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Facing Organised Violence

Research Agendas and Conversion Potentials

CONFERENCE DOCUMENTATION

Elvan Isikozlu, Susanne Heinke (Eds.) \ BICC



SUMMARY

On the occasion of its 20th anniversary, the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) hosted a two-day international academic conference on “Facing Organised Violence: Research Agendas and Conversion Potentials” from 27 to 28 October 2014 in Bonn. The aim of the conference was to approach current dynamics of organised violence from a critical angle. Speakers and panellists focussed on concepts, means, and practices of organised violence. “Concepts” were reflected as discourses that legitimise the use of violence, such as security policies or military strategies. The panels about “means” referred to the tools and material infrastructure of organised violence, such as the arms industry and conventional weapons (in particular small arms and light weapons—SALW). Visible patterns of behaviour such as rules, norms, and types of actors were investigated in the “practices” section. Building on these three dimensions, the conference discussed “natural resources” and “migration” as two intersecting themes touching organised violence in societal contexts.

The proliferation of SALW makes violence more deadly. BICC conducted a project in Sudan and the sub-region with a special focus on strengthening co-operation on SALW control and cross-border co-operation.

A soldier from the Joint Sudan–Chad Border Patrol Force keeps watch from on top of a Land Cruiser while on patrol in Bir Saliba, West Darfur.

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Jakob Rhyner \ Director United Nations University

Thomas Göbel \ Head of Division, German Foreign Office

The audience listening to the video keynote by Carolyn R. Nordstrom, University of Notre Dame, Indiana

PREFACE

We can no longer blind out organised violence in the crisis-hit regions of the world nor the questions and problems connected with it. Even if we turn off television, stop reading newspaper and ignore Internet postings: Global conflicts are still even then reflected on our own streets. A global domestic policy as called for by Willy Brandt over 30 years ago serves not only the interests of peace in the crisis-hit regions of this world, but also peaceful co-existence here in Germany. Apart from which, as one of the world's economically strongest industrial nations we have a global responsibility.

As a major industrial region in the heart of Europe, North Rhine-Westphalia has close links and economic relations to the entire world. Each war and each international crisis endangers this network. That is why a world at peace must be of interest to us as well, apart from the humanitarian aspect. In addition, the crises across the globe are topics which move people. They expect guidance—and they are right to do so. As a key location for science and research with the highest density of universities and research institutions in Europe, we have the potential in North Rhine-Westphalia to make an appropriate contribution through an interdisciplinary and practice-oriented approach.

Part of this potential is also the Bonn International Center for Conversion. Founded in 1994 on the initiative of Johannes Rau, it has been celebrating its twentieth birthday in 2014. BICC is today one of the top addresses for peace and conflict research in Germany. Conversion research, which is illustrated by the conference with the title of "Facing Organised Violence: Research Agendas and Conversion Potentials", stretches a conceptual framework within which topics are investigated and correlated with each other. They range from the question of future and presence of war to the mobilisation and demobilisation of combatants, control of small arms as well as cross-cutting themes such as natural resources and migration to classic conversion topics. Structural transformation processes in military facilities and in the armaments industry, for example, are topical issues now as before.



Svenja Schulze \
Minister for Innovation, Science and Research of the State
of North Rhine-Westphalia

We have outstanding researchers and scientists in this field in North Rhine-Westphalia. This undoubtedly also includes the BICC staff in Bonn. With its high-level, application-oriented and transdisciplinary research, it is a valuable enrichment for our federal state's research landscape. In Bonn, this international UN location with the United Nations University, the Center for Development Research and the German Development Institute—to name but a few—BICC finds itself in a synergetic environment in which it is contributing to the investigation of major global issues. Its findings are in demand both at national and international level. In the past years, it has numbered amongst the top 100 worldwide in the Global Think Tank Ranking.

I would like to thank you most sincerely, Professor Schetter, as well as your entire team for this tremendous commitment. Together with BICC, you are all a great enrichment for Bonn as an international science and research location and an enrichment for North Rhine-Westphalia.

FOREWORD

BICCs vision is a more peaceful world!

BICC celebrated its 20th anniversary with an academic conference at the Uniclub and the Festsaal of the University of Bonn, from 27 to 28 October 2014. Over the course of the two days, more than 120 international researchers from different academic backgrounds debated different patterns of “organised violence” and how BICC can engage with this topic in the coming future.

Organised Violence

The theme of this conference, “organised violence”, is the new overarching topic of BICC’s 2014 to 2018 research agenda and the focus for studying “conversion.” We chose this topic for several reasons.

First, research and policy realise that the complex puzzle of violent conflicts can no longer be understood by applying a hermetic grid of definitions and differentiations: We are hardly able to differentiate clearly between “war” and “peace”, between “inter-state wars” and “civil wars” or other kinds of bipolar ascriptions. One can even question whether we have ever been able to differentiate one from the other. What is more, every attempt in the last two decades to define conflict dynamics with labels such as “new wars” or “fragile/ failed states”, or recently “ungoverned spaces”, fails to include contradicting trends, such as the continuing existence of conventional forms of warfare: The war between Russia and Georgia in 2008, the current situation of hybrid warfare in the Donbass in Eastern Ukraine or the repeated sabre-rattling between China and Japan, India and Pakistan or Thailand and Cambodia in recent years. These conflicts show that the time of military confrontation between nation states is not over. On the contrary: We can observe the multiplicity of diverging patterns of organised violence today.

Second, the complexity of war and the direct involvement of many different actors in war have become more and more obvious. Refugee movements, commodity chains or the exploration of extractive resources such as gold, oil and diamonds show that wars—even if they are located somewhere at the fringes of the modern world—have a direct impact on our daily life and make us part of such conflicts. For example, the ongoing war in Syria and Iraq illustrates how organised violence has a direct impact on our society and vice versa:

- \ We witness that thousands of Jihadists from Europe and the United States are fighting side by side with militants of so-called Islamic State. This has stimulated a public debate about what has gone wrong with social integration in Western societies. Why are citizens attracted to participate in war and celebrate extreme violence?
- \ The mass flight of refugees from Syria has become a pressing theme for national and local politics across Europe. The phenomenon of refugees is not an abstract one. Society and politics have to find quick solutions for providing support.
- \ We have to keep in mind that over the last decades Western arms industries have exported military equipment to the Middle East, which today are used for warfare. Western governments share a responsibility for the creation of the most militarised region in the world—as shown by the latest data of BICC’s annual Global Militarisation Index.

The complexity of wars does not only mean that we are facing the externalities of war and organised violence in our daily lives, but that we can no longer distance ourselves from such wars.

Third, we find blunt acts of violence disturbing and shocking when they appear in real life. Our society eclipses violence from real life, but tends to experience and even enjoy violence in virtual life: In our high-tech world social media, computer games, movies and videos have become the modern platforms, not to say battlefields, of heroic warfare. Physical violence disappears in our real life. It becomes stigmatised.

However, if physical violence and warfare appear, the Western public tends to frame such phenomena in terms of a cultural-religious othering. On the one hand, we see the disturbing pictures of the beheadings of hostages or stoning of women in Syria and Iraq, posted on social networks. Here the tendency of the public is to connect such forms of violence directly with the religion of Islam—neglecting the atrocities inflicted in the name of Christianity, the modern nation states or racism in the 20th century. On the other hand, we still believe in the supremacy of Western modernity, which is for example expressed in the continuous improvement of modern warfare: for example, “surgical” interventions and the use of the latest technology make us believe that only the “real evil” is targeted and that collateral or civil damage can be minimised. In imagining that it is possible to limit violence and human casualties to a very large extent, we have the impression that Western civilization is able to humanise or to civilise war, while IS represents the barbaric side of violence.

Summing up these three examples, BICC understands “organised violence” as a challenging and pressing topic due to

- \ the academically limited ability to cope and categorise organised violence,
- \ the un-bounding and complex nature of the subject, which influences our daily lives, and
- \ the way in which violence is framed by value and norm systems.



Conrad Schetter \ Director for Research BICC

Two Decades of Conversion Studies

Selecting the theme of “organised violence” also gives us the opportunity to reflect on the road BICC has travelled over the last 20 years. BICC is a unique institute at the crossroads between research and policy and technical advice. The institute integrates applied and policy-relevant research with concrete knowledge exchange with policymakers, practitioners and the public. This is what we call the “knowledge circle.”

BICC was established by the state of North Rhine-Westphalia in 1994 and is the only institute worldwide with the term “conversion” in its title. At that time the main challenge was to cope with the overwhelming military surplus of the times of the Cold War: Bases, arms depots, nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons had to be converted or destroyed not only in Europe and Russia, but also across the world. Other questions were the demobilisation and reintegration of military staff, and the conversion of arms industries and military research. BICC quickly became the spearhead of conversion research. BICC’s *Conversion Survey*, published between 1995 and 2005, was then one of the most prominent sources for Conversion Studies.



This broadening of the BICC perspective links present Conversion Studies with its past tradition, which focussed strongly on the military, military industry and public defence budgets. At the same time, this understanding aims to overcome the two main shortcomings of the classical understanding of conversion. These were

- \ the domination of mono-causal pre-assumptions and
- \ the understanding of the transformation from military to civil as a linear process.

In a nutshell, BICC defines conversion as any change of organised violence that responds to the problem that it poses to society as a whole. This definition emphasises the embeddedness of organised violence in social contexts. From this point of view, Conversion Studies draws attention to the ways in which organised violence translates into: a) concepts, b) means, and c) practices. These three perspectives are interwoven with each other. No single one can be investigated without considering the other. For the sake of research, the separation into these three perspectives is beneficial as different objectives, theories, methods and approaches come to the fore.



Michael Dedek (l.) \ Director for Administration BICC
 Conference venue: Universitätsclub, Bonn

While these themes are still high on BICC's current research agenda, our understanding of conversion has changed. Today, BICC understands Conversion Studies as the reflective and policy-relevant engagement with the dynamics of organised violence. Organised violence manifests itself both in armed conflicts themselves as well as in the preparation for them. This is why Conversion Studies at BICC does not only focus on the conversion of military to civilian means, but includes a wide range of themes such as discourses of war, civil-military relations, the production, trade, control and destruction of small arms and light weapons as well as the mobilisation and demobilisation of combatants, not to mention direct acts of violence.

Concepts, Means, and Practices

Against this background it is no wonder that the conference programme's structure was based on our new *Concept Paper* and on the three perspectives that we elaborated in there.

“Concepts” address any attempt that seeks to either legitimate or de-legitimate expressions of organised violence, whether this relates to the build-up or reduction of military forces or to the actual use of physical force. A conceptual approach arises from a consideration of *discourses*. The first session on “Discourses of War” discussed current interpretations of war and the—often concealed—world views and belief systems these interpretations are based on. Although “going to war” is delegitimised in public discourses

or is seen as the *ultima ratio*, one might provocatively ask if—on the conceptual level—wars are not utterly needed to appreciate the absence of war.

The second session discussed “Means of Organised Violence.” “Means” refers to instruments and material infrastructure of organised violence—such as defence industries, battle tanks and aircraft carriers, small arms and light weapons or military bases. Our starting-point of research is the *physical artefact*. We split this session into two panels, one on “Small Arms and Light Weapons” and one on “The Arms Industry.” The first panel on “Small Arms and Light Weapons” discussed possible ways ahead for improving arms control. One important question was whether the timing, the concepts as well as the stated and unstated goals of arms control and DDR were indeed the right ones. In the parallel panel “The Arms Industry” we reflected on the recent public and heated debate on the need for a defence industry—and under which conditions—in Germany and in the European Union.

The “Practices of Organised Violence” include the formulation of normative rules and the constitution of different actor-types. “Practices” can relate to strategies of mobilisation and demobilisation as much as to actual acts of violence themselves such as rape, homicide or torture. In the panel discussion we addressed

several regions of conflict—from the Balkans via Western Africa and the Horn of Africa to Afghanistan. We discussed different aspects of practices, ranging from the production of knowledge to the question of the internal and external mobilisation of militias. The central debate was the crucial role think tanks are playing for producing certain narratives about conflicts. This critical debate about the self-understanding of think tanks was highly welcome because it gave us the chance at BICC to reflect on our own role between research and policy- and technical advice.

Besides concepts, means and practices, BICC has identified two intersecting research topics for its future research: “Natural Resources” and “Migration.” Both are highly relevant themes in international politics, which are strongly influenced and shaped by different patterns of organised violence. Both topics were addressed in the last session of the conference. Benedikt Korf discussed the relationship between climate change and civil wars and argued that direct linkages are promoted by research, but empirically hard to find. Paula Banerjee focussed on the interface of migration and violence in the Indo-Bangladesh border region.

While this conference was not be able to answer all of the questions that were raised, it gave us at BICC the occasion to gain a few new insights and, much more importantly, some new puzzling questions. And finally it was the event for celebrating the 20th anniversary of BICC.

I believe that this occasion merits a heartfelt “Thank You” to the State government of North Rhine-Westphalia not only for having had the vision in 1994 to establish with BICC an international peace and conflict research institute but also for its unwavering support through core funding since then.

BICC would also like to thank all contributors to this conference as well as the kind support by the Sparkassen Stiftung, the America House in Düsseldorf, the Rector of the University of Bonn and the UniClub.

Participants in a lively discussion





Marc von Boemcken (l.) \ presented the paper “War: The First Casualty of Truth”

Concepts of Organised Violence— Discourses of War

How is organised violence legitimised or delegitimised in discourse? How can researchers critically engage with these discourses? And to what end? These questions were considered by Marc von Boemcken, BICC, Claudia Aradau, King’s College London, and Kai Koddenbrock, RWTH Aachen University, in a challenging and provocative opening panel, moderated by Luuk van de Vondervoort, BICC.

There is No Single Truth of War

Marc von Boemcken, BICC, identified three discourses of how war is conceptualised and thus legitimised in the West: war as the collapse of the political, war as the truth of the political, and war as the rational instrument of an independent political will. Each legitimisation is a contradiction of the other, revealing that there is no single authoritative “truth” of war or organised violence. Any attempt to tell only one of these truths is therefore bound to omit some of the significance of war. In an argument built on insights from Foucault, von Boemcken characterised these different discursive formations in ideal-types, working out their theoretical and political underpinnings as well as their various expressions in contemporary conflict settings.

The first discourse, which conceptualises war as the collapse of the political, assumes the existence of a universal order of peace and a nexus of truth and peace. Here, war results from a breakdown of this order, and thus is not part of “good society.” The second discourse, war as the truth of the political, is directly opposed to this, because war is placed at the centre of all social relations, constituting politics as the continuation of an everlasting war where truth can only be spoken from a position in the battlefield with clearly defined antagonists. The third discourse—war as the rational instrument of an independent political will—sits somewhere in-between. It assumes that war can be “tamed” insofar as its performance can at least partially be subjected to a sovereign human intention.

Although all three discourses can be found next to each other in contemporary discussions and debates, von Boemcken argued that each discourse warrants its own critical analysis and thus should be examined separately. For example, when considering the first discourse, peace may not be a promising perspective or truth of war, as it is itself a universalist political project characterised by an inherent paradox: waging war for peace. The second discourse is an equally unpromising perspective, as it only offers a totalising image of war. Consequently, von Boemcken stressed the importance of confronting any single discourse or truth of war with its deconstruction. He emphasised that a critical study of war is not to dis-

cover a “hidden truth” of the phenomenon, but rather to highlight the multiple narratives through which war is continually conceptualised. He concluded by noting that there might be other marginalised or suppressed discourses of war that may disrupt conventional narratives for legitimising organised violence, opening up alternative ways of critically confronting the aforementioned prevailing concepts.

Security and the Future: The Limitations of Knowledge

Claudia Aradau, King’s College London, shifted the attention from discourses of war to discourses of (in)security, which feature prominently in both research and policy today. This discourse is commonly framed in the context of the future, where focus is placed on emerging threats and how to deal with unexpected, unpredictable and potentially catastrophic events. One way to critically analyse discourses on (in)security is to look at how they approach the problem of knowledge—what is and is not known, and what can and cannot be known. Here, Aradau identified three epistemic regimes found in discourses on (in)security, characterising them as follows: ignorance and secrecy, risk and uncertainty, and surprise and complexity. She outlined each in turn.

Within the regime of ignorance and secrecy, Aradau argued, there is an assumption that the unknown can be reduced and made accessible through surveillance, transparency, and the disclosure of secrets. Ignorance appears simply as a failure which can be resolved by better access to what is held secret, hidden, or underground. Knowledge can therefore be produced by moving from depth to surface. Knowledge is always accessible and achievable despite hindrances or complications. The reaction to future threats within this epistemology implies better intelligence or surveillance and thus makes pre-emptive action possible.

Critical Security Studies

By contrast, the regime of risk and uncertainty produces knowledge by creating a parallel world that simulates, models, and mimics the “real” world with the help of statistical and computing techniques. Uncertainty is dealt with by establishing parallels between individuals and masses, or between a specific event and a class of events for which statistics can be calculated. It is a specific calculation of the future based on archival and statistical knowledge about a class of events. It underpins preventive actions directed at groups that are singled out and marked by certain risk factors, but it does not tackle uncertainty at the level of the individual.

In the regime of surprise and complexity, (in)security events are as always emergent and likely. Within this regime there is one “flat” world where surprise is inevitable and ever a potentiality encompassing the unknown as always already part of this world. The production of knowledge is simply innovation positioning preparedness and resilience as answers to surprise and epistemic complexity. For confronting future threats this leaves nothing more than preparedness as inhabiting the event.

While several pressing issues questioning these modalities of knowledge production could and should be put forward, Aradau stressed that this was not the intention of her argument. Rather she underlined the fact that we have not stepped from one to the other but that all three are present and in use even though they appear contradictory. These three regimes are mobilising institutions and society in large while their tensions are negotiated in practice. In conclusion Aradau pointed out two implications of her argument: first, that critical analysis of discourses of war needs to consider particular epistemic formations and differential modes of producing knowledge in relation to different unknowns; and second, that the issue of epistemic regimes requires us, as researchers and academics, to think over the ways we ourselves produce knowledge.

Kai Koddenbrock, RWTH Aachen University, referred to BICC’s *Concept Paper* and highlighted the centrality of critical research in BICC’s work. He acknowledged the Paper for articulating a rather explicit comprehension thereof, as this is strikingly absent in most work in critical security studies. In his presentation, Koddenbrock set out to illustrate different meanings of being critical and altering understandings of critique by referring to influential authors such as Michel Foucault, Bruno Latour, Luc Boltanski, and Karl Marx. Yet, before going into detail on these different avenues he argued in favour of considering theory and critique as always dependent on the social relations it takes place in. As an important inspiration for critical work, Foucault is positioned as refuting a dominant social force always emphasising the multiple and contingent character of reality. Taken together, Latour and Boltanski are perceived as criticising critical theory for being arrogant in assuming to know better about what is best for the actors that they write about. These authors propose to follow the lead of the actors in perceiving the world around them. However, Koddenbrock argued that through this perspective, a system like capitalism is rendered unknowable, which is unfortunate when confronted with an array of disturbing capitalist processes. Consequently he proposed for a new critique of capitalism, highlighting how a focus on the “local” is increasingly missing the issue of power differentials. Analysis in this tradition fails to acknowledge that global processes might have a systemic or structural logic that has an ontological importance of its own. This then leads to a relative gap when focussing on the relationship between conflict, war, intervention and capitalism. Koddenbrock recommended to question how contemporary capitalism works and to translate this into the study of intervention and war. In this venture, he maintains that a return to Marx would be promising as it allows a consideration of material realities and the active role of the researcher in interpreting these relationships. Critique is then always a mixture of active interpretation and a thorough analysis of the dynamics and history of what is going on in society. In pointing to current work on the link between practices of warfare and certain forms of capitalism, Koddenbrock advised that this could be a promising perspective to pursue further.



Luuk van de Vondervoort (2nd l.) \ with Claudia Aradau, Kai Koddenbrock and Marc von Boemcken (clockwise)

A Critique of Discourses of War

The question of how to go about a critique of discourses on war was a central point of discussion. In light of the thoughts put forward, what are the practical consequences they impose? Are they suggestive of silence rather than dialogue? And what happens to truth? While Koddenbrock emphasized the politically empowering act of claiming to be able to speak some kind of truth, von Boemcken referred to the unresolved question of real political contestation that is non-violent. He argued for accepting the multiplicities of truth and for speaking up when challenging legitimising discourses of organised violence. The concept of peace put forward by the panellists was also questioned by the audience, and it was noted

that in contrast to totalising notions of peace, there are other conceptions that incorporate multiplicity and difference that may offer promising avenues for future research. Finally, the issue of knowledge and particularly hidden knowledge was taken up. While Aradau suggested that transparency could be an objective to pursue, this is a typical reaction that is exemplary of modern thinking of knowledge. She urged the audience to consider trust as an important imperative of knowledge production. While it demonstrates the need for new or alternative ways of producing knowledge, it also demands that we acknowledge the limitations of our own modes of research and advice.



Michael Brzoska (3rd l.) \ gave an input on the German arms industry's strategy

Means of Organised Violence— The Arms Industry

The arms industry is responsible for producing the most pervasive tools used for perpetrating organised violence. In this dynamic panel, arms industry experts Jocelyn Mawdsley, University of Newcastle, former BICC Research Director Michael Brzoska, University of Hamburg, and Jan Grebe, BICC, moderated by Bernhard Moltmann, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, considered the state of the industry in Europe and Germany more specifically, pointing to signs of crisis and change in the years ahead.

The European Arms Industry: Changing State–Firm Relations

Jocelyn Mawdsley, University of Newcastle, stated as fact that despite the general trend of decline in defence spending after the end of the Cold War, there is a substantial over-capacity in certain sectors of defence–industrial production, as well as a low number of mergers between European arms industries. Economically, European firms have become dependent on their revenue from arms exports. Mawdsley believes this is deeply problematic, because arms exports are a very short-term solution to a bigger problem, namely whether exports can be relied upon in an increasingly competitive international market. Along with these difficulties, Mawdsley highlighted emerging issues, such as new security priorities, as well as the shift from a closed to a more fluent security sector structure, both of which play into the blurring of internal and external security, as there is no longer a clear dividing line between what is civilian and what is military. Ultimately, all of these factors suggest a change in state–firm relations, though there is significant variation among EU Member States. For example, the United Kingdom and France are open to having closer ties and possible mergers of their arms industries, while Germany focusses on national consolidation of its arms industry. The European Commission as a new actor plays into this confusion of aims and objectives. Overall, the interest in conversion is remote, though there are exceptions— notably France.

The German Arms Industry: No Clear Strategy

According to Michael Brzoska, University of Hamburg, there is always a crisis in the German arms industry. This is underlined by the recent announcements of the new German government to reduce arms exports. A core problem seems to be the relationship between the Ministry of Defence and the arms industry, which is characterised by a certain complicity of interests, in particular regarding the procurement of weapons. Brzoska sees this status finally questioned today, as Minister of Defence, Ursula von der Leyen, remarked that very few sections of the



Jocelyn Mawdsley \ with Bernhard Moltmann

German arms industry are actually indispensable; hence many areas (e.g. tank/ submarine production, small arms) are challenged as the strategy of governmental protection begins to crumble. This development contradicts the line of policy in recent years. While in the wake of the end of the Cold War some processes of conversion were initiated, the dominant trend for defence companies in Germany was to maintain their potential for arms production, but to diversify in the meantime. In Brzoska's assessment, the German government's strategy is not reasonable in light of changing security threats and capacities of the *Bundeswehr*. At present, there are only incoherent ideas on how to address current security issues, which is why the direction of change is difficult to identify: Minister of Economic Affairs, Sigmar Gabriel, for example, argues for a reconsolidation of selected companies around government protection, whereas von der Leyen is pushing to open up industry. Brzoska believes a political decision on this matter is critical for the way forward.

Understanding Demand in the Arms Industry

Jan Grebe, BICC, underlined the current trend among European states to maintain their country's defence production capacity based on their fear of becoming dependent on other states. Instead of fostering European co-operation, states follow export strategies. Grebe affirmed a rise in the international arms trade

since 2001 and, in response to NATO states' decreased equipment expenditures in their home markets, a search for new markets in Asia, Latin America, North Africa and especially the Middle East. In addition to the sale of weapons to these regions, weapons technology is also being transferred. Leading states of recipient continents, that is South Korea, India or Turkey, are not only motivated to import, but also to advance their arms industries and to strive for exporting their own weapons, for which technology is required. But rather than the sellers dominating the transfers, today the recipient states increasingly dominate the relation between seller and buyer by dictating the conditions for arms deals. Accordingly, Grebe stressed that the demand for arms and weapons technology needs to be the focus of research. Grebe expressed concern regarding the sale of Western technology to other continents, as the control over proliferation is sold in this process as well. In conclusion, future research must (1) address the tools of violence, that is the danger of small arms exported to countries where they are likely to be used to endanger society; (2) understand the patterns of international arms transfers; and (3) reflect on the technological basis behind arms exports. This mandate refers primarily to questions of demand; in other words, the recipients' interest in purchasing weapons.

Looking to the Future

In the ensuing discussion, it was emphasised that the export of arms is not a zero-sum game between the sale of weapons and the slide into mass unemployment/ poverty; rather, it can be conceived of as a win-win situation, and should be promoted as such. Mawdsley confirmed this argument by criticising that in the arms debate today, fallacies are often adopted as policy, especially at the European level—a fact that needs to be corrected. Grebe's emphasis on the demand side was challenged, as it was commented that the defence market is not only a buyer's market, but also a very corrupt market, and thus research needs to focus on both buyer and seller. How should the European arms industry be structured in ten years? Mawdsley envisioned smaller markets and increased competition, equating fewer defence firms consolidated in only a few European states. Brzoska posited that it depends on two levels of politics: the design of politics, that is the size of the armed forces in Germany/ Europe and the characterisation of military activity as “defence” or “intervention”, as well as the relationship between the state and industry. In his opinion, further Europeanisation is most likely, though not necessarily on a full-scale. He emphasised that in the arms industry, politics and the influence of actors' interests are extremely visible and powerful. Grebe agreed, commenting that in ten years it is likely that arms will still be exported based primarily on political considerations. Thus, the aim should be a “dependency among partners” with limited export capacities in Europe, and not—as it currently is—a situation in which economic pressure leads to arms exports and technology transfers to the Middle East. With regard to technology, panellists noted that the dominance of drones is predicted by experts and that, while new technologies are certainly considered, the importance and impact of conventional arms such as tanks, fighter aircraft and warships will remain, as illustrated by so-called Islamic State (IS) or in the South Chinese Sea. Brzoska and Grebe agreed that reducing the export of small arms would be the most effective type of export reduction for global stability and peace.

Jan Grebe \ focussed on EU arms exports





Owen Greene \ presented on SALW control

Means of Organised Violence— Small Arms and Light Weapons

This panel offered a unique blend of perspectives on small arms and light weapons (SALW) from both research and practice. Sami Faltas, University of Groningen, Owen Greene, University of Bradford, and Simon Yazgi, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, actively discussed the prospects of controlling these weapons and minimising their role in organised violence, moderated by Wolf-Christian Paes, BICC.



Sami Faltas \ presented on gun fetishism

Gun Fetishism

Sami Faltas, University of Groningen, emphasised that we often confuse ends with means when talking about guns and gun control, which can be destructive or dangerous. There is such a thing as gun fetishism. The term *fetish* means artefact. It was primarily used in religious contexts, however it can have a sexual connotation and it is used in various other contexts where the power of a person/ divinity is ascribed to an object. Fetishism is a form of substitution or confusion. Faltas pointed out that guns are not always and exclusively regarded as the tools of armed violence. Most often they are seen as the embodiment of certain values, such as power, virility, adulthood, fun, safety, but can also be simply merchandise or used as a mean of obtaining food. Faltas argued that researchers and policymakers need to be aware of this diversity and to carefully inquire into the function of weapons to their possessors.

There is also a fetishism of gun control. Faltas pointed out that if the ends and the means are confused, gun control mechanisms such as the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) are seen as the solution, which they are not. Here the advocates of gun control ascribe various things to weapons and measures that are taken to regulate them. Again, researchers must guard against confusing ends and means, the packaging and the content, policy and practice, symbols and reality.

Lessons Learned on SALW Control

Owen Greene, University of Bradford, provided a short account of the development of research on small arms that began in the mid- to late 1990s. Greene pointed out that usable knowledge has been accumulated since then, but the last few years have been particularly fruitful. Some overall findings are that causes, drivers, and characteristics of armed violence are highly complex, multi-factorial and dynamic. Among important factors affecting many relevant structures, actors, and dynamics of armed violence is the availability of SALW, its flows and types.

Greene analysed the research, policy and programming agendas that are implied by the term “organised violence.” The term can be divided into three broad categories:

- \ “Legitimate” means and use of violence by and for state or international authorities;
- \ Instrumental violence by organised armed groups/ actors;
- \ Socially structured violence.

For each of these categories small arms availability, flows, types have distinct potential as causes, means, and impacts. They depend greatly on context, norms, governance and security provision.

Greene pointed out that there is a lot of experience with a variety of policies and programmes by which affected states and societies can reduce armed violence. However, these need to be customised based on a detailed understanding of the risks for and resilience against armed violence in each specific country. Over the last decade, the challenge of local strategies, initiatives and programmes for armed violence reduction and SALW control changed from developing international agreements, norms, mechanisms and resources, to a supply/ demand matchmaking challenge, where poor links with security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes, coupled with governance issues, a short-termism and inflexibility of the programmes and the donors are the major hindrances.

Applied research is required to overcome these challenges. Greene pointed out that applied research and policy challenges should focus on five main clusters of international co-operation regimes to address SALW control and armed violence reduction (AVR) challenges:

- \ Aiding conflict-affected and “post-conflict” countries;
- \ Eliciting and responding to requests from fragile or severely affected countries;
- \ Promoting and ensuring adequate national controls on all aspects of SALW and AVR;
- \ Co-operation and support to prevent and tackle illicit/ unauthorised SALW cross-border flows of SALW and “organisers of armed violence”;
- \ Integration of AVR and SALW control into wider development programmes and processes.

Experience from the Field

Simon Yazgi, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, brought the practitioners’ perspective into the debate. The United Nations has been involved in DDR for 25 years, starting in Latin America in 1989. Since then, DDR programmes have become a standard tool of UN peacekeeping and have been included in most of the newly mandated operations deployed by the organisation.

Traditionally, a DDR programme is composed of the following steps: After a conflict, the conflict parties agree on a peace agreement. Within that peace agreement there are provisions for a DDR programme. The conflict parties have agreed to give up their guns and to pursue their goals through political or other means. The combatants are then disarmed and provided with civilian clothing, and sometimes money before they are “reintegrated.” A detailed/ elaborated compilation of the policies, the practices and the guidelines of integrated disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration standards (IDDRS) was published in 2006.¹

Yazgi explained that, unfortunately, the context in which DDR operations are deployed nowadays has since changed. The United Nations tries to run DDR operations in environments that are no longer peace-keeping environments, but rather active conflicts. This means that the DDR officers have little political leverage over the parties and, since they have not agreed to anything, there is nothing the officers can hold the parties accountable for. Moreover, the DDR target groups have changed, too. As most of the conflicts are internal conflicts, several more or less disciplined armed groups, sometimes up to 5,000, can exist in a conflict. Some of the groups may be local defence groups, others terrorist organisations, others join simply for mercenary outfits, few will have a political motivation, and many will have links to organised crime.

The structure of these groups also makes it difficult to find out who is in command and control, and to get in contact with the people the DDR officers need to talk to do their jobs. Also, the line between civilians and conflict forces are blurred. Moreover, Yazgi stressed, insecurity is a growing problem, and by some the United Nations is now seen as a “legitimate” target. While the solutions to these problems have not yet been found, the relevant questions to ask are known, and the goal of answering them is set.



Simon Yazgi (r.) \ and Wolf-Christian Paes

1 \ <http://unddr.org/iddrs-framework.aspx>



Berit Bliesemann de Guevara \ and Tobias Debiel

Practices and Narratives of Organised Violence—Warlords, Knowledge Producers and Reputation

This panel focussed on the crucial role of researchers and institutions in producing certain narratives about conflicts. Antonio Giustozzi, King’s College London, William Reno, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, and Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, Aberystwyth University, Wales, provided insights on this process from their fieldwork in various parts of the world, moderated by Tobias Debiel, INEF, Duisburg.

Remobilisation and Lessons Learned from Afghanistan

Antonio Giustozzi, King's College London, analysed the internal and external factors that led to the remobilisation in Afghanistan after the international community announced its withdrawal. The official UN-led disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process between 2003 and 2005 had been a failure, partly because it had started two years after the official end of the Afghanistan war in 2001. By this point, military groups had already converted into mafias, gangs and smugglers who had no political motivation to fight a civil war. By consequence, the UN DDR programme even "demobilised" young men who had never fought a war. Due to the inadequate disarmament process, the circulation of automatic weapons was really high in the aftermath of the conflict, but outright violence was remarkably low in Afghanistan. Giustozzi highlighted the point that a high fluctuation of weapons does not necessarily mean a threat to the state or its population.

The situation in Afghanistan changed significantly with President Obama's 2011 announcement to withdraw all United States forces by the end of 2014. Giustozzi explained that, with little faith in the Afghan army to protect them and their interests after the withdrawal of the international military presence, some old civil war players, but also some new players began to remobilise. A fear of the Taliban was also shared by other foreign powers, such as India. However, another reason for the unofficial mobilisation of militias and armed groups was—in the near absence of political opposition—their perceived need to defend their interests against one another. Despite their different structures and degree of organisation, all groups were unified in their need for weapons. During the previous ten years, many of the weapons had been sold on the black market, broke down or were simply kept at home. In response, remobilised groups either started to buy weapons on the black market or to find foreign states that would provide them with weapons and ammunition. Over the past few years, external funding and support has helped the remobilisation of groups.

Giustozzi concluded by highlighting the big picture of organising for war and the small picture of weapons proliferation, which often diverge. A high proliferation of weapons in a country can lead to different outcomes. Thus he further stressed that any DDR programme, which is not embedded in a larger political framework, is simply meaningless, as the stock of external funding and that of human resources that can be mobilised is nearly endless.

The Influence of Global Narratives on Armed Groups and Practices

William Reno, Northwestern University, argued that global narratives influence what kind of struggle is seen as legitimate by the international community. Although at the beginning of a conflict, it is possible for various sorts of armed groups to emerge, the leaders and groups that take hold are those who are able to respond to the global narrative. In turn, these groups enjoy better access to international resources. While people join armed groups for very different reasons, every armed group passes through a process of assimilation, during the course of which all motivations are crunched together into *the* narrative. In addition, by legitimatising certain struggles, global narratives also determine which armed groups deserve to be supported by the international community.

Reno illustrated his argument using the example of Charles Taylor, who, by trying to leverage a narrative of himself as the liberator of Liberia, responded to the then predominant liberation war narrative, which had accepted fights against colonial rulers and against apartheid as legitimate struggles of the time. Taylor thereby tried not only to gain access to material resources but also a voice in international politics. However, the global narrative changed from the liberation war narrative towards the criminal war narrative, to which Taylor struggled to adapt.



William Reno (l.) \ with Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, Tobias Debiel and Antonio Giustozzi (l. t. r.)

The criminal war narrative delegitimised rebellions and portrayed armed conflicts as something that can be managed since the international community possesses the right tools: sanctions, truth commissions, prosecution, peace negotiations. Spoilers were able to be identified, and peace was seen as a restoration of the status before the war. Armed actors were impacted by and reacted differently to this notion and the tools. While peace negotiations were sometimes seen as incentives for groups to split, so that subordinates could also be included in the process, sanctions shaped the resources that each armed group would get.

Over the last years, Reno argued that a new global narrative has emerged, which does not accept some of the foundations of the criminal war narrative: firstly, there has been a shift away from the norm of no conquest; and secondly, there has been the shift away from the idea that all territory needs to be occupied by states. A third development, which explains the emergence of the new narrative, is the phenomenon of state collapse, which was previously experienced only in African countries, but which has spread to the Middle East as of 2011. Faced with the failure of the project state, many of the fighting groups in this region seem to be in search of adequate narratives and to figure out what they are fighting for. In a similar vein, this new narrative has created uncertainty in the international community with whom to support. Reno suggested that BICC could engage in this debate by offering concrete ideas about this new narrative, about whom to support and about the connection between Western values and their impact on violent conflicts.

The Influence of Interpreters and Interpretations of Organised Violence

Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, Aberystwyth University, Wales, looked into practices of producing knowledge about violence and conflict. In line with Reno, she argued that although conflicts take place in a local context, they all have a transnational dimension. Very often, local violence is categorised and evaluated through international observers—our interpretations of the conflict. This process bestows legitimacy on certain actors while delegitimising others. Some interpretations, such as those produced by international institutions like the International Crisis Group (ICG), tend to propagate the belief that analysts or observers can assume an “outsider position” and identify clear problems and appropriate policy recommendations. Bliesemann de Guevara, however, argued that anyone who engages in the construction of knowledge about a conflict is part of the conflict as such. While the problems start with diverging realities felt by people involved in the conflict, she also highlighted the danger for analysts to be instrumentalised by all sides of the conflict. This holds especially true for organisations like the ICG that strongly relies on field research and social relationships. In addition, Bliesemann de Guevara highlighted the process of simplification that takes place, for example when the ICG translates their detailed and rich analyses into clear policy recommendations. While she deems this simplification as necessary, policy recommendations are only taken up if they fit into compatible narratives that are already out there. She therefore maintained that organisations like the ICG, but also BICC, need to be aware of these shortcomings and to remain cognisant about which complexities are being left out in their analysis, and what consequences this might have for whom.



Antonio Giustozzi (r.) \ debating after the panel

The Relationship between Producing Knowledge and the Practice of Organised Violence

In the discussion period, Reno admitted that political scientists face a similar problem to advocacy groups, because they are interested mainly in linear causality and so have to leave out a great deal when analysing a conflict. In turn, they often generate non-false conclusions that are not very operative or interesting. With regard to Reno's presentation on narratives, Giustozzi acknowledged that in the long-term the declining narrative of state unity could affect the integrity of Afghanistan in a negative way as well as the declining narrative of centralised insurgency groups when these decentralised groups take over the government. Referring to Bliesemann de Guevara's findings on the ICG, the discussion mainly centred on the question of how academic research, especially field

research, can be improved. Suggestions included to actually live "in the field" instead of conducting short research trips, to use an anthropological approach to research, to include more local researchers in the process, and to engage more with the local population instead of focussing on political stakeholders. Nevertheless, it was highlighted that the relationship between the production of knowledge and practices of organised violence is interdependent, as violence can also highly restrict and influence the production of knowledge. Furthermore, it was proposed to increase transparency about which information is being left out, and to decrease the period between the collection of data and its publication.



Paula Banerjee (l.) \ with Adolf Kloke-Lesch and Benedikt Korf (l. t. r.)

Intersecting Themes of Organised Violence

Natural resources and migration are closely related to organised violence, sometimes as manifestations of discourses of organised violence, but also as means and practices of organised violence. In this way, they are intersecting themes of research at BICC. In this panel, Benedikt Korf, University of Zurich, and Paula Banerjee, Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group, gave two highly provocative and engaging presentations, forcing audience members to question their own approaches to conducting research on these themes. The discussion was moderated by Adolf Kloke-Lesch, German Development Institute, Bonn.

Climate Change and “Environmental Orthodoxy”

Benedikt Korf, University of Zurich, challenged the view that scarcity and abundance of natural resources, be they influenced by climate change, demographic growth or other factors, lead to violent conflict. He highlighted the importance of field research to challenge the correlations presented by many quantitative studies that climate change enhances mechanisms that trigger violence and insecurity. According to Korf, this idea is flawed and amounts to “environmental orthodoxy.” Instead of adhering to this orthodoxy, Korf recommends using Tim Forsyth’s approach of looking at the field to shed light on the missing links that can explain the mechanisms between the environment and conflict. These explanations could then confront the “causal stories” that are often made up to explain any correlations.

Nevertheless, the myth of an apocalyptic future remains strong. Influential books such as *The coming anarchy* by Robert D. Kaplan link population growth, resource scarcity and mass violence. *Collapse* by Jared Diamond associates environmental stress and overpopulation to political stress and predicts an apocalyptic future in which people will struggle over scarce resources. As the climate gets hotter, the argument goes, scarcity will increase especially in places that are already less developed, leading to more violence. Homer-Dixon presents an institutionally softened version of these causalities. In *Environment, Scarcity and Conflict*, he presents the view that institutions can adapt to stress, albeit not in poorly governed countries.

What is problematic is that scholars take actual cases of conflict and use them as real life laboratories in which the future can be anticipated. For example, in places like Darfur or Somalia, Korf argued that a narrative of violent struggle over scarce resources has materialised. In Harad Welzer’s *Klimakriege* (“climate wars”), the Darfur conflict is presented as a conflict resulting from scarcity. Resource scarcity caused stress between pastoralists and peasants. Coupled with desperation and forced displacement, the result was violent conflict over the few remaining resources.



Benedikt Korf \ presented on climate change

This reading of the Darfur conflict in particular is in line with Kaplan’s view presented in his book, *Collapse*. However, other research (Kevane & Grey, 2008²) has shown that rainfall patterns in Darfur do not coincide with the conflict events in the way presented by the scarcity narrative. More specifically, violent conflict occurred during wet periods rather than during periods of drought in Darfur, so water scarcity was not a trigger. In addition, Turner (2004³) rejects the notion of a clash of civilisation between peasants and pastoralists, because these groups have co-existed for ages and have their own mechanisms in place to de-escalate tensions. Any failure of these mechanisms in the more recent past would have had more to do with geopolitics, and not resource scarcity. Also, if the Darfur conflict was a struggle over scarce resources, why would Arab militias be burning everything, destroying the very resources they allegedly needed?

2 \ Darfur: Rainfall and conflict. *Environmental Research Letters* 3(3).

3 \ Political ecology and the moral dimensions of “resource conflicts”: the case of farmer-herder conflicts in the Sahel. *Political Geography*, 23, 863–889.

Borders, Migration and Organised Violence

Korf turned to another example, the Sahel conflict constellation, where environmental stress coupled with a social crisis in already weak states is believed to have caused civil war. In fact, this constellation has led to violence in some instances, but has also led to collaboration in others. While scarcity is normally not the trigger for violence, it is still a powerful discourse that frames the debates on causes of organised violence. This discourse continues to shape our ideas of governance. However, for Korf, the apocalyptic futures presented by the abovementioned authors are imagined. What we should actually be afraid of, he argued, is a climate Leviathan; a paradigm of security as normal governance.

In the ensuing discussion, Korf emphasised that, while there are some links between resources and conflict, most studies and publications are primarily concerned with proving a link between scarcity/abundance and conflict. When these studies find some correlation between the two variables, they present a story of causality. The media often takes up this story, leading to the environmental orthodoxy of climate change leading to wars. This is then used to justify the protection of our security by means such as Frontex. Missing, however, are the explanatory variables and mechanisms that can only be found by conducting field research, and that may present a very different story. Critical analysis of this dominant discourse would require field research to counter this story, but it would also need to question how this form of orthodoxy is produced, and what other avenues of knowledge production are possible.

Referring to the example of the Indo-Bangladesh border, Paula Banerjee, Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group, discussed the phenomenon of how a state creates an enemy area and how a refugee problem becomes a security problem. Looking back at the history since the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, and at many other instances of border creation in former colonies, Banerjee takes the creation of borders as the starting point for violence. Initially, the border was drawn arbitrarily within six weeks. It ran amidst villages, even amidst houses. Fields were divided. For the people living in the border area, coexisting with the marked and fenced borders is difficult.

In the case of India, partition meant the forceful movement of populations, abductions and killings. Over time, immigration policies have changed in India. While formerly, Tibetans were given an acre of land upon arrival, they are less welcome now, not given land and moved around. In the region, Pakistan has the most refugees. Continuous migration means continuous violence.

Since the age of terrorism, Banerjee affirmed that migration has become a contentious issue. The alien is the body of the migrant. He is seen as a threat to the state. The border, then, becomes a matter of national security, which is concerned with the land and no longer with people. By crossing the land, the migrant is committing an act of subversion and becomes a suspect. Undocumented migrants are seen as terrorists, possible agents of so-called Islamic State (IS). The discourse on the numbers of migrants is inflated, especially during times of election. Refugees in this area face a tremendous amount of violence, though there is little interest in or public attention on this issue. External donors are far more interested in issues of human trafficking, especially mapping trafficking routes to Europe. There is a fear of uncontrollable population movements. This is also linked to uncontrolled sexuality of women that threatens to destroy the morality of the country. What is needed, Banerjee concluded, is cross-country, transnational research.



Claudia Aradau (r.) \ with Herbert Wulf, Conrad Schetter, Kees Kingma and Tilman Brück (r. t. l.)

Closing Panel: Reflections on Current Challenges of Peace and Conflict

In the closing panel, BICC Director for Research, Conrad Schetter, summarised four prominent questions that arose from the conference and invited founding Director of BICC, Herbert Wulf, Claudia Aradau, King's College London, Tilman Brück, former Director of SIPRI, and Kees Kingma, Independent Consultant, to provide their input.



Herbert Wulf \ Founding Director of BICC

The following four questions were raised by the conference, and have implications for how BICC carries out its work in the future:

- \ Is it possible for research to be critical on the one hand, and policy relevant on the other? If so, how can we shape our work to be both things?
- \ How can research differentiate between, and focus on what we can know, versus what we cannot know? How should we deal with what we cannot know?
- \ What is organised violence, and what is it not?
- \ Does classical base conversion research still matter? Should BICC continue to work on base conversion in the future, or is this type of conversion no longer relevant?

Herbert Wulf affirmed that there are many areas where research is still needed on classical conversion. For example, military base conversion, which is the core of classical conversion research, continues to face some resistance within Germany at the local level. Why is this so? What dynamics are at play? Wulf also highlighted the problem of industrial conversion, as some major weapons producers are building up their defence production capacities rather than exploring alternative ones. Conversion of the defence industry takes a long time, he observed, and the best way to promote it needs more understanding.

With regard to somewhat less classical understandings of conversion, Wulf argued that research is still needed on a number of unfulfilled goals, such as the conversion of “swords into ploughshares”—that is the conversion of military weapons and technologies to civilian assets—and the conversion of military spending, which has seen an increase over the past years. He also highlighted the need to examine how armed groups and militias like IS can be demobilised once defeated, which is also a form of conversion. Wulf nevertheless underlined the importance of research beyond conversion to examine the causes of conflict, in order to be able to avoid mistakes from the past. He observed that the term “security” is now preferred to “conflict prevention”, yet the aim of promoting security is not clear and too often interpreted as military action. This interpretation should be questioned and critiqued, he argued, and the securitisation of large parts of our society should be examined for any conversion potential.

Claudia Aradau emphasised that being critical in research implies an understanding of the limits of the work that we do. She suggested that being critical requires constant reflection, a consideration of what we can know amid so many unknowns, recognising that there are always limits, blind spots, omissions, and contexts that we need to contend with. Aradau advised that being critical, unravelling gaps and blind spots, can be used to offer policy-relevant advice, because it allows us to identify and ask different questions, to reframe the research that we do. More specifically, it allows us to reflect on whether policymakers are asking the right questions to begin with, and how different questions may lead to alternatives perspectives and pathways.

Tilman Brück supported the need for a transdisciplinary approach to examining organised violence. He stressed that there is a risk of considering only expressions of violence and their consequences, and not the dynamics that are involved in organising it. This often happens when violence is examined from a particular perspective, for example economics or conflict studies, which tends to consider only the motivations, costs and consequences of violence. Brück suggested that one could instead ask how any one discipline would approach the problem of organised violence, and to use the insights of many different disciplines in trying to understand the phenomenon. For example, he noted that missing from most perspectives to date is a focus on the individuals—what do the citizens think? Are they free of fear? Do they feel secure? How do their feelings and perceptions affect their behaviour? Brück suggested that behavioural psychology could offer an interesting perspective and cover gaps that we currently have about organised violence at the micro-level.

Kees Kingma stressed the importance of basing our research and/ or policy advice on an actual problem rather than generalised standards, such as in the case of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes. He noted that one of the strengths of peace research is that it can be proactive and point to problems rather than follow “hot” news items. With regard to the link between critical research and policy advice, Kingma cautioned not to get, or to be perceived as getting, too close to a certain government or donor, as this could compromise one’s position and reputation. Keeping such distance is a constant struggle, but one that must be consciously negotiated. Kingma advised BICC to practically bridge the gap between research and policy by facilitating discourse, capacity building, evaluations and programme reviews for practitioner institutions.

On the thematic front, BICC was encouraged by all panellists to aim for analytical clarity on our use of the term “organised violence”, but not to get too mired in defining it. Aradau commended BICC for putting violence, rather than security, at the forefront of our work, as this shift opens up the possibility for new questions to be asked, and new answers to be found. The term “security” closes this debate, she added, as it is strongly connoted to a friend/ enemy paradigm. Violence, on the other hand, allows an examination of how societies are organised—according to which principles, norms, and values?—which may help to shift the discussion on conflict in a different direction.

Tilman Brück (l.) \ and Kees Kingma



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