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The emergence of property rights enforcement in early trade: a behavioral model without reputational effects
[journal article]
Abstract The present article focuses on the conditions that allow governments to increase property
rights protection because they expect enough income from such action. We develop a
behavioral explanation, according to which the answer lies in the growth in the importance,
size and wealth of merchant guilds ... view more
The present article focuses on the conditions that allow governments to increase property
rights protection because they expect enough income from such action. We develop a
behavioral explanation, according to which the answer lies in the growth in the importance,
size and wealth of merchant guilds in the medieval era in Western Europe as well as a
somewhat surprising effect of volatile price structures. We add to prior research by showing
that even uncoordinated embargo pressures among multiple guilds could get medieval rulers
to offer high levels of property rights protection.... view less
Classification
Social History, Historical Social Research
Political Economy
Free Keywords
Agent-based model; Institutions; Guilds; Property rights; Property rights enforcement
Document language
English
Publication Year
2008
Page/Pages
p. 48-62
Journal
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 68 (2008) 1
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.05.002
Status
Postprint; peer reviewed
Licence
PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)