Download full text
(external source)
Citation Suggestion
Please use the following Persistent Identifier (PID) to cite this document:
https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i2.3888
Exports for your reference manager
The European Central Bank and the German Constitutional Court: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms
[journal article]
Abstract In May 2020, a ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) questioned the legality of the Bundesbank's participation in the European Central Bank's (ECB's) Public Sector Purchase Programme. Applying elements of a principal-agent analysis, this article analyses how the FCC ruling presents... view more
In May 2020, a ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) questioned the legality of the Bundesbank's participation in the European Central Bank's (ECB's) Public Sector Purchase Programme. Applying elements of a principal-agent analysis, this article analyses how the FCC ruling presents us with a new understanding of the relationship between the ECB, other EU institutions and Eurozone member states. Existing principal-agent analyses of the ECB focus upon its relations with other EU-level institutions and point to the limited ex ante control mechanisms and efforts to reinforce ex post control mechanisms - notably European Parliament oversight. The FCC ruling and the ECB's reaction demonstrate the relative importance of national level controls over the ECB agent. This article understands the role of private plaintiffs in Germany as a form of ‘fire alarm’ on ECB policymaking against the background of weak ex post controls at the EU-level.... view less
Keywords
Federal Reserve Bank of Germany; Bundestag; European Central Bank; supervisory authority; European Parliament; European Court of Justice; Federal Constitutional Court; monetary policy; ordoliberalism
Classification
European Politics
Economic Policy
Free Keywords
accountability; principal-agent analysis
Document language
English
Publication Year
2021
Page/Pages
p. 241-251
Journal
Politics and Governance, 9 (2021) 2
Issue topic
Reforming the Institutions of Eurozone Governance
ISSN
2183-2463
Status
Published Version; peer reviewed