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On time-inconsistency in bargaining
[working paper]
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract This paper analyzes dynamically inconsistent time preferences in Rubinstein's (1982) seminal model of bargaining. When sophisticated bargainers have time preferences that exhibit a form of present bias -satisfied by the hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic time preferences increasingly common in the econ... view more
This paper analyzes dynamically inconsistent time preferences in Rubinstein's (1982) seminal model of bargaining. When sophisticated bargainers have time preferences that exhibit a form of present bias -satisfied by the hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic time preferences increasingly common in the economics literature- equilibrium is unique and lacks delay. However, when one bargainer is more patient about a single period's delay from the present than one that occurs in the near future, the game permits a novel form of equilibrium multiplicity and delay. Time preferences with this property have most recently been empirically documented; they can also arise when parties who weight probabilities non-linearly bargain under the shadow of exogenous breakdown risk, as well as in settings of intergenerational bargaining with imperfect altruism. The paper's main contributions are (i) a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes and payoffs for separable time preferences, and (ii) present bias as a readily interpretable sufficient condition for uniqueness at the level of individual preferences. (author's abstract)... view less
Keywords
time management; equilibrium; collective bargaining
Classification
Sociology of Economics
Income Policy, Property Policy, Wage Policy
Document language
English
Publication Year
2014
City
Berlin
Page/Pages
52 p.
Series
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, SP II 2014-205
Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/101451
Status
Published Version; reviewed
Licence
Deposit Licence - No Redistribution, No Modifications