

Transnationalism and cosmopolitanism: Europe and the global in everyday European lives

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Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version

Sammelwerksbeitrag / collection article

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Favell, A., Reimer, D., & Solgaard Jensen, J. (2014). Transnationalism and cosmopolitanism: Europe and the global in everyday European lives. In E. Recchi (Ed.), *The Europeanisation of Everyday Life: Cross-Border Practices and Transnational Identifications among EU and Third-Country Citizens - Final Report* (pp. 138-168) <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-395162>

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**The Europeanisation of Everyday Life:
Cross-Border Practices and Transnational Identifications
Among EU and Third-Country Citizens**

Transnationalism and cosmopolitanism:
Europe and the global in everyday European lives

Adrian Favell, David Reimer and Janne Solgaard Jensen

(EUCROSS Final Report, pp. 138-168)

This document originates from the research project *The Europeanisation of Everyday Life: Cross-Border Practices and Transnational Identities among EU and Third-Country Citizens* (acronym: EUCROSS).

The EUCROSS research project is funded as part of the European Commission's 7th Framework Programme ('Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities', activity 8.5: 'The Citizen in the European Union'; call identifier: FP7-SSH-2010-2; Funding scheme: collaborative project – small and medium-scale focused research projects; grant agreement: 266767). The project started on April 1, 2011 and is scheduled to end on March 31, 2014.

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This is Deliverable D9.17 of Workpackage 9 (Dissemination and exploitation). Release date: June 2014.

Transnationalism and cosmopolitanism: Europe and the global in everyday European lives²⁸

In this chapter, we will take another look at the data our study provides on what might be called “everyday transnationalism” among ordinary European populations. European integration has provided for an extraordinary range of rights enabling ordinary European citizens to benefit from participation in a wide and open European space, whether for economic and business reasons, leisure, tourism and consumption, or in terms of wider knowledge and interest in countries around the region. Transnationalism has become a commonplace feature of everyday life for ordinary citizens across the continent.

In academic analyses of Europe, however, it has become routine to argue that European integration most benefits elites and upper classes—the people most likely to have international connections – while being of much less benefit to lower classes (Fligstein 2008). This is then linked to the widespread mistrust and (sometimes) hostility among ordinary citizens to the European project in political and identification terms. Other sociologists (i.e., Beckfield 2006) have presented evidence that European integration is causing more inequality in the context of global economic change.

Related to this perception—and which also threatens the integrity and future of the EU—is growing Euroscepticism among people who may feel themselves to be the “losers” of European integration, especially in countries which are politically and economically important to the European project’s success. Among our countries, we are able to take a close look at the often openly Eurosceptic UK and Denmark, but also consider countries which have had high levels of support, but where there is now growing doubt.

Our question is whether these attitudes make sense in terms of the growing transnationalism in these same countries? Firstly, we might be interested to know something about the relative scale of transnationalism across Europe, and whether it is strongly associated with more privileged social positions. Secondly, we might ask about the geography of this transnationalism: whether it can be classified a European transnationalism, and how it relates to the rest of the world (i.e., globalisation). Thirdly, we would be curious to know if and why such transnationalism might be related to cosmopolitan values, which would both point to a progressive global outlook, as well as concurring with the European promoting of particular values: its so called “normative power” agenda (Manners 2002). In this way we might be able to look into the apparent paradox of highly transnational yet supposedly Eurosceptic nations, as well as assessing to what extent the EU can take credit for the spread of cosmopolitan values alongside the “everyday transnationalism” it has facilitated.

All of the above questions can be answered initially with the quantitative data gathered in the first round part of the research, the EUCROSS survey. Yet another part of our mission in EUCROSS was to generate qualitative data, through follow up in-depth interviews with a sub-sample of the original survey, the EUMEAN survey. We are thus able here to offer a

²⁸ Adrian Favell, David Reimer and Janne Solgaard Jensen.

first analysis of the different meanings and nuances given to these questions by members of different European member states. Here, starting from the in-depth findings of our own country case, Denmark, we offer some preliminary comparisons and contrasts with understandings in Germany, Spain and the UK. The qualitative interviews, certainly, put more of an accent on what we might call the varieties of European transnationalism and cosmopolitanism, while in our reading of the quantitative analysis we stress more the close commonalities of Germany, Denmark and the UK (i.e., of both “core” and “outsider” EU member states), and their overall difference from the Southern and Eastern European member states on these measures.

A note on reference literature

Our goal in this chapter is not to pursue theoretical questions from the literature, but rather to offer a straightforward descriptive analysis of the data on European transnationalism and cosmopolitanism, as well as some analysis about how it is determined by obvious social markers such as class and education. We are pursuing these questions in other publications aimed at scientific journals (i.e., Favell and Reimer 2013; Favell and Reimer 2014b; Solgaard Jansen and Favell 2014). We have also published one policy brief which shadows closely this chapter (Favell and Reimer 2014a).

EUCROSS builds on and expands the study on German nationals published in a monograph by Steffen Mau (2010). This was noteworthy for shifting the debate on transnationalism in Europe away from migrants and elites, and examining instead the everyday “ordinary” national populations of a core European member state. It found remarkable evidence for the transnationalisation of the German population since its heyday as a self-contained welfare state in the 1960s. Already to simply replicate Mau’s study for more European countries would be a significant advance. Moreover, our study also relates to two other works, with similar goals, but different methodologies. Savage et al. (2005), a mixed methods study of the ordinary middle and working class populations of Northern England, similarly showed how deeply transnational practices and cosmopolitan values have been integrated routinely into the lives of quite average British populations, although with a distinctive geography that intersects less with the European mainland. A further recent study by Andreotti, Le Galès and Moreno (2013), on urban dwelling upper bourgeoisies in France, Spain and Italy, found that while embracing many of the opportunities (i.e., financial and social) of transnational lifestyles, they retained a strong sense of place and involvement in their home cities. They were highly “mobile” but not “migrant”. Our survey goes substantially beyond Eurobarometer techniques, including the one that has most delved into similar subjects, Eurobarometer 65.1 (as operationalised by Kuhn 2011, 2012; Mau and Mewes 2012; Delhey et al. 2014).


These various studies above provide important indicators of what we expect to find among our European populations. A further key reference that we put to use here is Díez Medrano’s earlier work (2003) on the variety of perceptions of Europe. In his mixed methods study of British, German and Spanish “framings” of Europe, he pinpoints strong geographical, historical and psychological differences underpinning each country’s general understanding of the European identity question. Our study is particularly relevant in this sense as we are able to look at the same three countries, while adding a

Nordic variant, Denmark.

Quantitative findings

Without a doubt, general support for the EU has suffered considerably as a result of the recent economic crisis in Europe and a negative perception of the EU's handling of the situation. On this, Eurobarometer measures are sufficient to gauge the backdrop of change in the continent, provoking a widening gap between political opinion and everyday practices. When asked in Eurobarometer 2012 (EB 77.3), it was found that EU citizens continue to support, or are at least neutral about the idea of the EU, but are now much less happy about "the present direction of the EU".

Figure 1 Attitudes towards image and present direction of European Union across 5 EU countries




Source: Eurobarometer 77.3, 2012

Across the continent, it is clear that European citizens feel that the EU is not working as it should. In this context, the Danish and British results, for example, can be seen less as outliers. In fact, formal measures in Denmark continue to suggest that Denmark has maintained a relatively positive view of the EU despite the temper of its media debates. Britain posts the most negative results to the other member states, suggesting an implacable Euroscepticism in well over half the population. In other similar measures, from both Eurobarometer and EUCROSS, about attachment to the EU or whether a person would be sad if the EU were gone tomorrow, Danish percentages are remarkably

close to Germany, Italy and Spain, which are all considered more core, supportive members of the EU. British results confirm it as an outlier in overt political hostility toward the EU.

Figure 2 Attachment to European Union and reaction to European Union dissolution scenario across 5 EU countries (per cent)



Source: (1): Eurobarometer 77.3 (2012); (2) EUCROSS Survey.

What is puzzling about all this is that the EU explicitly and implicitly stands for cosmopolitanism, and when we relate these issues to the level of cosmopolitanism in these two countries compared to others using results from EUCROSS, there is little to suggest that the British, let alone the Danes, are out of step with the solidly European norms and values of their neighbours (as shown in Gerhards 2007). Some of these cosmopolitan measures are distinctive to the European conception of the good society and polity, such that they are also a mark of a European “civilisational” influence quite distant from, say, North American or East Asian alternatives (Therborn 1995).

A first kind of measure concerns the widespread acceptance or tolerance of diversity. On these measures, whether we take a first question about the make up of society by different ethnic, religious or cultural origins as a good or bad thing, or a second question about whether foreign forms of media and culture are a bad thing for the national culture, Britain scores high on cosmopolitanism, close to its other West European neighbours. Danes meanwhile obviously feel provoked by the first formulation of cosmopolitan diversity, posting a much lower acceptance, while being more comfortable than other countries about the second, the influx of foreign media and cultural products.

Moving to a third measure – identification with the world as a global citizen – Denmark, Britain and Germany all post similar mid level identifications, somewhat less overtly cosmopolitan than their southern neighbours. Regarding then a fourth dimension of cosmopolitanism, about feeling responsible for other nation’s fortunes, a further distinction becomes apparent. The British are just a little less solidaristic than their rich Northern European neighbours. But enter the EU into the question (“the EU should bail out member states in times of crisis”), and figures fall quite dramatically for the British, but also for Denmark and Germany, with the Germans (probably in the light of Greece’s debt crisis) even more hostile than the Britain. Only the Southern Europeans retain a sense of European solidarity through thick and thin.

Table 1 Cosmopolitan Attitudes (% of “yes” responses) and Cosmopolitan Index across 5 EU Countries

	Feel citizen of the world	Different ethn./culture/rel. good for society	Exposure to foreign film/music/books good for culture ¹	Help of EU country stuck by disaster by all EU countries	Pooling of state funds to help EU member state in crisis ²	Cosmopolitan Index ³ (range 0-1)
Denmark	46	53	72	90	42	0.57
UK	49	68	70	82	38	0.64
Germany	47	76	69	86	32	0.62
Italy	64	71	71	94	71	0.70
Spain	80	73	68	94	76	0.74
Spain	70	60	68	94	54	0.72

Source: EUCROSS Survey. ¹In the original question the formulation “damaging for culture” was used. The item was reversed so that it fits in the direction with the other items. ²The original item was dichotomized so that the values 4 and 5 on a scale from 1 to 5 (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree) represent agreement with the statement. ³Based on an additive index of the five cosmopolitanism dummy variables divided by five.

These findings can be added into a simple additive index (see last column in Table 1). Whether this is made up of all five measures cited or the first three (i.e., minus the supra-national and EU governance questions), the Italians and Spanish score as more overtly cosmopolitan, through no doubt this is pushed up by an aspirational wish to feel they are first class global citizens as well as high minded solidarians with struggling neighbours. What is interesting though is that Britain and Denmark average out with a middling score, always very close to that ostensibly much “more European” – and certainly more overtly post-national – core member state, Germany. And on some measures, either Britain or Denmark seem to exemplify some of the highest aspirations of what is often referred to as the EU “normative power” agenda (Manners 2002); while consistently disliking the framing of these influences in terms of the EU.

There is enough a puzzle here to suggest that we need to take a much closer look at British and Danish transnational practices to see if these differ from other member states,

particularly the core state, Germany. In the analysis here, we present twelve basic questions of transnationalism from the EUCROSS survey. We distinguish between transnational travel/mobility (six items), transnational social relations (friends and family, two items), transnational communication and consumerism (three items), and transnational human capital (languages, foreign language television, 2 items). In these analyses and later regressions we are also able to put in the figures for Romania, although the nature of their transnationalism may be somewhat different.

Table 2 Dimensions of transnationalism (in per cent) across 6 EU countries


Type of Transnationalism	Denmark	UK	Germany	Italy	Spain	Romania
<i>Travel & Mobilities</i>						
Familiarity with one or more foreign countries	60	64	66	42	49	24
Lived in another country before turning 18	7	8	6	4	5	1
Visited at least three countries before turning 18	63	44	56	24	18	2
Lived in another country for at least 3 month after turning 18	23	24	15	12	14	11
Participated in EU sponsored exchange program	4	3	4	5	7	3
3 or more overnight trips abroad in last 24 months	56	37	39	22	21	5
<i>Social Relations</i>						
Know somebody living abroad	49	64	49	58	66	79
Partner with foreign citizenship at birth	3	7	7	4	5	1
<i>Communication & Consumerism</i>						
At least 10% of all received messages from abroad (email/phone etc.)	23	27	33	21	26	33
Sent money abroad (for reasons other than purchasing goods/services)	15	11	10	12	11	4
Purchased goods abroad	40	32	27	17	20	13
<i>Human Capital</i>						
Command of at least one foreign language*	90	36	74	63	64	56
Watch foreign TV once a month or more	63	8	17	13	18	35

Source: EUCROSS Survey. *Note: Command of the language is defined as speaking the language at least at the “just so” level.

Transnational practices of course may not be restricted to a European scale: certain kinds of cross-border transaction or tie may be linked to growing global interconnections. Yet thought of this way it is striking how much more transnational European populations have become, and how much more transnational are countries that are often seen at the edge of the (inherently transnational) European project. These questions may thus not necessarily be restricted to Europeanised practices, but they do indicate general levels of internationalisation. We see here a high degree of internationalisation across the board: markedly in Germany (which we would expect, following Mau) but also especially in Denmark and Britain, there is a higher experience of living abroad, familiarity with foreign countries or knowing people in other countries.

This practical transnationalism does not disappear, however, when we ask about practices more obviously linked to European integration. For example if we ask about whether they have bought goods abroad in the last 24 months, or look into the number of overnight trips to other countries in the last 24 months (two questions with a certain specificity to the regional scale of European mobilities), it turns out that the Danes are by far the highest, with Germany and Britain closely matched, and the Italians and Spanish much further behind. Only when we put in data related to a specific EU sponsored programme do the figures drop down towards the less EU inspired, as we would expect in Denmark and Britain (although similar to Germany), with Italians and Spanish more Europeanised in this sense. Danes also possess the most transnational human capital, measured in their ability to speak foreign languages – whereas few British speak another language than English. On the classic question of whether respondents are willing to move to live and work in another country, not surprisingly the Southern Europeans post high percentages: but over 50% of Germans and over 40% of Danes and British are willing to “get on their bikes” too—hardly consistent with their professed Euroscepticism.

Figure 3 Willingness to move abroad (per cent yes-answers)



Source: EUCROSS Survey 2012

These various indicators illustrate concrete effects of European integration that may in fact suggest a certain Europeanisation of everyday life in Danish and British society, even if these populations often express negative opinions about it or are unlikely to explicitly identify with it. To formalise these results though, we put together a complete additive index of transnational practices (not shown), consisting of thirteen items, collapsed into an overall score ranging from 0-13.

Table 3 Transnationalism Index across five EU countries

DK	UK	GER	IT	ESP	ROM
4.98	3.65	4.03	2.93	3.22	3.16

Source: EUCROSS Survey. Based on additive Index of 13 binary variables. Range for Index 0-13.


What these results display is that on a 0-13 scale Danes score 4.98 – considerably higher than Italians and Spanish, whereas Germans and British are closely matched somewhere in between. Given that we do not have an equal amount of items for each dimension of transnationalism, the dimension “physical” mobility particularly receives more weight in our index (6/13=46%) compared to the other dimensions. While we think our first index is a plausible operationalisation of transnational practices, weighing the items equally across all dimensions leads to very similar results in terms of average levels of transnationalism across countries. There is in sum here a strong indication that everyday Europeanised practices in Denmark and Britain far outstrip the conscious identification with or support for the European project.

The principle objection to these findings are likely to be related to parallel work by Mau and Mewes using Eurobarometer (2012): that these kinds of differences might be accounted for by country level differences, for example relative wealth, or by geographical and cultural specificities in relation to the wider world. While some of this challenge remains outside the scope of this chapter, we are able to control for standard education, occupation and demographic variables to check that these results hold across social groups in the various countries.

Certainly there are similar relative differences between class or educational groups (it tends to hold for both variables) in terms of transnationalism. In very broad terms, one can indeed read this in terms of Fligstein’s thesis in *Euroclash* (2008), which presents a stark portrait of the winners and losers from European integration. However, EUCROSS results suggest nuances need to be suggested to this rather crude polarised view of the European crisis. Interestingly, in highly transnational countries such as Denmark and Germany, respondents with mid level education have reached levels of transnationalism similar to those of the highly educated in the lower ranked transnational countries. There is some evidence here for a broader “massification” of the effects of European integration in some countries, in opposition to the simple polarisation suggested by Fligstein. It is widely reported that middle class Danes and British (i.e., not just “elites”) are some of the most enthusiastic in utilising their European free movement rights: in terms of buying

property abroad or retiring in the South of Europe (Favell 2014). In order to follow up on these claims we explore to what extent each of the 13 different transnational practices reported in table 2 is unequally distributed across different social groups in the six EUCROSS countries. To that end we chose to calculate “odds ratios” that express the relative degree of inequality in access to or performance of a certain practice. An odds ratio of 2 for “familiarity” in Germany means that respondents with tertiary education are 2 times more likely to be familiar with another country than respondents with less than tertiary education (e.g. secondary and compulsory education). Note this may be relative to large percentages or small (see Long and Freese 2006).

Figure 4 Educational Inequality in transnational mobilities across six countries. Odds-ratios between holders of tertiary degree vs. everybody below




Source: EUCROSS Survey.

Given that in most cases the odds ratio is well above 1 indicates that that the higher educated respondents display a higher degree of mobility across all six practices. There is some variation across the type of mobility practice in terms of inequality. The figure suggests that the more resource-craving types of mobility practices are more unequally distributed in each of the six countries (e.g. three or more overnight trips in the 24 months, travel to many countries before the age of 18). Finally, it seems like there is not very much variation between the six countries in terms of the degree of inequality across items, although Romania seems to stand out at least with respect to some mobility practices.


In a next step we take a look at the other specific forms of transnationalism.

Figure 5 Educational Inequality in transnational relations across six countries. Odds-ratios between holders of tertiary degree vs. everybody below



In Figure 5 we see that transnational relations are not very stratified across levels of educational attainment in the EUCROSS countries. Both the measure for knowing somebody abroad and having a partner with foreign citizenship hardly surpass an odds-ratio of 2 in any of the selected countries. Again, with the exception of Romania, levels of inequality are quite similar across all of the countries. In the following analysis (Figure 6) we then look at financial relations across borders. Level of education plays a bigger role in Romania when it comes to “middle class” consumerism, which is indicated as quite routine among West Europeans across all educational groups. Sending money abroad does not seem to be particularly related to educational background whereas receiving messages from abroad seems more prevalent among the respondents with higher education.


Figure 6 Educational Inequality in transnational consumerism & communications across six countries. Odds-ratios between holders of tertiary degree vs. everybody below



Source: EUCROSS Survey 2012

Finally, looking at consumption and ability to participate transnationally because of language skills (human capital), we get the results of figure 7.

Figure 7 Educational Inequality in transnational human capital across six countries. Odds-ratios between holders of tertiary degree vs. everybody below




Source: EUCROSS Survey 2012

Here, not surprisingly there is a much stronger stratification across education relationship, regarding language (which is of course correlated with higher levels of education), although less in Germany and (surprisingly) the UK. There is a quite consistent relationship in terms of cultural consumption of foreign products (here TV).

In a final step, we dichotomize the summary index of transnationalism into a high transnationalism group (scores 6-13, 22 percent of the pooled sample) and low transnationalism group (scores 5 and below, 78 percent of the pooled sample) to gain an impression of how education, class and gender are related to transnationalism across Europe.

In terms of educational level inequality in “high transnationalism” almost linearly increases from North to South. The UK, the country next to Spain with the highest level of inequality, does not quite fit this pattern however. We might infer that these countries are more likely to sustain the Euroclash type reading, while countries with less inequality of access to transnationalism, Denmark and Germany, may be showing more signs of massification. Figure 8 also reveals that stratification in transnational practices seems to be much more related to education than to class. Possibly this can be interpreted in a way that transnational practice is to a lesser extent a direct consequence of financial resources or social prestige (i.e., class) and to a larger extent associated with a more international outlook and attitude that gets typically fostered in the higher education environment (access to which may of course be stratified by class or not). Finally, with the exception of Romania, age is almost not related to transnationalism, while women slightly less often display high levels of transnationalism than men.

Figure 8 Inequality in high transnationalism (scores 7-13 on the index of all 13 items) across Education (tertiary vs. lower) Class (High ISEI Score – 68 and above vs. lower)²⁹ and Gender (Male vs. Female)



Source: EUCROSS Survey.

As regards geographical specificities, there is a wealth of data available from the survey, regarding the particular relationships of certain countries with others around the globe. To take our first example, Denmark, it is possible to analyze these relationships in terms of familiarity with foreign countries, travel, and social networks abroad. These data presented in table form are the equivalent of the Google world maps that have been constructed from internet data that map out each country's particular geographical relations in the world.³⁰ The following figures are based on a follow up question with regards to which country specific forms of transnational practice are related. Since respondents in the EUCROSS survey were allowed to name multiple responses in case they for example are familiar with more than one foreign country, the following figures present cumulative frequency counts of all named countries.

²⁹ This cutoff follows Ganzboom and Treimann (1996: 214) coding of the service class according to the Erikson-Goldthorpe class scheme based on ISEI scores.

³⁰ For a look at how Google represents this kind of data, see the following website: <http://www.facebookstories.com/stories/1574/interactive-mapping-the-world-s-friendships>.

Fig 9 Knowledge: Which countries are you familiar with?








Fig. 10 Travel. Which countries did you live in for more than three months?



South East



Figs 14/15 Why are you familiar with these countries? (absolute numbers)



Unsurprisingly, familiarity is clearer with more contiguous neighbours, but in terms of travel and social networks the USA and even some Asian countries loom large in Denmark. Where we have some interesting results is in putting alongside these results for Denmark with other member states. In fact a clear North-South distinction can be found if we group these nations into “North-West” and “South-East” Europe, with Denmark, Germany and the UK resembling each other much more than they resemble the Southern European forms of transnationalism. We choose one of these questions as an illustration: familiarity with other countries.

Of course, identifying inequalities between the North and South in Europe overlooks other structural inequalities that might be found across Europe, between social classes. This in itself might be a feature of Europeanisation, and is certainly the challenge at the heart of Fligstein and Beckfield’s argument: that European integration is feeding off inequalities, and leading to a more individualised and fragmented European society, for all its egalitarian talk about citizenship or the proud boasts in the Lisbon Agenda elsewhere of being able to achieve growth with sustainability and social cohesion. Our study therefore moves in its final quantitative stage to a full analysis of the relation to cosmopolitanism in terms of various socio-economic controls.

In this last step we explore whether transnational practices observed in our sample of countries can be systematically related to cosmopolitan values by regressing the cosmopolitan index on transnational practices. We go beyond previous work by introducing our four dimensions of transnationalism (mobility, relations, consumerism/communication and capital) separately in the model. Furthermore we can account for a richer set of control variables that might mediate the relationship between transnationalism and cosmopolitanism. In addition, we ran separate models for high vs. low education respondents to explore whether the strength of the relationship between transnational practice and cosmopolitan values is of equal relevance across educational levels. One could hypothesize that transnational practices are more common among the wealthy and privileged, but are more beneficial (i.e., make more of a positive difference) for the development of cosmopolitan attitudes for respondents with lower levels of education.

Table 4 OLS Regression of Cosmopolitan Index on four Dimensions of Transnationalism and Socio-demographic Control Variables

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 2a Educ=High	Model 2b Educ=Low
<i>Transnationalism</i> ¹ :				
Mobility	0.090*	0.059	0.044	0.067*
Relations	0.053**	0.049**	0.039	0.053*
Communication/Consum.	0.086**	0.066*	0.071*	0.064*
Human Capital	0.077**	0.049*	0.035	0.060*
<i>Country</i> (Reference: UK)				
Denmark	-0.078***	-0.051**	-0.089***	-0.025
Germany	-0.049***	-0.028**	-0.053***	-0.006
Italy	0.205***	0.217***	0.198***	0.247***
Romania	0.051**	0.064***	-0.007	0.116***
Spain	0.243***	0.255***	0.223***	0.286***
Female	0.020	0.018	0.028*	0.012
Age	-0.028	-0.042	-0.047	-0.045
<i>Place of birth</i> (Reference: Ctry. of res.)				
EU country	-0.019	-0.014	-0.006	-0.022
Outside EU country	0.002	0.001	0.009	-0.007
Partner citi.ship not COR at birth	-0.023	-0.019	-0.034	-0.010
<i>Education</i> (Reference: Compulsory)				
Secondary		0.040		
Tertiary		0.117*		
ISEI (imp.) ²		0.059*	0.054*	0.061**
R ²	0.121	0.136	0.120	0.117
N	5408	5408	2061	3347

Source: EUCROSS Survey * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: ¹ Each dimension of transnationalism is based on an additive index based on the dummy indicator variables presented in table 2, divided by the number of items for each dimension.

² Missing ISEI values for 1172 observations were imputed using STATA's impute command using country, age, gender, place of birth and citizenship of partner at birth.

Table 4 reports unstandardized coefficient estimates from four OLS regression models based on our pooled country sample. In the first model transnational practices, a set of basic demographic controls (age, gender place of birth) as well as country dummy variables are included. To test whether a potential association between transnational practices and cosmopolitanism cannot be simply attributed to respondents' socioeconomic position, we introduce measures for respondents' education and occupational status (ISEI) in a second model. The estimates from Model 1 show that each dimension of transnationalism is significantly related to cosmopolitan attitudes. As would be expected, in Model 2, controlling for occupational status and education reduces the coefficient size for all dimensions of transnationalism. Nevertheless, all coefficient estimates remain statistically significant with the exception of transnational mobility. These results are in line with previous studies showing that the effect of transnational practices on cosmopolitan attitudes (Mau et al. 2008) or European identification (Kuhn 2012) cannot be simply attributed to socioeconomic control variables. The coefficients for

the country dummy variables (Britain is the reference category) indicate that net of transnationalism and sociodemographic controls, pronounced and statistically differences in cosmopolitanism between countries remain: The British have higher net levels of cosmopolitanism than the Danes and the Germans, and lower levels than Italians, Romanians and Spanish. It follows that while cross-border transnational practices do seem to influence cosmopolitan orientations in the expected direction, they cannot account for the observed country differences. Finally we run model 2 separately for respondents with higher education (model 2a) and lower levels of education (model 2b). Comparing the two education-specific models reveals that all of the coefficient estimates for transnationalism remain statistically significant in the model for respondents with lower levels of education, the opposite is true for the “higher education model” where only the coefficient estimate for consumerism/communication is significantly different from zero. These results point in the direction that travelling and engaging in other forms of transnational activities might potentially have more of an impact on individuals with lower levels of education. These are tentative conclusions, however and we should also point out that the coefficient estimates for the different types of transnational practice in the “lower education model” are not drastically higher compared to the “higher education model”.

The above analyses offer a guide to the strongly emergent transnationalism among ordinary European populations, as well as some indication of how this relates to expanding cosmopolitan values that have been influenced by the European project in the context of regional integration and globalisation, albeit without necessarily always being connected explicitly to political support for Europe. The cosmopolitanism expressed in generic questions, however, may not always have the same meaning in every European context. As we have seen, transnationalism has its own geographical varieties, and following Díez Medrano (2003) we would expect that the cosmopolitanism found in each country might also have its own distinctive expressions, according to “local” (i.e., national) differences in each country’s relation to Europe and the World. Accordingly then, we are able to here supplement the quantitative analysis above with below a first qualitative analysis of the in-depth interview material gathered in the EUMEAN survey. We will focus selectively on evidence from (as in Díez Medrano) Germany, Spain and the UK, in relation to our reference country Denmark.

Qualitative findings

Díez Medrano (2010) argues that Eurobarometer type surveys rarely help us to understand the dynamics of European integration at the national level, because there are marked qualitative differences in the way the European project is perceived and understood in different member states. He speaks of this in terms of the way Europe is “framed” differently in different places. This could be related to the historical specificities and trajectories of different member states, as much as their geographical location. In his work he considers the fairly obvious contrasts in this respect of Spain, Germany and the UK, also delving into internal regional differences within these countries.

The Danes

Taking this as an inspiration, we began our analysis of the EUMEAN data with the Danish case. Prominent among the Nordic states, Denmark reveals itself as an ideal test ground for exploring the paradoxes of nationalism, Europeanisation and globalisation in Europe today. Long known for its affluence, its high ratings in terms of levels of globalisation, and for being allegedly the happiest people on Earth, Denmark is an archetypal small nation that has known well how to position itself for success in the currents of international politics and economy. Yet in recent years, its golden image has become tarnished by both a fairly intransigent attitude towards European cooperation – a version of Euro-scepticism – as well as a quite harsh anti-immigrant politics grounded in a kind of “common sense” populist xenophobia. ISSP data from 2004 on national identity shows that Danes, comparatively more than their Scandinavian friends in Norway and Sweden, want to live in Denmark rather than any other country (81%). This clarifies the continuous importance of the national scale in the Danish case.

We are interested in how these issues show up in the everyday life of ordinary Danes. As part of the research for EUCROSS, in addition to the large N telephone survey, a small number of follow up interviews were made with Danish residents. Crucially, we opted for a wide spread of locations in different parts of Denmark, some very far out in the regions away from the metropolitan centre, Copenhagen, even though the major part of this small sample were rated as “high transnationalism” in the original survey. In particular, we see our work as contributing to the effort to develop new qualitative methods and instruments in European identity research after Díez Medrano (Duchesne 2010; Duchesne et al. 2013), as well as studies about the empirical human dimension of international mobilities and globalisation in everyday life (Savage et al 2005; Mau 2010). Counter to their politically expressed Euroscepticism and nationalism, ordinary Danes of a variety of backgrounds engage in a wide range of European, global and cosmopolitan practices in everyday life, which nuance their obviously expressed range of “banal Danish-isms” (Billig 1995; Jenkins 2011). We also share the effort in the recent sociological and geographical literature (i.e., Andreotti et al. 2013) to shift discussions on mobility away from the limited numbers of obvious movers in Europe to more settled, mass populations.

We connect the investigation above into the relation of cosmopolitan attitudes and transnational practices to perceptions of space, place and belonging on the other. In part this implies investigating the experience and choice of residential place within Denmark as well as how Denmark as a collected space is negotiated and constructed in a changing global context in the lives of these ordinary citizens, in the light of a seemingly large range of differentiated transnational practices such as leisure travel, work related mobility and/or experiences of the effects of globalisation, i.e. immigration, new technological possibilities and increased personal international connections. From such stories, we further show how and when different scales, such as the city, the national, the European and the global are invoked to make sense of the world they live in. In the Danish context, the city of Copenhagen has a special role as a spatial reference in strategies of “elective belonging” (Savage et al. 2005) and a sense of self, in contrast to living in Jutland (the mainland) where choices concerning residency are mainly linked to family questions. Variations in cosmopolitan attitudes and transnational practices may be linked with these belonging strategies, but crucially we find that the geographical periphery is not any less transnational than Copenhagen, only sometimes *differently* transnational; social class too

– frequently cited as the main factor in explaining opportunities for transnationalism or cosmopolitanism – does not seem to determine the kind of cosmopolitanisms expressed by Danes, and it only affects certain transnational practices. Most Danes are in many ways comfortably transnational and cosmopolitan in banal ways that would satisfy anyone looking for proof of Europe’s cosmopolitan “normative power” agenda (Manners 2002; Beck and Grande 2007). However, when questions are linked with immigration or the European economic crisis (and especially issues of the common currency or identification with the EU), the national scale is immediately re-invoked and defended, particularly with reference to the superior democratic capacity of the Danish state, as well as its fragility as a small nation likely to be swamped by European or global problems. Our findings thus suggest some interesting particularities of the everyday effects of Europeanisation and globalisation in Denmark, and how various types of mobilities expressed and embodied by Danes in their everyday practices are quite separate from their political opinions and values.

To summarise our findings, our data portrays a group of Danes as a peculiar mix of politically and culturally engaged citizens at local, national, European and global scales alike. Yet the fluidity of different scales in everyday life is highly contrasted both among the group of interviewees, but also in different contexts. Denmark is a nation with what seems to be a general well-travelled population and consequently the effect of class as well as the centre/periphery hypothesis do not seem to hold as much as they might do in other countries; at least not when it comes to the intensity of transnational practices or cosmopolitan attitudes. Dependent on the context, choice of life style and self-perception seem to be the most decisive factor in determining the most significant difference among this group of interviewees when negotiating transnational practices in everyday life. While the periphery is no less transnational than people living in Copenhagen, this data indicates differences in the *form* of integration of these practices and as well as the *reason* for crossing borders or buying products online. For example, one respondent living in the North East of Jutland and classified “low transnational” in fact was highly aware about the benefits of global flows and how she benefitted from the EU. Her use of the Internet, for instance, is a good indication of how the EU has certainly made it easier to live in a small town and she told a lot about the use of (particularly) Amazon in Germany which consequently created a very pragmatic and economic relationship to crossing borders as the next quote indicates.

We feel that [closeness] even more with Hamburg though. We go there a lot. And that’s simply what we pick, and we pick that over Copenhagen actually [...]. We do actually [like it better than going to Copenhagen]. From here and then on the high way, it takes no time [...]. In the beginning when we talked about it, it was like: “But that’s another country, that’s Germany”. But there isn’t anyone at the border anymore, you don’t even notice passing it.

This was mainly part of their belonging strategies behind choosing residential placement as well as their motivation for travelling. Place and perceptions of place in a variety of ways seem to depict a certain cultural status and profile – as we saw in the perceptions of a travel-hierarchy that existed among some of the interviewees, where Europe is simply the most “ordinary” travel destination in some cases, so ordinary that going there seems less a “serious” trip than if you cross the Atlantic to the West or the Ural Mountains to

the East. Hence, this is witness to the fact that the banal integration of transnational practices might very well be established in the European space.

The data also show that the national scale is in fact intertwined with many other experiences of being European and using Europe as well as the world; that is, in the context of travels and other practices as part of social distinction, individuality, residence and general “free living”. At the same time, identification with Europe and the EU is also affected by the experience of being clearly part of a national community which currently seems to be invoked mostly due to the economic crisis or when talking about immigration. Such stories indicated that the wish to uphold the national was mostly in a political context; on these issues, there is a decrease in (EU)ropean attachments, an attachment which had been so vividly expressed as an almost second home earlier when travelling had been the focus. Thus what interviews also clarify is the importance of untangling experiential frames of, at once the local and the city, the national, the European and the global scales, which show not only *what* the European or the national might be, but more significantly *when* the different scales are invoked and thus when they become meaningful (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008). In this case we can therefore assign the European space much more credit than might be the case if we only measured the political convictions about the EU that would be expressed in a quantitative survey. The transnational and cosmopolitan Danes are more visible when they are *not* talking about politics.

Denmark is a good place to start as a case in Europe, because it is ideal typical of a highly globalised, highly affluent, yet highly cohesive and relatively homogenous society. It is routinely rated as one of the most highly globalised societies on Earth (Dreher et al. 2008). Yet it combines high levels of social transnationalism with high levels of national loyalty: mobilities are not an “exit” issue in terms of brain drain or the flight of capital, and Danes are very rarely driven to move themselves or their activities outside of the country for reasons of pure economic disadvantage. It is, in other words, the epitome of the privileged and economically successful North-West of Europe, which has combined growth and affluence with a high level of welfare and social protection, and in which mobilities are more a matter of choice, consumption and lifestyle, yet highly diffused across society. We see European transnationalism under ideal conditions; yet we also see through our analysis that high levels of practical Europeanised behaviour is not necessarily accompanied by high levels of support for the European project.

The Spanish

How do things look in contrast, in the South of Europe? In contrast to Denmark, the Spanish history of travelling abroad is not dating as far back as to the 50s; at least not for the majority of the population. As one respondent says:

I don't know how young people have it these days because maybe things are not better or worse, they are just different, but I don't think that there is so much difference from my time. Bear in mind that when I went abroad I was 17, it was in 1963, and Spanish were not used to travelling abroad during summer. But there were some who did it, anyway, it was not very common.

As in the other Mediterranean countries the sun shines in their own country and summer holidays are therefore also likely to be at their *own* coast and without crossing any

borders. This would partly explain the low Spanish numbers on mobility and trips in the past 24 months (Table 2). This is obviously a different story than among the Northern Europeans who line up every year on the German highways to go South. Some of the older interviewees in Spain tell stories about how few travelled around Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, but also how they as tourists were blacklisted due to the international view on Franco-ruled Spain. However, having experienced the change from when Franco was still alive, this seems to have had an effect on how the Spanish people today enjoy their freedom to speak and travel, which can be seen in terms of certain “international choices” and general reflections that still seem to be enhanced in the light of the Spanish past.

Advancing in language proficiencies is especially something that the older population is very focused on in relation to the new global opportunities. From such discussions it also become clear that what we could refer to as Spanish cosmopolitanism is based on more virtual mobilities than the Danish hard-core physical mobility. Also Spanish respondents seem more pragmatic in their openness as learning languages in both in terms of travelling to new places, but also increasing opportunities to be involved in new and other work-relations with foreign countries.

There is a clear difference between the Danes and the Spanish on the front of physical mobility, especially when it comes to “leisure movement” or moving “without a reason” and there is a tendency among the Spanish to go to countries close to their own. Though there surely are interviewees from Spain who are extremely well travelled as well, what travelling means to them appears a lot more modest, and to what extent this is relevant to their self-perception, is also less evident than in the Danish cases.

Lack of language proficiency might be one explanation as this was not even a topic in the Danish interviews: there was much frustration among Southern European populations at how they were bad at making themselves understood in other languages. Hence, in this respect, the Spanish seem to perceive themselves as somewhat more restricted in the places they are able to travel to because of language. The Danes also appear less restricted in their talks about being mobile. It is not questioned anymore, whereas a profound part of the Spanish population still remembers the past and did not “grow up” with travelling. The economic crisis since 2008 has also changed the character of mobility as people are indeed leaving Spain to find work, which is mentioned in the interviews and inevitably gives mobility with a more pragmatic character. Whereas freedom to move is mainly only seen as good in Denmark as a personal asset (not in term of immigration), the Spanish are forced to think of the necessity to move because their country is currently in a deep crisis. Mobility is thus in general much more politicised than it is in Denmark. Mobility and politics goes together in Denmark only when you talk about immigration; otherwise it is associated with dreams, opportunities and self-development. In Spain, the historical pathway of the country have left mobility and therefore also their cosmopolitan outlook with a very different character. In Spain, mobility is today as it has been in the past, as much about politics as it is about leisure, except for the narrower group of those who can easily afford it and prioritise it.

The Spanish clearly position themselves geographically in a different way. Latin America, unsurprisingly, is close. The same goes for places like Morocco, France, Italy and Portugal

(even to some extent Switzerland), countries which are often talked about as self-evident travel destinations. This is different from Denmark, Germany and Britain – colonialism certainly plays a role in these differences. Something indicates in the Spanish interviews that they are quite used to people coming from Morocco as immigrants and the distance is small.

Sure. It is obvious that I have more things in common with a Spanish person or a European (than a Japanese person) because we are nearer, we have more contact, we share the currency... But anyway, I have less in common with a Pole than with a Moroccan because we're neighbours, even though they are not European. But yes, you will always feel this union with a European, you have this connection.

The European crisis and a growing hostility to “the South” (referred to quite commonly as the PIGS in Europe) is hinted at. Europe has lost some of its “goodness” and sense of solidarity. One interviewee was now very hesitant of drawing any points of identification with Northern European populations and he was extremely reluctant to think of the EU as anything else than German domination, though the EU was still good in terms of facilitating mobility.

If Spain wasn't in the EU it could have done things like depreciating the currency and other similar things. And maybe these would have improved our situation. But we cannot do anything because we are inside and, ok, it is true, when things go well it is great but when things go wrong... We cannot take the risk of letting this happen, what is going on now, it is not worth it. The crisis started when I was about 17 and so I wasn't thinking about economic problems too much. I did not care. I was not thinking about Europe as something economic. I perceived it rather as something more cultural. I enjoyed it, such as the possibility to travel to all these countries. And all these scholarship agreements to study wherever you like. I liked all these things very much and I still like them. But this thing about economic union, I don't see it very clearly.

The Spanish in many cases are openly critical of their home environment and self-perception, but many have only travelled in a more virtual sense, when compared with Danes. In contrast, it is almost the opposite case with Danes, where everybody travels, but where many are also more protective of their residence and home sphere. If place matters in Spain according to this small number of interviews, it seems like there are different varieties of this matter where the choice of place (or belonging to a place) is either pragmatic, forced or based on a feeling about the environment, such as climate. At least for some the crisis have given both the free choice of who they should identify with, as well as posing the question of international mobility. The willingness to move to a different country is therefore also rather large, which confirms the numbers in the EUCROSS dataset. This therefore forces some Spanish to be more pragmatic in their mobility, such as expanding their own global and cosmopolitan opportunities by learning a new language, taking Erasmus scholarships, or leaving to Germany for work (to which more than one was referring).

The relation of place, belonging and the Europe/EU is bound up in many interviews. In the Danish interviews, place and city residence in many cases had a lot to do with self-perception and lifestyle and even their approach to globalization, with contrasts between the peripheries and urban centre. In contrast, place, belonging and self-perception seem explicitly politicized in Spain: everyone is suffering the crisis, and the struggle often translates into regional concerns. Thoughts of mobility are immediately related to the

country's political situation. This might also have something to do with the eyes looking at them from the outside. Spanish respondents seem highly aware of the world and Europe in the sense that they are aware of what others think about them and their politicians and in this sense there are a lot of "cross-border references", whereas Danes are a lot more caught in their own bubble and a bit more careless and confident in their nationality. This is for instance evident when the Spanish talk about reading foreign media to get more or new perspectives on the matter, a further interesting banal effect of globalization as well as the crisis.

In sum, the EU at an economic and political level seems to leave a huge divide among the Spanish. They are ambivalent in their idea of how Europe is today divided between North and South, with Germany placed in the middle as a sometimes too strong or dominant political neighbour, but sometimes as their way out of the crisis, perhaps through using mobility and exit options themselves.

The Germans

Regarding Germany, we focused on adding nuances to the extensive picture that Mau and his colleagues have provided on horizontal Europeanisation and transnational practices. The issue of being pro- or anti-EU is much less salient in Germany. However the former East/West divide has a significant effect on citizens' perception on European freedom and Germany identity. Germans like the Spanish evoke the political crisis when thinking about the EU: it is as much a political space as it is an experiential and cultural space. Unlike with the Danes, politics is part of living in everyday Europe and is much more up front.

This qualitative dataset does not reproduce the negative prejudices between the two parts of Germany; if anything some of the interviewees find it absurd that some Eastern and Western citizens are still living with this mental divide even though they were not even born then. However, there are also several references to the divide when we talk about freedom to move and a general globalization that demands cosmopolitan outlooks. A mother with children abroad and living in Western Germany reflected on how Germans should celebrate more the "wonderful" fact of free movement now, and also get over their prejudices to the Turkish population. She is proud her children are "cosmopolitan":

We are getting more open. Let us be happy that the wall is gone.

The possibility of being cosmopolitan citizens is something to be thankful for; and not least because of Germany's own national history – that is the message here. It is not something that can be taken for granted and in this sense, the freedom to move is rather more linked in its connotations to national history, over and above European free movement policies. Moreover, the quote shows a similar "good quality" of the cosmopolitan outlook as we also find in the Danish interviews, where being global and cosmopolitan is a personal lifestyle and asset; something you characterize yourself and others with, that is, as a form of distinction. This is in contrast to Spain where it appeared as a more pragmatic approach to make use of the world's resources of work and a way to upgrade your ability to be part of the world economy.

Another interesting aspect is how being "European" can also be a positive reference point in the sense that "Germanness" does not seem to have clarified meaning – and again, the

old divide shows its face, as in this quote from a former East German, when asked if he felt European:

Well, definitely, more as European than, what do I know, German, I dare to say. Well this is probably because I have lived in different countries and perhaps have not gained ground back here again. As far as the mentality is concerned and so on. And hmm, for this reason rather European than German.

For Germans, there seem to be a fine line between cultural Europe and political Europe, which might be caused by the role that Germany has been given as a consequence of the crisis. This is now also to be found in the attitudes among the German citizens. Moreover, Germans also seem to have a geopolitical location that provides different and many types of transnational networks to the Germans both in a political and personal sense. There is a much more and different references to countries, for example to the Balkans and other East European countries, than in Denmark or Spain.

Germanness is difficult to grasp from the dataset. The feeling may not be so strong, or it may be hidden in the minds of Germans because of their history with nationalism. There is also little reference to other parts of Germany. People seem to be rather local or regional, and intra-national movement is not something that shows up in their talks about neighborhood or residence. In Germany, Berlin is not the obvious big, global city to which all the small time village people flee to evade narrow-minded citizens; at least not as obviously as it is for the Danes with Copenhagen. Instead, every region in Germany seems to have its own big city that would contrast with local village life. Country size and the network of mid-sized cities in Germany surely matters in this respect. On the other hand, the cosmopolitanism of certain Germans seems itself to be dependent on quite typical German traits: for example, a distrust for newspapers and the media, which pushes them to check and compare how the media might be covering it in another country such as the UK.

The British

The UK, like Denmark, has a specific national state of mind when it comes to Europe, as well as it comes to travelling. On this front, the Danes, the Germans and the British exemplify their privileged position, incorporating mobility as a more routine or banal factor or everyday life, and the advantage of globalisation, in a different way to the Spanish in the South. Travelling represents a certain lifestyle, and is also about being categorised as such in terms of social distinction. It is not only about working or holidaying, but is also a life lesson in seeing the world or seeking authenticity.

The interviewees were primarily happy about living in Europe, but though they were very open to other parts of the world, thinking about such experiences would also sometimes be the route to expressing oneself about the rest of the world in a less flattering and exclusive way, about what Europe seemed to be or not, or where certain European trademarks would be portrait as “the good way” to do things.

I think that when something daft like the Eurovision song comes to have Israelis in it, that's ridiculous: they're Middle Eastern. I am [also] not so sure I class Turkey as Europe. I know that Turkey wants to be part of the European Union but I don't class it as Europe.

At the same time (and not without self-contradiction), there is of course a distance to

Europe expressed among the British interviewees. Negative comments about European immigrants are now commonplace.

Because we are an island, aren't we? There is going to be a saturation point at some point.

A very typical reflection on European identity goes as follows:

Britain or the United Kingdom is not particularly European really. Everyone in Britain pretty much hates Europe and blames Europe for any problems. I suppose with Western Europe it is quite similar culture, but with Europe it is a vastly different culture... I don't think most people in the North of England will consider themselves European.

The question opens up the way to embracing English nationalism:

The fact that I really do not associate with Britain, lessens the tie with Europe, so I do not consider myself European. But again if I was in American, then again I would be European.

Internal distinctions in the UK do matter: such as its own North/South divide. Non-Londoners, identify London – which is also seen as the main city of UK's fabled multiculturalism and diversity, as is Copenhagen – with being unfriendly, depressing, lonely. A true Briton can even feel a “foreigner” in London, hearing nothing but foreign languages on the tube. Others meanwhile, strongly identify with London.

The British, similar to Danes, are in general satisfied with life in Britain and most people prefer to stay in Britain. There is a sense that people are more flexible with their country of residence in Germany or Spain. To some extent, as also in Denmark, residence is evaluated from a social and family perspective and it therefore becomes a hindrance for moving away. Language (as for the Spanish) is also a major hindrance. We therefore see a similar type of satisfaction with the UK among the British as we find among Danes with Denmark. Many of the interviewees also express this through taking a stand on their neighbourhood and their city, and contrasting it with other cities, then identifying with their country as especially a place where they like to live. Pure Danishness is stronger than being British because the larger category is now highly conflicted with Englishness. There is growing differentiating within the UK, which is mixed up with people's thoughts about the EU, the European region and the UK's place in the global: a self-contradictory mix.

Conclusions

In this chapter, we have offered an analysis of the relation of transnational practices to cosmopolitan values in the EUCROSS survey, investigating how they vary by social position and by national context across Europe. Transnationalism and cosmopolitanism can be found to be very similar in scale and intensity in Denmark, Germany and Britain, which belies the Danish and British Euroscepticism often expressed in these countries in so far as many of these practices are concretely linked to European integration. While finding obvious and unsurprising evidence that transnationalism and cosmopolitanism is associated with higher class positions, we also show some tentative evidence for a broader diffusion of opportunities for mobility across middle classes in Europe than suggested by Fligstein and others (particularly in Denmark and Germany), as well as

evidence that the people whose values change the most in a cosmopolitan direction when exposed to transnational experiences are those from a lower social class background.

In the second part, we offer a first analysis of some of the most salient variable meanings and framings found in the qualitative survey EUMEAN. Taking Denmark as the ideal typical successful European society, we see how transnationalism and Europeanisation have become banal, while neither negating strong national affiliation, and defensiveness towards Danish homogeneity. In other respects, the Danes are exemplary cosmopolitans, with Europe a zone of lifestyle choices and easy mobility, but there is a mismatch with their European opinions. Germany and the UK offer views on mobilities and identity that might be closely expected: heavily determined by geographical position and national history. They share similar degrees of cosmopolitanism, but give it very different meanings in relation to national particularities. Meanwhile, it is only the Spanish in our analysis of these four worlds of European transnationalism who are conscious of the primary economic justifications for European mobility rights. Yet they are markedly less experienced and more rooted in their everyday lives.

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