of responses on confidence in the government, European Values Study-2017 (sorted in the descending order of the combined ratio of those with "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence)

Country	a great deal	quite a lot	not very much	none at all
Azerbaijan	40.87	51.75	6.24	1.14
Switzerland	9.67	58.95	26.93	4.45
Norway	7.10	54.68	32.82	5.40
Belarus	12.26	43.80	29.75	14.19
Russia	13.06	41.41	28.87	16.67
Sweden	4.90	49.01	36.89	9.20
Netherlands	3.20	46.88	41.56	8.35
Finland	3.99	41.29	42.57	12.15
Estonia	4.32	40.86	44.52	10.30
Lithuania	1.10	41.53	47.28	10.09
Denmark	4.08	36.71	45.29	13.92

Austria	4.27	35.89	44.31	15.52
Hungary	10.84	28.26	31.28	29.63
Georgia	10.09	27.49	33.53	28.88
Montenegro	6.93	30.36	39.50	23.21
Germany	3.19	33.28	47.51	16.01
Iceland	3.33	29.50	46.16	21.01
Slovakia	5.34	27.40	43.56	23.70
France	2.15	30.29	36.01	31.55
Great Britain	4.34	25.27	50.87	19.51
Armenia	2.89	23.73	40.44	32.94
Serbia	5.14	21.18	38.68	35.00
Poland	5.87	20.34	39.44	34.35
North Macedonia	5.41	19.80	30.61	44.18
Italy	3.15	21.10	48.90	26.86
Spain	4.37	18.49	37.98	39.16
Bulgaria	3.84	17.78	50.64	27.74
Romania	3.89	15.29	36.55	44.26
Czechia	1.86	16.41	51.30	30.43
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.22	14.65	36.38	45.75
Slovenia	1.72	13.84	56.77	27.67
Albania	3.09	11.73	28.16	57.02
Croatia	0.69	8.05	42.47	48.79

Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2017.




Figure 7. Changes in the country level of confidence in the government between 2008 and 2017
 Source: This figure was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017.




Figure 8. Changes in the relative country ranks on confidence in the government between 2008 and 2017

Source: This figure was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017.

Table 11. Intercorrelations between national pride and attitudes towards democracy and the government

		Natio nal pride	Approval of democrac y	Democracy in own country	Satisfaction with political system	Confidence in gover nmen t
National pride	EV S- 201 7	-	0.112	0.148	0.150	0.164
	EV S- 200 8	-	0.103	0.183	0.164	0.178
Importance of democracy	EV S- 201 7	0.112	-	0.224	0.118	0.048
	EV S- 200 8	0.103	-	0.201	0.170	0.127
Democracy in own country	EV S- 201	0.148	0.224	-	0.694	0.444

	7					
	EV S-2008	0.183	0.201		0.581	0.471
Satisfaction with political system	EV S-2017	0.150	0.118	0.694		0.528
	EV S-2008	0.164	0.170	0.581		-0.504
Confidence in government	EV S-2017	0.164	0.048	0.444	0.528	
	EV S-2008	0.178	0.127	0.471	0.504	

Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017.

Table 12. Correlations between national pride and approval of democracy, EVS-2008 (sorted in the descending order, non-significant correlation coefficients in italics)

Country	Nonparametric correlation coefficient
Ukraine	0.223
Northern Cyprus	0.222
Malta	0.210
Lithuania	0.184
Montenegro	0.180
Latvia	0.167
Croatia	0.155
Estonia	0.151
Czech Republic	0.116
Greece	0.116
Turkey	0.106
Kosovo	0.096
Poland	0.093
Austria	0.091
Germany	0.090
Spain	0.090
Bosnia Herzegovina	0.089
Ireland	0.089
Switzerland	0.088
Finland	0.084

Russian Federation	0.084
Italy	0.072
Cyprus	<i>0.071</i>
Albania	0.070
Slovak Republic	0.062
Great Britain	0.059
Moldova	0.058
Hungary	0.055
Belarus	<i>0.045</i>
Belgium	<i>0.044</i>
Armenia	<i>0.040</i>
Iceland	<i>0.040</i>
Sweden	<i>0.032</i>
France	<i>0.031</i>
Northern Ireland	<i>0.025</i>
Romania	0.023
Georgia	<i>0.021</i>
Slovenia	<i>0.020</i>
Denmark	<i>0.019</i>
Bulgaria	<i>0.007</i>
Serbia	0.006
Portugal	0.003
Luxembourg	<i>-0.001</i>
Netherlands	<i>-0.012</i>
Macedonia	<i>-0.051</i>
Norway	<i>-0.100</i>

Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2008.

Table 13. Correlations between national pride and approval of democracy, EVS-2017 (sorted in the descending order, non-significant correlation coefficients in italics)

Country	Nonparametric correlation coefficient
Lithuania	0.218
Russia	0.156
Finland	0.155
North Macedonia	0.152
Slovenia	0.144
Estonia	0.142
Croatia	0.141
Czechia	0.127
Azerbaijan	0.123
Albania	0.108
Armenia	0.107
Serbia	0.104
Italy	0.099
Hungary	0.097
Spain	0.096

Poland	0.087
Norway	0.081
Iceland	0.069
Georgia	0.064
Sweden	0.063
Belarus	0.061
Denmark	0.061
Bulgaria	0.058
Austria	0.053
Great Britain	0.052
Montenegro	0.051
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.048
Romania	0.041
France	0.038
Switzerland	0.036
Netherlands	0.023
Germany	0.019
Slovakia	0.013

Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2017.




Figure 9. Changes in within-country correlations between national pride and approval of democracy between 2008 and 2017

Source: This figure was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017.

Table 14. Correlations between national pride and evaluation of democracy in one's own country, EVS-2008 (sorted in the descending order, non-significant correlation coefficients in italics)

Country	Nonparametric correlation coefficient
Kosovo	0.396
Montenegro	0.368
Estonia	0.327
Belarus	0.324
Italy	0.257
Macedonia	0.247
Ukraine	0.243
Denmark	0.222
Armenia	0.217
Lithuania	0.196
Finland	0.189
Czech Republic	0.188
Germany	0.182
France	0.177
Cyprus	0.176
Belgium	0.170
Greece	0.166
Latvia	0.166
Luxembourg	0.165
Slovak Republic	0.152
Switzerland	0.139
Georgia	0.135
Portugal	0.127
Bulgaria	0.123
Russian Federation	0.120
Hungary	0.113
Malta	0.108
Croatia	0.107
Poland	0.105
Ireland	0.098
Moldova	0.095
Slovenia	0.093
Turkey	0.092
Iceland	0.084
Norway	0.078
Netherlands	0.075
Great Britain	0.075
Austria	0.070
Sweden	0.057
Albania	0.052
Northern Ireland	0.052
Northern Cyprus	0.045
Romania	0.039

Spain	0.039
Serbia	0.017
Bosnia Herzegovina	-0.028

Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2008.

Table 15. Correlations between national pride and evaluation of democracy in one's own country, EVS-2017 (sorted in the descending order, non-significant correlation coefficients in italics)

Country	Nonparametric correlation coefficient
Spain	0.302
Hungary	0.274
Croatia	0.270
Lithuania	0.261
Poland	0.235
Russia	0.229
Azerbaijan	0.226
Belarus	0.217
Iceland	0.183
Estonia	0.179
Finland	0.178
Great Britain	0.177
Austria	0.166
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.161
Montenegro	0.150
France	0.141
Sweden	0.137
Denmark	0.135
Slovakia	0.130
North Macedonia	0.129
Czechia	0.128
Switzerland	0.125
Georgia	0.123
Albania	0.113
Netherlands	0.109
Italy	0.106
Serbia	0.105
Slovenia	0.104
Norway	0.085
Armenia	0.073
Bulgaria	0.066
Germany	0.055
Romania	0.052

Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2017.




Figure 10. Changes in within-country correlations between national pride and evaluation of democracy in one's own country between 2008 and 2017

Source: This figure was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017.

Table 16. Correlations between national pride and satisfaction with a country's political system, EVS-2008 (sorted in the descending order, non-significant correlation coefficients in italics)

Country	Nonparametric correlation coefficient
Montenegro	0.395
Estonia	0.291
Denmark	0.287
Belarus	0.276
Italy	0.263
Ukraine	0.259
Kosovo	0.243
Latvia	0.229
Slovak Republic	0.222
France	0.214
Macedonia	0.209
Lithuania	0.189
Portugal	0.180
Finland	0.179
Germany	0.176

Georgia	0.175
Czech Republic	0.157
Belgium	0.155
Malta	0.155
Cyprus	0.153
Armenia	0.149
Bosnia Herzegovina	0.148
Bulgaria	0.133
Turkey	0.130
Croatia	0.125
Greece	0.119
Switzerland	0.114
Netherlands	0.109
Russian Federation	0.106
Hungary	0.094
Sweden	0.094
Iceland	0.093
Ireland	0.089
Luxembourg	0.087
Slovenia	0.087
Great Britain	0.086
Moldova	0.073
Poland	0.060
Northern Cyprus	0.053
Austria	0.044
Romania	0.043
Spain	0.036
Albania	0.032
Serbia	0.031
Norway	0.030
Northern Ireland	0.011

Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2008.

Table 17. Correlations between national pride and satisfaction with a country's political system, EVS-2017 (sorted in the descending order, non-significant correlation coefficients in italics)

Country	Nonparametric correlation coefficient
Hungary	0.296
Russia	0.269
Croatia	0.258
Poland	0.249
Belarus	0.227
Lithuania	0.212
Spain	0.212
Azerbaijan	0.206
Great Britain	0.192

Montenegro	0.184
Czechia	0.183
Estonia	0.179
Iceland	0.178
Denmark	0.163
Austria	0.159
Switzerland	0.152
Finland	0.147
France	0.147
Sweden	0.146
Serbia	0.138
North Macedonia	0.138
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.127
Slovenia	0.118
Netherlands	0.116
Georgia	0.106
Slovakia	0.103
Albania	0.098
Armenia	0.091
Bulgaria	0.079
Italy	0.077
Norway	0.075
Romania	0.060
Germany	0.022

Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2017.




Figure 11. Changes in within-country correlations between national pride and satisfaction with a country's political system between 2008 and 2017

Source: This figure was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017.

Table 18. Correlations between national pride and confidence in government, EVS-2008 (sorted in the descending order, non-significant correlation coefficients in italics)

Country	Nonparametric correlation coefficient
Montenegro	0.362
Estonia	0.299
Belarus	0.285
Ukraine	0.264
Denmark	0.242
Germany	0.238
Macedonia	0.237
Lithuania	0.227
Armenia	0.222
Russian Federation	0.220
France	0.217
Italy	0.216
Kosovo	0.210
Slovak Republic	0.207

Portugal	0.205
Cyprus	0.159
Belgium	0.156
Bulgaria	0.152
Greece	0.151
Georgia	0.148
Switzerland	0.147
Northern Ireland	0.143
Finland	0.139
Czech Republic	0.136
Turkey	0.133
Northern Cyprus	0.127
Croatia	0.125
Latvia	0.117
Slovenia	0.105
Hungary	0.102
Austria	0.091
Netherlands	0.086
Albania	0.084
Ireland	0.084
Luxembourg	0.079
Poland	0.075
Sweden	<i>0.053</i>
Moldova	<i>0.052</i>
Malta	<i>0.051</i>
Great Britain	<i>0.039</i>
Bosnia Herzegovina	<i>0.037</i>
Norway	<i>0.037</i>
Romania	<i>0.034</i>
Iceland	<i>0.020</i>
Spain	<i>0.018</i>
Serbia	<i>-0.013</i>

Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2008.

Table 19. Correlations between national pride and confidence in government, EVS-2017
(sorted in the descending order, non-significant correlation coefficients in italics)

Country	Nonparametric correlation coefficient
Hungary	0.286
Belarus	0.268
Poland	0.267
Iceland	0.258
Russia	0.243
Croatia	0.234

Austria	0.222
Montenegro	0.220
Finland	0.213
North Macedonia	0.211
Spain	0.196
Denmark	0.194
Azerbaijan	0.186
Lithuania	0.183
Great Britain	0.181
Serbia	0.162
Armenia	0.146
Italy	0.146
Sweden	0.143
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.140
France	0.133
Norway	0.131
Czechia	0.128
Netherlands	0.127
Georgia	0.125
Slovenia	0.121
Switzerland	0.109
Albania	0.108
Estonia	0.10
Bulgaria	0.094
Slovakia	0.089
Romania	0.031
Germany	0.003

Source: This table was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2017.




Figure 12. Changes in within-country correlations between national pride and satisfaction with a country's political system between 2008 and 2017

Source: This figure was made by the author based on the analyzed data of the European Values Study-2008 and European Values Study-2017.