

Family and Migration: Research developments in Europe; A general overview

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working paper



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Family and Migration

Research developments in Europe: A general overview

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Abstract

This paper examines research developments in the area of family and migration in Europe. It starts by giving a general overview of major migration trends in Europe paying special attention to the development of family migration. This is followed by a discussion of several economic and social science theories explaining family migration. The paper also offers an overview of selected research topics related to this issue, among them the effects of migration on families, family functions in the context of migration, family, kinship and migration, older migrants and gender and migration.

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Introduction

Looking back on two centuries of European migration experience, one aspect stands out among all the others: until the 1960s, migration in the context of this continent was predominantly emigration, even though there had always been movement back and forth within the continent. Between 1800 and 1960, more than 60 million people emigrated from Europe to another continent. About 40 million people left for North America; and another 20 million, to South America, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand or the Asian parts of Russia. Afterwards, however, migration patterns began to change in a big way. (Müller-Schneider 2000)

This paper will begin with a general overview of major migration trends and, in particular, the development of family migration. It will then go on to look at research on family and migration in Europe.

1 Migration in Europe: a general overview

1.1 Migration characteristics from a historical point of view

Starting at the beginning of the 19th century, a surge in European *intercontinental* migration took place, as a consequence of Europe's worldwide colonial expansion. Hoping to improve their lot, most European migrants left their home country because of poverty, unemployment or political unrest. Apart from this development, Europe also faced different trends in *intracontinental* migration. During the same period, hundreds of thousand Polish and Ukrainian workers migrated to new hubs of the coal mining, iron and steel industries in France, Germany and England. Some hundred thousand Jews fled from Eastern European countries because of anti-Semitic *pogroms*. Thousands of people from Ireland moved to the United Kingdom to improve their living conditions. Migrants from Italy moved to Switzerland, France and Austria for the same reason. (Fassmann & Münz 1996)

The last major emigration wave started after the end of World War II: between 1945 and 1960, seven million people left the European continent. In addition, even while this population movement was still in full swing, European migration began to change substantially, though the results became visible only much later. With the exception of Eastern Europe, nearly all European countries developed from emigration to immigration countries, though this did not happen simultaneously in all regions (see the figures below on migration balance). A remarkable feature in the development of European migration is that *international* migration mainly took place *within* the continent. Immigration from Asia (with the exception of Turkey), Africa (except the Maghreb region) or Latin America did not occur in such numbers as to achieve relevance at that point in time.

Table 1: Migration balances in European regions between 1950 and 1995 (in millions of people)

Region	1950-1959	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-1995	1950-1995
Northern Europe	-0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.7
Southern Europe	-2.9	-3.1	0.6	1.6	1.1	-2.7
Western Europe	4.3	5.1	2.5	2.5	5.0	19.4
Eastern Europe	-3.9	-1.8	-1.5	-2.7	-4.3	-14.2
Europe	-2.6	0.3	1.8	1.6	2.1	3.2

Sources: (Müller-Schneider 2000:27, Münz 1997:224)

Northern Europe: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden

Southern Europe: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain

Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom

Eastern Europe: Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Yugoslavia

1.2 Migration characteristics in Europe during the last 50 years

1.2.1 Different types of migration movements

To be able to explain the characteristics of European migration during the last 50 years, we must distinguish among several types of migration with varying impacts on the different European regions. Fassmann & Münz (1996) identify five different types of migration within Europe:

- 1) Migration from colonial and postcolonial regions
- 2) Ethnic migration
- 3) Labor migration
- 4) Migration of refugees and asylum-seekers
- 5) Migration of elites

MIGRATION FROM COLONIAL AND POSTCOLONIAL REGIONS

In the decolonialization period, i.e. during the 1950s and 1960s, many settlers, soldiers and government officials returned home who were originally from such colonial countries as the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Italy and The Netherlands. Following them were people native to the former colonies who hoped to find better living conditions abroad. The demand for cheap labor triggered a mass migration movement to the respective former 'mother countries'. Migrants from former colonies willing to migrate to Europe had several advantages over people from other regions: most of them were already able to speak the language of the host country and also received preferential treatment when it came to obtaining a residence permit or even citizenship. These conditions made it easier for many groups: Indians and Pakistanis, among others, who migrated to Great Britain, Moroccans and Algerians who moved to France; and people from Surinam who migrated to The Netherlands. (Fassmann & Münz 1996)

ETHNIC MIGRATION

In Europe, ethnic migration often entails the movement of ethnic minority groups to countries where they constitute the majority. This mainly concerns migration from Eastern to Western Europe, especially ethnic Germans moving back to Germany from Eastern European countries or Jews leaving Eastern Europe for Israel.¹ Unlike their fellow citizens from the former communist bloc who did not enjoy freedom of travel, sometimes members of these ethnic groups got the chance to leave as a result of bilateral negotiations.

For example, Israel guaranteed all Jewish people the legal right to immigrate. Supported by the United States, Jewish NGOs were able to get concessions from the Soviet government that enabled Jewish people to leave the USSR. Many of them took advantage of the opportunity. (Fassmann & Münz 1996:20-22)

Germany also guaranteed ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe the unlimited right to return. For that reason, about 3.4 million people of German origin immigrated to Germany between 1950 and 1995. Most of them came from Poland (44.6%), from the former Soviet Union (36%) and from Romania (12.8%); the rest came from the Czech Republic, Hungary and the former Yugoslavia (6.6%). (Rudolph 1996:166) The great majority of ethnic Germans migrated after 1989, when travel restrictions were abolished following the breakdown of the socialist regimes. Since that time, ethnic Germans officially have had the right to emigrate. This caused a massive wave of emigration. Many of them were looking for better living conditions in a new setting. Their motives were similar to those of labor migrants. In the early 1990s, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany attempted to regulate and limit the immigration of ethnic Germans to 220,000 people per year. (Bommes *et al.* 2000, Rudolph 1996)

LABOR MIGRATION

By the end of the 1950s, most Western European countries faced a growing demand for labor. This was due to massive economic growth, the so-called 'economic miracle' that lasted from the end of the 1950s to the early 1970s. To satisfy the demand for cheap labor, Western Europe began to recruit young workers, mainly male, from several Mediterranean countries: Italy, Spain, Portugal and the former Yugoslavia, and later Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Turkey as well. This recruitment was essentially based on treaties and bilateral agreements.

The employment of foreign workers reached its peak at the beginning of the 1970s. Due to the oil crisis in 1973, Europe faced an economic recession in the mid-1970s. This reduced the absorption capacity of European labor markets. The governments reacted by blocking the recruitment of foreign labor and imposing restrictive immigration regulations on the residents of former overseas territories. The aim was to stop all further immigration (for more details, see Section 2). (Fassmann & Münz 1994: 7-9)

MIGRATION OF REFUGEES AND ASYLUM-SEEKERS

Another European migration trend was the entry of large waves of refugees, displaced persons and asylum-seekers at different points in time. Just after World War II, between 1945 and 1950, about eight million displaced Germans from Eastern Europe, and especially from Poland and Czechoslovakia, migrated to Western Germany; and around 4.5 million to

¹ Other European countries faced with ethnic migration are Finland (immigration of Karelians), Greece (Greeks from Bulgaria, Turkey and the Soviet Union), Italy (Italians from Istria and Dalmatia), Poland (Poles from Lithuania and the Ukraine), the Czech Republic (Czechs from the former Yugoslavia), Slovakia (Slovaks from Hungary, Karpato-Ukraine and the Vojvodina). (Münz 1997: 223)

Eastern Germany. During the same period, about 4.6 million people emigrated from the former East Germany, at least until the Berlin Wall was built in 1961. At the same time, about half a million West Germans moved to Eastern Germany.

However, the migration of displaced persons from Eastern European countries declined when the Iron Curtain was put in place and the communist regimes imposed travel restrictions. After 1950, mass emigration was mainly connected with such political crises as the national uprising in Hungary in 1956, when some 194,000 Hungarians left their country. During the 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia, about 170,000 Czechs and Slovaks escaped to Western Europe. Both of these waves were viewed with great sympathy in Western Europe and regarded as political heroism. However, the attitude towards migration from Eastern Europe began to change during the political crisis in Poland at the beginning of the 1980s, when about 250,000 Poles left for Western Europe to escape political oppression. Differently from the flight of people from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Poles coming to Western Europe were not regarded as true political refugees. They were seen as merely escaping the bad economic situation in their home country. (Bade 2000)

While refugee movements from East to West receded in the period between World War II and the beginning of the 1990s, the number of asylum-seekers from Third-World countries began to increase, especially during the 1980s. In 1983, as few as 76,000 people sought asylum in 14 European OECD countries; but these figures almost tripled within three years. Unlike asylum-seekers from Eastern European countries, refugees from the Third World were instantly perceived as having come to Europe for purely economic reasons. As a consequence, many European countries started to change their liberal policy towards asylum-seekers and introduced more restrictive regulations. (Fassmann & Münz 1994)

At the beginning of the 1990s, the migration of European refugees and asylum-seekers once more increased. In 1992, 680,000 people requested asylum in Member States of the European Union (438,000 of them in Germany) or the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). This was mainly due to the end of the Cold War, which caused political and economic instability in many Eastern European countries and civil war in the region of the former Yugoslavia. Due to this development, the number of people and refugees from the former Yugoslavia seeking asylum in Central and Western Europe grew rapidly, reaching 700,000 in 1993. (Fassmann & Münz 1994) (Fassmann & Münz 1996) Between 1991 and 1998, more than one million persons from the states of the former Yugoslavia sought refuge in Western Europe, including about 600,000 persons from Bosnia and Herzegovina and approximately 400,000 from Croatia and other states that seceded from the former Yugoslavia. (International Organization for Migration 2000: 175)

Although the number of persons petitioning for asylum was rather high in several European states, only a small number of these people was actually granted refugee status.² As a consequence, applications for asylum decreased after 1993. Most European countries tried to prevent the entry of refugees by introducing more restrictive asylum regulations. Petitioners had to apply for asylum in the first so-called 'safe country'³ they entered. For the very reason that such Eastern European countries as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia were regarded 'safe', it became impossible for refugees coming to EU Member States by land to be recognized as refugees. They had to return to the first 'safe' country they entered with the hope of being granted refugee status there. This principle was also incorporated into the Schengen Agreement and became law in all Member States of the European Union. (Bade 2000, Fassmann & Münz 1994)

² Nevertheless, a large number of applicants, especially those from the former Yugoslavia, remained in the receiving countries as *de facto* refugees. They obtained a residence permit and, in some cases, a work permit as well for a certain period of time.

³ All states that signed the Geneva Human Rights Convention were considered safe countries.

MIGRATION OF ELITES

This type of migration comprises businessmen, people employed by multinational companies and international organizations, artists, researchers and students. Meanwhile, the migration of this group has also become a mass movement, although people belonging to elites were never considered foreigners in the same way as were people coming from rural areas in Eastern Europe or the Third World. Therefore, they did not become the target of xenophobic activities. However, the migration of wealthy retirees from the United Kingdom or Germany to the Mediterranean coast of Spain and France, or to south of the Alps in Italy, Switzerland and Austria, met with some resistance from the local population. The locals feared a massive sell-out of their homeland to foreigners with money, which accounted for their disapproval and mistrust of this elite migrant group. (Fassmann & Münz 1994, Fassmann & Münz 1996)

1.2.1 Migration characteristics in several European regions

Migration movements affected the different regions in Europe in different ways. Roughly speaking, countries in the Western and Northern parts of Europe developed into regions of *immigration*; whereas many countries not only in the East but also in the South⁴ turned into regions of *emigration*. This is largely due to economic disparities between the countries of origin and those of destination. Notwithstanding, we can also observe differences in the way migration affected the different countries. Economic aspects alone do not suffice in explaining the development of migration movements. Cultural, political and historical components may be even more important.⁵

As the European experience shows, the geographic proximity of countries of origin and of destination is another important factor in the development of migration movements. Migrants sometimes received privileged access to the labor market in neighboring countries⁶, though sometimes cultural similarities and language also played an important role.

All in all, Europe recruited about 20 million foreign workers between 1950 and the late 1990s. More than half of them, however, returned to their home countries during the economic recession. (Münz 1997: 228)

WESTERN EUROPE

In the first few years after World War II, Western European countries were obliged to receive refugees, asylum-seekers, displaced persons and colonial migrants from overseas. Differently from other regions of Europe, by the 1950s, Western Europe had already turned from a region of emigration into an area of immigration (see Table 1). This was mainly due to the recruitment of people from the South and the periphery of Europe, in order to cover the economic demand for labor. In the beginning, labor migrants were recruited from Italy, Spain and Portugal, and then from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Greece, the former Yugoslavia and

⁴ In Southern European countries, the situation changed. Traditional regions of origin for European labor migration (e.g. Italy and Spain) also changed from regions of emigration into areas of immigration (see below).

⁵ Fassmann & Münz (1994) point out that, in cases where economic indicators (e.g. wage differentials) were the only factor responsible for a person's choice of destination and where as members of the EU he or she had a right to choose between countries, people from such countries as Portugal preferred to migrate to Germany rather than to France. Despite higher wage levels in the Western parts of Germany, however, few Portuguese migrants live there. For this reason, the authors are convinced that cultural, political and historical links between the society of origin and the host society can sometimes be a greater motivator than such purely economic factors as wage differentials. (Fassmann & Münz 1994:17)

⁶ E.g. Finns and Danes in Sweden, Irish in the United Kingdom, Dutch and French in Belgium, Austrians and Poles in Germany, and Italians in Switzerland and France. (Fassmann & Münz 1994: 17)

Turkey. In the United Kingdom, labor immigrants came from Ireland and the Commonwealth nations. In most cases, their recruitment was based on bilateral treaties.

Migration to the United Kingdom

Source: OECD 1999

With 5.1 million more immigrants than emigrants, the positive net migration rate in Western Europe rose to its highest level between 1960 and 1969. Due to an economic decline at the beginning of the 1970s, the positive migration balance went down to 2.5 million people, remaining at this level during the 1980s and rising once more to five million people during the 1990s. The new increase in migration is mainly due to the fact that the difference in living standards has grown, when one compares the situation in Western Europe with that of Eastern Europe or North Africa. Thus, Western Europe has consistently remained an attractive area for immigration. People remain motivated to migrate to regions with high unemployment rates, hoping to improve their situation. Most European countries have reacted to the new increase in migration by passing restrictive immigration laws.

In Western Europe, the most important immigration countries are Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Switzerland. In all these countries, the foreign population had already exceeded one million persons by the beginning of the 1990s. (Fassmann & Münz 1994) (Münz 1997)

Northern Europe

In Northern Europe, regional migration was common during the first few years after World War II: workers from Finland and Norway migrated to Sweden to improve their situation. Others left their home country for overseas. While emigration was dominant during the 1950s, the situation began to change in the 1960s. Denmark, Sweden and Norway also started to recruit workers from Southern Europe, which led to positive figures in the migration balance (see Table 1). However, these figures never reached the same level as in Western Europe. (Fassmann & Münz 1994, Münz 1997)

Southern Europe

Until the 1950s, emigration overseas was the dominant type in Southern Europe. Afterwards, the situation changed: economic growth in Western Europe led France, Germany, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium to recruit workers from Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain. For this reason, people no longer needed to emigrate overseas.

Until the end of the 1960s, emigration figures had exceeded those of immigration. Many people from Spain, Portugal and Italy went to Central or Northern Europe to find a job as a guest worker. In the 1970s, when the recession caused many labor migrants to return to their home country, the situation in Southern Europe was to change dramatically. This was not only due to Germany, France and Switzerland barring immigration. During that decade, Greece, Portugal and Spain all underwent a change in their political systems, from dictatorships to a type of democracy based on Western European models. By the 1980s, all these countries had joined the European Union.

Since that time, all Southern European countries have registered a positive migration rate (see Table 1). Similar to the way in which workers from the South moved to Western Europe, new immigrants from Maghreb countries, sub-Saharan countries and the Middle East have migrated to Southern Europe. After the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989/90, migrants from

Poland, Bulgaria and Albania moved to Italy and Greece to improve their standard of living.

Despite the positive migration rate over the last 20 years, more than 2.5 million people left Southern Europe between 1950 and 1995. (Münz 1997: 227)

Eastern Europe and the Balkans

Compared to other regions, Eastern European emigration rates always exceeded immigration rates. Between 1961 and 1989, migration from the East to the West mainly took place between the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic. Other migration movements from East to West have been the result of emigration by ethnic and religious minorities. (see 1.2)

In 1964, Yugoslavia became the first communist country to permit its citizens to emigrate. As a consequence, Germany, Austria, France and Switzerland were to recruit Yugoslav workers. It was not until the 1980s that people from Poland were permitted to leave their country without facing major problems. Many Eastern migrants were political refugees (see 1.2).

The great majority of migrants leaving Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and 1990s belonged to ethnic and religious minorities. Some of them were members of an ethnic *diaspora* with links to Western European states (ethnic Germans, Jews, Greeks). Others became victims of ethnic cleansing (e.g. people from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo) and were accepted as *de facto* refugees into Member States of the European Union for a certain period of time. Other migrants belonged to underprivileged minorities such as the Roma, who do not have a supportive lobby in the receiving countries. Another small group of Eastern European migrants from Albania, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic moved to neighboring countries in the West and South as legal and/or illegal labor migrants.

As a consequence of migration, Eastern Europe and the Balkans lost a total of more than 11.6 million people between 1950 and 1995. (Münz 1997: 225f)

2 Family migration within Europe

In Europe, family migration is closely linked to the development of migratory labor. When recruiting workers, many Western European countries followed a special concept that allowed a foreigner to stay only as long as full employment could be guaranteed to him or her. In this context, the experiences of Germany and Austria are rather typical for Europe: in these countries, the recruitment process as such was based on the principle of 'priority to citizens'. Foreigners applying for employment needed work permits as well as residence permits. Employment was only provided if no nationals were available for the job. This permitted Germany and Austria to practice 'the principle of rotation'. The basic idea underlying this concept was to recruit young males as so-called 'guest workers' for a few years. After that time, they were supposed to return home and be replaced by other young men. This concept facilitated the recruitment of cheap foreign workers in a flexible way and guaranteed priority to nationals on the labor market. It seemed to be an ideal mechanism to bar further immigration in times of economic recession and to improve the integration of the national population into the labor market. From the governments' point of view, this concept seemed suitable for dealing with the consequences of the oil crisis in 1973, which was perceived as the start of a worldwide economic recession. In Germany, the government imposed a freeze on immigration, with a massive wave of remigration starting at the same time. (Bommes *et al.* 2000) (Jahn 1999) (Bauböck 1996)

At the beginning of the recruitment process, migrants were not entitled to bring their relatives with them. The majority of the workers recruited did not object to this concept, because they themselves only intended to stay for a few years. After migrating, with the aim of saving a lot of money within a short period, many of them soon came to the realization that this was impossible. Some of the migrants also started to bring in their spouses, intending to let them participate in the earning process in order to accelerate their plan to return home.

The economic crisis at the beginning of the 1970s led to a break with the basic ideas of the rotation principle. The foreign workers remaining in Germany obtained long-term resident permits because they had accumulated claims to social services. In addition, the possibility of family reunification was embodied in the bilateral recruitment treaties. Moreover, employers were interested in keeping the foreign workers in their company because they wanted to save on what it would cost to train their replacements.

These factors, however, do not suffice to explain the increase in family reunification. From the viewpoint of the national economy, the State could not support the principle of any increase in migration during times of recession and growing unemployment, when such a development could only be seen as an undesirable consequence. Nevertheless, some striking reasons prompted European governments to back family reunification. Castles *et al.* presume that the main cause was simply that migrants were not willing to accept the denial of the basic human right of living with their wife, husband and children. (Castles *et al.* 1984: 14)

Müller-Schneider point out that this does not explain why governments accepted any family reunification at all and did not simply choose to ignore the migrants' wishes. According to him, they were willing to do so for humanitarian reasons based on the protection of family life as enacted in the law. Family reunification is not an inevitable result of labor migration. Rather, it is the logical consequence of the humanitarian commitment European States espouse when it comes to protecting families.⁷ (Müller-Schneider 2000: 255)

This development decisively changed the pattern of labor migration in many European countries. In practice, migrants stayed increasingly longer, even though the majority of them still stuck to the plan of returning soon after having brought in their relatives. This was mainly due to the fact that family reunification entailed an unexpected hike in the cost for living: what it cost for the family to live together ended up exceeding the combined earnings of those family members who were bringing in an income. The intention of returning turned out to be an illusion. The real status of foreign workers from Southern Europe and the Balkans changed from short-term 'guest workers' to long-term residents—in fact, immigrants.

Even though we do not have exact figures, family reunification turned out to be an important quantitative factor in the development of European migration after the mid-1970s. Data on family migration were only registered unsystematically, mainly due to the fact that many countries deal with applications filed by family members on an individual basis. Therefore, any statistics gathered during the admission process cannot be linked with those submitted by close relatives.

Nevertheless, some figures are available. Lederer made some calculations for Germany and

⁷ This argument proves appropriate when describing the situation in the oil-producing countries of the Middle East that have also recruited a great number of foreign workers. Migrants in these countries are not given any real opportunity to bring in their relatives, even if they are legally entitled to do so. Contrary to the European countries, some Middle Eastern countries were even prepared to expel migrants no longer needed in the work force. At the beginning of the 1990s during the Gulf War, 800,000 Yemenis were expelled. (Müller-Schneider 2000: 255)

came to the conclusion that more than eight million persons entering the country between 1973 and 1994 were relatives of migrants already living there. (Lederer 1997: 211) According to Coleman, more than 600,000 relatives came to the United Kingdom between the early 1970s and the early 1990s. (Coleman 1994:122) The figures for family members migrating to Switzerland amounted to more than 727,000 in the period between 1968 and 1995. (IGC 1995:288)

The humanitarian commitment to legally protect family life did not prevent governments from confining family reunification to spouses and children. Other migrants applying for family reunification had to prove that certain conditions were met, e.g. the availability of adequate housing and the means of materially supporting his or her family (e.g. a steady source of income). Some countries confine reunification to children within certain age limits. All these restrictions may be taken to indicate that Western European societies do not perceive themselves as immigration countries. (Müller-Schneider 2000)

3 Family and migration: research developments

3.1 Introduction

A review of the research literature on migration yields some remarkable geographical differences in the attention given to topics dealing with family and migration. In such non-European countries as the United States, Canada and Latin American or Southeast Asian countries, research tends to focus on why families choose to migrate. It attempts to answer such questions as family decision-making, family migration and chain migration, etc. (Boyd 1989; De Jong & Fawcett 1981, De Jong 1998, Fawcett 1989, Harbison 1981) European research places more emphasis on the effects migration has on families. In this context, studies have dealt not only with changes in family and kinship patterns, but also on a more general level with social change within a new surrounding. (Herwartz-Emden 2000b, Nauck 1988, 1989, 1999) These differences may be due to the specific development of familial migration within Europe. When the recruitment of labor-migrant workers started at the end of the 1950s, those who migrated to Western or Northern European industrial countries were mainly males from the Southern or Eastern periphery of Europe. They came without their family. Familial migration as a joint experience was not an important topic at the time. Issues of family and migration only gained relevance when the process of family reunification started in the mid-1970s. Thus, questions dealing with the consequences of family reunification became more relevant than studies looking at the reasons behind joint familial migration.

3.2 Economic theory explaining family migration

Starting in the mid-1980s, the family as a unit of analysis in economic theory became more and more important. A concept emerged called the 'new economics of migration' that challenged many of the assumptions and conclusions put forward by neoclassical migration theory.⁸ A key insight of this new approach is that migration decisions are not made by isolated individual actors but rather by larger units of related people. This applies especially to families or households in which people act collectively to maximize the expected income, to minimize risks and to mitigate the constraints associated with a variety of economic failures not necessarily limited to the labor market. Unlike individuals, households are in a position to control risks endangering their economic well-being by diversifying the allocation of such household resources as family labor. Whereas some family members can take on economic activities in the local economy, others may be sent to work in foreign labor markets where wages and employment conditions may be totally different from those in the family's local community. If local economic conditions deteriorate and activities do not bring in

⁸ See Stark & Bloom 1985.

sufficient income, the household can rely on the money earned and sent home by the family member who migrated. For that reason, wage differentials are not really a prerequisite for international migration. Even in their absence, households may be strongly motivated to diversify risks through transnational movement. (Massey *et al.* 1993)

Another idea put forward by the new economics of migration is that international migration and local employment/production are not mutually exclusive. In addition, there are equally strong incentives for households to migrate as well as to participate in local activities. In fact, an increase in the number of those migrants returning to local economic activities following a successful migration experience may well heighten the attractiveness of migration as a means of overcoming capital and risk constraints that would otherwise curtail their ability to invest in those local activities. For that reason, economic development within the sending regions does not necessarily reduce the pressure to migrate internationally.

According to this theory, international migration does not necessarily stop when wage differentials between host and sending countries have been eliminated. Incentives for migration may even continue to exist if other markets within sending countries are absent, imperfect or imbalanced.

Another assumption is that the same expected gain in income will not have the same effect on the probability of households migrating who are located at different points in the income distribution, as well as among those located in communities with different income distributions. On the macro level, governments can influence migration rates not only through policies with an impact on the labor market, but also through measures aimed at the insurance, capital and future markets. Government insurance programs—and in particular, unemployment insurance—may constitute a significant incentive or disincentive for international migration. In addition, government policies and economic changes influencing income distribution will alter the level of relative deprivation in some households—and thus, their incentive to migrate. Such events will have an impact on international migration irrespective of their effects on people's mean income. Government policies producing a higher mean income in migrant-sending areas may increase migration if relatively poor households are not among those benefiting from the gain in income. Likewise, policies may reduce migration if they do not increase the income of relatively rich households. (Massey *et al.* 1993: 436-440)

3.3 Social-science theories explaining family migration

3.3.1 Family migration based on value-expectancy models

Several researchers have underlined the central importance of family networks in the migration process. Some of these theories are summarized below.

Harbison (1981) uses a value-expectancy model to explain the influence of the extended family on the migration process. In the context of decision-making about whether or not to migrate, value-expectancy models are based on the premise that individuals are challenged to make decisions. Individuals have to choose between several options. De Jong & Fawcett's value-expectancy model consists of two components: a person's expectation to reach a goal through her/his course of action, and the value ascribed to a sequence of actions or to a goal. The decision to migrate is influenced by such goals as welfare, security, need satisfaction, social status, comfort, autonomy or affiliation, and values connected with the action. These goals and values are connected with fulfilling that expectation. (For details, see De Jong & Fawcett 1981)

Harbison (1981) argues that family structure and the role of the family affect the family

member's decision to migrate, by influencing one of the four motivators:

incentives or goals
 motives (or strength of goals)
 availability
 expectation (or likelihood of goal fulfillment)

In this context, Harbison (1981) identifies three functions of the family that have an impact on a person's motivation to migrate. In its role as a subsistence unit or 'family workforce', the family assigns different roles to its members.

The family determines access to family resources on the basis of kinship, age, title and other characteristics; and it sets the rules for passing on the family belongings.

The family socializes the individual, training him/her in attitudes, values, and responsibilities, as well as in culturally appropriate behavior.

The family constitutes a social group or network of relatives with whom interaction is defined by kinship rights and obligations. Family networks therefore function as important links between the individual and society. (Harbison 1981: 238-251)

3.3.2 Social-network theories and family migration

Social-network approaches also emphasize the importance of family in the decision-making process as it relates to migration. As a rule, families tend to underline the relevance of social relations and consider this variable to be the key phenomenon. In this context, Fawcett (1989) sees the importance of family and personal networks as follows:

Family relationships have an enduring impact on migration because obligations among family members are of an abiding nature.

Family members are central, highly credible sources for information on migration.

Family members become role models: through their achievements in foreign countries, they have a close behavioral immediacy that makes their first-hand experience much more meaningful than the usual information on labor-market disparities. (Fawcett 1989: 678f)

In a similar way, Boyd (1989) conceptualizes migration waves as networks that can be described as complex webs of social roles and interpersonal relations. She concentrates on such different forms of social networks as familial networks, household-related networks, and networks of friends, community and relatives. For that reason, immigrant networks exist through family and friendship, through such community activities as festivals, through membership in associations, and through such intermediaries as recruiting agents, immigration consultants, smugglers and different religious and ethnic associations.⁹

In her theoretical framework, Boyd (1989) argues that this approach has a certain advantage in that it abandons that static concept of migration as a one-time event in which a person moves from place A to place B, emphasizing interdependency and reciprocity. System-theory approaches focus on stability and movement in both sending and receiving areas. They examine flows within the context of other flows, and they emphasize that flows of people are part of and often influenced by flows of goods, services and information. (Boyd 1989: 641)

⁹ In this context, Boyd (1989) points out that sociologists and anthropologists generally use the term 'social network' to refer to networks of personal relations. She uses the notions 'social networks' and 'personal networks' in an interchangeable way.

According to her, social relations both transmit and shape the effect of social and economic structures on individuals, families and households. Additionally, social ties transmit information on places of destination and sources of settlement assistance. Therefore, studying networks, and particularly those linked to family and households, enables one to understand migration as a social product. It sees migration not merely as the sole result of individual decisions made by individual actors, nor as the sole result of economic or political parameters, but rather as an outcome of all these factors interacting.

In this context, the domestic unit is regarded as an important component in social network-based migration, which is usually represented by households and families. In migration research, this unit is important for four reasons:

Domestic units are sustenance units with their own structural characteristics that condition both a person's propensity to migrate as well as the pattern of migration.

Domestic units are socializing agents that build the foundations for family and household-based networks. Within these units, families are socializing agents who transmit the cultural values and norms that influence who migrates and why. Families also transmit norms about the meaning of migration and how to maintain family-based obligations over time and space.

Families, in the context of migration, represent a geographically dispersed group who creates kinship networks existing across space and providing information and assistance. In turn, they influence decisions on migration. The 'shadow' households in the place of destination consist of persons who have obligations to households in the sending area. For that reason, it is likely that they will help other household members or be sending funds to the family members who stay behind.

Families are migratory units. For that reason, families may migrate together or individuals can be sent out with the clear expectation that other members will follow. (Boyd 1989: 642f)

Boyd concludes that the study of personal networks in migration reveals the importance of social relations in migratory behavior. It provides insight into the origins, composition, direction and persistence of migration flows. However, she states that a large research agenda remains to be dealt with and proposes paying greater attention to the non-development and cessation of personal networks and to the incorporation of personal networks in a broader migration-systems approach. (Boyd 1989: 661)

De Jong et al. (1998) criticize that, even if there were a shift in focus from the individual to the family and household as the basic decision-making unit, economists and sociologists would be uncertain as to what would be the best way to understand the processes within households and among family members making migration decisions. They point out that interaction among family members in the form of exchanging information about home, community and labor-market environments is a key process in migratory decision-making. By means of interaction, household members define problems and issues and engage in a two-way feedback process to arrive at a decision within the constraints of their normative expectations, past interactional experiences, tangible and intangible resources, and special interests. Their research model is based on the assumption that migratory behavior is directly determined by the desire to move and expectations related to that move—which, in turn, are the result of processes of interaction within the household. Thus, interaction is a necessary condition whenever a household makes their decision about whether or not to migrate and who will go. (De-Jong *et al.* 1998: 156-158)

Based on data from a panel survey in Pennsylvania, De Jong et al. were able to prove that the more people talk with each other about housing and neighborhood preferences, the greater the likelihood that they will be willing to move, will expect to move and actually will move. They point out that those who never discuss with fellow household members what

they like in a house, neighborhood or area are primarily older, long-term residents who expect to stay where they are. Thus, the results of this analysis support an expanded theory of household decision-making on migration that includes discussing the move as a major component. Frequent household interaction about moving is theoretically significant in predicting migration; the absence of such interaction among household members is important in predicting their willingness to stay. (De-Jong *et al.* 1998: 163f)

3.3.3 European research experiences on family migration and family reunification

As mentioned above, the reasons for family migration have not been perceived as the pivotal issues in European migration research. However, some studies on this issue are available. Müller-Schneider (2000) developed a theoretical model to explain the process of family reunification. In a first step, using a macro-model approach, he analyses the systems in Western European and North American countries that offer opportunities for family reunification. According to him, any system offering opportunities for family reunification will consist of the sum of its rules related to that issue. Such a system will mainly comprise three components:

The first component consists of migrants who live in the receiving country and are legally entitled to bring in their relatives.

The second component defines which relatives might be brought into the receiving country.

The third component comprises all other the conditions that have to be fulfilled in order to reunify the family.

All three components determine the potential for family reunification within the whole system: the more extensive the first two components, and the less restrictive the third, the greater the potential for family reunification. (Müller-Schneider 2000: 261)

This macro-model approach may provide an important framework for family reunification. However, it cannot explain the process as such: the existence of opportunities for family reunification does not tell anything about whether or not these opportunities are actually used. Müller-Schneider argues that this is a key aspect. One important motive for family reunification is the willingness to reestablish family life under one roof. Family reunification may therefore be explained as the result of personal relationships. (Müller-Schneider 2000: 265)

The very reason that the opportunity to reunify the family is only used selectively, casts doubt upon the comprehensiveness of this explanatory approach. Migrants coming from Western welfare states have proved to be less likely to bring their relatives than are persons from developing countries. Müller-Schneider argues that family reunification is due not only to familial relationships but also to individual migration intentions that already existed before parts of the family migrated. In Western European countries, relatives need not come along to partake in the Western lifestyle. This may explain the lower inclination of persons from Western European countries to follow relatives who have migrated. (Müller-Schneider 2000: 266)

Family reunification cannot only be explained as the willingness to live together with one's relatives: the motives of 'pioneer migrants' to help reunite the family also deserve scrutiny. Müller-Schneider indicates that certain obligations to reunify the family are not confined to members of the nuclear family but extend to the extended family. Pioneer migrants, and especially those coming from developing countries, are morally obliged to create the conditions for reunification with other family members. (Müller-Schneider 2000: 267)

Müller-Schneider also points out that migrants create new opportunities for immigration by using the legal frameworks of family reunification. In this context, new migrants also use their kinship networks to make the most of existing regulations. Migration through intra-ethnic marriage may also be seen as a means to enhance the chances of staying in the receiving country. (Müller-Schneider 2000: 270-272)

To explain family reunification in Western welfare states, it is also necessary to view the sequence of migration processes. Each case of family reunification is based on a preceding migration process.

In Müller-Schneider's theoretical model, the degree of family reunification is also due to the extent of original migration. In relation to the first component of his model, we can argue that the more people come in as original migrants, the more relatives will follow in the wake of family reunification. In many European countries, the increase in family migration may be due to the process of original migration. (Müller-Schneider 2000: 273f)

In addition, we must look at the potential for family reunification resulting from original migration. This may be seen as the first element of a chain of familial migration that provides new opportunities for reunification. In the European context, it may be classified as 'chain migration' over legally closed borders. The logic of this chain migration is based on the reunification of spouses. Other relatives cannot be brought in. Nevertheless, chain migration does occur, even if it takes time. In that context, the children born in the receiving country become a relevant factor. When they are grown up and able to marry, some specific migration opportunities emerge. The second generation may bring in foreigners from their parents' home country. By means of family formation, the second element of the migration chain comes into existence, though with a one-generation delay. A new potential for further chain migration develops. (Müller-Schneider 2000: 283f)

Nauck (1987 and 1988) and Özel (1987) empirically analyzed the migration behavior of Turkish migrant laborers coming to Germany. They were able to prove that persons from urban middle-class or upper-class nuclear families with a weak religious affiliation, and who provided their children with a good education, will migrate at an earlier age as compared to other families. These factors determine whether families migrate together or bring along their relatives at a later point in time. Families with male pioneer migrants constitute the majority, whereas families with female pioneer migrants are rather rare, as is joint family migration in general. The conditions leading to an early decision for migration also have an effect on the duration of separation. People migrating at an early age tend to migrate together. Nauck and Özel also found that the process of reunification is linked with different times of separation. Whereas male spouses follow their wives after 3.5 years, female spouses do so after 4.6 years. When females migrate first, there is a greater tendency towards family reunification. Nevertheless, some striking historical changes may be observed. Whereas the average duration of separation was about ten years in the 1960s, this period has meanwhile dropped down to two years. Regarding this trend, Nauck (1988) assumes that familial considerations will gain more importance in the decision-making process on whether and how to migrate and do not depend on State regulatory measures. (Nauck 1988: 283f)

3.4 Selected research topics

3.4.1 Effects of migration on families

Both European and American studies analyzing the effects of migration on families assume that this process leads to social change within families and alters kinship patterns. (Foner 1997, Nauck 1989, Nauck 1999) To be able to grasp this development, it makes sense to

pursue Nauck's (1999) methodical suggestion to differentiate among the various levels requiring simultaneous analysis:¹⁰

Change at the social level in the country of origin, as well as in the country of destination.

Intragenerational change within the family life cycle, and change of individual family members within the life course.

Intergenerational change between the generation that migrated first and the generation that followed.

Gender aspects should be discussed (see 3.6).

Change at the level of society

Regarding the development of migration processes in Europe after World War II, it becomes evident that the receiving societies have changed. As a consequence, the opportunities for migrants and their relatives to find a good job on the labor market have also changed, with those coming later being at a disadvantage. Moreover, migration policies have also profoundly changed opportunities for both migration and integration. For migrant families in Europe, this has dramatically altered their chance to become a true part of the receiving society.

An analysis of differences between migrant families who arrived during a pioneer migration period and those who came later, must therefore take into account the different opportunities for migration and integration. These differences lead to a change in the behavior of migrants, even if their goals remain the same. Nauck points out that this argument is particularly important when analyzing the integration process of migrant families of different origins. However, many findings indicate that the different ways in which people become integrated into a new society are not so much determined by cultural differences but rather by differences in the opportunity structures. (Nauck 1999: 15)

Social change, however, does not take place only within the receiving society, but also in the society of origin. Nauck argues that migrant laborers often forget that their country of origin has changed while they were abroad. Migrants tend to preserve a rather conservative picture of their home country that they constructed before they migrated. (Nauck 1999: 16)

According to Nauck, it seems useful to distinguish between *intragenerational* and *intergenerational* change. The former describes processes of transformation within the family life cycle as well as changes by individual family members within the life course. The latter describes processes of transformation between the generation that migrated first and the generation that followed. (Nauck 1999: 18)

Intragenerational change

In the course of the migration process, families themselves change by going through different stages in the family life cycle, ranging from family formation to the moment of family dissolution.¹¹ In a comparative analysis of migrant families from different countries of origin, the position within the life cycle is very important.

¹⁰ Nauck argues that migration is a social process, following a time sequence in which change may take place on different levels. Very often, these differences are neglected. This may give rise to a misleading assessment of this phenomenon. (Nauck 1999: 14)

¹¹ According to Nauck (1999), migrant families tend to live through these different stages with higher regularity than do native families in the receiving countries. The occurrence and sequence of family events, as well as the reorganization of family processes, tends to show greater variation. Nauck attributes this to separation and divorce.

For the European context, it has to be noted that the time when an individual migrates within the family life cycle has changed. From the 1960s to the early 1970s, it was typical that young married men stayed alone in the receiving country. Most of them intended to return home after having worked abroad for a few years. Marriage, as well as the first stages of family formation, took place in the country of origin and in line with the social and normative rules valid in this context.

In ensuing years, family members tended to follow the pioneer migrant at increasingly shorter intervals, and the total number of families becoming established in the receiving societies increased. According to a change in the regulations governing legal immigration that were introduced in many European countries, migration was only possible within the legal context of family reunification. As a consequence, more and more migrants ended up trying to find a partner within the receiving society and not within their own minority group of fellow migrants. (Müller-Schneider 2000: 219-244)

In this context, Nauck points out that members of different origin also belong to different cohorts within the family life cycle. For the very reason that migration takes place in waves that successively comprise members from different countries, it may happen that families of different origin are compared without considering that they also belong to different cohorts. (Nauck 1999: 19)

Intergenerational change

The analysis of intergenerational change was profoundly influenced by the concept of the race-relations cycle developed by members of the Chicago School (Park & Burgess 1921). This model analyzes the processes whereby migrants adapt and become assimilated. Assimilation is considered an adjustment to the cultural traditions of the receiving country. It takes a long time and requires personality changes and modifications in one's cultural heritage. Assimilation, however, is not regarded as like-mindedness of immigrants with members of the receiving society, but rather as competence and linkage to living together in a joint culture.¹² Park and Burgess (1921) state that the level of assimilation may only be reached by the second or third generation. At this stage, assimilation is supported by an increased number of contacts to nationals in the receiving country: immigrants have not only formal contacts but also those involving friendship and family. According to Park and Burgess, assimilation even takes place if immigrants try to resist it. It happens at the subconscious level. A common language is a prerequisite for assimilation. (Park & Burgess 1921: 737)

Assimilation is seen as the inevitable consequence of interaction between members of the receiving society and ethnic groups. This causes these groups to change. The concept of the race-relations cycle may be classified as a model of collective adaptation. It proved rather influential in sociological migration research, leading to the development of similar theoretical approaches to describe this process. (Eisenstadt 1954, Esser 1980, Gordon 1964, Richardson 1957, Taft 1957)

All these models compare the level of assimilation between the first generation of immigrants and the subsequent generation, in order to formulate general laws of integration behavior that can be applied to different nationalities. Most of them propagate the idea that the process of assimilation takes place in sequence. Concepts developed around these considerations adhere to a strictly dichotomized idea of culture, assuming that, in terms of

¹² Park & Burgess define assimilation in the following way: "Assimilation is a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments and attitudes of other persons or groups, and, by sharing their experiences and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life". (Park & Burgess 1921: 735)

cultural exclusivity, one person can only belong either to the society of his/her origin or to the society of the destination country. As a consequence, the specific cultural features of migrants will lose their importance and the migrants will take on the leading culture of the receiving country as a point of reference. According to the theoretical implications of these models, individuals cease to be ethnic.

However, research results on assimilation obtained during the last two decades in the United States refute these linear-sequence models. Some facts indicate that members of the second generation, who were born in the receiving country, were indeed more assimilated than migrants of the first generation. Members of the third generation, however, often tend to recall the cultural traditions of their home country even if these traditions are culturally transformed and do not have much in common with the actual cultural practices taking place in the country of origin.¹³

Instead of theoretical models of assimilation, concepts of segmentation prove to be vital for analyzing immigration processes and effects. Segmentation is defined as a tendency to orient oneself by one's ethnic origin, to fight off the imperviousness of the status system in the receiving society. (Esser 1989: 427) New empirical research results point out the complexity of integration and acculturation processes. They may be summarized as follows: Patterns of acculturation interact not only with such contextual factors as racial discrimination and urban subcultures, but also with perspectives on one's chances of finding a decent job on the labor market.

Migrant families develop functional modes of adaptation comprising both the generation that migrated first, and the generation that grew up or is growing up in the receiving society. Contrary to the belief that their behavior is going to be based either on the cultural norms of their home country or those of the country of destination, the situation is more complex. For instance, in the division of labor, migrant families may develop flexible modifications on how to deal with traditional patterns in order to overcome certain obstacles. In certain situations, the family may also develop new patterns of action.

The ethnic community has an important moderating function. Intra-ethnic relationships and friendship networks have a great impact on migrants' family relationships.

Individual and collective self-definitions are very important for integration in all areas of society. The self-image of migrants, i.e. how they perceive themselves, is decisive for their choice of acculturation strategy. When dealing with challenges in their new surroundings, there is a close link between the structural alternatives enabling integration and how migrants feel about themselves. (Herwartz-Emden 2000a: 17)

Nauck studied the assimilation process and group integration of families in Germany and critically reviewed theoretical models of assimilation.¹⁴ Based on his empirical research, Nauck concludes the following: there is no scientific evidence to support any of the theoretical considerations putting forth the premise that migrant families are a major barrier to individual assimilation.¹⁵ Nevertheless, there are no indications that a high level of family orientation on the part of migrant workers necessarily goes hand in hand with their resistance

¹³ At a very early stage, some researchers had already doubted the universal validity of linear assimilation concepts. In 1938, Hansen said, "What the son wishes to forget, the grandson wishes to remember". (Hanson as quoted in Esser 1989: 426ff)

¹⁴ Nauck (1989) defines assimilation as a process in which the main options prevailing in the society of origin and in the ethnic colony are substituted by the options offered by the receiving society. Desegregation is defined as a process that aggregates the choices offered by the society of origin and the receiving society.

¹⁵ In his theory on the process of assimilation, Esser (1980) indicated that extensive contacts with family and kin absorb a variety of the social needs that migrant workers have. Both are resources competing with those of the receiving society in a migrant's efforts to cope with the problems of everyday life. For that reason, contacts with members of the receiving society are rare, and situational opportunities for assimilative actions are reduced.

to becoming assimilated. On the contrary, Nauck's data show that the combined resources of the migrant's family actually increase opportunities for assimilation. Thus Nauck questions the theoretical assumptions, highlighting the interrelationship of ethnic concentration, assimilation and integration¹⁶ and stating that these factors are not necessarily connected with the availability of an ethnic colony¹⁷. Probably, the self-regulating potential of a relatively autonomous nuclear family achieves these benefits in a more reliable way. This new autonomy of the family group is inevitably connected with a greater level of cooperation between spouses. (Nauck 1989: 47f)

If an increase of familial autonomy, group integration and spousal cooperation appears to occur as an immediate reaction to the migration situation, then there is reason to question some of the most frequently discussed theories on migrant families. Particularly open to question are those theories suggesting that migration-induced family changes come about as a result of contact with modernized contexts, which then lead to modernization within the migrant family. (Nauck 1989: 48)

In a later study, Nauck (1999) was able to prove a high level of intergenerational continuity between members of the generation that migrated and most of the generation born in the receiving country. Members of the younger generation tend to anticipate and internalize normative expectancies and to follow them. This happens even if they have to face up to the challenge of providing support, not only in terms of moral support but also in terms of material support. For the very reason that these are normative expectations with no equivalent in the receiving society, these processes cannot be conceived as intergenerational change through acculturation. In this context, we must ask why this basic orientation remains constant. Nauck argues that intergenerational transmission may be seen as a main factor in the propagation of minority subcultures.

Intergenerational transmission is an important element in the socialization process of young people from the second generation. Even if there are intergenerational differences in the way the young people try to fit in and react to life in the receiving society, there seems to be a high level of cooperation between the generations concerning basic values and preferences on how to behave. Nauck argues that migrant families presumably take over many socialization functions normally performed by culturally homogeneous milieus. This pronounced intergenerational transmission leads not only to greater conformity in terms of attitudes within migrant families, as compared with families who did not migrate. Family members also know much more about each other; they are more sensitive to intrafamilial interaction and tend to synchronize interaction as well. (Nauck 1999: 63f)

Nauck's findings contradict many assumptions in family and migration research, especially those based on comparisons of cohorts that indicate intergenerational differences at the aggregate level. These aggregate differences lead to the conclusion that intergenerational relations are endangered at the individual level, thus increasing intergenerational conflicts within migrant families. Nauck's research design directly compares dyadic intergenerational relations in both the society of origin and the society of destination. In this way, he was able to prove that these assumptions are indeed wrong.

Summarizing Nauck's findings on the acculturation of families, we may say that knowledge about both the society of origin and the receiving society, as well as contacts with one's own ethnic group and with members of the receiving society, are independent factors. Therefore,

¹⁶ See Wiley 1970a.

¹⁷ An ethnic colony comprises different relationship structures within migrant communities, on the basis of self-organization within a certain area. Such a colony can emerge and develop with any minority group, with intra-ethnic relationships voluntarily sought out and nurtured. (Heckmann 1992: 97f)

there is no reason to expect migration to have linear effects on families.

3.5 Family functions in the context of migration

There has only been fragmentary analysis of the family's functions within the context of migration. Some studies highlight protection as a central role of the family. (Keefe *et al.* 1979, Markides *et al.* 1986, Mays 1983, Taylor 1985, Wolf *et al.* 1983) They point out that the more negatively members of the receiving society react to the presence of migrant families, the more the family turns into the only place where the people in that family can develop a positive self-image. The family, then, is regarded as a refuge, a place where one can feel safe and secure from the rejection of others. The pressure from outside requires a special 'economy' within the family to provide support, as well as an efficient management of intrafamilial power. This is especially true for migrant families with an agricultural background. The extended family takes on both a protective and integrative role.

There is no agreement on the extent to which these functions are taken over by the family in the context of migration. Maldonado (1979) points out that the protective function of the Mexican-American family is a myth. Industrialization in the country of origin had already shattered this function even before the people emigrated. Mays was able to prove that the extended family among the Asian minority experienced a revival in Great Britain. The Mexican-American extended family is also described as a highly protective network characterized by intensive interaction with grown-up children. (Markides *et al.* 1986) For Germany, Herwartz-Emden (2000a) points out that the nuclear family has become more central in the context of migration. According to her, the focus is on the couple relationship along with special relationships with children.

Other studies highlight the special integrative function of the family within the process of migration. Jelen (1993) regards the family as the central key to enable integration into the society of the receiving country. He draws special attention to the function of education and to the status of women within families. In this context, he argues that those families who practice a non-authoritarian upbringing and simultaneously grant women a high status within the family provide a good starting point for a successful integration into the society of the receiving country.

Other studies also acknowledge the importance of the family as a facilitating element for integration. (Dietzel-Papakyriakou 1993, Izquierdo Escribano 1996, Pumares 1996, Tribalat *et al.* 1996) Nevertheless, many of them do not agree with Jelens' conviction that the family is the only decisive factor accounting for successful or unsuccessful integration. Izquierdo Escribano (1996), Pumares (1996) and Tribalat (1996) indicate that legal, social and economic setups in the receiving country are also important elements in the integration process. Contrary to Jelens' findings, these authors come to the conclusion that difficult external living conditions within the receiving country might also weaken the integrative potential of migrant families.

Nauck (1989) states that the mere presence of the family in the receiving context does not support personal integration and desegregative processes. Personal integration requires the ability to adapt. It relates to more collective decision-making processes and to a higher willingness to cooperate within the family. The empirical results show that these adaptation skills end up reducing psychological tension among family members. This makes Nauck assume that the family reacts to the migration situation by strengthening its boundaries. (Nauck 1989: 47f) Fernández de la Hoz & Pfliegerl (1999) see family integration as a dynamic process that can follow different courses. With integration processes, different internal dynamics appear to result from (1) the interplay between concepts and lifestyles familiar to both the majority of the population and the migrants, (2) the basic conditions prevailing in the

receiving country, and (3) the 'family migration project'¹⁸. Hence, integration is also conceived as an open process. In their contact with the receiving society, migrants can define their original migration objectives in a new way, while simultaneously establishing themselves in a new life. (Fernández de la Hoz & Pfliegerl 1999: 109-111)

3.6 Family, kinship and migration

Even though kinship relations are an important factor in explaining the development of family migration processes, migration research hardly ever pays attention to this issue in its own right. This is mainly due to the specific tradition in this research field that either highlights the particular role of the individual or analyzes the ethnic community in the context of the receiving country. However, migration research does not address family and kinship relations in the same way. In part, these are dealt with in the framework of analyzing ethnic communities. Such analyses consider both relationships within ethnic communities and kinship relations to be structurally similar, which justifies not paying special attention to them. At present there is some controversy over the impact of kinship relations on migration.

On the one hand, family and kinship relations are regarded as an alternative to integration. Extensive family contacts meet many of a migrant's social needs and are therefore regarded as an institutional system opposing the receiving society but that helps to overcome everyday problems. As a consequence, it is assumed that migrants have rather few and coincidental contacts with members of the receiving society. This reduces their readiness to assimilate and to accept the norms and values of the receiving society. Family and kinship relations therefore work in a way similar to that of ethnic colonies. As Wiley (1970b) points out, they reduce the probability of status mobility for the very reason that migrants remain in closed communities. Consequently, the strong family orientation of migrant laborers is considered to be responsible for their being opposed to becoming integrated into the receiving society. This is mainly due to the fact that strong family ties are associated with the traditional norms of the society of origin. This family orientation on the part of migrants, along with their feeling a strong bond with family members and relatives, thus prevent assimilation outside the family. (See Nauck & Kohlmann 1998: 204)

On the other hand, family and kin are taken to support migration, as family members and relatives provide invaluable knowledge about social relations particularly helpful in the integration process. (Choldin 1973, Gurak & Caces 1992, Hendrix 1979, MacDonald & MacDonald 1964, Tienda 1980) (also see 3.5) Consequently, a strong family orientation is regarded as an important factor in the integration process, one which encourages migrants to make choices in favor of assimilation. Wilpert (1980) considers family and kinship relations as an essential factor facilitating successful integration processes, while the lack of these relations promotes identification with deviant subcultures.

Nauck (1998) argues that theoretical considerations and empirical findings both raise doubts about the prevailing perspective in migration research. He states that family and kinship relations are a special case within that of ethnic colonies. In addition, he argues that the importance of ethnic colonies for a migrant's integration process is presumably overestimated, because they are ascribed achievements actually obtained within kinship relations. Ethnic colonies are probably meaningless for the development and speed of these processes. (Nauck & Kohlmann 1998: 204f)

¹⁸ The 'family migration project' comprises all the family's intentions and aims that encouraged them to migrate in the first place. Whether the migration project changes during the process of migration, is substantially determined by such factors as the prevailing legal and economic conditions in the receiving country and the experience of the migrant families with the majority of the population at both the public and private levels. Furthermore, the current situation and available opportunities in the country of origin also influence the migration project. If there persists a political and economic crisis that endangers the basic living conditions of families over a long period of time, then migration will become more likely. (see Fernández de la Hoz & Pfliegerl 1999: 110f)

Regional data from various European research projects indicate the importance of kinship relations as opposed to ethnic colonies. These projects highlight the fact that migrant clusters sharing the same regional background can be observed in various regions of Europe. This phenomenon is not due to ethnic affiliation but rather to family and kinship relations. (See Boyd 1989, MacDonald & MacDonald 1964, Tilly & Brown 1968) Other studies show that migrants cultivating extensive kinship relations are more likely to migrate. (Choldin 1973, Hendrix 1979, Litwak 1960) These family and/or kinship networks are used in the country of origin as a basis for supporting relatives who have stayed behind; however, they are also utilized as first contacts in the receiving society. (Abadan-Unat 1977, Friedl 1976, Jitodai 1963, Pessar 1982, Pfliegerl & Fernández de la Hoz 2001)

Nauck was able to prove these hypotheses in a research project studying the kinship relations of Turkish migrant families in Germany. He found clear indications that kinship relations play an important role in shaping social integration—at least for the first generation of Turkish migrants—while contacts with members of the same ethnic background are not relevant. The integration of migrant families therefore does not develop along ethnic but rather along family lines. Relationships to people from the same country of origin develop quite differently from the patterns of an ethnic community. Moreover, the bilateral social relationships in this context do not tend to be close. (Nauck & Kohlmann 1998: 217f)

Nauck underlines the fact that the migration process connected with the chain migration of family members leads to some significant changes within the family and kinship relationships of Turkish migrant families. Instead of settling near the husband's parents, they tend to move in with the husband's brothers, while both parents remain in the country of origin. Parents cease to be the closest persons who either provide or receive help in everyday life, since despite their important role as personal advisors on crucial family issues they are simply too far away. The supportive role they fulfilled in the 'old country' is taken on by brothers and sisters, as well as by brothers- and sisters-in-law. (Nauck & Kohlmann 1998: 218f)

Another striking fact in Nauck's findings is the great importance of kinship relations for young Turkish migrants. Among Turkish migrants, 50% of the daughters and 60% of the sons identify at least one brother or sister as an important reference person. These close relationships may be due to the early experience of living together in families with more than one child. A high average spatial distance from one another is an indicator that close relations are not contingent upon living together in one household. (Nauck & Kohlmann 1998: 219f)

High-intensity contacts with other kinship members, however, cannot be taken as a proof that these migrants live in extended families comprising more than two generations as well as other more distant relatives. There is a striking difference in the quality and intensity of relationships between family and kin. Turkish migrant families living in Germany display all the characteristics of the modern intimate nuclear family, but they also show a clear internal differentiation of sex, generation and rank among siblings. Relationships with people outside the (extended) family rarely exist for Turkish men and hardly ever for Turkish women. According to Nauck, the development of personal relations is strongly linked to the availability of extended family members. (Nauck & Kohlmann 1998: 224f)

3.7 Older migrants

In the last decade, the number of older migrants in Western European countries has grown, because a greater number of them has decided to stay in the receiving countries. In addition, many migrants brought their elderly relatives and family members with them. In some of the receiving countries that have a longer history of migration and a greater number of migrants

(e.g. France and Great Britain), the rate of older migrants is already higher than in countries that have not been receiving migratory labor for such a long time. It is estimated that, in 2010, more than 1.3 million foreigners aged 60 or above will live and stay in Germany. In 2010, migrants aged 60 and above will constitute 6.4 % of all persons living in Germany in this age bracket (in 1987, this figure was about 1.3%). Many of them do not choose to stay but are forced to, because an unstable political, economic and/or social situation prevents them from returning home.

As Dietzel-Papakyriakou (1993) explains, the plan to eventually go home is a fixed part of the migration project of first-generation migrants. Many of them, however, constantly postpone their return home until they finally decide to stay, seeing no feasible way to fulfil their original goal.

Therefore, the question of whether to return or stay is a central topic in that area of migration research that focuses on older migrants. This is due to the fact that the option to return home no longer corresponds to the migrants' intention to actually do it. During the first few years after the migration process had started in many European countries, information from the migrants themselves proved to be helpful when planning necessary services for them. Today, this information is no longer reliable, as many migrants stay even if they still have an underlying desire to return home. Various factors are responsible for this phenomenon.

In this context, the economic situation proves to be an important factor. Because many migrants find it impossible to save enough money to guarantee a good life in their home country, it seems rather clear why they would decide to stay despite their feelings of fear and uneasiness. (Perrone 1995: 259) Moreover, the family situation of older migrants is an important factor in their decision to stay or return home. Many older migrants with children who were able to settle in well, choose to remain with their children simply because they no longer have a lot of contacts in their home country. Many of them take on certain duties, such as caring for their children and grandchildren. In return, they can expect to be supported by their children. (Dietzel-Papakyriakou 1993: 88-97)

Another important reasons for migrants to stay may be their health status . Since older migrants have worked for a long time in the respective receiving country, they are entitled to certain social benefits. If they return to their country of origin, they run the risk of forfeiting claims linked to their place of residence and (former) employment. Certain regulations may prevent older migrants from returning to their country of origin once they have retired. Pensions from the receiving country cannot be transferred to the 'old country' if the old people return, nor will they have access to the health-care benefits of the receiving country if they go abroad. (Naegele *et al.* 1997)

The question of care for the elderly becomes more important as migrants get older. The family plays an important role in this context, as many migrants—and especially those from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey—regard it as their special task to care for elderly family members. Nevertheless, this question will probably lead to certain conflicts within families in the future, as the need for elderly care will increase to the point where it cannot be completely covered by the family. Many institutions that care for elderly people are not yet prepared to meet the special needs of older migrants. (Dietzel-Papakyriakou 1993: 39-42) (Fernández de la Hoz & Pfliegerl 2000)

In addition, the way older migrants assess the situation in their home country is another important factor governing the decision of whether to return home or not. Long-term political and economic crises may endanger their living situation in their home country and are therefore bound to impede their return. Moreover, an extended stay in the receiving country

may lead to alienation from the home society. Özakin (1993) was able to prove that their compatriots in the old country regarded as foreigners those migrants who had lived in Germany for a long time. Besides, migrants tend to idealize their home country and adhere to a certain image from the past that no longer corresponds with the current situation back home. (Özakin 1993)

3.8 Gender and migration

A family-oriented perspective on migration must include gender-specific dimensions of intrafamilial processes. It is important to analyze the distinctive role women play during the migration process in order to understand not only their specific position but also the special function of the family in general. Accordingly, it is also important to analyze the specific role of men during the migration process even though research on this topic is rather scarce. (Herwartz-Emden 2000a)

3.8.1 Women and migration

According to Morokvasic (1993) the obvious recent interest of researchers and policy-makers in women's migration can be traced back to the mid-1970s. Before that time, mainstream research was overwhelmingly gender-blind and specific issues concerning women were only dealt with in the framework of family migration. The specific role of women in the migration process had been totally neglected. (Pedraza 1991: 303) In the European context, two factors contributed to an increased focus on female migrants.

A quantitative increase in the number of women both in the migratory flow and within the immigrant minority population.

Increasing evidence in the 1970s that a great number of these women had entered the labor market.

Differently from the 1960s and the 1970s, we can no longer speak about male-dominated migratory patterns. In some ethnic groups, women are already in the lead¹⁹; and in some receiving countries the gender ratio is almost even.²⁰ In some cases, women have been pioneers in the migratory chains for the very reason that they responded more readily than did men to the factors that attracted them to the countries of destination. (Morokvasic 1993: 463)

Recent studies picture women as major participants in the process of family migration. As Zlotnik points out, women are important economic actors; their participation in economic activities is closely related to the needs of their families. The work choices made by migrant women cannot be understood without taking into account the situation of their family and women's role within this setting. More and more women are becoming migrant workers in order to improve the economic situation of their family or at least to ensure that the family's basic survival needs are met. Simultaneously, women rely on their family to provide the various types of support that both enable them to migrate and that influence the outcome. (Zlotnik 1995: 269)

The family proves to be not only the central reference point for female migrants but also the basis for their gainful employment. Their participation in the labor market is vital for the survival, welfare and advancement of their family. As mentioned above, the family also turns out to be an important resource for women in a hostile environment. For women with an

¹⁹ For instance, in 1995, some 19,000 Filipino female migrants worked in Italy, as opposed to only 8,700 Filipino men (see OECD 1999: 310).

²⁰ This applies, for instance, to Yugoslav female migrants living in The Netherlands. In 1997, some 22,900 female migrants lived there, with an almost equal number of 23,800 male migrants (OECD 1999: 288).

insecure social status, the family often turns out to be the only place where they can develop a positive sense of identity. For female migrants, the family is an anchor. A change in conditions encourages female migrants neither to change their family concept nor to question the relationship between husband and wife. However, these developments challenge them to change unfavorable conditions so as to achieve a positive result for the whole family network. (Herwartz-Emden 2000a: 23)

For a long time, international research held on to the thesis that female migrants are suppressed and discriminated in three ways. Approaches working with this concept are based on the idea that women migrate from traditional to modern cultures/societies. Such approaches harbor the assumption that the women rarely worked outside the home before they migrated. They consider female migrants as suppressed because of their gender, their affiliation to a given social class or national origin, and because of their status as foreigners in the receiving society. Therefore, they are at a triple disadvantage:

as foreigners

as employees

in comparison to men (Herwartz-Emden 2000a: 24)

In addition, some European studies proved that the situation for female migrants is more complex than had originally been assumed.

Andezian (1986) analyzed the situation of Muslim women migrating from Algeria to France. She pointed out that, during immigration, one could observe a redefinition of traditional roles within Algerian families. In the absence of mothers-in-law and other members of the extended female kinship network, Algerian wives became more important in decisions concerning their children's education, their matrimonial choices, and their relationship not only with the host society but with the home country as well. Their range of activities was to broaden significantly, and they gained access to a public world previously reserved only for men. Although few Algerian women worked outside the home, they had to contend with different public services, such as schools and health departments, in order to fulfil their role of wife and mother. In such bureaucratic surroundings, they quickly learn that they cannot rely on husbands, who are often equally illiterate and have little leisure time. Andezian's findings prove the incorrectness of the belief that Algerian women in France are becoming increasingly confined to the domestic world. Immigration has virtually forced them to have contact with the world outside their home. Moreover, Algerian women continue to be excellent, expressive emotional leaders both within their family and their community. Beyond these traditional roles of nurturing, controlling interpersonal relations and spreading information, women have taken on other roles. They are religious leaders, butchers selling lawful meat, shopkeepers selling ritual clothing, tenants of public baths for purification rituals, and singers of ritual chants performed during feasts and such familial events as births, circumcisions and weddings. For the very reason that Algerian men are often too occupied with their salaried work, it is the women using their social networks who assume the task of ensuring the symbolic life of their families. While in Algeria they formerly performed some of these roles—primarily as assistants to men—in France they have become fully responsible for the tasks of making symbolic life both official and legitimate. (Andezian, 1986: 258)

However, Algerian women living in France do not seem to consider their autonomy and competence to be the result of the liberation ideology propagated by Western women. Instead, their role is to do what men can no longer do. For that reason, they contribute to the maintenance of the basic symbols and values of their socio-cultural system. According to Andezian, immigration reveals that the production of a sense of identity and the creation of a new symbolic order are largely due to the participation of women. (Andezian, 1986: 265)

Bhachu (1986) found out, in London, that Sikh women from East Africa are heavily involved in communal and religious activities. Contrary to the widespread image of the subservient and locked-up Asian woman, the study analyzes their freedom to move and the time they spend on social activities. It also highlights the participation of these women in public life as well as their integration into the labor market. Paid labor has had a great impact both on the hierarchy within families and on specific traditional patterns. Nowadays Asian women from India and East Africa have more financial power within the family than ever before. In her analysis of Jamaican women in London, Foner (1975) was able to show the opportunities and freedom that many of these migrants have obtained through migration. Especially women working in white-collar jobs reported that they have had the opportunity to develop their potential in a way they never would have been able to do in their home country.

All these examples indicate an increase in public and private status, as well as more opportunities for the women to move around. Female migrants see these achievements as a result of having emigrated. This is in sharp contrast to the popular belief that these groups are burdened with too many expectations or that they are suppressed.

The assumption that female migrants never worked outside their home cannot be sustained, because many women were gainfully employed in their home countries. In the receiving country, they are entering the labor market in ever-greater numbers. According to Morokvasic (1991), society may consider some women to be outside the labor force but it should be stressed that women have always worked. These women are not 'engaging in' or 'locked out' of economic activity; rather, it is a simple question of whether they are paid for their work or not. Their income, however, is lower than that of women in the receiving country. This is mainly due to the fact that migrant women often take on jobs below their level of qualification and competence, that are characterized by insecurity, low wages, and a high level of safety and health risks.²¹ (Morokvasic 1991: 74f)

Morokvasic (1991) also points out that migrant women feel most discriminated against because they are migrants or foreigners. This tends to mask the exploitation by a male employer. It may also force a woman to stand by her husband whatever her relationship with him is. Nevertheless, paid work may enable women to somewhat assert their economic independence *vis-à-vis* men, though it does create a dependency on work and blocks their reacting to oppressive working conditions. They are less likely to question the unequal distribution of power within their home, or the fact that decision-making in the household may not be an option for them, because their work experience on the outside is often unrewarding and does not represent a sufficiently attractive alternative for social recognition. For this reason, performance in household tasks may remain the only possible source for getting this recognition, thus compelling women to accept the *status quo* in domestic relations. In a hostile environment, they may also feel like they are in the same boat with their husband and will therefore offer solidarity and seek compromise rather than seeking change through conflict. (Morokvasic 1991: 76)

These findings contradict all views in feminist research that focus on the family as the

²¹ Morokvasic (1991) points out that this might also apply to migrant men. The difference, however, is that the working women often do not fit in with the prevailing ideology of work. Their activities are underrated in official data and are not always recognized as economic activity at all. The women are employed in the service sector, rendering domestic services, working in petty trades, or taking on seasonal jobs (e.g. in the agro-industry or assembling garments or electronic equipment in their own home). Women in these types of jobs may all be considered as outside the labor force only because they are outside the formal economy. According to Morokvasic, official economic activity rates that show the number of migrant women active in the labor force largely underestimate their economic participation, particularly for such immigrant groups as North African migrants in France or Turkish migrants in Germany. (Morokvasic 1991: 75)

primary and most significant site for women's oppression. Studies on migrant women have often stated that the women take their subordinate position for granted. According to Morokvasic, the assumption that this subordinate position is the result of the migrant women's own cultural heritage not only contributes to their victimization, but also partly shifts the responsibility for this situation on them.²² (Morokvasic, 1991: 79)

Does migration lead to social change? Based on her own empirical investigations, Morokvasic estimates that, both on an individual and collective basis, women would rather oppose their situation than resign themselves to it. Opposition as an alternative to the direct adoption of values and behaviors in the new society is a basis for change. According to Morokvasic, there is no general answer to this question. Nevertheless, it seems to be true that gender inequalities remain intact, although some facets in the relations between genders may have been modified. The new environment certainly may raise women's awareness of their own possibilities. This might not be the case immediately but may well turn out to be true in the long run or for the generations to come. To enable women to speak about change, they have to be able to compare past and present experiences in a number of areas, such as participation in paid activity, income distribution and the chance to control their earnings, the distribution of household activities and decision-making. In each particular case, the outcome will be determined by the cultural context, the migrants' social class, and the interaction between genders both within the family and in the workplace outside the family. (Morokvasic, 1991: 81)²³

Morokvasic and Zlotnik (Zlotnik 1990) both come to the conclusion that women not only gain but also lose in the migration process. Depending on earlier experience, migration may strengthen the existing gender relations, increase inequalities or, on the other end of the spectrum, contribute to more equal relationships. It seems that women with prior experience in urban paid employment and with an above-average educational level are better prepared to face the challenges of the new environment than are other women. Nevertheless, the positive effects migration has on women should not go unnoticed, as Zlotnik indicates. Even in cases where their situation did not improve from an objective point of view, many of the women subjectively assess the migratory experience in a positive way. (Zlotnik 1990: 381)

3.8.2 Men and migration

As outlined above, the fact that specific issues concerning women were only dealt with in the framework of family migration (see 3.6.1) does not mean that there is much more research on male migrants, at least in terms of focusing on the meaning and change of their gender role. In fact, research on male migrants has remained rather unspecific, as they were treated as an undefined category ('migrant') rather than as subjects. In general, the consequences migration has had on men's sense of identity has not yet been systematically analyzed.

Nevertheless, there are some findings. Westphal (2000) indicates that men who have migrated do indeed change. Within the social context of the receiving society, they have to cope with their concept of masculinity. As a consequence of migration, which often coincides with experiences of discrimination and deprivation, it may be assumed that many of them undergo an intensive transformation processes. Adapting a theoretical model by Connell

²² Morokvasic points out that this has led to a proliferation of supportive agencies and institutionalized assistance. These agencies used to be helpful as transitory measures but are often outdated in their objectives, thus tending to control migrant women and stifle their own initiatives. (Morokvasic 1991: 79)

²³ Morokvasic highlights that the lack of systematic pre- and post-migration 'evidence' is the most serious deficit. The pre-migration 'evidence' sometimes consists of little more than assumptions stating that the societies of origin are traditional and backward and that gender relationships are less egalitarian as compared to the situation in the receiving societies. Another strategy is to make comparisons between migrant and native women based on criteria that are badly out-of-context, e.g. birth rates, economic activity, etc. (Morokvasic 1991: 81)

(1995)²⁴, Westphal states that male migrants are especially involved in the transformation process from hegemonial to marginalized masculinity. Even if some of them still show hegemonial tendencies, they lack authority within the society of the receiving country and are confronted with normative control by other men. Fatherhood as a part of the male gender identity is also affected. However, the question of whether migrant fathers experience this as a crisis of their fatherhood or whether they are emotionally challenged, has not yet been systematically analyzed. This also holds true for the question of whether they take this process as a chance to develop new forms of masculinity and other types of relationships with their children. Moreover, there are no studies on the effects of male transformation processes regarding marital relationships and children's development or well-being. Lacking are studies from a male perspective on the gender-specific allocations of duties, especially concerning child care and bringing up children. (Herwartz-Emden 2000b)

4 Conclusion

Family groups do achieve recognition as central agents in the migration process. However, in comparison with other topics in migration research—and not only in Europe—only a few studies examine the specific roles played by the family. Zlotnik (1995) argues that this is mainly due to two factors:

The strong influence that economic theory has had on migration research, which entails the widespread tendency among economists to view work only in terms of activities that produce an income: For the very reason that many of the activities taking place within families cannot be measured in monetary terms, economists have largely ignored them.

The prevalent but erroneous view that international migration comprises a transaction between States and family groups: Official migration statistics gathered during the migration process are mostly based on individuals and do not permit links to the family. As a consequence, in many countries it is rather difficult to use national data to trace, for instance, how families become separated or reunited during the migration process. It is also almost impossible to analyze which family strategies lead to which types of migration (Zlotnik 1995:253f)

Nevertheless, some theoretical efforts have been made in both economic and sociological research to explain the process of family migration. In economic theory, the family as a unit of analysis has become more and more important since the 1980s. In sociological research, social-network approaches also emphasize the importance of families in the process of coming to a decision about whether or not to migrate.

European research generally places more emphasis on the effects migration has on families. In contrast, in non-European countries (the United States, Canada, Latin America and Southeast Asia), much of the of research focuses on the reasons why families migrate, analyzing issues related to decision-making, family migration, chain migration, etc.

In light of the above, many European studies have dealt not only with changes in family and kinship patterns, but also on a more general level with social change in new surroundings.

²⁴ Connell (1995) points out that masculinity in and of itself does not exist. Moreover, different forms of masculinity vary in specific historic contexts. At present, different forms of masculinity may be found. He distinguishes between an authoritative or hegemonial masculinity (which prevails in Western industrial societies) and a marginalized or subordinate form of masculinity.

This is mainly due to the specific development of family migration within Europe itself, which began mainly with men migrating from the southern or eastern periphery of Europe. They came without their family. Family migration as a joint experience was not an important topic at the beginning. Issues of family and migration only became relevant when the process of family reunification started in the mid-1970s. Thus, questions dealing with the consequences of family reunification became more relevant than studies examining the reasons behind joint family migration.

In the last decade, studies dealing with gender and migration have been receiving more and more attention, especially those highlighting the distinctive role women play during the migration process. Recent studies picture women as major participants in the process of family migration. They have been able to prove that women are indeed important economic actors and that their participation in economic activities is closely related to the needs of their family. At the other end of the spectrum, the distinctive role men play during the migration process has not yet been systematically analyzed. It will be necessary to focus research efforts on this topic in years to come.

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