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Best, Heinrich

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RECRUITMENT, CAREERS AND LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR
OF GERMAN PARLIAMENTARIANS, 1848-1953

HEINRICH BEST⁺

The project presented here shall contribute to the inquiry into the connection between the character of the social system and the kind of power-organisation in Germany from the middle of the 19th century to the early phase of the Federal Republic of Germany. We plan to gather data on the biographical and career characteristics, parliamentary voting-behavior, and voting-districts of ca. 5,250 members of national German parliaments between 1848 and 1953. Therewith methods of collective biography, quantitative voting-analysis and multi-level-analysis (in the sense of an application of context-variables on the level of the voting-district) are combined. With this combination of methods, we intend, at first, to reconstruct the recruitment and legislative behavior of parliamentary leadership-groups in an empirical density and temporal depth which have not yet been available in the case of Germany. In a further step, the findings shall be incorporated into a comprehensive conception of investigation which can be expressed in the following research-question: Which structural properties of the surrounding society and political culture have determined the capability of parliamentary leadership-groups to make compromises, to form coalitions and therewith also to gain power in such a way which, in turn, contributed to the development, delayed and disturbed by crises, of German parliamentarism? The project is being supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.

1. STATE OF RESEARCH

The investigation of parliamentary leadership-groups and decision-making processes, as a subject of political sociology, has a respectable tradition. The prominent constitutional position of parliaments and the great public attention which has been directed to their work let the actors in the legislative process become important objects of social-scientific research quite early. (1) Not in the

⁺Address all communications to: Heinrich Best, Institut für angewandte Sozialforschung, Greinstr. 2, 5000 Köln 41.

least, the relatively easy accessibility of the information documented in parliamentary hand-books, protocols, and the public reporting has also stimulated the scientific interest in this field of research. Today, those theoretical and thematic aspects are important above all which connect research concerning parliamentary leadership-groups with central areas of political sociology. This is true especially for the three fields of:

- elite analysis - here above all concerning the recruitment and careers of representatives; (2)
- the sociology of parties - here above all with respect to the connection between the formation of factions and the forming of parties, as well as to the mediation of intra-party and factional decision-making processes; (3)
- the theory of decision - here above all with respect to the determining factors of voting-behavior and formation of factions and coalitions. (4)

Seen from today, the inquiry into parliaments and parliamentarians has gained historical depth chiefly through the steady interest in the object: This has led to an accumulation of research-results, without eo ipso implying a coherent observation of processes of change. In addition to this parliaments become an important field of research for social science history; not in the least, because biographies and voting-behavior, also for the past, can be investigated relatively easily by means of standardized procedures of data gathering and social-scientific techniques of data analysis. (5) Certainly the research situation sketched here indicates a relatively steady and intensive occupation with the subject, but still, remarkably large gaps in research and avoidable methodological and conceptual limitations are to be noticed. This ascertainment holds, with some restrictions, for the international state of research; it is true, with less reservations, of the situation in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Deficiencies are recognizable above all in four areas:

1. Up to now there is very little internationally comparative research in the area of parliamentary leadership-groups. (6) The few works with a synchronically comparative perspective restrict themselves for the most part to the interpretation of marginal distributions. More complex methods of analysis were, up until now, applied only infrequently. In the case of comprehensive comparisons of political cultures and elite-systems, parliaments are only one aspect among many. The restriction to macro-phenomena, characteristic of such global approaches, had the unavoidable effect that essential aspects, which are of interest in connection with the structure of parliamentary leadership-groups and their behavior, remained bracketed out. (7) In the area of historical social research, internationally comparative investigations are completely lacking.
2. The same holds for historically comparative investigation. The great number of individual studies has indeed led, in the course of time, to an accumulation of research-results; however, these investigations have been, so far, only seldom connected to cohesive observations. (8) When longer periods were treated cohesively at all, the traditional historical caesurae - such as revolutions, establishments of constitutions, reforms of voting-rights and comparable changes of the political system - remained the

usuallines of division. Over longer spaces of time and conventional historical periodizations, change and continuity of recruitment and of behavior of parliamentary leadership-groups as well as their connection with changes in other segments of society remain a field open to research. In the meantime, collections of data exist for the USA, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway which, on the basis of non-aggregated machine-readable data, allow long-term analyses. (9)

- 3: Up until now, the connection between biographical characteristics of representatives on the one hand and their parliamentary voting-behavior on the other has rarely been investigated systematically. In general, collective biography and quantitative voting-analyses are each used as independent methods. (10) True, individual demographical variables are occasionally drawn into quantitative voting-analyses, but this cannot count as a methodologically satisfactory combination of both procedures, for the explanatory power of such "monocausal" approaches is, on the whole, slight and the effects of intervening variables remain untested. Thus in social background analyses very widely reaching interpretations are deduced from apparent correlations, while the instruments for the control of intervening factors and third variables are only used infrequently. (11)
4. Just as unusual are multi-level analyses. At the voting-district level socio-economic structural data are, indeed, occasionally employed as background-variables for analyses of parliamentary decision-making, but the actual process of the mediation between the properties of the electorate and the behavior of the actors in the legislative process has still been hardly examined. (12) Here, data on participation-behavior and the influence of intermediate organizations on the voting-district level would have to be drawn into the analyses, in order to arrive at better founded results. (13)

However, this listing of deficiencies should not obscure the fact that, in most parliamentary democracies with a developed social-scientific tradition of research, quantitative voting-analyses and collective biographies are routinely applied and methodologically highly developed procedures. This holds true above all for the USA, where the existence of a specialized journal (Legislative Studies Quarterly), the establishment of a research-center at the University of Iowa (Comparative Legislative Research Center) and of a Legislative Behavior Network in the framework of the Social Science History Association can count as indications of an advanced process of differentiation and institutionalization of this field of research. Today, biographical core-data and voting-behavior of American congressmen from 1777 (Continental Congress) up to the present have been completely prepared in machine-readable form. (14) Similarly favorable is the research- and data-situation for Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway, about whose parliamentary leadership-groups Erich Gruner, Hans Daalder, Mogens N. Pedersen and a group of researchers from the NSD have gathered corresponding data from 1848 (in Norway: 1814) up until the present (Switzerland: 1919). The biographies of the representatives of national Austrian parliaments are presently being machine-readably prepared by Dieter Stiefel (Wien). (15) The parliaments of Japan, Great Britain, France and Italy were also intensively examined, with the application of quantitative collective-biographical procedures and, partly, voting-analyses of individual legislature periods. (16) In these cases too, investigations were occasionally carried out in great historical depth (e.g. Great Britain: Active Members of the House of Commons, 1691-1693), without, up to now, temporally cohesive sets of data having been put

out. Even for developing countries with a relatively short and questionable parliamentary tradition, data-bases are now available (Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Korea, Mexico).

The research in the Federal Republic of Germany is, in particular with respect to investigations with a diachronically comparative perspective, still hardly developed. With varying degree this holds true for the formation of theory, the formulation of complex conceptions of investigation and the application of advanced procedures of analysis (17), although, however, at least on the point mentioned first a significant tradition could be referred to. (18) Characteristic of the state of research in the Federal Republic is the fact that up until now there are hardly any works here which investigate legislative behavior of German parliamentarians with the methodological repertoire of quantitative voting-analysis. One reason for this is certainly that the high factional and coalitional discipline makes the application of this instrument to the parliaments of the Federal Republic not very productive. (19) However, this argument is not valid for the past up into the years of the Weimar Republic. Up until now in the USA, Mattheisen, Harris and Loesch have applied these procedures, with a historically limited interest, to the Frankfurt (20) and Berlin National Assemblies (21) as well as to the North German (22) and German Reichstage from 1867 to 1890. (23) But comprehensive publications on the subject were not submitted. The only two German works which, up until now, have applied the techniques of roll-call-analysis (Norpoth and Thomas (24)) rest exclusively upon American data and are to be ordered into the research context of the USA.

Just as clear is the backwardness in the case of the application of collective-biographical methods. Here the works of W. H. Schröder on the candidates of the SPD for the Reichstag and the machine-readable preparation of biographical data of the members of the Prussian House of Representatives by Bernhard Mann represent isolated exceptions. (26) The remaining historical works on the subject are too limited with respect to their regional areas of coverage and investigative periods of time, and too heterogeneous in their methodological approaches and posings of the question in order to be connected in a temporally and spatially comprehensive analysis from social-scientific perspectives. (26)

In the preparation of the project presented here, first experience could be gained with the methods of quantitative voting-analysis on the basis of a set of data on the behavior of the representatives of the Paulskirche in 52 roll-call votes. This basis of data is being presently extended to the whole space of time up to the dissolution of the National Assembly. In spite of the still short space of time for observation (from June to October 1848) the preliminary results of this pilot-study allow us to expect a high cognitive potential for complex procedures of analysis.

Thus a factor-analysis of the voting-behavior showed that factional loyalties were only one among several determinants of parliamentary decision-making processes. One factor, which represents the structuring of the voting-behavior by factional bonds, has indeed the greatest weight, but next to it the specific lines of tension of Germany's national process of integration become visible in the voting-patterns: in decisions concerning the position of the Empire's (central) power vis-à-vis the individual states, the integration of Austria into the Empire, the relationship to ethnic minority-groups (autonomy of the Polish minority), the relation of state and church, the treatment of questions with high, national, symbolic significance

(Malmö Armistice) and the defense of the authority of the revolutionary parliaments of 1848 vis-à-vis the competing, traditional holders of power, parliamentary group-formations become recognizable which deviate, in part considerably, from the manifest factional structure.


The multi-dimensional scaling of the 52 votes (cf. illustration 1) yields a similar result: next to two blocks of parliamentary decisions, which can be classified unambiguously according to a "right-left-dimension", further votings are grouped along a dimension "particularist versus unitarian". Themes such as the relationship between state and church, industrial policy, the position of ethnic minorities and rather moral positions (attitude towards the death-penalty) can be coordinated neither to the one nor to the other dimension. Despite the still narrow range of these preliminary findings, it becomes recognizable in a sketchy manner that in early German parliamentarianism political, economic, social and cultural constellations of problems immediately influenced the decision-making processes. The bundeling together of different complexes of questions and the disciplining of representatives with partially deviating orientations succeeded only incompletely. This establishes good presuppositions for the application of the procedures of quantitative voting-analysis.

The first preparatory works are also available in the area of the diachronic investigation of social and political structures of German parliaments. Thus, out of the scattered pieces of information of published statistics, a "social profile" of the representatives of German parliaments between 1848 and 1976 has been put together. It was the goal of this rather conventional collection of material to determine more exactly whether, respectively, in what manner parliamentary leadership-groups can be characterized as cross-sections of different segments of the elite-system and how the configuration of these cross-sections changed in the course of time (cf. table 1). Also from published tables, for a series of legislative periods measures of association were calculated which represent connections between professional structure and factional structure and between regional origin of the representatives (determined by means of the location of the voting-district) and factional structure. The findings hitherto reveal that, from the middle of the 19th century up into the Weimar Republic, the relationship between professional structure and factional membership became stronger and stronger (cf. table 2). An occurrence which contemporaries interpreted as a mediatisation of the parliament by socio-economic interest-groups and made essentially responsible for the relative weakness of the parliaments in the Empire and the Weimar Republic. (27) As against that the early Bundestage are characterized by a relatively even distribution of representative-professions among the factions. With respect to the relationship between faction and region the unexpected finding of a "regionalization", between 1848 and 1871 at first increasing and then until 1912 for the most part unchanging, of the political structures of German parliaments becomes recognizable. Compared with this, regional factors played only a subordinate role in the structuring of the parliamentary landscape of the Bundestage (cf. table 3).

These preliminary findings, whose theoretical relevance will be discussed in the following section, are indeed, presently still too incomplete and are founded on primary data which are too inconsistent to make possible a systematic theory-test. It will be one task of this project, by means of its own primary surveys, to put together into

Illustration 1:
 Multi-dimensional scaling
 National Assembly - from
 June to November 1848

100 }
 95 }
 92 }
 88 }
 84 }
 80 }
 76 }
 72 }
 69 }
 64 }
 60 }
 56 }
 52 }
 48 }
 44 }
 40 }
 36 }
 32 }
 28 }
 24 }
 20 }
 16 }
 12 }
 8 }
 4 }



Kruskal's stress in 3-dimensional solution: 0,045
 Coeff. of alienation in 3-dimensional solution: 0,05

Table 1: The social profile of representatives of German parliaments (figures in percent)

	1848	...	1871	1874	1877	1878	1881	1884	1887	1890	1893	1898	1903	1907	1912	1919	1920	1924	...	1972	1976		
1. Administration officials																							
a) higher service	17.7		19.9	13.5	12.6	13.5	10.2	8.3	7.9	5.8	4.6	5.1	4.6	5.5	3.2	1.6	4.0	6.0	6.1		22.1	20.6	
b) middle & lower	4.6		0.3	0.3	0.0	0.5	0.3	0.8	1.5	0.8	1.0	1.5	2.3	2.0	2.6	1.4	2.8	5.1	5.2		8.1	9.2	
2. Justice officials	13.5		11.0	11.4	12.7	11.7	10.3	7.4	7.9	7.6	6.6	6.8	5.9	8.4	5.5	2.4	1.7	4.0	3.0		2.7	2.1	
3. Local officials	2.6		2.8	3.0	3.0	2.8	3.9	2.1	4.0	2.3	2.1	1.3	1.3	2.6	1.4	3.1	0.9	3.0	1.4		1.9	2.7	
4. University professors & teachers	6.8		4.7	5.7	4.5	5.3	4.7	3.1	3.9	2.1	1.8	2.2	1.5	2.8	2.5	2.0	3.0	3.1	3.2		3.9	4.2	
5. Teachers at higher schools	6.0		2.2	2.0	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.3	1.5	1.0	2.6	1.8	1.4	1.9	2.0	1.9		3.5	3.5	
6. Teachers at elementary & intermediate schools	1.5		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.7	1.0	0.7	1.8	2.6	3.3	2.1	3.4	3.4		3.1	2.2	
7. Officers	2.2		0.7	1.4	0.7	1.5	0.5	1.3	0.5	1.0	0.3	0.5	0.5	1.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5		1.0	0.6	
Civil service total	54.9		41.6	37.3	35.0	36.4	31.4	24.2	27.2	20.9	18.4	19.9	17.8	26.7	20.1	15.2	16.4	27.1	24.7		46.2	41.1	
8. Clergy																							
a) protestant	2.4		0.3	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.7	1.0	0.5	1.0	1.4	1.0	1.1	0.8		1.0	0.9	
b) catholic	2.4		3.7	5.6	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.3	4.3	5.6	5.9	5.3	5.6	4.8	4.6	1.4	0.9	1.1	0.6		0.0	0.0	
9. Farmers																							
a) large landowners	5.0		27.9	28.6	28.4	29.0	28.9	30.4	31.1	29.1	25.2	23.2	20.4	18.3	16.2	2.6	3.4	3.0	2.0		1.0	1.0	
b) small a. middle landowners	0.7		1.3	2.4	2.1	2.4	3.0	6.1	4.9	3.5	8.6	8.4	7.9	7.4	7.0	5.4	8.0	7.2	9.9		2.9	2.8	
10. Entrepreneurs & managers	1.7		2.5	4.8	5.2	7.0	9.7	8.8	12.0	9.1	8.0	6.3	6.9	6.4	2.5	2.3	5.8	7.6	9.3		8.0	7.9	
11. Salesmen & bankers	4.3		4.7	3.3	4.0	5.0	5.0	4.4	5.4	7.3	4.6	3.9	3.7	4.0	3.0	1.7	0.9	1.2	1.5		3.0	2.8	
12. Indep. craftsmen & tradesmen	0.5		0.8	2.3	2.2	2.5	2.1	3.9	3.4	8.8	8.3	9.1	8.3	5.8	6.3	4.8	4.0	2.1	1.2		1.2	1.0	
13. Lawyers	15.0		9.5	8.9	7.4	7.0	6.3	5.4	3.8	5.3	5.5	8.1	7.5	8.5	10.1	7.3	3.6	3.6	3.7		5.2	6.9	
14. Other free academic professions	7.2		3.2	3.9	4.5	3.0	3.3	3.5	3.4	1.2	5.0	2.0	2.3	2.3	2.0	0.7	0.8	1.0	0.9		4.6	5.6	
15. Assoc. function.	0.0		0.5	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.5	1.0	0.5	1.8	2.0	4.0	5.0	3.7	5.1		2.3	2.5	
16. Party & union functionaries	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.3	3.3	1.8	4.6	6.5	9.8	15.3	10.8	22.9	43.5	38.6	31.7	29.4		15.8	13.7	
17. Office workers	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.4	2.1	2.5	3.4		5.0	5.1	
18. Workers	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.1	2.4	4.4	4.0		1.0	1.5	
19. Private gentlemen, pensioners	0.0		2.6	3.2	3.8	3.0	3.2	4.0	2.4	2.5	2.0	2.0	2.5	3.0	1.5	3.5	3.9	2.5	2.3		0.0	0.0	
20. Others, unknown	5.9		1.4	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	1.0	3.0	2.1	0.2	1.5		2.7	2.9	

Table 2: The connection between professional- and factional-
membership of German parliamentarians (Lambda-values)

Frankfurt National Assembly 1848/49	0,06
Reichstag 1871	0,08
Average of the Reichstage from 1893 to 1912	0,34
Reichstag 1912	0,41
Weimar National Assembly	0,28
Reichstag 1924 I	0,68
2. Bundestag	0,14
8. Bundestag	0,23

Table 3: The connection between regional origin and factional-
membership of the representatives (Lambda-values)

Frankfurt National Assembly	0,23
Reichstag 1971	0,43
Reichstag 1881	0,48
Reichstag 1912	0,44
1. Bundestag 1949	0,26
2. Bundestag 1953	0,06

temporal series these and other indicators in order to grasp the change of the structure of parliamentary leadership-groups between 1848 and 1953.

2. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The general framework of our theoretical considerations is staked out by the connection between national integration and the formation of parliamentary leadership-groups. Thereby we are starting out from the assumption that, on the presupposition of a competitive process of selection, the nationally specific constellations and expressions of social, economic, political and cultural cleavages influence the recruitment-patterns, factional structures⁺ and decision-making processes of national parliaments and that, on the other hand, the specific manners of the manifestation of these lines of tension in parliamentary decision-making then react upon the processes of the formation of nation and state. The assertion of a connection should, indeed, not imply that parliaments reflect as it were in a mirror-like fashion social conflict-structures; thus different interest-groups had and have (frequently also formally) different chances of participation in the legislative process, and cleavages can be covered up by overlappings and alliances in the observed party- or factional structures. However we think that we can start from the fact that parliaments are those central decision-makers and parliamentary leadership-groups are that segment of national elites in whose make-up and action, structures of conflict and lines of tension manifest themselves most evidently. (28) One piece of evidence for this is the shape of the parliamentary landscape of the German Empire, in which socio-economic, religious, sectional and ethnic conflicts have found a very immediate expression in the factional structures and voting-patterns. (29) But it is to be presumed - and to be proved by a great number of findings - that the extension of cleavages into the parliaments was and is less pregnant in other systems and at other points in time. Thus Great Britain in the 19th century can count as an example of the relative autonomy of parliamentary leadership-groups vis-à-vis the social system. In the context discussed here, analytically interesting is only that share of autonomy which is not to be traced back to formal restrictions on voting-rights. (30) The investigation of the extent, causes and effects of this indeterminacy (Lasswell: "representativeness" (31)) shall be one subject of the plan proposed here.

German parliamentary history opens up a good approach to the posing of such problems. This history is characterized by fundamental changes of the political system in which the distribution of political power and the access to political power were newly organized formally. Naturally, the effects of the sudden change of constitutional orders on the structure and behavior of parliamentary leadership-groups can be better investigated in a country whose history is moulded by such discontinuities than in states with uninterrupted political traditions like the USA or Great Britain. This state of

*By a "factional structure" we understand here the arrangement of a parliament into such associations of representatives which claim to determine the voting-behavior of their members over time and various political areas.

affairs justifies, for Germany, also a special interest in a long-term analysis comprehending several "regimes".

The expectation of a relatively undisturbed extension of cleavages into the forum of decision in the case of parliaments in contrast to other central decision-makers was an important reason for choosing parliamentary leadership-groups as an object of research. Thereby one must, however, remain aware that - as Pierre Birnbaum has investigated in the case of France - parliamentarians are related to other segments of the national elite in varying constellations of "fusion" and "dissociation". (32) Thus, the behavior, mentality and structure of parliamentary leadership-groups are to be interpreted as elements of a comprehensive system of the elite, but without the demand for a total analysis of "the" national elite necessarily having to be deduced from this. Parliaments are an autonomous part-sector of the elite-system - whereby the degree of autonomy can vary from case to case - whose personnel acts and is recruited according to laws partially its own. Roughly, the peculiarity of parliamentary leadership-groups can be characterized by the fact that 1) they are an intersection of different segments of the elite-system, a mixtum compositum of representatives of different interest-groups, and that 2) the area of decisions in which they are involved is extraordinarily widely taken and heterogeneous. Both of these facts lead to the result that, in all modern societies, parliaments and parliamentarians play a significant role among those whom Kadushin calls the "Central Power Circle": "At the very least, legislatures serve as check-points or as mobilizers of elite opinions; at most they are key influentials in the decision-making process itself and must be consulted". (33) Therefore, the constellations of cooperation and conflict with other segments of the national elite will be treated as significant aspects of a conception of investigation centered on parliamentary leadership-groups. It is regrettable, although in the framework of a historically comparative investigation unavoidable, that thereby relations between sectors of the elite-system can be grasped only on the level of formal structures and as overlapping memberships (in the sense of a positional approach).

However, this qualification does not hold for the internal structure of the parliaments. In this area it is possible, through the documentation of voting-behavior, to identify informal networks also in the historical dimension. What Kadushin names as the reason for a special interest on the part of the network-analysts in parliamentary leadership-groups and decision-processes, holds good precisely for historical parliaments: "Their committees, parties and rules of procedure are their formal structures, but these generally do not determine the actual alignments of interaction or structure of influence. Network studies of legislators are therefore especially interesting and it is somewhat amusing to find them the structural equivalent of a neighborhood gang". (34) The methods of and problems posed by an application of legislative vote-call analysis will be more closely examined further below.

The central hypothesis of our project rests upon Stein Rokkan's observation that the national integration of Germany was burdened by an accumulation of "developmental crises" which other countries were able to overcome sequentially in the process of their formation as nations and states; a fact which is traditionally discussed by German research, with a somewhat altered perspective, under the key-word "die verspätete Nation" ("the delayed nation"). (35)

The process of the "founding of the Empire" was rendered extraordinarily difficult through the fact that in a few decades all those central problems had to be solved which are connected with the process of national integration:

- the unification of the system of justice, the taxation system and the military; the creation of a surface transport- and communication-system (penetration);
- the joining of oppositional ethnic and religious minority-groups; the unification of regions which were differently depending on the world-market (integration);
- the extension of the right to vote to groups which up until then possessed no rights of participation (participation);
- the development of a canon of national symbols and myths and its communication by means of the media and institutions of political socialization (identity);
- the creation of loyalty towards, trust in and observance of the national political institutions (legitimacy);
- and, finally, the establishment of institutions of social security and of a taxation-system which did away with traditional privileges and levelled regional disparities (redistribution).

The founders of the Empire had to solve this bundle of problems for a society and a political culture which were characterized by a plurality of social and regional, religious, ethnic and ideological cleavages. (36) Following Arthur Stinchcombe we understand these "cleavages" as coalitions between party-elites and interest-groups. (37) The presupposition for the extension of the cleavages into the parliamentary forum was that a regional component was laid under the central lines of tension: The insular industrialization and the regionally different orientations to the international markets led to the result that socio-economic distribution-conflicts were simultaneously settled as regional-conflicts. Just so, the historical distribution of confessional camps was conducive to the reinforcement of territorially particular orientations; the same holds for the different expression of political cultures in the German states with their specifically deviating constitutional traditions; the same holds also for the problem of the integration of ethnic minorities which were for the most part concentrated in closed areas of settlement. This constellation made also the representatives of those (interest-)political camps which throughout the Empire were in a clear minority-position capable to gain a majority in certain regions. The other side of the coin was that until 1918 no German party succeeded in extending itself fully throughout the Empire and the party-landscape remained characterized by clear regional patterns. (38)

Now it is further argued that the accumulation of developmental crises under the condition of a segmented political culture factionalized and polarized the parliamentary landscape of Germany in such a manner that, up until the end of the Weimar Republic, the capability of the national parliaments to form coalitions, to make compromises, to coordinate itself and finally, thereby to gain power was retarded. Simultaneously, with this the presuppositions for the widespread acceptance of an authoritarian guidance of German politics by the executive were given. (39)

Here, more widely reaching perspectives of investigation become recognizable: For example, the question concerning the kind and weight of the determinants which influenced the formation of the parliamentary landscape in Germany (how great was, e.g., the relative weight of socio-economic, religious, and regional orientations?), or concerning a comparison with other countries (is the strength, at first increasing and after the Second World War then decreasing, of the connection between social and factional structure a specific feature of the parliamentary development of Germany, or can similar changes be proved in the parliaments of other countries?) and concerning the significance of such connections for parliamentary decision-making processes (how does a crystallization of factions along socio-economic/regional/religious lines of tension effect their compromise- and coalition-capability? Is it only accidental that the three coalitions of German history which encompassed wings - the "Simon-Gagern-Pact" of 1849, the Weimar Coalition and the Great Coalition - arose in periods in which socio-economic lines of tension had a relatively slight effect on the inner-structure of the parliaments?).

With these questions, considerations get taken up which the contemporary observer Otto Hintze has already formulated in his article on "Das monarchische Prinzip und die konstitutionelle Verfassung". (40) In it he ascertains that the parliaments in Germany have not succeeded in gaining the "ruling influence in the state", among other things because they

"were completely lacking in the necessary inner unity and solidity which would, under all conditions, be the pre-condition for a role in political power. The great economic and social gap which has always existed between the Prussian East and West and which has its roots in the diversity of the agrarian structure and of the different division of the agrarian and industrial interests prevents a unified integration just as does the opposition of religious confessions, which maintains itself in no other state in the world so strongly and comprehensively as in Prussia and in the German Empire. In addition to this there comes especially the radical animosity of Social Democracy vis-à-vis the state in the Empire. ... With us parties are, properly speaking, not political but rather economic-social or religious-confessional formations. This is connected with the fact that it is actually the life of the bourgeois society - as opposed to the actual political operation - which finds expression in our representative-bodies. ... That is, however, a formation of the party-system which leads more to a monarchical leadership of the state than to parliamentary influence." (41)

In a similar way, though more from the viewpoint of the active politician, Friedrich Naumann has characterized the connection between the character of the social system and the kind of power-organization in Germany:

"So long as the majority-formation remains on the present German level of development, the initiative of the Reichstag can only be slight. In this respect the constitution offers more than what the Reichstag up until today can offer. So long as the parties mutually neutralize one another, the right of the Reichstag, for its part, to suggest laws is almost a slumbering right: Our law-making gets done,

in reality, by the government, and the Reichstag has only the possibility of introducing changes and accepting or rejecting them. ... It is pointless to declaim about the rape of the Reichstag, so long as it is not capable, of itself, of offering a firm foundation in the case of greater legislative actions." (42)

This argumentation also renders plausible the relatively well-ordered functioning of the parliamentary system of the Federal Republic, which certainly is not only to be traced back to the wisdom of our founding fathers:


- The reduction of the significance of religious cleavages through the decreasing strength of religious connections and through the removal of Catholicism from its minority-position as a consequence of the drawing of the borders after 1945;
- the levelling of sectional contrasts by the removal of developmental backwardness, the loss of the agrarian north-east, the mixing together of the population as a consequence of the movements of flight and wandering after 1945 and the dissolution of the historical German states;
- the cession of almost all areas with ethnic minority-groups; and, finally,
- the decreasing militancy of socio-economic conflicts as a consequence of the economic prosperity during the early phase of the Federal Republic, by means of the establishment of functionable institutions and procedures for the mediation of interests and the policy of collection of the larger parties

have dissolved the traditional political "camps", or have at least rendered their fronts more permeable and, therewith, have strengthened the capability of the Bundestag to form coalitions and to coordinate itself. (43) With that, this development would be the fruit of the fact, occasionally regretted, that after 1945 the German parties have become "sociologically, and, in terms of world-view, rootless" and "today form a kind of super-structure which, socially, does not reach very deeply." (44)

We justify the decision to restrict the time period of the inquiry chiefly to the years from 1848, in which the first national parliament of Germany met, to 1953 with the clearly deviating contextual conditions of the parliamentary system of the Federal Republic: This is the phase of factional polarisation and relative instability of the parliamentary landscape of Germany. This limitation of the period covered may also be drawn from the findings of electoral history: While the election of the Bundestag of 1949 "still exposes the structures of the elections of the Weimar Republic", by the election of 1953 "the party-structure of the Federal Republic was newly ordered, the election has been, in V. O. Key's sense of the term, a 'critical election'." (45)

In connection with the considerations of the preceding section, our theoretical assumptions can be systematized in the following way (46):

Table 2: Central categories of investigation and causal connections of an analysis of parliamentary leadership-groups.



We distinguish four central categories of investigation:

1. the cleavage-structure, as an enduring pattern of political conflict, which is anchored in the social-structure and has found its expression in the system of parties;
2. characteristics of the origins and careers of parliamentary leadership-groups (elite-characteristics), in which experiences of socialization, chances of access to parliamentary leadership-groups, continuity of the exercising of legislative functions and the association with other segments of the elite-system manifest themselves on the individual level;
3. legislative behavior as an expression of issue-orientations and group-connections of the members of parliamentary leadership-groups; and
4. "systemic policy outcomes", by which we mean - borrowing from Carl Beck et al. (47) - central decisions at the level of the state as a whole in which, besides parliamentary leadership-groups, other segments of the elite-system too are involved and which, in particular, concern the regulation of the access to power and the range of the exercising of power by leadership-groups.

Between the central categories of investigation, the following causal connections are being postulated:

1. an influence of the cleavage-structure on the recruitment of parliamentary leadership-groups in such a manner that the "social-moral milieu" sent representatives each with specific constellations of attributes, further, an influence of the properties of the electorate on the behavior of the actors in the legislative process in such a manner that the perception of interests and expectations of the voters effected through the anticipation of their voting-behavior the decisions of the elected; (48)
2. an influence of characteristics of social background and career of the members of parliamentary leadership-groups on their legis-

lative behavior through acquired values and issue-orientations; these can have been mediated via socialization and/or connections of interest;

3. an effect of legislative behavior on the "systemic policy outcomes" in such a manner that the capability of parliamentary leadership-groups to form coalitions and to arrive at (internal) compromises influences their chance to acquire and expand positions of power in competition with other segments of the elite-system (49);
4. a repercussion of the "systemic policy outcomes" on the legislative behavior, in particular by establishing the responsibilities of the parliaments; further an effect of the "systemic policy outcomes" on the recruitment of parliamentary leadership-groups, partly immediately by restrictions of the voting-right, partly mediately by financial compensation and such; and finally an effect on the cleavage-structure, e. g., over the granting or denial of possibilities of articulation for oppositional "milieus", or ethnic and religious minority-groups.

In our model, two criss-crossing dimensions of investigation are being connected: for one thing, we can distinguish categories of investigation which characterize the socio-political context for the action and the recruitment of parliamentary leadership-groups (Cleavage-structure, systemic policy outcomes) from those which cover these leadership-groups themselves on the individual level (elite-characteristics, legislative behavior). For another thing, the categories of investigation can be classified according to whether they belong more to the political area (legislative behavior, systemic policy outcomes) or are more related to the social-system (cleavage-structure, elite-characteristics). Therewith our approach can be characterized simultaneously as multi-levelled in the sense of a connection between contextual and individual data and as transcending areas in the sense of an interlocking of social and political analysis.

Our model of a plexus of relations between the social system, the political system and the elite-system can claim no theoretical conciseness. Exogenous factors which cannot be controlled, or only insufficiently, react upon the categories of investigation. E. g., this holds for the aspect of a federal structure of the political system, which we take into account only insofar as it becomes manifest on the level of national leadership-groups. However, in spite of this restriction, we assume that our conception of investigation covers a constellation of variables which is of some explanatory power for our task of analyzing the (social-) structural conditions for the delayed and crisis-infected development of German parliamentarism. In this way, we want to get into the developmental problems of German parliamentarism with less moral prejudice and ideological predisposition and with more appropriate methods than has been frequently done until now. Thus we do not consider "failure" and "treason" of bourgeois politicians to be useful categories of a historical-political sociology, and the phenomena intended thereby are not "ultimate" reasons, but rather themselves in need of explanation. (50) At the same time, the investigation into German parliamentarism should be freed from its previous orientation to the history of persons and events and taken up under a social-scientific perspective as the analysis of the structural conditions of parliamentary processes of recruitment and decision.

3. METHODS

Our project will investigate the recruitment, careers and political behavior of the members of national German parliaments between 1848 and 1953. Excluding the phases between 1849 and 1867 (North German Reichstag) as well as between 1945 and 1949, in which there were no national, or at least supra-regional parliaments in Germany, further, the time of the National Socialistic dictatorship, in which no competitive selection of parliamentary leadership-groups took place and the Reichstag was degraded to a rubber-stamp, the period under investigation extends itself over 73 years. In this period, a total of ca. 5,250 representatives belonged to German parliaments. This large number makes the application of sampling-procedures advisable. However, random-sampling is inapplicable because of the pronounced factionalization of German parliaments in the period under investigation. In relation to individual legislative periods the number of cases would decrease so far that deeply reaching multivariate analyses would no longer be possible. Because of the sloping distribution of many attributes, similar problems would also arise in the case of a stratified probability-sample or of a quota-sample. Thus in the area of biographical and career characteristics many categories are only weakly filled. To provide their representation in the sample, an increased quota would have to be apportioned to them. But this would lead to an extremely complicated stratification of the sample and increase considerably the danger of errors in the analysis. But above all it is problematical that the communication-connections of legislative behavior which are documented in the voting-patterns would be destroyed by sampling-procedures based on probability or quotas. As a result, questions about the formal and informal organization of legislative decision-making could no longer be answered. The complete reconstruction of individual ad hoc-coalitions and proto-factions would be extraordinarily laborious and liable to error. In addition to this it would provide only a fragmentary picture of the phenomenon being investigated, because an important reservation against an application of representative sampling-procedures in the case of roll-call analysis holds true: "A simple, true-to-scale sample taken from a comprehensive totality abstracts ... from important structural features of the collective. In particular, in this way important networks of institutions of opinion-formation like neighborhoods and cliques are usually torn asunder." (51) Since, for the reasons mentioned, the number of cases cannot be reduced by means of the application of sampling-techniques, it is necessary, from the viewpoint of research-economy, to restrict the list of variables to some central categories of investigation. Thereby it will be proposed, for the analysis of the voting-behavior, to take a random-sample from the aggregate of all roll-call votes. The techniques and the methodological problems of drawing samples out of a pool of variables will be examined more closely in another context.

The research-plan submitted here combines the methods of collective biography, quantitative voting-analysis and multi-level analysis (in the sense of an application of context-variables on the voting-district level). With this combination of methods we intend first of all to reconstruct the recruitment and legislative behavior of parliamentary leadership-groups in an empirical density and temporal depth which have not yet been available up until now for the case of Germany. In a further step, the findings are to be drawn into a more comprehensive conception of investigation which, simplifying, can be

formulated in the following research-question: Which structural properties of the surrounding society and political culture (context-variables) have determined the capability of parliamentary leadership-groups (collective and individual elite-characteristics) to make compromises, to form coalitions and therewith also their chance to gain power in such a way which, in turn, contributed to the delayed and crisis-infected development of German parliamentarism (systematic policy outcomes: the dependent variable)? This research-perspective is approximately reflected in the variable-plan of the project. It can be divided, roughly, into three sections:

- 1) Origine and careers of the representatives;
- 2) Parliamentary voting-behavior;
- 3) Voting-district data.

3.1) Origine and careers

Features such as year of birth, type and location of the place of origin, family-background (father's profession) and formal education (school and university grades) are taken as social background variables. In this connection, above all questions are to be posed about the significance of the starting-chances and the early experiences of socialization in the family and educational system for the recruitment, behavior and mentality of parliamentary leadership-groups. For example, was there a connection between homogeneity of origin, cohesion and capability of political cooperation? Some evidence for this hypothesis is provided by a comparison of social-background characteristics between British MP's and German MDR's: While the members of traditional elites in the British House of Commons enjoyed a clear majority and almost 40 % of the MP's had received their university education at Oxford and Cambridge, the Reichstage - in terms of family and educational background - were far more heterogeneous. (52)

A further aspect of the investigation are the "cohort-effects" which are possibly realized in the age-distribution: For example, have collective "key-experiences" such as the Revolution of 1848, the founding of the Empire in 1871, the First World War and the National Socialist seizure of power had significant effects on the orientations and behavior of parliamentary leadership-groups? (53)

On the other hand, religion and factional membership indicate rather stable value-orientations, which at the same time refer to connections to certain "social-moral milieus" and define the relationships between representatives and their social, political and cultural surroundings. (54) It is presumed that value-orientations also get expressed in voting-behavior, whereby here - depending upon the context - individual components of the value-orientation can come into conflict with one another and differentiated processes of evaluation can become effective. The problems of the indicator-quality of voting-data which result from this will be discussed in the following section.

Career-characteristics of the representatives are covered by information on the membership in national and regional parliaments, further, by data on their professional background. In this connection, an important question is the relationship, already discussed, between the professional composition of the parliaments and their factional structure. A further aspect is the investigation of tendencies towards pro-

fessionalization and continuity of the exercise of parliamentary functions. For example, when, in which formations and under which circumstances did stable parliamentary leadership-groups in Germany (in contrast to other countries) appear on the national level? How large was the "net circulation" (personal circulation (55)), expressed as the rate of exchange of the membership in parliament from legislative period to legislative period? How large was the average length of stay in parliament? Is it as a matter of fact so, as some researchers think, that a low net circulation goes hand in hand with a growing isolation of leadership-groups and a decreasing readiness for innovation (56), or, vice versa, does the formation of relatively stable and professionalized leadership-groups increase their elasticity for adaption, as Max Weber apparently assumed? (57) How large was the "gross circulation" (social circulation), expressed as the rate of change of central social background-variables of the members of an elite-system? (58) How did the connection between change on the level of the whole society and the recruitment-patterns of parliamentary leadership-groups take shape? For example, how is the phenomenon to be assessed that the very high percentages of government officials in the early German parliaments (Frankfurt and Prussian National Assembly, Second Chambers in Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden and Hessen at the middle of the 19th century: over 50 % (59)) clearly decreased in the Empire (Reichstag 1903: 18 % (60)), in order to rise again drastically in the Weimar Republic (Reichstag 1924 I.: 25 % (61)) and the Federal Republic (8th Bundestag 43 % (62))? Were there comparable occurrences in other countries (the France of Louis Philippe - to characterize the starting-situation: 32-45 % (63))? A further question to be investigated in this connection concerns the relative significance and the change of significance of local, regional and national instances of recruitment. Was there - as is repeatedly maintained - a process of the "nationalization" of parliamentary leadership-groups? To what extent and in what way did alterations of the voting-rights play a roll thereby?

The data on the origins and careers of German parliamentarians are to be gathered primarily from parliamentary handbooks, the collections of biographies published by parties, party-correspondences and other contemporary periodicals. A collection of such materials can be found in the Archive of the Bundestag. It is helpful that, in the Biographisches Handbuch der Reichstage compiled by Max Schwarz, some biographical core-data of all German representatives of national parliaments for the entire period of time under investigation (with the exception of the first Bundestage) are available in a form already pre-structured. (64) Schwarz covers the characteristics voting-district, year of birth, profession, academic and nobel title, length of membership in the Reichstag and regional parliaments. But unfortunately his collection is unreliable in many cases and contains gaps, in particular for the early German parliaments. For this reason, and because additional biographical information shall be considered inquiries of our own on the basis of primary material remain necessary. This has already taken place for the representatives of the Frankfurt National Assembly on the basis of the "Biographische Ausarbeitungen" put out by archivists of the Frankfurt Außenstelle of the Bundesarchiv. The data are presently being transformed into machine-readable form. The set of variables for this partial study is much more extensive than the one for the whole project. In addition it includes, among other information, changes of residence, stages of the course of study, changes of professional position, association-affiliations, functions in clubs, membership in committees, political functions at

the local and district level, participation in protest-actions and political persecutions. The collection of primary material by the Archiv was extraordinarily laborious and extended over decades. Thus, covering the whole German Confederation within the boundaries of 1848 to 1851, the church-records of the birth- and death-places of the representatives, matriculations at the university, police-records, privately and publicly available testaments, government handbooks, contemporary newspaper-articles as well as an almost immense biographical, regional and local historical literature were made use of. This extent of inquiry would burst asunder the framework of a temporally restricted plan of research, if it were to be extended to the whole period of time under investigation. In addition to this, because of the destruction or inaccessibility of archives as a result of the Second World War, much biographical data is no longer to be reconstructed for the whole German Confederation. These considerations justify the decision, in our project, to restrict the inquiry rigidly to such characteristics which are particularly relevant and accessible in printed sources.

Besides problems of the availability of data, specific defects in the quality of biographical evidence are to be noted. The methodological difficulties which arise here are discussed under the key-word "functionality of biographical information" (65). What is meant is that the representatives expected from the publication of their personal data an influence on their career-chances which, in the case of greater discrepancies between "intended" and factual biography, could become the motive for the manipulation and interpolation of *curricula vitae*. Members of workers' parties were especially liable, and information concerning profession was particularly frequently involved. The comparison of different sources as the usual way of purifying biographical data from such falsifications and distortions is laborious and time consuming. Therefore it is very helpful that, for the particularly large and particularly involved population of the SPD-representatives, the project can fall back upon the "cleaned-up" data of the Berlin researcher Wilhelm H. Schröder. The same holds true for the collection of biographical data, above all of representatives of the Zentrum, which was compiled by Klemens Arndt at the Historisches Seminar der Universität zu Köln.

3.2) Voting-behavior

A presupposition for an application of quantitative voting-analysis are formal internal structures of the parliaments which are loose or strongly varying in the course of time. If the behavior of the representatives in parliamentary decisions is not determined by factional discipline and/or constant connection to a coalition, then by means of a serial analysis of voting-patterns latent determinants of legislative behavior, such as interest-connections, ideological fixations and tactical calculations, become apparent. (66) Among other informal networks of relationships we distinguish "proto-factions" (i. e., groups of representatives of different factions who vote in the same way on specific issues) and ad-hoc-coalitions (i. e., correspondance in the voting-behavior of factions which are restricted temporally or to specific issues without a formal agreement). Using the methodology of roll-call analysis it becomes possible, on better empirical foundations than previously, to answer questions about the course and determinants of singular parliamentary decisions. For example, how did the pressure of competing loyalties effect the voting-beha-

behavior of representatives of the Zentrum from agriculturally and industrially structured voting-districts when a question like the raising of the duties on grain was at stake? How did which representatives of the national-liberal faction vote in issues in which fundamental liberal principles collided with considerations of political opportunism, thus in the case of the socialist laws? Was there a persuasive, obstructive cooperation between the NSDAP and the KPD factions against the Weimar Republic, independently of the voting-objects up for debate? (67) Over and above the reconstruction and description of such concrete decision and strategies for action, quantitative voting-analysis is capable of revealing fundamental conditions and structures of legislative behavior which transcend time, groups and subjects. (68) Then the findings which have been gained on the level of parliamentary representative bodies can be drawn into more comprehensive analyses of the political process. Among others, W. O. Aydelotte has pointed to the research possibilities of roll-call analysis, in particular for historical social research: "The analysis of parliamentary history raises questions not only about the maneuvers and strategies of political leaders but also about the conditions out of which these actions emerged or with which they were designed to cope. A legislature that deals with major questions reflects the society behind it, public tensions and disagreements, in the sense that general social and political problems are dealt with and settled, whether adequately or not. It is sometimes argued that the study of representative assemblies, in view of the kind of work they did and in view of the great amount of information we have about them, constitutes one of our principal windows upon the (socio-) political history of the past, an effective means of learning how politics actually worked." (69) Thereby the restriction indeed holds that in parliamentary votes only a part of legislative behavior becomes manifest. Important decisions also get made in committees, factional committees and negotiations between the proponents of parliamentary groupings. These aspects are, for the past, only inadequately documented, at least when one keeps in mind the requirements of a consistent basis of data. Thus the scope of analyses of the voting-behavior is restricted insofar as they immediately document only the last act of the parliamentary decision-making process. On this basis, statements about that which happened in the forefield are indeed not impossible, but they presuppose the employment of complex procedures of analysis and the readiness to make long chains of inferences. (70)

Now before the cognitive potential of quantitative voting-analyses for the present project gets more exactly defined, it remains to explain whether and to what extent the structural presuppositions, already indicated, for the employment of this methodological instrument are given at all in German parliamentary history. First inquiries of our own and the evaluation of the - indeed scanty - literature on the subject allow an optimistic prognosis. While, on the level of voting-behavior, the Bundestag is (or better: has become) a very disciplined parliament and therefore is of little interest for the analyst of votes (the only "latent" dimension here is the factor of factional, respectively, coalitional discipline), this does not hold true for historical German parliaments up to and inclusive of the Reichstag of the Weimar Republic.

In principle four types of irregularities of legislative behavior can be distinguished, in which informal structures manifest themselves

and in the case of which an application of roll-call-analysis is meaningful:

- a) Dissident voting-behavior, thus a breach of factional discipline, or - in less rigid contexts - deviation from the factional majority. This is the "classic" case of the deviation and was, in the German parliaments until the beginning of the 20th century, an everyday affair. For 52 votes in the Frankfurt National Assembly we have ascertained an average of approximately 20 % dissidents per vote, which varied from faction to faction (thereby the Left tends to be more disciplined than the Right). In the Reichstag of the Empire the average was, according to a first, rough estimate, at ca. 10 % (with peaks on certain votes which split heterogeneous factions, thus e. g. the votes on commercial policy of the 9th legislative period). In the Reichstag of the Weimar Republic the average was at ca. 7 % (71); a decrease which can be explained by the better possibilities for sanctions of the party and factional heads as a consequence of the proportional voting-right.
- b) Non-factional representatives. Their share in the Frankfurter National Assembly was at ca. 27 % of all representatives. They formed, next to the members of the Right-Center, the strongest grouping in the Paulskirche. (72) In the Reichstag of the Empire the "Wilden" and "Hospitanten" had a share of 16-10 % (with a decreasing tendency), while this type of representative, because of the voting-right which was prohibitive of individual candidacy, was no longer present in the Weimar Republic. (73)
- c) Change of faction. Up until now quantitative data on this type of "irregularity" could be gathered only for the Weimar Republic. Here the values vary between 17 % of all representatives (in the voting-period 1920 to 1924) and 6 % (in the voting-period 1930 to 1932). (74) As a general feature changes of faction also belonged to the usual occurrences of German parliamentarianism: Frequently whole wings split off from the mother-faction, which then either lay as "erratic blocks" on the parliamentary landscape or joined themselves to other factions.
- d) Change of coalition and ad-hoc-coalitions. In the Empire, with the exception of a few years, no constant majorities or even clearly delimitable government - respectively opposition-camps formed themselves. Votes were worked out mostly ad hoc between the factions, respectively, between the factions and the government. Something similar holds true for the Weimar Reichstag, which here took over the inheritance of its predecessor and whose incapacity to form a constant majority is notorious. (75) In contrast to the Reichstag of the Empire, in the Weimar Republic it was indeed the government which was in danger of falling in the case of a re-grouping of the parliamentary landscape. The changing voting-constellations render it meaningful to apply the repertoire of quantitative voting-analysis also to the Weimar Reichstage, which, with respect to dissident voting-behavior, exhibit somewhat more stabile parliamentary structures.

In view of the ephemeral formal structures and fluctuating coalition-connections of the German parliaments before the war, in the application of procedures of voting-analysis we see a chance to widen the positional approach of elite analysis to include procedures of network-analysis.

Under this aspect, the following concrete research-questions are to be treated:

Which factors and cleavages structured the voting-behavior which, especially in early German parliamentarianism, often appears diffuse? How did such patterns change in the course of time? How did which representatives vote under the pressure of competing loyalties? In which manner and with what "closeness" did social cleavages continue on into the area of the parliaments? How did such connections between social-system and power-organization effect the chances of party-, respectively, faction-leaderships and executives to influence parliamentary decision-making processes? On the other hand, what effect did such connections have on the capability of parliamentary leadership-groups to coordinate themselves, to form coalitions and to make compromises?


For quite a long time problems of this kind have been investigated by international research on the basis of voting-behavior. (76) Thereby, a very positive - occasionally even euphoric - estimate of the validity, reliability and scope of this type of data is dominant. (77) But it should render rather skeptical that here a plurality of different research problems is being approached on the basis of series of similar indicators. This indicates that voting-behavior is a multi-dimensional phenomenon in which different calculations and predispositions flow together in specifically different constellations. It is not accidental that the instrument of Guttman-Scaling, which presupposes one-dimensionality of the indicators used, is becoming unfashionable in roll-call analysis. The investigations of the indicator-quality of voting-data, still rare, have indicated the property of multi-dimensionality and attempted to show ways in which the different factors which cooperate in legislative voting can be isolated. (78) Today it is agreed that votes, as indirect indicators and resultants of different factors of influence, do not represent - respectively do not only represent - individual attitudes and ideological predispositions of the individual representative (which, in turn, can be the result of experiences of socialization, of the subsequent rationalization of past manners of behavior - of his "voting history" - etc.). Rather, the representative orientates himself (simultaneously) on the expectations of relevant actors in his surroundings (field of forces) such as faction- and party-leadership, executives, groupings and formations within factions, respectively, parties, extra-parliamentary interest-groups and the electorate. (79) John Kingdon has interpreted the operation of these actors on the voting-behavior as a process in the sense of a sequence of calculations of the representative. His integrated model of parliamentary voting-behavior exposes the multi-dimensionality of this indicator (80):

Illustration 3 overleaf

This model opens up also a theoretical access to the question about the causes of the varying structuredness of parliamentary voting-behavior. It can be formulated as a hypothesis: The more inconsistent the expectations of the actors are and the more their particular chances for sanctions resemble each other, the more incoherent will be the voting-behavior and the greater is the latitude for individual decisions of the representatives.

Illustration 3:

AN INTEGRATIVE MODEL OF LEGISLATIVE VOTING DECISIONS



At this point the question about the possibilities of isolating and weighing the different components of voting-behavior poses itself. Only after such a step can the validity of this type of indicator be determined with an exactness which suffices for a systematic test of hypotheses. A presupposition is that the different factors which cooperate in voting-behavior manifest themselves as patterns of similarities and differences between groups of issues. Empirical findings show that this condition is, as a rule, fulfilled for parliaments with loose factional-ties. Then the analysis of the correlations between voting-results can be used as an effective instrument for the discovery of the dimensionality of legislative behavior. (81) Thus, e. g., the results of a factor-analysis of votes in the Frankfurt National Assembly can be interpreted plausibly in the framework of an actor-model such as it is being proposed by Kingdon. Investigations related to the present, in which voting-analyses were confronted with results of interviews, have demonstrated a fairly good correspondence between ex-post-interpretations of voting-patterns by

scientists and the self-observation of legislative behavior by the representatives. (82) Thus the expectation appears to be justified that such procedures of analysis, which are capable of representing the multi-dimensionality of the phenomenon, make possible an appropriate evaluation of the indicator-quality of voting-data. Among these procedures are in particular multi-dimensional scaling, factor- and cluster-analyses. It remains to be added; that their application is not only a promising approach to the solution of the problem of validity, but also let us expect significant empirical results.

Besides the evaluation of the indicator-quality, the ascertainment of criteria for the selection of votes is a further basic methodological problem with the analysis of legislative behavior. This holds especially true for a long-term investigation such as the project presented here, in which a total inquiry, simply from the viewpoint of the economy of research, is inapplicable. During the Frankfurt National Assembly, lasting ca. one year, alone there were approximately 300 roll-call votes; in the Reichstag of the Weimar Republic between 1923 and 1933 there were ca. 500. The total number of roll-call votes in the period of time under investigation can be roughly estimated at ca. 4,900. With a number of, on the average, ca. 450 seats in parliament, for the variable-group of the voting-behavior alone a data-matrix with 2.2 million places would have to be worked out. With respect to the volume of information gathered as well as the expense of the analysis, such masses of data would burst the framework of a research of limited length and restricted resources. Therefore it is necessary to make a selection from the documented "universe of indicators" which secures, as undisturbed as possible, the most important properties of the phenomenon which is to be measured. In social research the question concerning a representative selection of indicators has been discussed, controversially, for quite a long time. Thereby, weighty arguments have been stated against a position which regards selecting indicators as analogous to sampling units of observation. (83) It is supposed that, since a universe of indicators which is only theoretically determined represents no basic totality in the statistical sense, a central presupposition for the applicability of a calculation of selection based on theoretical probability remains unfulfilled. This reservation, however, does not extend into the given research-situation: the roll-call votes documented for the period of time under investigation form a well-demarcated universe whose elements possess a calculable probability of getting into the sample. Thus, here we have the case, in social research rather rare, of a large but closed set of similar indicators. In legislative roll-call analysis, the transposition of the data-matrix, here usual, also speaks in favor of the admissibility of a selection of indicators analogous to the selection of cases: cases (representatives) are then treated as variables and variables (votes) as cases. (84)

The procedures for the selection of votes can be demarcated roughly according to the necessary degree of the preparation of the primary material. Thus the application of Guttman-Scaling (selection of votes according to the one-dimensionality of the issues treated) and factor-analysis (selection of votes according to the strength of the "loads" on latent properties of the characteristic-space) presupposes a complete availability of individual votes in machine-readable form. (85) Thus procedures of selection of this type can be used for a reduction of data in the phases of analysis and interpretation, but they are not capable of narrowing down the extent of data-gathering.

Therefore they are to be applied meaningfully only in such research-contexts in which voting-data in machine-readable form are already available covering time and space. Up until now this is only the case for the USA, but not for Germany.

The second type of selection-procedure rests upon an inspection of the marginal distributions of voting-results. Thereby votes are selected according to their "importance", which is measured 1) as the proportion of representatives who take part in a vote to the total number of representatives and 2) as the extent of the disputedness of the decision, expressed as the proportion of "yes"- and "no"-votes. The American political scientist Riker has combined these components into a "coefficient of significance". (86) With this procedure a narrowing down of the extent of the inquiry can indeed be reached, for in the protocols of the negotiations of the parliaments the results of roll-call votes are also documented in an aggregated form. However, the underlying concept of the "importance" of votes is highly problematic and, in the technical literature, disputed. Thus it has been pointed out, we think correctly, that also parliamentary decisions which occurred against small minorities can contain relevant information concerning lines of conflict and determinants of the voting-behavior. Just as little is the presence of representatives a reliable indicator of the importance of an issue. One may think of the case, not rare, of the absence of representatives in the case of votes which are "unpleasant" for them. In such a situation absence would even have to be estimated rather as an indication of the importance of an issue.

The third type of selection-procedure rests solely upon the information that a roll-call vote on an issue has taken place. Deliberate selections according to certain political areas, such as financial policy, foreign policy, military policy, traffic policy, etc. are frequent. (87) Here, the subjective and, in borderline-cases, arbitrary classification of issues to political areas is problematic. Even more important: The goal of the project presented here - a reconstruction of legislative behavior covering the whole thematic width of parliamentary decision-making - would not be realized with such a procedure. These considerations justify the application of a selection based on probability. (88) It makes possible a reduction of the extent of the inquiry in a degree to be determined by the director of the project itself, without preliminary decisions on the classification or "importance" of votes. Also, the field of investigation is less biased than it would have been the case using other procedures. The decision as to whether a pure probability-selection or a systematic chance-selection is to be applied cannot yet be made. For this, still more information concerning the structure of the basic totality must first be available. (For example, do certain issues accumulate in certain sections of a legislative period?)

The extent of the sample will lie at ca. 20 % of the basic totality. This means that about 1000 votes are covered in the gathering of data. Our investigations into the voting-behavior in the Frankfurt National Assembly, in which results on the basis of an inquiry into all roll-call votes in one definite period of time were compared with those of a 20 % random-sample, have shown that, in the case of a data-reduction of this extent, the dimensions of the voting-behavior are still represented in the data.

Besides the votes represented in the random sample, other parliamentary decisions which are considered to be especially important by research are to be incorporated ("Sozialistengesetz", fleet budget, etc.). Against the background of the analyses of the "representative"

voting-behavior, these "important" issues will be localized in the topography of the political realm of decision.

3.3 VOTING-DISTRICT DATA

Relationships between the system-levels of the voters and the elected belong to the traditional subjects of research into parliamentarism. In the past, this connection was discussed above all under the aspect of the "best" form of parliamentary representation. Today on the other hand, for a political sociology it is rather questions concerning the factual mechanisms of mediation between the "will of the voters" and the political process of decision which stand in the foreground. (89) The plan presented here also takes up this posing of the problem. We want to investigate to what extent and in what manner, in German parliamentary history, social cleavages have effected the political realm of decision and have influenced the capability of parliamentary leadership-groups to make compromises, form coalitions and to gain power. In our theoretical concept we have outlined two lines of connection between the system-levels of the voters and elected: 1) an indirect influence of popular voters on legislative voting-behavior via the recruitment of parliamentary leadership-groups in the sense that the "social-moral milieus" sent representatives, with different types of biographical "profiles", and 2) a direct influence of the properties of the electorate on the behavior of representatives in such a manner that the perception of interests and expectations of the voters, via the anticipation of their voting-behavior, effected the decisions of the elected. (90) For the past, even with an extensive exhaustion of written sources, the perception of voter-opinions by the representatives cannot be reconstructed with the required completeness and precision. On the other hand, data on the political preferences of the voters are to be gathered without problems for almost the whole period of time under investigation: From 1871 on the voting-results and a series of demographical characteristics (population-number, number of those having the right to vote, distribution of confessions, economical structure) on the level of the voting-district are available in machine-readable form for all legislative periods. Even though these data allow no direct inferences on the psychology of legislative voting-behavior, they still give us information on relevant properties of a context which is of great importance for the representatives. This evaluation is supported by the intensive contemporary discussion about voting-results and about the connection between the structure of the electorate and its political preferences. (91) In the Empire, additionally, the anticipation of voting-results on the level of the voting-district played a central roll in the working-out of second ballot-agreements. (92)

The connecting of voting-district data and individual characteristics of representatives follows an approach which Erwin K. Scheuch designed as "options analysis". (93) This is a multi-level approach, in which the higher of two levels of investigation is interpreted as a subjectively relevant surrounding-world ("Umwelt") for the units of the lower level. The "costs" of the options of individual actors are then determined by the reactions, perceived by them, of relevant surrounding-worlds on their decisions. In contrast to "pooled-analysis", in which context-variables, as part of the set of characteristics of a person, are treated in the same manner as their individual characteristics, the "options-analysis" presupposes the

reactivity of the relationship between "surrounding-world" and actor. With a view to the connection between voting-district and representative this implies: We expect that the representative orientates his political action c. p. on the (voting-) behavior of the electorate which, in turn, reacts on the voting-behavior of its representatives. In the concrete case it will have to be asked, among other things, in which way popular voting-results at the level of the voting-district effected legislative voting-behavior. For example, did representatives of the Zentrum elected in voting-districts with large social-democratic (respectively Protestant) minorities behave differently from those elected in voting-districts with large liberal or conservative minorities (respectively purely Catholic population)? Did the safety of his voting-district effect the representatives voting-behavior? How did such connections change in the course of time, in particular after the Voting Law of the Weimar Republic had dissolved the direct ties between representatives and their individual voting-districts?

The incorporation of voting-district data demands no further data-gathering, since, for almost the whole period of time under investigation, voting-results and additional voting-district data in machine-readable form can be obtained through the Zentrum für historische Sozialforschung from the holdings of the ICPSR. The exceptions are the Frankfurt and Weimar National Assembly, the North German Reichstag and the Zollparlament, for which (presently) no equivalent collections of data are available. In the case of the Frankfurt National Assembly, an exhaustive reconstruction of voting-district data may be impossible because of the loss of the vote-protocols. However, we are of the opinion that the relationship between the system-levels of the voters and the elected can be investigated with sufficient empirical density on the basis of the available data-bases.

FOOTNOTES

Thanks to George Heffernan who has done most of the work to translate the manuscript.

- 1 For Germany this is documented by a series of publications out of the 1920's and 1930's: Walther Kamm, Abgeordnetenberufe und Parlament. Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie des Parlamentarismus, Karlsruhe 1927; Louis Rosenbaum, Beruf und Herkunft der Abgeordneten zu den deutschen und preußischen Parlamenten 1847-1919. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des deutschen Parlaments, Frankfurt a. M. 1923; Adolf Borell, Die soziologische Gliederung des Reichsparlaments als Ausdruck der politischen und ökonomischen Konstellationen, (Diss.) Gießen 1933; Willy Kramer, Der soziale Aufbau der Parteien des deutschen Reichstages von 1871-1918, (Diss.) Köln/Emstetten 1934; G. Benshausen, Zur Struktur-analyse parlamentarischer Repräsentation in Deutschland vor der Gründung des Norddeutschen Bundes, (Diss.) Hamburg 1926.
- 2 Cf. e. g.: Lester Seligman, Recruiting Political Elites, New York 1971; John Jackson, Constituencies and Leaders in Congress, Cam-

- bridge/Mass. 1974; Wendell Bell, Richard J. Hill and Charles R. Wright, *Public Leadership*, San Francisco 1961; John W. Kingdon, *Candidates for Office*, New York 1968; James David Barber, *The Lawmakers. Recruitment and Adaption to Legislative Life*, New Haven/London 1967; Peter Gerlich and Helmut Kramer, *Abgeordnete in der Parteiendemokratie*, München 1969.
- 3 Examples of investigations with a methodologically differentiated approach are: Mary P. Ryan, "Party Formation in the United States Congress, 1789 to 1796. A Quantitative Analysis", in: WMQ, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Oct. 1971), pp. 493-542 and John F. Hoadley, "The Emergence of Political Parties in Congress, 1789-1803", in: *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 74, No. 3 (1980), pp. 757-799. It is true that rather descriptive-"qualitative" approaches are usual. As examples of a plurality of works cf. the passages on the formation of parties in: Heino Kaack, *Geschichte und Struktur des deutschen Parteiensystems*, Opladen 1971 and David Truman, *The Congressional Party*, New York 1959.
 - 4 Cf. e. g.: Aage B. Clausen, *How Congressmen Decide*, New York 1973; Cleo Cherryholmes and Michael Shapiro, *Representatives and Roll Calls*, Indianapolis 1969; John W. Kingdon, "Congressmen's Voting Decisions", in: *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (1977), pp. 563-595; Timothy M. Hennessy and Jeanne Martin, "Exchange Theory and Parliamentary Instability", in: Allan Kornberg (ed.), *Legislatures in Comparative Perspective*, New York 1973, pp. 182-202 and John G. Grumm, "The Legislative System as an Economic Model", in: *ibid.*, pp. 235-249.
 - 5 Jerome M. Clubb, "The Historical Analytical Approach", in: Donald M. Freeman (ed.), *Foundation of Political Science*, New York 1977, p. 654 ff. and William O. Aydelotte (ed.), *The History of Parliamentary Behavior* (Introduction), Princeton/N.J. 1977, p. 3 ff..
 - 6 A comparative approach is pursued by, e. g., E. Ozbun, *Party Cohesion in Western Democracy*, Beverly Hills 1970 and (on the factionalization of parliaments) Douglas Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*, New Haven 1968. A synopsis of results from different parliamentary systems, without a comprehensive, comparative conception of research, is given by the contributions in: Gerhard Loewenberg (ed.), *Modern Parliaments: Change or Decline?*, Chicago 1971 and Komberg, *Legislatures. An early example of a systematically comparative procedure is: A. Lawrence Lowell, Governments and Parties in Continental Europe*, Cambridge/Mass. 1896.
 - 7 Thus, e. g., in: J. Blondel, *Comparative Legislatures*, Englewood Cliffs/N.J. 1973. Cf. also Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, New York 1967, which, for the investigation of the genesis and location of political cleavages in Western and Central Europe, restricts its observations in the area of parliaments to the numerical strengths of factions.
 - 8 A time-series analysis on the basis of a consistent data-basis has been carried out by Morgens N. Pedersen. Cf. "The Personal Circulation of a Legislature: The Danish Folketing, 1849-1968", in: William O. Aydelott, *History*, pp. 63-101. An example of a fusion of research-results from various historical individual studies is: W. L. Guttsman, "The British Political Elite and the Class Structure", in the volume edited by Philip Stanworth and Anthony Giddens, *Elites and Power in British Society*, Cambridge 1974, pp. 22-44. Cf. also the contributions in Allan Kornberg and Lloyd D. Musloff (eds.), *Legisla-*

- tures in Developmental Perspective. On the cognitive potential of time-series analyses of parliamentary decision-making processes, cf. Clubb, Approach, p. 654 ff.
- 9 SS Data, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1979), p. 4 ff.
Despite the favorable data-situation in the USA, here too the analysis of parliamentary decision-making processes is done for the most part as "episodic individual research". Cf. Joel H. Silberg, "Congressional and State Legislative Roll-Call Studies By U.S. Historians", in: Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 4, (1981), pp. 597-607.
 - 10 Cf. Gerhard Loewenberg, "Comparative Legislative Research", in: Samuel C. Patterson and John S. Wahlke (eds.), Comparative Legislative Behavior: Frontiers of Research, New York 1972, p. 14 ff.. An example of a methodologically differentiated combination of social background-variables and voting-data is: Peter H. Smith, "The Making of the Mexican Constitution", in: Aydelotte, History, pp. 186-224.
 - 11 On this cf.: L. J. Edinger and D. D. Searing, "Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry", in: APSR, Vol. 61 (1967), pp. 428-445 and Uwe Schleth, "Once again: Does it pay to study social background in elite analysis?", in: Sozialwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch für Politik, Vol. 2 (1971), pp. 99-118. Cf. also William O. Aydelotte, Introduction, p. 17 f.
 - 12 For the USA cf. the investigations of James H. Kuklinski and Richard C. Elling, "Representational Role, Constituency Opinion and Legislative Roll-Call Behavior", in: American Journal of Political Science, 21 (1977) pp. 135-147; Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress", in: American Political Science Review, 57 (1963), pp. 45-56 and Morris Fiorina, Representatives, Roll-Calls and Constituencies, Lexington/Mass. 1974.
 - 13 On this cf. Heinrich Best, "Die regionale Differenzierung interessenpolitischer Orientierungen im frühindustriellen Deutschland - Ihre Ursachen und ihre Auswirkungen auf parlamentarische Entscheidungsprozesse", in: Rainer Fremdling and Richard H. Tilly (eds.), Industrialisierung und Raum - Studien zur regionalen Differenzierung im Deutschland des 19. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart 1979, pp. 251-282.
 - 14 On the data-situation, summarizing, SS Data, Vol. 8, No. 3 (1979), p. 4 f. and European Political Data Newsletter, Vol. 20 (1976), RECR: 9-15 and Vol. 23-24 (1977), RECR: 9 f..
 - 15 Kjell A. Eliassen with Jarle Brosveet, "Politikeraktivitet 1814-1876: Problemstillinger og analyseforslag", Bergen: NSD Handbøker Nr. 1, 1977; Hans Daalder and Jerrold G. Rusk, "Perceptions of Party in the Dutch Parliament", in: Samuel C. Patterson and John C. Wahlke (eds.), Comparative Legislative Behavior, pp. 143-198; Erich Gruner, Die Parteien in der Schweiz. Bern 1969; Dieter Stiefel, "Structure of Generations in Austrian Parliaments 1919-1979", in: Historical Social Research, No. 21 (1982), pp. 4-11.
 - 16 Compare footnote 14.
 - 17 Gerhard A. Ritter observes a "very unsatisfactory state of research": "Entwicklungsprobleme des Deutschen Parlamentarismus", in: idem, Arbeiterbewegung, Parteien und Parlamentarismus, Göttingen 1976, p. 159.
It is symptomatic that, in the reader edited by William O. Aydelotte,

- The History of Parliamentary Behavior, in which research-studies are presented on parliaments of France, the USA, Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries, no contribution on Germany is contained.
- 18 Cf., e. g., Max Weber, "Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland", in: Gesammelte politische Schriften, Tübingen 1971, pp. 306-443 and Robert Michels, Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens, Leipzig 1911.
 - 19 A rare exception is: Frank W. Dishaw, "Roll Call Vote Deviancy of the CDU/CSU Fraktion in the West German Bundestag", in: Sozialwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch für Politik, Vol. 2 (1971), pp. 539-561. On the first Bundestage cf. also: Heinz Markmann, Das Abstimmungsverhalten der Parteifractionen in deutschen Parlamenten, Meisenheim am Glan 1955 and Jürgen Domes, Mehrheitsfraktion und Bundesregierung, Köln/Opladen 1964.
 - 20 Donald J. Mattheisen, "Liberal Constitutionalism in the Frankfurt Parliament of 1848: An Inquiry Based on Roll Call Analysis", in: Central European History, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1979), pp. 124-142.
 - 21 Idem, "Die Fraktionen der preußischen Nationalversammlung von 1848", in: Konrad Jarausch (ed.), Quantifizierung in der Geschichtswissenschaft. Probleme und Möglichkeiten, Düsseldorf 1976, pp. 149-167.
 - 22 James Harris, "Partei-gruppierungen im konstituierenden Reichstag des Norddeutschen Bundes von 1867", in: Jarausch, Quantifizierung, pp. 168-175.
 - 23 Idem, "Broadening the Scope: A Computer Analysis of the German Reichstag (1867-1884)", in: Historical Methods Newsletter, Vol. 4 (1971), pp. 78-84; Jeoffrey H. Loesch, "The Application of Roll-Call Analysis to the Study of German Parliamentary History". Paper presented to the Study Group on Quantification in German History, American Historical Association Convention, December, 1973.
 - 24 Helmut Norpoth, Sources of Party Cohesion in the U.S. House of Representatives (unpubl. Ph. D. diss.), University of Michigan 1974; Harald Thomas, Die Westexpansion der USA und das Auseinanderbrechen des zweiten amerikanischen Parteiensystems (unpubl. Ph. D. diss.), Köln 1982.
 - 25 Wilhelm H. Schröder, "Probleme und Methoden der quantitativen Analyse von kollektiven Biographien. Das Beispiel der sozial-demokratischen Reichstagskandidaten (1898-1912)", in: Heinrich Best and Reinhard Mann (eds.), Quantitative Methoden in der historisch-sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung, Stuttgart 1977, pp. 8-125.
 - 26 In the mid-1970's the state of historical research into parliamentarianism was documented in two volumes edited by Gerhard A. Ritter: Die deutschen Parteien vor 1918, Köln-1973, and Gesellschaft, Parlament und Regierung. Zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus in Deutschland, Düsseldorf 1974. Cf. also Peter Molt, Der Reichstag vor der improvisierten Revolution, Köln/Opladen 1963 and the list of publications of the Kommission für Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien.
In the investigations of the structure of historical elites in Germany which are presented by social scientists, parliamentarians are treated either not at all or only as a subordinate subjects.

Cf., among others, Ralf Dahrendorf, *Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland*, München 1968; Maxwell E. Knight, *The German Executive 1890-1933*, Stanford 1952; Wolfgang Zapf, *Wandlungen der deutschen Elite. Ein Zirkulationsmodell deutscher Führungsgruppen 1919-1960*, München 1965.

In opposition to this, the empirical investigation of political elites in the Federal Republic of Germany has placed a strong emphasis on parliamentary leadership-groups, whereby attention is directed above all to their inter-locking with other political and social "functional areas". On the current research-situation cf., among others, Heino Kaack, "Zur Struktur der politischen Führungselite in Parteien, Parlament und Regierung", in: *Handbuch des deutschen Parteiensystems*, Vol. 1: *Parteistrukturen und Legitimation des Parteiensystems*, Opladen 1980, p. 195 f.. Without claiming a systematic consideration of the existing literature, cf. also: Klaus von Beyme, *Die politische Elite in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, München 1971; Dietrich Herzog, *Politische Karrieren. Selektion und Professionalisierung politischer Führungsgruppen*, Opladen 1975; Werner Kaltefleiter, "The Recruitment Market of the German Political Elite", in: Heinz Eulau and Moshe M. Czudnowski (eds.), *Elite Recruitment in Democratic Politics*, New York 1976; idem and Rudolf Wildenmann (eds.), *Westdeutsche Führungsschicht. Eine sozialwissenschaftliche Untersuchung der Inhaber von Führungspositionen (Tabellenband)*, Bonn 1973; Rudolf Wildenmann, *Eliten in der Bundesrepublik. Eine sozialwissenschaftliche Untersuchung über Einstellungen führender Positionsträger zu Politik und Demokratie*, Mannheim 1968.

- 27 Emil Lederer, "Probleme des deutschen Parlamentarismus", in: idem, *Kapitalismus, Klassenstruktur und Probleme der Demokratie in Deutschland 1910-1940*, Göttingen 1980, pp. 186-198.
- 28 On the relative autonomy of the elite-system vis-à-vis the social system and on the structural analysis of German leadership groups cf.: Erwin K. Scheuch, *Das sichtbare Establishment und das unsichtbare System der Macht*, Mimeo. 1968 and idem, "Soziologie der Macht", in: Hans K. Schneider and Christian Watrin (eds.), *Macht und ökonomisches Gesetz*, Berlin 1973, pp. 989-1042.
- 29 Cf.: M. Rainer Lepsius, "Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur. Zum Problem der Demokratisierung der deutschen Gesellschaft", and James J. Sheehan, "Politische Führung im deutschen Reichstag, 1871-1918", in: Gerhard A. Ritter (ed.), *Deutsche Parteien vor 1918*, pp. 56-99.
- 30 Cf., among others, Adolf M. Birke, "Wahlrechtsreform und Wählerbewegung in England. Zum Verhältnis von Parlamentarismus und Demokratisierung in der Viktorianischen Zeit", in: Otto Büsch (ed.), *Wählerbewegung in der europäischen Geschichte*, Berlin 1980, pp. 211-225 and Gerhard A. Ritter, "Deutscher und britischer Parlamentarismus. Ein verfassungsgeschichtlicher Vergleich", in: idem, *Arbeiterbewegung*, p. 195 ff..
- 31 This is a central category of Lasswell's "genetic" elite-theory. On this compare Daniel Lerner, Harold D. Lasswell and C. Easton Rothwell, *The Comparative Study of Elites: An Introduction and Bibliography*, Stanford 1951.
- 32 *Les Sommets de l'Etat: essai sur l'élite du pouvoir en France*, Paris 1977.

- 33 Charles Kadushin, Richard Alba and Gwen Moore, Network Studies of National Elite Systems, mimeo. August 1977, p. 44.
- 34 Ibid., p. 20.
- 35 Cf. the introduction to: Citizens, Elections Partys, Oslo 1970, p. 102 ff. and idem, "Models and Methods in the Comparative Study of Nation-Building", in: Acta Sociologica, Vol. 12 (1969), pp. 53-73; Helmuth Plessner, Die verspätete Nation, Stuttgart 1959.
- 36 M. Rainer Lepsius, Parteiensystem; Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918, Göttingen 1977, p. 78 ff..
- 37 Franz Urban Pappi, "Sozialstruktur, Gesellschaftliche Wertorientierungen und Wahlabsicht", in: PVS 18 (1977), p. 195. Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Social Structure and Politics", in: Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), Macro-Political Theory, Vol. 3 of the Handbook of Political Science, Reading/Mass. 1975, pp. 557-622.
- 38 Gerhard A. Ritter, Kontinuität, p. 434, fn. 47.
- 39 On the structural crisis of German parliamentarianism in the Weimar Republic cf.: M. Rainer Lepsius, "From Fragmented Party Democracy to Government by Emergency Decree and Nationalsocialist Takeover: Germany", in: Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (eds.), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Baltimore and London 1978, Part II, pp. 34-80 (also, further literature here).
- 40 In: Gesammelte Abhandlungen, Vol. 1, Göttingen 1970³, pp. 359-389.
- 41 Ibid., p. 377 ff.. Similarly, but less pregnantly formulated, this idea is also found in Max Weber, Parlament und Regierung, p. 384: "In industrial countries a two-party system is impossible simply as a result of the splitting of the modern economic classes into bourgeois classes and proletariat and as a result of the significance of socialism as gospel of the masses. There is so to say a "confessional" barrier. Thus above all among us. The organization of Catholicism further, as a party which protects a minority, following from the relationships between the confessions in Germany, will, among us, ... be eliminated with difficulty. Thus at least four, but probably five large parties will exist among us side by side for a long time, coalition-governments will remain a necessity and the power of a prudently operating crown will remain always significant."
- 42 Friedrich Naumann, Demokratie und Kaisertum. Ein Handbuch für innere Politik, Berlin 1905, p. 54.
- 43 Connected therewith is a process of rapid "defactionalization" of the German Bundestage. Cf. Frank Dishaw, "Bemerkungen zur Konkurrenz im deutschen Parteiensystem 1871-1969", in: Sozialwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch für Politik, Vol. 2 (1971), pp. 61-72. However, this should not be taken to mean that the traditional lines of tension had completely lost their significance for the shaping of the political culture in the Federal Republic. It is precisely religious orientations which display a remarkable stability. It is true that, today, no conflicts arise out of this which, in their intensity, could be compared, e. g., to the "Kulturkampf". Cf. on this Franz Urban Pappi, "Konstanz und Wandel der Hauptspannungslinien in der Bundesrepublik", in: Joachim Matthes (ed.), Sozialer Wandel in Westeuropa, Verhandlungen des 19. Deutschen Soziologen-

- tages, Frankfurt 1979, pp. 465-500.
- 44 Wilhelm Hennis, "Parteienstruktur und Regierbarkeit", in: idem, Peter Graf Kielmannsegg and Ulrich Matz, Regierbarkeit. Studien zu ihrer Problematisierung, Vol. 1, Stuttgart 1977.
- 45 Cf. Peter Hoschka and Hermann Schlucht, "Stabilität regionaler Wählerstrukturen in der Bundesrepublik", in: PVS 18 (1977), p. 280.
- 46 On the persistence of the party-system in most western European countries, cf.: Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments", in: idem, Party Systmes and Voter Alignments, p. 50 f.
On certain points our model orientates itself on the theoretical considerations which were proposed by the "Research Group on Comparative Political Leadership" (Carl Beck, William A. Welsh, et al.). Cf. Carl Beck et al., Comparative Communist Political Leadership, New York 1973, Introduction; William A. Welsh, Leaders and Elites, New York 1979, p. 41.
For quite a long time now the assumption of a direct relationship between structural properties of society and type of power-organization belongs to the theoretical repertoire of American community-research. Cf. Erwin K. Scheuch, Soziologie der Macht, p. 1010 ff.
- 47 Cf. Carl Beck, Introduction and William A. Welsh, Leaders and Elites, p. 47 ff..
- 48 Samuel C. Patterson and John C. Wahlke, "Trends and Prospects in Legislative Behavior Research", in: idem, Comparative Legislative Behavior, p. 299 ff.
- 49 Cf. Juan J. Linz, "Crisis, Breakdown and Equilibrium", in: idem and Alfred Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, pp. 66-69.
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- 51 Erwin K. Scheuch, "Auswahlverfahren in der Sozialforschung", in: René König (ed.), Handbuch der empirischen Sozialforschung, Vol. 3a, Stuttgart 1974, p. 12.
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