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https://doi.org/10.31977/grirfi.v19i3.1296
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Enativismo e conhecimento prático
Enactivism and practical knowledge
[Zeitschriftenartikel]
Abstract In 'Being and Time' (1927), Heidegger claims the primordial knowledge of Dasein comes from coping with mundane beings. Merleau-Ponty, in turn, argues on 'Phenomenology of Perception' (1945) for knowledge as a bodily activity non translatable in propositional terms. Later, on 'What Computers Can't Do... mehr
In 'Being and Time' (1927), Heidegger claims the primordial knowledge of Dasein comes from coping with mundane beings. Merleau-Ponty, in turn, argues on 'Phenomenology of Perception' (1945) for knowledge as a bodily activity non translatable in propositional terms. Later, on 'What Computers Can't Do' (1972), Hubert Dreyfus use the work of both to point out the flaws of cognitivism, the dominant paradigm in early days of artificial intelligence. Finally, 'The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience' (1991) by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch brings enactivism as an attempt to take from cognitivism and connectionism the hegemony in cognitive sciences. That being said, the paper describes enactivism while showing its phenomenological heritage.... weniger
Klassifikation
Philosophie, Theologie
Freie Schlagwörter
Enactivism; Phenomenology; Heidegger; Merleau-Ponty; Francisco Varela
Sprache Dokument
Portugiesisch
Publikationsjahr
2019
Seitenangabe
S. 12-22
Zeitschriftentitel
Griot: Revista de Filosofia, 19 (2019) 3
ISSN
2178-1036
Status
Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet (peer reviewed)