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Quality, reputation and the choice of organizational form
[Zeitschriftenartikel]
Abstract "This paper revisits the hypothesis that nonprofit organizations emerge in markets that are characterized by contractual incompleteness because they ensure consumers against opportunistic behavior. We extend the Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) framework which studies an entrepreneur's optimal choice of ... mehr
"This paper revisits the hypothesis that nonprofit organizations emerge in markets that are characterized by contractual incompleteness because they ensure consumers against opportunistic behavior. We extend the Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) framework which studies an entrepreneur's optimal choice of organizational form and service quality when quality is non-contractible into a repeated interaction setting. The main result is that when reputations can be sustained, then for-profit status is the preferred organizational form and high quality services are ensured. This finding suggests that existing explanations of nonprofit organizations that focus entirely on contractual imperfections in the producer/consumer relationship may be inadequate." [author's abstract]... weniger
Thesaurusschlagwörter
Reputation
Klassifikation
Allgemeines, spezielle Theorien und "Schulen", Methoden, Entwicklung und Geschichte der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
angewandte Psychologie
Freie Schlagwörter
Nonprofit Status; Contractual Incompleteness
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2009
Seitenangabe
S. 515-527
Zeitschriftentitel
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 71 (2009) 2
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.014
Status
Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz
PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)