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Self-serving dictators and economic growth
[Zeitschriftenartikel]
Abstract We study the effect of fair institutions on growth. In our model, individuals are endowed with unequal entitlements to the economy's output. They can free-ride or cooperate. Cooperation is individually costly, but increases aggregate output and growth. Experimentally, we observe significantly less c... mehr
We study the effect of fair institutions on growth. In our model, individuals are endowed with unequal entitlements to the economy's output. They can free-ride or cooperate. Cooperation is individually costly, but increases aggregate output and growth. Experimentally, we observe significantly less cooperation, when dictators chose high instead of low inequality. This effect is not observed when the degree of inequality is chosen randomly. Simple cross-country regressions provide basic macroeconomic support for interaction effects between the degree and the genesis of inequality. We conclude that economies granting equal opportunities are less likely to suffer retarded growth due to free-riding than economies with self-serving dictators.... weniger
Klassifikation
Volkswirtschaftstheorie
Erhebungstechniken und Analysetechniken der Sozialwissenschaften
Freie Schlagwörter
Inequality; Fair procedures; Corruption; Dynamic public goods game; Institutional design
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2008
Seitenangabe
S. 573-586
Zeitschriftentitel
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 67 (2008) 3-4
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2007.09.004
Status
Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz
PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)