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Mergers and Barriers to Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets
[Zeitschriftenartikel]
Abstract After patent expirations in pharmaceutical markets, brand-name laboratories are threatened by generic firms' entry. To fill the gap in the theoretical literature on this topic, we study brand-name firms' incentives either to deter entry, or to merge with the entrant. These strategies are considered ... mehr
After patent expirations in pharmaceutical markets, brand-name laboratories are threatened by generic firms' entry. To fill the gap in the theoretical literature on this topic, we study brand-name firms' incentives either to deter entry, or to merge with the entrant. These strategies are considered along with the possibility of the brand-name firm producing its own generic drug, called a pseudo-generic drug. Using a vertical differentiation model with Bertrand-Stackelberg competition, we show that each strategy, merging and deterring entry, may be Nash equilibrium, according to the generic firm's setup cost level and to the rate of discount.... weniger
Klassifikation
Wirtschaftssektoren
Allgemeines, spezielle Theorien und "Schulen", Methoden, Entwicklung und Geschichte der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Sprache Dokument
Englisch
Publikationsjahr
2009
Seitenangabe
S. 297-309
Zeitschriftentitel
Applied Economics, 42 (2009) 3
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840701604495
ISSN
1466-4283
Status
Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
Lizenz
PEER Licence Agreement (applicable only to documents from PEER project)