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From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance: theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms
[Arbeitspapier]
Körperschaftlicher Herausgeber
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Abstract We characterize a parametric family of application-rejection school choice mechanisms, including the Boston and Deferred Acceptance mechanisms as special cases, and spanning the parallel mechanisms for Chinese college admissions, the largest centralized matching in the world. Moving from one extreme... mehr
We characterize a parametric family of application-rejection school choice mechanisms, including the Boston and Deferred Acceptance mechanisms as special cases, and spanning the parallel mechanisms for Chinese college admissions, the largest centralized matching in the world. Moving from one extreme member to the other results in systematic changes in manipulability, stability and welfare properties. Neither the ex-post dominance of the DA over the equilibria of Boston, nor the ex-ante dominance of Boston equilibria over the DA in stylized settings extends to the parallel mechanisms. In the laboratory, participants are most likely to reveal their preferences truthfully under the DA mechanism, followed by the Chinese parallel and then the Boston mechanisms. Furthermore, while the DA is significantly more stable than the Chinese parallel mechanism, which is more stable than Boston, efficiency comparisons vary across environments. (author's abstract)... weniger
Thesaurusschlagwörter
Schulwahl; USA; China; Experiment
Klassifikation
Makroebene des Bildungswesens
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2013
Erscheinungsort
Berlin
Seitenangabe
71 S.
Schriftenreihe
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, SP II 2013-205
Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/74787
Status
Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet
Lizenz
Deposit Licence - Keine Weiterverbreitung, keine Bearbeitung