

Does terrorism matter in South Asian peace process? A perspective of India-Pakistan

Chowdhury, Suban Kumar; Islam, Shakirul

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Indexing

Abstracting

DOES TERRORISM MATTER IN SOUTH ASIAN PEACE PROCESS?: A PERSPECTIVE OF INDIA-PAKISTAN

Suban Kumar Chowdhury

*Department of International Relations,
University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh
skc_ruir[at]ru.ac.bd*

Shakirul Islam

*Department of International Relations,
University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh
ruir.shakir[at]gmail.com*

Abstract

The study has started with the sole argument that peace process of this region is now turned into a complex political theatre where terrorism is the major menace. The aim of this study is to scrupulously investigate the nature and substance of South Asian peace process with particular emphasis on India-Pakistan. Thus intends to extend the scope of further research on peace process through linking it with terrorism. The methodology of this research relied largely on qualitative analysis. Methodologically, the study does not directly address the policies of the South Asian countries rather it uses already available literature of policy experts to research the linkage between terrorism and peace process, test their correlations (whether it is positive or negative) in context to South Asia, and to conclusively make a judgment based on the research question-to what extent the incidence of terrorism is hindering the progress of South Asian peace process?

Keywords: South Asia, Terrorism, Peace Process

INTRODUCTION

The term “peace process” implies the existence of a structure, continuity and some understanding of the outcomes it seeks to achieve (Sajad 2012, 3). Based on this view the present study on South Asian peace process has revealed that, it lacks two (i.e. continuity and understanding) of the three above mentioned elements. The study starts with the sole argument that peace process of this region is now turned into a complex political theatre where terrorism is the major menace. Further in this complex playhouse of politics, the process and ingredient of peace talks are found as not related. At this stage, understanding the difficulties inherent in the peace process is critical to assess. As such the study has

made a review of the existing related literatures on South Asian peace (Ahmad 2014, Ahmad and Varun 1998, Aiyar 2011, Andley 2007, Armon 1998, Ashraf 2009, Ashutosh 2007) and has divided the peace process under two broad category-intra-state peace process (i.e. CHT peace Accord, ethnic conflict and peace process in Sri Lanka, Northeast Accords which includes Assam-Bodo Accords; Mizo Accords & Naga Accords, Afghan Peace Process) and inter-state or regional peace process (i.e. Indo-Pak peace process). It not denying that intra-state peace process is not without importance but for a better understanding of the fact here author has focused only on the inter-state peace process with particular emphasis on India-Pakistan peace process to examine whether terrorism is working as a barrier or not. In order to reach to the possible research outcomes the study has firstly shade lights on the nature of South Asian peace process to identify the major barriers of ensuring sustainable peace.

An exploration of the essence of South Asian peace process has identified a close link between the will of the political parties and peace process where the former are always intends to maximize their political interests through patronizing terrorism. Clare Castillejo (2016, 1) has shown in an analysis that in the case of most of the South Asian states political parties have played very different roles in relations to both the grievances and struggles that have fuelled conflict and attempts to ensure enduring peace. Based on the findings of Clare Castillejo (2016, 1) the study has argued that the tendency of the political parties to increase their dominance within the state partially works as an entrance door for the terrorists. Taken this argument into consideration the study has selected “Does Terrorism Matter in South Asian Peace Process?: A Perspective of India-Pakistan” as the title of the research to cover how terrorism matters in South Asian peace process.

The very rationality of this study is that it may facilitate the scope of further research on South Asian peace process and terrorism through contributing to the realm of knowledge. In fact, study on South Asian peace process is very important. Considering the futile outcomes of recent peace process between South Asian states it may be very rational to conduct a research to find out the actual causes of such failure of South Asian peace process. Although several factors are responsible for the slow outcomes of peace negotiations between South Asian nations (e.g. armed conflicts, mistrust, corruption, intra-state conflicts), the study presented here has focused only on terrorism as the root cause of the failure of peace process within the region.

This is because, today South Asia generally evokes the image of a region which is plagued by violent religious extremism where groups like the *Taliban*, *Al-Qaeda* and *Lashkar-e Tayyeba* (LeT) are active. As a result most of the South Asian nations are still facing the problem of terrorism, and if anything, the problem has only intensified in several cases.

Under the above context this study has outlined the trends setting of terrorism and peace process in the South Asian region. Though the structural factors obtaining in the region have made cooperation an imperative for the countries like India and Pakistan, their endeavors towards cooperation have not been rewarded with trust and enduring relationships (Dhruba 2002, 206). This study is a primary part of this endeavor and has focused on the incidence of terrorism in South Asian states, particularly, in India and Pakistan to know how the prevalence of terrorism hinders the process of peace.

A number of research has already concluded on South Asian peace process and terrorism (i.e. Raja2012, Awasthi 2009, Arif 2010, Suban 2016, Akbar 2011, Banerjee and

Gert 2003, J.N. Dixit 1995 and so on) but there is a few completed research works focusing on the linkage between South Asian peace process and terrorism (i.e. S D 2002, Anand 2012 and a few more). As such it is expected that, the outputs of this study may be an important contribution in the realm of knowledge. It may be worthy to mention that the present study has tried to identify the loop wholes of South Asian peace process with their possible solutions and this may be an important contribution to conduct further research on peace process and terrorism in South Asia. Accordingly, considering the contemporary political environment of the South Asian region the outputs of this research may play a vital role to find out the ways of combating terrorism to foster peace initiatives.

To reach to such outputs the study has dwelled upon the history of the peace process since its inception in the earlier period. In the context of India-Pakistan peace process the study has examined the impact of Mumbai terrorist attack on 26/11. A critical observation of the inter-play of bilateral relations between India and Pakistan has revealed that, however the state parties have already started negotiation to solve their inter-state conflicts, the prospects are still now in a *status quo* position. In South Asian context several factors are responsible for such *status quo* of peace negotiations process. Among them one of the driving factors is the failure of the South Asian states to address the issue of terrorism. Under this argument, it will be rational to mention the example of India-Pakistan military stand-off of 2001-2002 which took place against the backdrop of the “War on Terror” in the region. The attack on the Jammu and Kashmir state assembly in Srinagar on October 1, 2001 and subsequent attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001 precipitated a 10-month military stand-off between the two countries (Shaheen 2010, 3). It may be pertinent to mention that Pakistan for the first time condemned the attack on the state assembly and the Indian Parliament. Based on the above discussions the study elucidates on the concept of a peace process and its spoilers in the context of relations among the South Asian states with particular emphasis on relations between India-Pakistan.

The methodology of this research relied largely on qualitative analysis. Quantitative methodology has been used in this research to a limited extent. It was a field of inquiry cutting across several disciplines and subject matter. The study has also followed an analytical model to make an assessment on to what extent terrorism affects the South Asian peace process. Methodologically, the study does not directly address the policies of the South Asian countries but rather uses already available literatures of policy experts to research the linkage between terrorism and peace process, test their correlations (whether it is positive or negative) in context to South Asia, and to conclusively make a judgment based on the research question-to what extent the incidence of terrorism is hindering the progress of South Asian peace process? The study is entirely based on secondary sources of data and has used several scholarly literatures (i.e. Sajad 2012, Ashutosh 2007, Shaheen 2010 and so on)-to conduct an analysis that contextualizes the assertions of the literatures, assesses the impact of terrorist incidence in South Asian peace process. The study has divided in to six sections. The second section has made a theoretical discussion on the concept of peace process and terrorism with a linkage between the two in the context of South Asia. The third section has tried to explore whether terrorism works as a barrier to South Asian peace process or not. In this regard the case of India-Pakistan peace process has taken in to consideration under the pretext of Mumbai terror attack. The fourth section has focused on the findings of the study and the last section has made concluding remarks with few policy options.

CONCEPTUALIZING PEACE PROCESS AND TERRORISM IN THE SOUTH ASIAN CONTEXT

Peace process is generally perceived as something inherently positive and an optimistic upshot in itself to be backed at any means. Such a common view about peace process has indicated that a person, an organization or anything too influential who opposes peace process is routinely listed as an enemy of peace. However the above indication tends to heighten the expectation about the possible outcomes of peace process, an acceptance of this sight in to consideration in the context of South Asia has revealed that the records of outcome and long term effectiveness of peace process are really mixed. In this region the prevalence of armed conflict and terrorism do not lead to any formal peace process or any formal peace agreements. In between these two barriers (armed conflict and terrorism) to bring sustainable peace terrorism is considered as a major threat. So it could be said that a peace process may be failed even if it does address the key issues of the armed conflict and represent a genuine attempt to move forward to resolve them. Based on this statement the present section attempts to theoretically conceptualize peace process and terrorism in the South Asian context. It is expected that such theoretical conceptualization may help to identify the linkage between peace process and terrorism in the context of this region.

The theoretical concept of peace process is assessed in this section in line with the view of Harold Saunders, Timothy Sisk, S.Y. Bowland and such other prominent scholars. In this section it has argued that peace process is considered as a linked term of peace. To ensure peace it is necessary to take several initiatives like-conventional diplomacy, arbitration, conflict resolution and so on. Such initiatives to bring peace are often called as peace process. This is well established by the view of Harold Saunders (2001, 483), who opined peace process as a political process in which conflicts are resolved by peaceful means. Peace process is a mixture of politics, diplomacy, changing relationships, negotiation, mediation, and dialogue in both official and unofficial arenas (Harold Saunders 2001, 483). Saunders says that, peace process operate simultaneously in four arenas (Diagram 1).




Diagram 1: Four Areas of Operating Peace Process

The official mediated peace process is referred to as *track 1* diplomacy. *Track 2* then refer to as quasi-official peace process by conflict resolution professionals, usually non-governmental and unofficial groups and individuals, often parallel to and in support of *track 1*. This is the arena that Susan Allen Nan (1999) in her essay on Track I-Track II Coordination calls track one-and-a half. The people involved are outside of government, but have close ties to government and trade information back and forth. Public Peace Process is the arena of sustained dialogue between non-officials, who try to address the "human" (as opposed to governmental) causes of conflict-perceptions, stereotypes, distrust, and sense of hopelessness. In regard to civil society it may be said that this is the arena where civilians live and work. It is comprised of networks of relationships, often between disputing groups. In intractable conflicts, these relationships break down, causing tears in the framework of civil society which must be rebuilt in any peace process.

In the context of South Asia the effectiveness of the above mentioned areas of operating peace process may not be an easy task to imagine. This is because factor like terrorism often works as a challenge to the effectual working such operating system. As such measured like confidence building, disarmament as well as stable political environment may help to avert this sort of threat to the functioning of peace process. In this case the view of Timothy Sisk (2001, 787) can best be cited who clarifies peace process as step-by-step reciprocal moves to build confidence, resolve gnarly issues such as disarmament, and carefully define the future through the design of new political institutions. In other terms, a peace process is an intricate dance of steps-choreographed by third-party mediators-among parties in conflict that help to gradually exchange war for peace (Timothy 2001, 787). Exchange war for peace suggests that, Tim is limiting his definition to violent international and civil conflicts. An analysis of the clarification of Timothy Sisk has further revealed that as a first step the South Asian peace process must move forward to build confidence through eradicating distrust between or among the participating parties to make peace process as successful. This is because if the concerned parties have failed to build confidence then terrorism may take the opportunity to turn such generous steps to ensure peace as vain one. As a step to make peace process as successful Nicole Ball divide it into two stages and each of these into two phases (Nicole 2001, 721-722). The first stage of a peace process is cessation of violent conflict. This breaks up into two phases-negotiation and cessation of hostilities. The second stage is peace building, which moves from a transition phase to a consolidation phase. The objectives of each of these phases are shown in the Table 1 below.

Table 1: Peace process in Countries with Negotiated Peace Settlement (Source: Nicole 2001, 721-722)

STAGES	CESSATION OF CONFLICTS		PEACE BUILDING	
Phases	Negotiations	Cessation of Hostilities	Transition	Consolidation
Main Objectives	Agreeing on key issues to enable fighting to stop	Signing peace accords Establishing cease-fire Separating Forces	Establishing a government with adequate legitimacy to enable it to rule effectively Implementing reforms to build political institutions and establish security Inaugurating economic and social revitalization Promoting societal reconciliation	Continuing and deepening reform process Continuing economic and social recovery efforts Continuing promotion of societal reconciliation

As can be seen from this table, the peace agreement, on a timeline, is left of middle, meaning as long as it may take to agree to a peace settlement, implementing that settlement takes even longer. In one of his more pessimistic, but perhaps often realistic observations, peace builder and scholar John Paul (1998) often observes that getting out of a conflict takes as long as it takes to get into it. A consideration of the observation of John Paul (1998) in the context of South Asia has indicated the very rationality of his scrutiny. It may be pertinent to mention that South Asia is one of the most conflict prone areas of the world where intra-state and inter-state conflict are so acute that peace process often become failed because the states authority of this region are facing challenges to settle it. The single basic reason of facing such challenges is the prevalence of terrorism in the states this region. As for instance the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir issue can best be cited. As such in this section based on the observation of Paul (1998) it is argued that, whereas the term ‘peace’ is labeled as bliss, the word “terrorism” is considered as a barrier to peaceful South Asia which often caused by state violence. To understand the meaning of terrorism a theoretical insight may be necessary. In fact the definitions of terrorism are varies from state to state. In its popular understanding the term “terrorism” tends to refer to an act that is wrong, evil, illegitimate, illegal, and a crime (Alex 2010, 7). The term has come to be used to describe a wide range of violent and sometimes not-so violent, conduct (especially in the hands of the media since 11 September 2001).

A theoretical description of terrorism can best be sketched by five basic explanations (i.e. instrumental approach; organizational approach; multi-casual approach, political or structural approach and psychological approach) for how the conspiratorial organizations that practices terrorism behave. It is pertinent to mention that, each of the above approaches may be necessary to understanding terrorism and its consequences. This is because analysis of each approach yields different policy recommendations. Taken this into consideration

five approaches of terrorism study which are derived from established bodies of theory are presented sequentially in order to set out the logical premises and the policy implications of each.

Justification of these above approaches in the South Asian context reveals that, terrorism is an effect of direct violence and is considered as a major hindrance to foster peace. The instrumental approach, the organizational process theory, the multi-casual approach, the political approach and the psychological approach of terrorism may be the best way to understand the concept of terrorism from theoretical perspective. Whereas the instrumental approach assess that, act of terrorism represent a strategic choice, the organizational process theory considered the act of terrorism as the outcomes of internal group dynamic. The organizational process theory of terrorism is best relevant in the context of South Asia where various internal groups are still conducting their terrorist activities to ensure their dominance.

WHETHER TERRORISM WORKS AS A BARRIER TO SOUTH ASIAN PEACE PROCESS OR NOT?

The success of any peace process largely depends on bilateral trust. In the South Asian context it is found that, terrorism often works as the root cause of mistrust among the south Asian states and thus disrupts the efforts of peace process between states of this region. So it could be said that, terrorism has been negatively playing a critical role in the way of peace process in South Asia. As such, in order to scrutiny the impact of terrorism on peace process of this region it will be rational to discuss first how terrorism affects the bilateral relations through creating a feeling of mistrust. This could best be illustrated through the bilateral relations between India-Pakistan, India-Bangladesh, and India-Sri Lanka.

The instrumental approaches of terrorism study have revealed a clear example in the case of South Asia where an attitude of acquiescence or even encouragement has been adopted by one state towards terrorist violence in or on the other states to create a barrier to bring internal peace. Such situations have naturally resulted in added acrimony and tensions between the two neighboring states (i.e. India-Pakistan, India-Bangladesh, India-Sri Lanka) and this ultimately caused the failure of peace process. In this case one can recall the influence of India-Sri Lanka relations on Sri Lankan peace process during the early years of Tamil insurgency, before 1987. The operations of Tamil militants in Sri Lanka from their safe sanctuaries and bases in India gave rise to serious strains in Sri Lankan peace process.

Just prior to the signing of India-Sri Lanka Agreement of July 1987, on the ethnic conflict, the government of India had directly intervened, (in early June 1987), under the pretext of dropping food supplies to the beleaguered Tamil militant groups (S D Muni 2002, 11). Perhaps India had its own reasons for this intervention, but this period (from the late seventies till July 1987) witnessed tremendous acrimony in India-Sri Lanka relations (S D Muni 1993, 10). The peace process efforts of India with her other neighboring states (i.e. Pakistan, Bangladesh) have also hindered by the impact of terrorism.

In case of Bangladesh, however, the present government led by Awami League has adopted strong anti-terrorism actions, the continuing complains of India regarding ISI activities and shelter as well as support provided to the northeast insurgents constitutes an area of tensions (*The Independent* December 16, 2001). Such complain often creates

mistrust between India and Bangladesh and thus hinder the talks on border peace. So it is evident that, trans-border terrorism is the negative factor in the case of India-Bangladesh border peace.

In the same way the India-Pakistan peace process presents the worst case of terrorism spoiling bilateral relations. The terrorist groups of Pakistan are still continuing their terrorist activities against India in the name of 'freedom movement' in Kashmir (S D Muni 2002, 12). These terrorist activities may not really end even with the resolution of the Kashmir problem, which in any case looks remote. President General Musharaf has in fact said so soon after assuming power in 1999 that, Pakistan has always used force in disturbing the bilateral *status quo* and the grand objective behind sponsoring terrorism seems to be a manifestation of ISI's resolve to weaken India internally (S D Muni 1993, 12). As such, India is insisting on ending cross border terrorism as a pre-condition for having normal communications and relations with Pakistan seems to be a desperate policy posture.

It may be worthy to mention that India was on the verge of going to war with Pakistan to force an end to this terrorism (S D Muni 2002, 12). It may still come to that dangerous point quickly even after the de-mobilization of the Indian forces ordered in early November 2002 (S D Muni 2002, 12). The mistrust and bitterness between these two states are too acute that the strategic analysts in India are still interested to organizer counter-terrorist attacks on Pakistan (Bharat 2002). As such, it may be now a generally perceived view that terrorism is main cause for the failure of India-Pakistan peace process.

In South Asia the degree of hostility fueled by terrorism between or among the states has been conditioned by two factors namely-the degree and nature of involvement of the state in sponsoring terrorism against the other one, and secondly, the approach to terrorism in the victim state (S D Muni 2002, 12). These two factors are often works as a hindrance to the way of peace process. As for example, the Pakistan sponsored terrorism is resulted in a very high degree of acrimony and conflict, leading to intense diplomatic rivalry and thus caused the failure of peace process to settle the disputes.

Terrorism in South Asia has been increasing on the borders of Pakistan and Afghanistan where the Taliban has escalated attacks over the last three years. Tensions in Pakistan escalated in 2007 when Presidential candidate Benazir Bhutto was assassinated, and deaths have increased by 20 % over the last two years. In India, there remains significant terrorist activity, including on the border between India and Pakistan.

A critical analysis of the linkage between terrorism and peace process has revealed that, countries with higher levels of terrorism perform significantly worse on the Pillars of Peace. Such framework of negative co-relations has also developed by IEP to assess the positive peace factors that create peaceful societies.

It is found that, three countries (i.e. Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan) with the most deaths from terrorism in 2013 performed 26 % worse on the Pillars of Peace compared to the international average. In South Asia these countries performed particularly poorly on three out of the eight Pillars of Peace. These three Pillars are-free flow of information, which captures the extent to which citizens can gain access to information, whether the media is free and independent. Peaceful countries tend to have free and independent media, which disseminate information in a way that leads to greater openness and helps individuals and civil society work together.

This leads to better decision-making and rational responses in times of crisis. Good relations with neighbors, which refers to the relations between individuals and between communities as well as to cross-border relations.

The above mentioned pillars are hardly prevalent in South Asia. India, Pakistan and Afghanistan are the three countries in this region with the highest levels of terrorism border each other. Acceptance of the rights of other, which include both the formal laws that guarantee basic freedoms as well as the informal social and cultural norms that relate to behaviors of citizens. Afghanistan is the worst performing country in this Pillar, with India and Pakistan also performing in the bottom three.

The most common context for the onset of terrorist violence is within an ongoing conflict. According to the GTD there were around 40,000 terrorist attacks in which at least one person was killed between 1970 and 2013. This number spans 178 countries. Of these 40,000 terrorist attacks, around 70 % occurred in countries that were at the time already immersed in serious political, civil, ethnic or international conflicts. This statistic remains true even if one removes terrorist attacks that have occurred in MENA and South Asia.

Considering all the above, this section has described the impact of terrorism in South Asian peace process through using socio-economic, political and conflict indicators which caused terrorist incidence. The study has found three groups of factors related to terrorist activity in South Asia. Countries that are weak on these factors and do not have high levels of terrorism are assessed as being at risk. These three groups of factors are shown in the Diagram 2 below.




Diagram 2: Factors Related to Terrorist Activity in South Asia

The above factors as shown in the Diagram 2 related to the terrorist activities in South Asia has been identified through using different approaches of terrorism study (i.e. instrumental approach, organizational approach, multi-casual approach, psychological approach, and political or structural approach).

The organizational approach indicates that, the Taliban and other groups of Afghanistan are responsible for the ongoing terrorism in this state. An application of instrumental approach reveals that, grievance among different political groups often led to patronize terrorism in countries like Bangladesh and India particularly. Accordingly the application of multi-causal and psychological approach of terrorism study identified the social hostilities between different ethnic groups as one of the three factors related to terrorism in Pakistan and India. Likewise multi-casual approach identified religion based groups in Afghanistan (i.e. Taliban) as another factor related to terrorism. Based on the above three factors related to the terrorism in South Asia the study has grouped the risk of terrorism in this region into three categories as below.




Diagram 3: Categories of the Risk of Terrorism in South Asia

To scrutiny the impact of terrorism on South Asian Peace process this section has further identified few causes due to which the states of South Asia are still the playing ground of terrorism. Most remarkable among such causes are-weak state capacity, illegitimate and corrupt governments, powerful external actors upholding corrupt regimes, - extremist ideologies, historical violence and conflict, inequality in power, repression by foreign occupation or colonial powers, discrimination based on ethnic or religious origin, failure of the state to integrate dissident groups of emerging social classes; and social injustice.

Considering all the above discussions the study has made a concrete analysis to find out the impact of terrorism on India-Pakistan peace process. In regards to the India-Pakistan peace process, along with the prevalence and incidence of terrorists the impact of Mumbai terrorist attack on 26/11 has taken into consideration.

Impact of Terrorism on India-Pakistan Peace Process

Since the day of independence India-Pakistan has been passing a seesaw type of relationship. In this fluctuating nature of bilateral relations cross boarder terrorism is always considered as a threat. Even though both states are willing to develop a friendly mutual relations through arranging dialogue and peace process but such eagerness is still hardly seeing the face of success only due to terrorism. The terrorist incidences have blocked the way of peace process and also smashed all the hard work to bring peace between India and Pakistan.

The bilateral relations between these two states are based on accusation and counter accusation where the authority of India and Pakistan often raised voice and indicated each other as the epicenter of terrorism. As for instance, India blamed *Lashkar-e-Tayaba* for targeting the Indian nationalist. A mistrust is exist in bilateral relations between India and Pakistan and such mutual suspicion often led both states to take violent approach which is now considered as the most serious current problem that confronts India-Pakistan relations.

It is evident from scholarly analysis that, the threat of terrorism is prevalent both in India and Pakistan. In India terrorism has increased by 70 % from 2012 to 2013, with the number of deaths increasing from 238 to 404 (Global Terrorism Index 2014). The number of attacks also increased, with 55 more attacks in 2013 than 2012 (Global Terrorism Index 2014). However, the majority of terrorist attacks in India have low casualties. In 2013 around 70 % of attacks were non-lethal (Global Terrorism Index 2014). There were attacks by 43 different terrorist groups who can be categorized into three groups: Islamists, separatists, and communists.

In India the Communist terrorist groups are by far the most frequent perpetrators and the main cause of deaths (Global Terrorism Index 2014). Three Maoist communist groups claimed responsibility for 192 deaths in 2013, which was nearly half of all deaths from terrorism in India (Global Terrorism Index 2014). Police are overwhelmingly the biggest targets of Maoists, accounting for half of all deaths and injuries. This is mainly through armed assaults, which killed 85, and bombings and explosions, which killed 43 (Global Terrorism Index 2014). Kidnapping is also a common tactic of the Maoists where it is often used as a political tool to force the government to release Maoist prisoners.

The majority of Maoist attacks occurred in the provinces of Bihar, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. Generally, the dispute with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir is the source of Islamic terrorism. In 2013 three Islamist groups were responsible for around 15 % of deaths (Global Terrorism Index 2014). This includes *Hizbul Mujahideen*, an Islamist group allegedly based in Pakistan with a membership of around 15,000. This group was the only group in India to use suicide tactics in 2013 (Global Terrorism Index 2014).

Islamist groups in India commonly use armed assaults targeting the police or bombings targeting private citizens. The majority of attacks occur in Hyderabad in the south, a city with a 40 % Muslim population, and Jammu and Kashmir in the north, an area which is nearly two thirds Muslim (Global Terrorism Index 2014).

In September 2014 *Al-Qaeda* announced a presence in India, hoping to unite other Islamist groups. North east region of India has for the last three decades seen continual ethno-political unrest from ethnic secessionist movements. Separatist groups including in Assam, Bodoland, Kamtapur and Meghalaya were responsible for 16 % of deaths. Targeting private citizens, police and businesses, attacks are generally restricted to the geographic region as most of these groups are relatively small and have local claims (Global Terrorism Index 2014).

Likewise India terrorism in Pakistan is strongly influenced by its proximity to Afghanistan with most attacks occurring near the border involving the Taliban. As like as Afghanistan, terrorism increased significantly in Pakistan in 2013, with a 37 % increase in deaths and 28 % increase in injuries since 2012 (Global Terrorism Index 2014). Nearly half of all attacks had no groups that have claimed responsibility. The deadliest group in Pakistan in 2013, responsible for almost a quarter of all deaths and 49 % of all claimed attacks, is *Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP), the Pakistani Taliban. Terrorism in Pakistan has a diverse array of actors (Global Terrorism Index 2014). In 2013 there were 23 different terrorist groups, down from 29 groups in 2012 (Global Terrorism Index 2014).

The above mentioned terrorist incidents and the number of casualties caused by it indicate that, India-Pakistan relations have been in a state of constant flux. In fact terrorism is playing a negative role in India-Pakistan peace process. At present the diplomatic relations between these two neighboring state represents the worst case of terrorism spoiling bilateral affairs (Saravanamuttu, 2003, 328). At this point the composite dialogue between India-Pakistan can best be cited. Although it was widely anticipated that the dialogue could be a possible solution to make an end of antagonism, but due to terrorist incidence occurred in Indian state it was failed to bring any real progress. While improvement is still a long time coming on many issues of the past such as Kashmir, the real immediate problem is the struggle against terrorism. Terrorism has held the region as hostage. It has obliterated any real developments in bilateral relations as well as people-to-people contact. In this context the study has made a historical survey of India-Pakistan peace process and has found that peace process of these two states denotes both its success and failure. Moreover these were also found as short-termed and replaced with renewed tensions due to trans-border terrorism (Table 2).

Table 2: Issues in the India-Pakistan Peace Process

ISSUES	INDIAN PERCEPTION	PAKISTANI PERCEPTION
Kashmir as a core Conflict	Disagreement	Agreement
Kashmir as a Peripheral Conflict	Agreement	Disagreement
Land for peace formula	Disagreement	Agreement
An independent Kashmir	Disagreement (at official level)	Disagreement (at official level)
Autonomous Kashmir	Partial agreement (at official level)	Partial agreement (at official level)
Maintenance of <i>Status quo</i> on Kashmir	Agreement	Disagreement
Confidence–building measures	Agreement	Partial agreement
Third Party mediation	Disagreement	Agreement
Conditional signing of NPT	Agreement	Agreement
Maintenance of territorial <i>status quo</i>	Agreement	Disagreement
Secret diplomacy	Not successful	Not successful
Impact of media	Partly negative	Partly negative
Role of Third Generation Peace process	Positive	Positive
Domestic pressure for peace	Becoming significant	Becoming significant
Perception of official elite for peace	Not positive	Not positive
Perception of unofficial elite for peace	Positive	Positive

It must be mention that, however, the two nations to a little extent have succeeded to manage as well as reconcile some of their bilateral conflicts-division of assets, evacuation of property, distribution of river water (the Indus Water Treaty of 1960), demarcation of the Rann of Kutch Boundary in 1969, and Salal Dam agreement in 1978, such achievements have hardly succeeded to trim down feelings of insecurity, fear, and resentment. Other agreements reached in the 1980s and 1990s-such as the agreements on non-attack of each other’s nuclear installations in 1988, cultural and communication in 1989, air and space violations in 1991, notification of military exercises in 1991, chemical weapons in 1992, and the conduct of each other’s diplomats in 1992-were aimed to build confidence between the two neighbors, but so far have failed to normalize India-Pakistan ties to the level of mutual trust and cordiality (Umbreen 2010, 348-349). The Kashmir dispute and to a lesser extent the other unresolved conflicts like the nuclear issue, Wuller Barrage, and Sir Creek, have derailed the India-Pakistan normalization process (Umbreen 2010, 348-349).

Along with unresolved conflicts, the nuclear issue is also considered as an irritant in India-Pakistan relations. However this requires a solution but it still remains dormant due to the opposing views of both states. Just opposite to the perception of Indian authority Pakistan views that, the nuclear issue is really comes only because of the Kashmir. It must be noted that the two wars fought between India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 produced two accords, *Tashkent in January 1966* and *Simla in July 1972*, and provided opportunities for CM and resolution. In both cases the Kashmir dispute and the activities of the terrorists groups were accepted as a major source of tension and both New Delhi and Islamabad pledged to seek a peaceful resolution of that conflict.

In spite of such acceptance of the activities of terrorist groups as a common threat the South Asian region is still remain a hot bed for terrorist incidence and Pakistan as well as Afghanistan is considered as the striking point of terrorist attacks. The terrorist groups through their activities often create mistrust among the South Asian nations as stated earlier of this study. Only because of mutual suspicion a dilemma and *status quo* situation is often noticeable in the India-Pakistan peace process. This can be called as the gap between ideal and reality of peace process between the two states.

Due to the threat of terrorism which creates a situation of national insecurity, it is noticed that, ranging from the role of personalities to the holding of *track-II talks*, there exists sharp difference in the methodology of peace building in the two states. Table 3 depicts the enormous difference between the ideal and the reality in the India-Pakistan peace process.

Table 3: Ideal and Reality of India-Pakistan peace Process

	INDIA	PAKISTAN
NON-INTERVENTION AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS		
Ideal	Agreement	Agreement
Reality	Violation	Violation
Disarmament and Arms Control		
Ideal	Agreement	Agreement
Reality	Violation	violation
Transparency in military CBMs		
Ideal	Agreement	Agreement
Reality	Violation	Violation
Promoting regional cooperation under SAARC		
Ideal	Agreement	Agreement
Reality	Violation	Violation
Promoting people to people interaction		
Ideal	Agreement	Agreement
Reality	Supportive	Violation
Support to the UN resolution on Kashmir		
Ideal	Agreement	Agreement
Reality	Violation in the case of Jammu & Kashmir	Supportive
Confidence building measures (military)		
Ideal	Agreement	Agreement
Reality	Violation	Violation
Confidence building measure (non-military)		
Ideal	Agreement	Agreement
Reality	Supportive	Violation
Third party mediation for the settlement of dispute		
Ideal	Disagreement	Agreement
Reality	Violation	Supportive
Fair treatment of diplomats		
Ideal	Agreement	Agreement
Reality	Violation	Violation

The table shows that, in almost all issues India and Pakistan have said one thing but in reality have not hesitated in breaking their commitments. This has led to a credibility gap in India-Pakistan relations and the two countries are not taken seriously by the outside world when they subscribe to non-intervention in the internal affairs each other, nuclear non-proliferation, or promotion of regional cooperation. The gap between the ideal and reality is primarily the result of the immense mistrust and suspicion prevailing between the two countries, which derived from terrorism, and the inability of the two governments to control their hawkish elements. In the case of CBMs or resolution of the Kashmir dispute, both the government of India and Pakistan could not do much because they are unwilling to take the risk of antagonizing hard-liners. They feel insecure and vulnerable from the rapid growth of terrorism and were not in a position to alter the *status quo*.

In bilateral relations between India and Pakistan a usual cycle of troughs and crests has manifested over the course of nearly three years since the January 2004 statement. During this period there has hardly been any transformative event to either wreck the ongoing peace process or provide it a major boost. The two remarkable terrorist incidences that have threatened to disrupt the peace process in the immediate past are-firstly the attack on the make-shift temple at Ayodhya on July 6, 2005 (N. Ram, *The Hindu*, July 7, 2005) and the other was the serial blasts in Mumbai on July 11, 2006. It may be rational to mention that during an interaction with the press, Prime Minister Monmohan Singh made it clear that, the success of the peace process depended public opinion and support and that an incident like Ayodhya attack would seriously undermine the ability of Indian government to carry the support of people (N. Ram *The Hindu*, July 7, 2005).

So from the above discussions it is evident that, the Composite Dialogue process between India and Pakistan postponed for several times due to suspicion and mistrust caused by terrorism. Based on this finding the study has argued that India-Pakistan peace process halts because of trans-border terrorist activities.

Mumbai Terrorist Attack 22/11, 2008

The history of rambling bilateral relations and unsettled conflicting issues hardly allows India and Pakistan to affiliate a friendly diplomatic relations. This becomes further difficult for both states to harmonize their relations due to the recurrent of terrorist incidences which led India-Pakistan peace process in unceasing turmoil. In fact the peace initiatives between India and Pakistan are severely impacted by the terrorist incidences in both states. In that case the Mumbai terrorist attack can best be cited as an instance.

The India-Pakistan peace process had seriously hampered by the impact of Mumbai terror. As a consequence of this attack the bilateral relations between these two states had come once again in to the flash point of distrust and antagonism and thus resulted to a deadlock of peace process. The impact of this terrorist attack may be considered as two fold-firstly it had indulged the South Asian region as a whole in the wave of terrorism and secondly it had damaged the positive image of Pakistan by defaming it as a global nursery of terrorism. Further after Mumbai blast the ongoing peace process between India and Pakistan were postponed. Just after the horror attack India had canceled the cricket tour of Pakistan, the meeting of Indian Pakistan Joint Commission on Environment and tensed the visa issuance process for the Pakistani nationals.

As a reaction to this attack India had opened the entire alternative and highlighted its war alertness to encounter terrorism and focused to influence the international community against the extremism in Pakistan (Umbreen 2013, 35). Reversely Pakistan had responded with the same preparedness. During that time the Political and military authorities of Pakistan had made it clear that they were ready to face the war consequence in order to defend their country.

On the other hand the reaction of international community to this terror incidence have found as limitless particularly because of the direct assault on the foreigners (Umbreen 2013, 36). Indians claimed Mumbai terror the 26/11 as the 9/11 of India and urged for unjustified pressure on Pakistan to stop terrorism, ignoring their own extremist and fundamentalist group terrorism on the Indian Muslims (Umbreen 2013, 30). Even so one can hardly ignore the involvement of non-state actors of Pakistan in the Mumbai terrorist incidence. A cultivable ground of extremism and fundamentalism is also existed in Pakistan although terrorism is a western spawn which now appears as consistent threat to adjacent power and other fear holding states. (Umbreen 2013, 36). The actual fact is lying in the inborn religious acrimony in the two states of this region. At this point the India-Pakistan dispute may be described from the genetic sense where terrorism is playing critically a negative role. As such the ultimate resolution of conflict between these two states can only be possible through eradicating religious fundamentalism from both states.

FINDINGS

A coherent, peaceful and harmonious relation among the South Asian nations is hardly possible if major steps are not taken by the member states of this region to combat terrorism. A consideration of relations among the states of this region from national security angle indicates the difficulties in interactions and understandings. Such obstructions in bilateral relations on the one hand have amplified the insecurity dilemma of the states and on the other hand facilitate the terrorists to become more active. Thus South Asian region now has become one of the terrorist prone areas of the world. In this study it has found that the growing nature of terrorist incidence has eroded the prospects of India-Pakistan peace process. The very rational cause of such slow outcomes of peace process may be that the two major states of this region are at the heart of terrorist threats.

The discussions in the section three of this study have showed that peace negotiation between India and Pakistan remain dormant in few cases (see table 3) while other saw the face of success. So the question is why some peace processes remain quiescent, and how they could be revived yields different answer in different cases. The section has illustrated the answer of these questions based on the research findings.

Study has found that, in South Asia the peace process often remain fainéant due to several causes like religious extremism, radicalism and fundamentalism and these three are termed as terrorism in this study. In the case of Pakistan the study has found the prevalence of Islamic fundamentalist who through their terrorist activities often pose a threat to the way of peace negotiations. In regard to the terrorism in Pakistan intelligence dictates that however their basic caused may be possible to address but a lingering solution of state terrorism in Pakistan will not be an easy task for the state authority itself. As for in Pakistan instance Islamic fundamentalism has turn out to be a key security concern for this fundamentalist ideology is still steadily taking lives as a tool to suicide bomb attacks.

Since the government of Pakistan have adopted a dichotomous attitude towards this threat but it may be a difficult task to prevent discretely. In support of this opinion with example it may be worthy to mention that a distinction has been made by the Pakistan Army between jihadi elements targeting Pakistan such as the Teharik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which is being suppressed. But, an Islamic outfit such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami that targets Afghanistan is patronized by Rawalpindi. So is the Quetta Shura headed by Mullah Omar. The Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is treated with special benignity from the time when it targets India (Chandran & Chari 2012). This differentiated approach towards terrorism foredooms the India-Pakistan peace process to failure.

Considering all the above discussion it is evident that, peace remains latent in few cases predominantly due to the nature of terrorism. The study has found an increasing trend of inter-state terrorism in South Asia in the new millennium. The present section has identified that, the religious extremism, left-wing extremism, Islamic fundamentalism as well as various separatist political groups (i.e. Maoist, LTTE, Taliban and others) are through their terrorist activities (i.e. insurgency, murder etc.) are still hindering the inter-state peace process of the South Asian region. The findings of the research articulate that almost every country in South Asia is faced with the problem of terrorism-in one form or the other.

Lastly the study also found that, the most imminent danger to inter-state peace process is arise from cross-border and domestic terrorism. The difficulty in meeting the threat of cross-border terrorism is that, very often, it is externally sponsored and state-assisted, furthermore interacts with and exacerbates domestic terrorism.

CONCLUSION

In this study terrorism is considered as the hindrance of South Asian peace process. From the discussions of section three and four of this study it is almost evident that, in the South Asian context terrorism often works as a barrier in the way of peace process through creating mistrust among the state parties who are engaged to the peace negotiation process. In this regard the case of India and Pakistan is not an exceptional. The terrorists are the key spoiler in India-Pakistan peace process. As for instance, When the Mumbai tragedy struck, the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, was on a visit to India to discuss important issues related to the ongoing dialogue process, including Kashmir, the Chenab River water dispute, and trade ties. Instead of engaging him, India committed the cardinal sin as regard to a peace process and blamed Islamabad for planning the attack within the first few hours of the terror attacks. Next, it put dialogue with Pakistan on hold. So it could be said that the success of India-Pakistan peace process ensues from efficiently identifying all the terrorists and collectively combating them.

Further it is suggested that both India and Pakistan need to address problem of terrorism by joint collaboration if they are really serious about establishing peace in South Asia. In this study India-Pakistan joint collaboration means the elimination of the tendency of double standards that inhibit the regional response capacity and be remained on the same page to be able to tackle the problem together because if these two states merely offer lip service, then it may render the task of countering terrorism even more arduous. This is because terrorism is not at all the threat for any particular state rather it is a regional

problem in the context of South Asia. That is why both India and Pakistan including other nations of South Asian region may need to take a collaborative approach towards averting the threat of terrorism.

As a prerequisite to make India-Pakistan peace process more fruitful the study has suggested the creation of a regional counter terrorism center to facilitate cooperation and integration among the South Asian states with the intention of combating terrorism. In regard to the proposed anti-terrorism center the study has also developed a strategic framework (Diagram 4) through which this could work more effectively under joint collaboration.




Diagram 4: Strategic Framework of Counter Terrorism

The prevention technique should be an inclusive one with joint efforts at regional level and its basic aim will may be detecting and deterring the threat of terrorism for the South Asian states. This strand may include-an increase to the observance of the general public, establishment of a South Asian intelligence network and diminution of susceptibility among the states of this region in regard to terrorist incidence as a way of promoting the sense of regionalism, prohibition of the spread of extremist ideologies, continuation of a stable regional political atmosphere, detection of those who promote violent extremism and abolition of the areas from where they function, bring to a halt the activities of the extremists to motivate the individuals to be recruited as a terrorist, or have already been recruited by extremists, and a step to address the grievances that are exploited by ideologies.

The Prepare strand will work in time of the occurrence of any terrorist incidence. In other words, this strategy will work to manage the ongoing attacks and will also need to be alert to avert the devastation of possible future terrorist incidence.

The Response strand must include a regional effort to increase the ability to respond effectively and immediately to terrorist attacks or threats of attack. This strand advocates for the creation of a regional security framework. In fact the effectiveness of this strategy is depends on such security framework. This is because if a regional security framework is created then under the direction of such security architecture it may be possible to make the

response strand as more effective coordination as regional level. Further three elements are considered in this study as prerequisite for the success of the response component. These include- risk identification and assessment, development of strategic know-how and lastly prompt response to terrorist incidence.

The efforts at regional level to restore a state of normality and abate the sufferings of the people who are directly harmed by the incidence of terrorism could be implemented through the recovery strand. To support the affected communities of South Asia this strategy must develop a regional recovery plan to be implemented by both governmental and nongovernmental agencies.

Implementation of such a framework in South Asian region will require developing cooperative security system where there will be a close cooperation among the South Asian states. All the concerned authority including government departments, security and intelligence agencies are needed to co-operate each other to make such security system as effective one. It is expected that a horizontal and vertical communication model among the concerned authority will may help to ensure the triumph of the cooperative security system to combat terrorism and thus pave the way of the success of South Asian peace process, particularly the peace process between India and Pakistan. As such it is the utmost duty of the South Asian nations particularly India and Pakistan to come together because neither can tackle the problem of terrorism unilaterally. Further it is hope that the initiation of India and Pakistan to adopt a cooperative security system will encourage the other states of this region to come under the umbrella of cooperative security.

In conclusion it can be said that, there is both skepticism and hope pinned to the peace talks in South Asia. India and Pakistan need to have trust, confidence, and a will to make this peace process into one which seeks a resolution of all conflicts inflicting on their relations. Terrorists and extremists need to be uprooted or their ideology ought to be changed. Many times the peace process has been derailed due to the presence of the parochial interests of the elites who often patronage terrorism.

So if the authority of both states failed to tackle terrorism then the prospects of peace process seems to be bleak. This is actually for the prevalence of terrorism and insurgency which have aroused from the concept of religious and left wing extremism, fundamentalism, and communalism reveals the existence of spoiler problems in South Asian peace process.

At the end it would not be an exaggeration to say that in South Asia the clampdown of terrorism is not seriously adopted yet as an objective at regional level. Consequently terrorism related issues (i.e. distrust, accusation and counter accusation and so on) have superimposed extreme impairment to the South Asian initiatives for organizing peace process. The credibility of sustainable peace within the region has highly eroded by such issues. This is because terrorism inflicted mutual relations hardly allow the initiation of a successful peace process. At this stance the basic question which have aroused is that-how can South Asian peace process become functional and effective if any nation of this region is bent upon hiring terrorists and use of power as devices of its engagement with the other?

It is suggested that a further research is needed to seek the answer of this question and the present study may facilitate conduct further research to reach to the answer of this query.



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