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A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
[working paper]
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly efforts while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rankorder tournaments. This survey provides... view more
Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly efforts while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rankorder tournaments. This survey provides a review of experimental research on these three canonical contests. First, we review studies investigating the basic structure of contests, including the contest success function, number of players and prizes, spillovers and externalities, heterogeneity, and incomplete information. Second, we discuss dynamic contests and multi-battle contests. Then we review research on sabotage, feedback, bias, collusion, alliances, and contests between groups, as well as real-effort and field experiments. Finally, we discuss applications of contests to the study of legal systems, political competition, war, conflict avoidance, sales, and charities, and suggest directions for future research. (author's abstract)... view less
Keywords
competition; structure; dynamism; application; politics; economy; welfare; law
Classification
Macrosociology, Analysis of Whole Societies
National Economy
Document language
English
Publication Year
2012
City
Berlin
Page/Pages
94 p.
Series
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Schwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Forschungsprofessur und Projekt The Future of Fiscal Federalism, SP II 2012-109
Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/68256
Status
Published Version; reviewed
Licence
Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications