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On time-inconsistency in bargaining
[Arbeitspapier]
Körperschaftlicher Herausgeber
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract This paper analyzes dynamically inconsistent time preferences in Rubinstein's (1982) seminal model of bargaining. When sophisticated bargainers have time preferences that exhibit a form of present bias -satisfied by the hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic time preferences increasingly common in the econ... mehr
This paper analyzes dynamically inconsistent time preferences in Rubinstein's (1982) seminal model of bargaining. When sophisticated bargainers have time preferences that exhibit a form of present bias -satisfied by the hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic time preferences increasingly common in the economics literature- equilibrium is unique and lacks delay. However, when one bargainer is more patient about a single period's delay from the present than one that occurs in the near future, the game permits a novel form of equilibrium multiplicity and delay. Time preferences with this property have most recently been empirically documented; they can also arise when parties who weight probabilities non-linearly bargain under the shadow of exogenous breakdown risk, as well as in settings of intergenerational bargaining with imperfect altruism. The paper's main contributions are (i) a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes and payoffs for separable time preferences, and (ii) present bias as a readily interpretable sufficient condition for uniqueness at the level of individual preferences. (author's abstract)... weniger
Thesaurusschlagwörter
Zeitökonomie; Gleichgewicht; Tarifverhandlung
Klassifikation
Wirtschaftssoziologie
Einkommenspolitik, Lohnpolitik, Tarifpolitik, Vermögenspolitik
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2014
Erscheinungsort
Berlin
Seitenangabe
52 S.
Schriftenreihe
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, SP II 2014-205
Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/101451
Status
Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet
Lizenz
Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitung